Chiocchio v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2019 CanLII 29131

Assessment Review Board / Commission de révision de l’évaluation foncière

ISSUE DATE: April 05, 2019

FILE NO.: RD 2019M11

Assessed Person(s): Domenico Chiocchio

Appellant(s): Domenico Chiocchio

Respondent(s): Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) Region 06

Respondent(s): City of Belleville

Property Location(s): 49 Campbell Street

Municipality: City of Belleville

Roll Number(s): 1208-020-045-09600-0000

Appeal Number(s): 3195893 and 3195894

Taxation Year(s): 2014 and 2015

Legislative Authority: Rule 123 of the Assessment Review Board Rules of Practice and Procedure

Request for: A review of the Board’s Decision DM 2018M10, issued on June 26, 2018

Heard: By written submission

Parties	Counsel+/Representative	Submissions
Domenico Chiocchio	Self-represented	Requester
MPAC	No one appeared	Not Requested
City of Bellville	No one appeared	Not Requested

DECISION DELIVERED BY PAUL MULDOON AND ORDER OF THE BOARD

INTRODUCTION

1Domenico Chicchio (“Requester”) filed a written Request for Review with the Assessment Review Board (“Board”) respecting the Decision of Vice-Chair Scott McAnsh issued on June 26, 2018, DM 2018M10 (“Decision”).

2The background to this Request for Review is as follows. The Requester is the owner of 49 Campbell Street in the City of Belleville (the “Subject Property”), which he purchased in a state of disrepair in 2003. As explained at paragraphs 3 to 5 of the Decision, the Requester undertook some significant repairs to the Subject Property in 2014 following a storm that caused further damage. The City of Belleville (“City”) then advised the Requester he was required to obtain certain building permits for the proposed repairs. The Requester applied for the required building permits, and later attempted to withdraw the applications. The power to the Subject Property was subsequently shut off by the City on May 28, 2015, though it is unclear what exactly transpired.

3On June 26, 2016, the Requester filed an application with the City pursuant to s. 357(1)(d)(ii) of the Municipal Act, 2001, S.O. 2001, c. 25 (the “Municipal Act”):

Cancellation, reduction, refund of taxes

357 (1) Upon application to the treasurer of a local municipality made in accordance with this section, the local municipality may cancel, reduce or refund all or part of taxes levied on land in the year in respect of which the application is made if, [...]

(d) during the year or during the preceding year after the return of the assessment roll, a building on the land,

(ii) was damaged by fire, demolition or otherwise so as to render it substantially unusable for the purposes for which it was used immediately prior to the damage;

4The Requester’s application sought a refund from the City for the taxes levied on the Subject Property for the 2014 and 2015 tax years.

5On August 22, 2016, the City sent a letter to the Requester advising him that his application for a tax refund for the 2014 and 2015 tax years was rejected for reasons of timing. In its rejection letter, the City cited s. 357(3) of the Municipal Act, which sets out the annual deadline for applications brought under s. 357(1) of the Municipal Act, namely, “an application made under this section must be filed with the treasurer on or before February 28 of the year following the in respect of which the application is made.”

6On August 30, 2016, the Requester responded to City’s rejection letter and expressed his concern with the City’s decision. The letter suggests the application should be accepted since he was advised by MPAC in June 2015 to bring a request for a refund to the City, but was not informed about the applicable deadlines or process. In reading the letter, it appears there was some confusion by the Requester with respect to the process for refund applications brought to the City under s. 357 of the Municipal Act, and MPAC’s process for Request for Reconsideration (“RfR”) applications set out under s. 39.1 and s. 40(3) of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. A.31. The Requester’s letter suggests that the failure of MPAC and the City to inform him of the application deadline warrants a meeting with council specified under s. 357(5) of the Municipal Act. The letter further states that an appeal to the Board will be the final step. There appears to be no further interaction between the Requester and City with respect to the application following this letter.

7On October 14, 2016 the Requester attempted to file an appeal to the Board under s. 357(8) of the Municipal Act. This provision only applies where council fails to render a decision on applications by the statutory deadline:

Where no decision

If council fails to make its decision by September 30 of the year following the year in respect of which the application is made, an applicant may appeal to the Assessment Review Board by October 21 of the year by filing a notice of appeal with the registrar of the board and the appeal shall be a new hearing.

8Despite the Requester’s attempt to file under s. 357(8) of the Municipal Act, the Board advised the Requester that his appeal could not be processed since the applicable 35 day deadline had passed under s. 357(7) of the Municipal Act. This was presumably because the appeal did not qualify under s. 357(8) since the Requester received a decision from the City on August 22, 2016. Section s. 357(7) of the Municipal Act states:

Appeal

(7) Within 35 days after council makes its decision, an applicant may appeal the decision of council to the Assessment Review Board by filing a notice of appeal with the registrar of the board.

