Assessment Review Board

Commission de révision de l’évaluation foncière

ISSUE DATE: March 13, 2019

FILE NO.: RD 2019M06

Assessed Person(s): Andrew Glenn Stadtegger

Appellant(s): Andrew Glenn Stadtegger; Catherine Dunn Stadtegger

Respondent(s): Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) Region 09

Respondent(s): City of Toronto

Property Location(s): 299 Riverside Drive

Municipality: City of Toronto

Roll Number(s): 1904-011-300-02500-0000

Appeal Number(s): 3269626 and 3299476

Taxation Year(s): 2017 and 2018

Hearing Event No.: 698466

Legislative Authority: Rule 123 of the Assessment Review Board Rules of Practice and Procedure

Request by: Andrew Glenn Stadtegger

Request for: A review of the Board’s Decision WR 153345 issued on October 02, 2018

Heard: By written submission

Parties	Representative	Submissions
Andrew Glenn Stadtegger	Self-represented	Requester
MPAC	No one appeared	Not Received
City of Toronto	No one appeared	Not Received

DECISION DELIVERED BY PAUL MULDOON AND ORDER OF THE BOARD

INTRODUCTION

1Andrew Glenn Stadtegger (“Requester”) filed a written Request for Review with the Assessment Review Board (“Board”) with respect to a Decision issued on October 2, 2018, WR 153345 (“Decision”).

2The background to this Request for Review is as follows. The Requester is the owner of 299 Riverside Drive in the City of Toronto (“Subject Property”). The Subject Property is a single-family detached residence built in 1936 and is located near the Bloor West Village area abutting onto a ravine. The assessment of Subject Property was returned at a current value of $1,969,000 for the 2017 and 2018 taxation years as of January 1, 2016. The Requester filed an appeal of the assessment with the Board seeking a reduction in the assessed value of the Subject Property to $1,562,000.

3The hearing was conducted on May 16, 2018 in the City of Toronto (“City”). The City did not appear at the appeal or present the Board with any submissions. MPAC presented evidence that the area in which the Subject Property is located has seen a large increase in the value of homes over the past two years, rising 32.7 per cent in the 23 months between January 2015 and December 2016. MPAC’s representative submitted to the Board that the assessment of the Subject Property was based six comparable properties in the neighbourhood of the Subject Property that sold between 2015 and 2016. MPAC’s evidence suggested these properties were similar to the Subject Property. The selling prices of the comparable properties submitted by MPAC ranged from $1,505,250 (time-adjusted to $1,592,842) to $2,812,500 (time-adjusted to $2,938,167).

4At the hearing, the Requester presented oral evidence, as well as an affidavit by the former owner of 301 Riverside Drive, the home next door to the Subject Property. The affiant swore that that 301 Riverside Drive sold for $1,505,250 in August 2015 to an arm’s length buyer following multiple offers. The Requester opposed the properties presented as comparable by MPAC on the grounds that his property is located on thoroughfare and is much busier than the comparable properties located on cul-de-sacs, and further that the Subject Property has a quality rating of 7, while some of the comparable properties had a rating of 7.5. The Requester also argued that the fact that the Subject Property abuts a ravine is not a positive feature because he is not permitted to cut trees or build on the land since it is environmentally protected. The Requester concluded in his evidence that the only comparable property to the Subject Property is 301 Riverside Drive and submitted the correct current value for the 2017 and 2018 taxation years is $1,505,250.

5In considering evidence before it, one of the main issues before the Board was which of the comparable properties, if any, the Board should accept in determining the current value of the Subject Property. The Board found that the Requester made valid criticisms of MPAC’s properties located on Brule Gardens and Riverside Crescent, which are located on cul-de-sacs rather than thoroughfares and rejected these properties as comparable. The Board also rejected the Requester’s argument that 301 Riverside is the only appropriate comparable property since other valid comparable properties exist.

6In the end, the Board accepted three properties located on Riverside Drive, 235, 279, and 301 Riverside Drive, were comparable. Finding these properties have a median value of $765 per square feet, the Board held the Subject Property would likely have sold for $2,036,430, and since no increase in assessment was sought by MPAC, confirmed the value returned by MPAC in the amount of $1,969,000 for the 2017 and 2018 taxation years.

7The Requester asks that the Board vary the Decision of Member Flemming, and reduce the current value of the Subject Property to $1,505,250, or in the alternative, cancel the Decision and remit the matter to the Board for another hearing.

8For the reasons that follow, the Board concludes that the Request for Review is denied.

RELEVANT RULES

9The Board’s Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Rules”):

Request for Review

120. A party may request a review of any final decision of the Board, other than a decision pursuant to Rule 122, by filing a request in writing no more than 30 days after the decision was issued, including:

(a) a copy of the decision to be reviewed;

(b) the written reasons for the decision, as set out in Rule 112;

(c) the reasons for the request, addressing the factors set out in Rule 121;

(d) notice of any appeals or applications for judicial review that have been filed in relation to the decision;

(e) proof of service on all other parties to the proceeding;

(f) the remedy or relief sought; and

(g) the fee specified by the Board.

