Paris Dryden v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2019 CanLII 18796

Assessment Review Board

Commission de révision de l’évaluation foncière

ISSUE DATE:

March 05, 2019

FILE NO.:

DM 2019M15

Moving Party(ies):

Paris Dryden

Respondent(s):

Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, (“MPAC”), Region 14

Respondent(s):

Town of Richmond Hill

Property Location(s):

40 Country Heights Drive

Municipality(ies):

Town of Richmond Hill

Roll Number(s):

1938-050-058-50011-0000

Taxation Year(s):

2017

Hearing Event No.:

709780

Legislative Authority:

Rule 26(b) of the Assessment Review Board Rules of Practice and Procedure

Heard:

February 8, 2019 by written submission

APPEARANCES:

Parties

Representative

Paris Dryden

Self-represented

MPAC

No one appeared

Town of Richmond Hill

No one appeared

DISPOSITION OF THE BOARD DELIVERED BY SCOTT McANSH

1Paris Dryden is an owner of the residential property located at 40 Country Heights Drive in the Town of Richmond Hill. He and his spouse, Elaine Ricketts, purchased the property as a vacant lot in September 2005. They obtained a building permit to construct a single detached house on the property in August 2012. They had difficulties with contractors and by December 2016, only the shell of the building had been completed. Mr. Dryden says that MPAC assessed the building as if it were complete for the 2017 taxation year, but also claims to never have received that assessment notice.

2Mr. Dryden is seeking permission to file an appeal of the 2017 assessment of the property after the time set in the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1900, c. A.31 (the “Act”). For the reasons that follow, I find that Rule 26(b) has no application to property in the residential property class. For that reason Mr. Dryden’s application is denied.

LAW

3This Board can alter filing deadlines set out in the Act, but only in limited cases. That legal authority flows from the decision of the Ontario Superior Court in Fleming and Smith Ltd. and Regional Assessment Commissioner Region No. 31 et al., 1979 CanLII 1870 (ON SC). The Court held that the Board could permit late filing if certain conditions were met. The Board codified those conditions in Rule 26(b), which states:

26 The Board may accept an appeal received after the time set in the Assessment Act only if the appellant satisfies the Board, by way of affidavit evidence, that: …

(b) the appellant is a person entitled to receive a notice of assessment who did not receive notice, and filed the appeal with the Board within 30 days of becoming aware of the assessment or classification that is the subject of the appeal.

4The common law basis of the Rule has been altered by the mandatory request for reconsideration set out in the Act. Subsection 40(3) of the Act states that, “if a property is in the residential… property class… no appeal may be brought to the… Board… by a person who is entitled to make a request for reconsideration… if the person has not made the request within the time required.” The Act also codified the Board’s role in altering request for reconsideration deadlines in subsection 40(4), supplanting any common law authority the Board may have had to otherwise alter that deadline.

Extension of Time

5Mr. Dryden’s only recourse is to seek an extension of time to file a 2017 request for reconsideration, because the request is a mandatory precondition for him to appeal to the Board. The filing deadline for a 2017 request for reconsideration is set out in subsection 39.1(1.2) of the Act, and was “120 days after the issuance date printed on the notice of assessment.” The notice of assessment was not entered into evidence, but if the notice was issued in 2017, the deadline has long passed.

6The Board’s limited authority to extend the request for reconsideration filing deadline is set out in subsection 40(4) of the Act. That subsection states, in relevant part, that the Board may extend the deadline if “in the Board’s opinion, there are extenuating circumstances explaining why a request for reconsideration in respect of a property was not made within the time required” and that power can only be exercised “on an application by the person during the taxation year.” While a failure to receive the notice may be an extenuating circumstance, this application to extend the 2017 request for reconsideration filing deadline was not brought to the Board in 2017. This application was filed with the Board on November 19, 2018.

7Subsection 40(4) is clear that I can only extend the time to file a request for reconsideration “on an application by the person during the taxation year.” This application was not brought in 2017 so cannot be used as the basis to extend the 2017 filing deadline. The Act sets out the full power of the Board. I cannot, therefore, extend the time for filing a 2017 request for reconsideration. Without a timely request for reconsideration, Mr. Dryden cannot appeal to this Board. Rule 26(b) has no application.

Conclusion

8Mr. Dryden’s application to file a late appeal is denied. Rule 26(b) has no application to property in the residential property class because the request for reconsideration regime that has been added to the Act has removed the Board’s common law power to alter fling deadlines. Mr. Dryden’s property is in the residential property class. He did not file a timely request for reconsideration for the 2017 taxation year and is out of time to apply for an extension of the 2017 filing deadline. His application is denied.