9On February 9, 2017, the Requester then brought a motion to the Board seeking permission to file his appeal after the deadline under Rule 27 of the Board’s former Rules of Practice and Procedure (“Rule”) effective January 4, 2016 to March 31, 2017. Rule 27 of these former Rules set out the circumstances upon which the Board may consider a late appeal. The Board’s Rules were amended on April 1, 2017.

10The Requester’s motion seeking permission to have his late appeal proceed was heard by Vice-Chair McAnsh on June 11, 2018. The Requester was the only party to appear at the hearing. During the hearing, Vice-Chair McAnsh put a recent decision of the Board to the Requester for his consideration and response, 2397146 Ontario Inc. v. Brampton (City), 2018 CanLII 37737 (“Brampton”). In Brampton, the Board found that it lacked the power to extend the time for appeal set out under s. 357(7) of the Municipal Act. In response, the Requester argued that Brampton is not binding since his application was filed under the Board’s former Rules were in effect, while Brampton was heard under the Board’s current Rules (effective April 1, 2017). The Board acknowledged this distinction in applicable Rules, however, was not convinced this would alter the finding in Brampton.

11After hearing the submissions of the Requester, the Board dismissed the motion and held the Board lacked the authority to extend the timelines set out in Municipal Act, as determined in Brampton. In particular, the Board held that pursuant to s. 357(7) of the Municipal Act, the application for appeal was due 35 days following the City’s letter dated August 22, 2016, being a deadline of September 26, 2016.

12The Requester asks that the Board cancel the Decision of Vice-Chair McAnsh, allow the late filing of the appeal, and refund his property taxes for the 2014 and 2015 tax years. For the reasons that follow, the Board concludes that the Request for Review is denied.

RELEVANT RULES

13The Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”):

Request for Review

120. A party may request a review of any final decision of the Board, other than a decision pursuant to Rule 122, by filing a request in writing no more than 30 days after the decision was issued, including:

(a) a copy of the decision to be reviewed;

(b) the written reasons for the decision, as set out in Rule 112;

(c) the reasons for the request, addressing the factors set out in Rule 121;

(d) notice of any appeals or applications for judicial review that have been filed in relation to the decision;

(e) proof of service on all other parties to the proceeding;

(f) the remedy or relief sought; and

(g) the fee specified by the Board.

Grounds for Review

121. A request for review will not be granted unless the Board is satisfied that:

(a) the Board acted outside its jurisdiction or violated the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness;

(b) the Board made a significant error of law or fact such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision;

(c) the Board heard false or misleading evidence from a party or witness, which was discovered only after the hearing and would have affected the result;

(d) there is new evidence that could not have reasonably been obtained earlier and would have affected the result; or

(e) any of the situations in Rule 122 exist.

Review Order

123. Upon consideration of a request for review, or on its own initiative, the Board may:

(a) dismiss the request;

(b) reinstate the appeal, with or without conditions; or

(c) after providing all parties an opportunity to make submissions,

i. confirm, vary, or cancel the decision,

ii. order a rehearing on all or part of the matter, or

iii. order a motion to decide the review.

ISSUES

14The Requester did not identify which grounds he relies on in this Request. In reviewing the submissions, the Board finds allegations submitted for review are appropriately addressed under Rule 121(a) and (b).

DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

15To meet the threshold for review, the Board must be satisfied that there was a breach of the principles of natural justice or procedural fairness as set out under Rule 121(a), or, in the alternative, the Requester must satisfy the Board that: (i) the Board made significant errors of fact and law; and, (ii) had the errors not been made, the Board likely would have reached a different decision. Unless one of the grounds set out above is met to the satisfaction of the Board, the Board will not interfere with the Decision.

The Requester’s Submissions

16The Requester makes a number of submissions. The Board will to address the concerns raised in this Request to the best of its understanding of the Requester’s submissions.

17First, the Requester submits the Board should have allowed the late appeal due to the circumstances surrounding the appeal, and in particular, the failure of MPAC and the City to explain his rights of appeal and the relevant timelines. The Requester argues he brought his application for appeal to the Board once he was aware of his right of appeal in a timely manner and therefore his appeal should be accepted.