Grounds for Review

121. A request for review will not be granted unless the Board is satisfied that:

(a) the Board acted outside its jurisdiction or violated the rules of natural justice or procedural fairness;

(b) the Board made a significant error of law or fact such that the Board would likely have reached a different decision;

(c) the Board heard false or misleading evidence from a party or witness, which was discovered only after the hearing and would have affected the result;

(d) there is new evidence that could not have reasonably been obtained earlier and would have affected the result; or

(e) any of the situations in Rule 122 exist.

Review Order

123. Upon consideration of a request for review, or on its own initiative, the Board may:

(a) dismiss the request;

(b) reinstate the appeal, with or without conditions; or

(c) after providing all parties an opportunity to make submissions,

i. confirm, vary, or cancel the decision,

ii. order a rehearing on all or part of the matter, or

iii. order a motion to decide the review.

ISSUES

10The Requester relies on the grounds set out in Rule 121(b).

DISCUSSION, ANALYIS AND FINDINGS

11To meet the threshold for review under Rule 121(b), the Requester must satisfy the Board that: (i) the Board made significant errors of fact and law; and, (ii) had the errors not been made, the Board likely would have reached a different decision.

The Requester’s Submissions

12The Requester submits the Board made two errors of fact in reaching its Decision. First, the Requester argues the Board failed to distinguish between the characteristics of the three properties accepted as comparable, namely 235, 279, and 301 Riverside Drive. While there was significant evidence distinguishing the properties provided at the hearing, the Requester submits these distinguishing characteristics, particularly the lot sizes, were not considered in the Decision. Had they been considered, the Requester submits it likely would have altered the outcome of the Decision. Second, the Requester submits the Board used an erroneous method for valuation that was not presented by the parties at the hearing. The Requester argues the Board made an error of fact by using the median value per square foot of the properties to determine the current value of the Subject Property. The Requester submits this valuation method was inappropriate given the dissimilarities in lot sizes and other characteristics of the properties accepted as comparable. The Requester submits that the Presiding Member should have only use 301 Riverside Drive as the comparable property to the Subject Property.

13The Requester also submits the Board made an error of law in deciding that could not rely on only one comparable property, namely 301 Riverside Drive. The Requester argues the Board erred by finding that it was required to consider other valid comparable properties and as set out in Kumar v. Municipal Property Assessment Corp., Region no. 14, [2011] O.A.R.B.D. No. 140. The Requester submits there is no principle in law that a single sale is not a reliable indicator of market value.

Findings

14The Board provided reasons as to why it accepted the three properties on Riverside Drive as comparable to the Subject Property at paragraphs 20 and 21of the Decision. In particular, the Board summarized the distinctions between the comparable properties in the table provided at paragraph 20, including lot size, year built, stories, and building area. At paragraph 21, the Board elaborated on the dissimilarities of the properties proposed by MPAC and accepted that only the properties on Riverside Drive were comparable to the Subject Property. The Board finds the Presiding Member did not err in reasons with respect to the properties it chose to accept as comparable, nor was there a lack of recognition from the Board that the properties had distinctive characteristics, including its finding that 301 Riverside Drive was distinct from the Subject Property.

15This alleged error of facts overlaps with the second alleged error in which the Requester argues that the Board erred in its use of median square foot value. This submission largely turns on the Requester’s assumption that the lot size and slope is the primary indicator of value and the distinctions in lot characteristics render the median value approach inappropriate in the given context. In making these submissions, the Requester fails to acknowledge that the fact that the property abuts onto a ravine was found to be a positive feature of the property, and further, that two of the three comparable properties accepted by the Board have smaller lots than the Subject Property. The Board based this valuation model on the evidence submitted by the parties and was empowered to make any decision MPAC could have made as set out under s. 45 of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990 c. A. 31 (“Act”). The weight of evidence in determining which properties are comparable properties is within the jurisdiction and authority of the Presiding Member and, absent a significant error, the Board will not interfere.

16Finally, with respect to the alleged error of law, while decisions of the Board are not stare decisis, meaning they are not binding, the Board has a duty to strive for consistency in its decision making and should only depart where there is good reason to do so. Further, contrary to the submission of the Requester, it is clear the Board did not find that it was bound by its previous decision in Kumar; rather, the Board considered the parties’ evidence and concluded that 301 Riverside Drive alone was not the best indicator of market value in the given context.

17A Request for Review is not an opportunity to reargue a case or make up for deficiencies in evidence or arguments presented at the appeal hearing.

18Based on the reasons above, the Board finds the Requester did not meet the threshold for review required under Rule 121(b).

ORDER

19The Request for Review is dismissed.