18Second, the Requester submits that the Board has the authority to extent time limits and accept late appeals. The Requester refers to a number of provisions from various Acts and suggests they should apply to the present circumstances. Namely, the Requester submits s. 16.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O., 1990, c. S. 22 (miscited as 16(6)) (“SPPA”); and, s. 4 of the Limitations Act, 2002, S.O. 2002, c. 24, Schedule B, (“Limitations Act”). Section 16.2 of the SPPA states, “A tribunal shall establish guidelines setting out the usual time frame for completing proceedings that come before the tribunal […].” Section 4 of the Limitations Act sets out the “Basic Limitation Period”. The Board understands the Requester is suggesting the Board is authorized to alter the timeline for appeals under s. 16.2 of the SPPA and therefore should adhere to the basic two year limitation period set out in the Limitations Act.

19Third, the Requester argues the Board’s finding in Brampton is distinguishable from the facts of the Requester’s appeal and therefore should not be relied on. The Requester argues that unlike the facts in Brampton, his appeal was late due to the incompetence of MPAC, the City, and the Board, and therefore he should not bear the consequences of having his appeal denied. The Requester suggests this consequence is contrary to purpose of the Municipal Act.

20The Requester also filed amended submissions to the Board on January 14, 2019. In his amended submissions, the Requester suggests the City’s letter denying his application on August 22, 2016 was not a decision since it was not made by “council”. The Requester submits therefore that the Board erred in reviewing his appeal as under the 35 day timeline set out under s. 357(7) rather than the October 21 deadline set out under s. 357(8) of the Municipal Act.

Findings

21After reviewing the Requester’s submissions, the Board is not satisfied that the Board is in breach of principles of natural justice or procedural fairness as required under Rule 121(a). Further, the Board finds the Requester was unable to point to a significant error of law or fact in the Decision that would have likely altered the outcome of the Decision. The Request for Review is therefore denied.

22The Board is an administrative tribunal enabled by the Legislature via the Assessment Review Board Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.32. The Board is delegated its authority by statutes, under which certain matters are referred to the Board for independent adjudication, such as s. 357 of the Municipal Act. This authority, however, is also limited by statute, meaning the Board cannot exceed the jurisdiction that has been delegated to it by the government.

23The Board is not satisfied that the events leading up to the proceeding breached the principles of natural justice or procedural fairness. The Requester received a decision from the City on August 22, 2016, acknowledged receipt of this letter on August 30, 2016, and was provided with an opportunity to make submissions to the Board under Rule 27 to accept the late appeal. Further, while the Board accepts that the Requester had an unsatisfactory experience with City, the Board’s responses are limited by its statutory jurisdiction.

24The Requester’s submissions relating to provisions of SPPA and Limitations Act are also not within the scope of this review. Nevertheless, the Board will address these provisions and clarify their application. Section 16.2 of the SPPA applies to the Board’s authority to control its own procedures and set out expected timelines for hearing and disposing of proceedings that come before it. It cannot alter or override deadlines for bringing appeals set out by the Legislature under s. 375 of the Municipal Act. Section 4 of the Limitations Act sets out the “Basic Limitation Period”. While the Board understands the Requester is suggesting the Board should adhere to the basic two-year limitation period, the Limitations Act only applies to court proceedings as explicitly specified under s. 2 of the Limitations Act. Further, the Limitations Act is not applicable where there are established statutory timelines.

25Turning to the Requester’s submissions that the Board erred in following the reasons set out in Brampton. The Board first clarifies that decisions of the Board are not stare decisis, meaning they are not binding. That being said, the Board strives for consistency in its decision-making process. The Board is not satisfied that the Board erred in following the reasons set out in Brampton, nor that the distinguishing facts of Requester’s appeal would have likely altered the outcome of the Decision. Further, this argument was addressed at paragraphs 2, 10, 11, and 12 of the Decision, in which the Board reasoned that it was unconvinced by the Requester’s arguments that the Board should depart from its finding in Brampton.

26Finally, the Requester’s attempts to argue in his amended submissions that the Board erred in analyzing the appeal under the 35 day timeline set out under s. 357(7) rather than the October 21 timeline set out under s. 357(8) of the Municipal Act. The Board does not accept the submission that, almost two years after the Requester filed a motion seeking permission to proceed with a late appeal, that the appeal was not late. While the Board acknowledges the Requester attempted to file his appeal under s. 357(8) of the Municipal Act, the Board did not accept this since council did not fail to make a decision; rather, the City provided a letter to the Requester rejecting his application on August 22, 2016. The Requester’s appeal therefore did not meet the requirements of s. 357(8) and was analyzed under the applicable provision, s. 357(7) of the Municipal Act.

27Based on the reasons above, the Board finds the Requester did not meet the threshold for review required under Rule 121(a) and (b).

ORDER

28The Request for Review is dismissed.