Quinn v. Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, 2018 CanLII 43333

Assessment Review Board

Commission de révision de l’évaluation foncière

ISSUE DATE: May 11, 2018

FILE NO.: WR 152742

Assessed Person(s): Marc Nicholas Quinn

Appellant(s): Marc Quinn

Respondent(s): Municipal Property Assessment Corporation (“MPAC”) Region 03

Respondent(s): City of Ottawa

Property Location(s): 1 Leeward Street

Municipality(ies): City of Ottawa

Roll Number(s): 0614-120-510-07200-0000

Appeal Number(s): 3259827 and 3291147

Taxation Year(s): 2017 and 2018

Hearing Event No.: 696275

Legislative Authority: Section 40 of the Assessment Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. A.31, as amended

Heard: April 18, 2018 in Ottawa, Ontario

APPEARANCES:

Parties	Representative
Marc Quinn	Self-represented
MPAC	Katherine Kennedy-Boisvert
City of Ottawa	No one appeared

DECISION OF THE BOARD DELIVERED BY SCOTT McANSH

1Marc Quinn appealed the 2017 assessment of his property, located at 1 Leeward Street in the City of Ottawa, on the basis that it was too high. The assessment had been returned at $912,000 for that taxation year. MPAC later reduced its opinion of value to $866,000, and it returned that value to the assessment roll for the 2018 taxation year. Mr. Quinn argued that the property should be assessed at $755,000 for both the 2017 and 2018 taxation years. MPAC maintained its opinion that the property would likely have sold for $866,000 on the January 1, 2016 valuation day.

2Both parties relied on the sales of other properties in the area to support their opinion of value. Mr. Quinn also raised a number of nuisance factors in his neighborhood that he says would further reduce value, including aircraft noise, groundwater contamination, and train traffic.

3I find that the current value of the property is $800,000. There is no evidence that it would be unfair or inequitable to assess the property at that value.

Legislation

4Section 44.(3)(a) of the Assessment Act (“Act”) requires this Assessment Review Board (“Board”) to “determine the current value of the land.” Current value is defined in s. 1 as “the amount of money the fee simple, if unencumbered, would realize if sold at arm’s length by a willing seller to a willing buyer.” That is, I must determine what the subject property would have sold for in an arm’s length transaction on the relevant valuation day, set pursuant to s. 19.3 of the Act, as January 1, 2016 for the 2017 and 2018 taxation years.

5Once I have determined the current value, s. 44.(3)(b) requires that I “have reference to the value at which similar lands in the vicinity are assessed and adjust the assessment of the land to make it equitable with that of similar lands in the vicinity” but only if that adjustment would result in a reduction of the assessment.

Current Value

6Mr. Quinn’s property is a large 3,633 square foot house built in 1991 on a fairly large lot with 120 feet of frontage. The property has an attached garage and an in-ground pool. It is in a suburban residential area of Ottawa known a Pineglen. Many properties in Pineglen, including Mr. Quinn’s, are not connected to municipal water or sewer services and rely on well water and septic systems. The home has not had major repairs since it was built and its septic system is reaching the end of its useful life.

7Mr. Quinn raised a number of concerns that impact the determination of current value. I see the main areas of dispute as:

a. the impact of the nuisance factors on the value of the property;

b. the importance of expert opinion evidence; and

c. the relevant points of comparison to other properties.

Nuisance Factors

8Pineglen has a mix of older, smaller homes and larger infill homes, like Mr. Quinn’s. The neighbourhood is adjacent to a large industrial park, and there have been some volatile organic compounds found in the well water that its residents rely upon. While the amounts detected are well below the drinking water guidelines, the City of Ottawa has had a testing program in place for a number of years to monitor the problem, and concerns remain in the community. The neighbourhood is also near the VIA Rail train tracks and Mr. Quinn testified that he can feel trains when they pass, several times a day. Additionally, Pineglen is in the flight path of a number of flight schools that fly out of the Ottawa International Airport, creating noise issues in the area.

9Mr. Quinn argues that these issues make living at the property less desirable then living at another property that didn’t have those issues. I agree that a reliance on well water and a septic system, potential contamination of the well water, aircraft noise, and train noise could all cause potential buyers to offer less money for the property than a comparable property that didn’t have those issues. But such an adjustment to value is only required when the property is compared to others that are not impacted by those issues. Any property in the same neighbourhood would be impacted by the noise issues and any property nearby that relied on well water will be in nearly the same position as Mr. Quinn’s property. Thus, the nuisance factors raised by Mr. Quinn must be considered when looking at the comparability of the other properties presented by the parties.

Expert Evidence

10Mr. Quinn presented his market evidence through Michel Brissette, a local realtor. I qualified Mr. Brissette as an expert witness, permitting him to provide opinion evidence on the valuation of residential property in the Ottawa area. I accepted him as an expert based on his nearly 30 years in the real estate business, including 20 years working in the Ottawa residential market. Mr. Quinn argued that I should put some weight on the fact that MPAC’s witness was not qualified as an expert, and therefore not permitted to give opinion evidence. MPAC did not seek that designation and Mr. Brissette’s qualifications as an expert witness would only benefit Mr. Quinn If I was to rely on Mr. Brissette’s opinion evidence. I put no weight on his opinion evidence because it was not well explained and does not fit with the evidence before me.

11Mr. Brissette prepared a report that included information about a number of properties that had sold in the area near the valuation day. However, Mr. Brissette was unable to explain how he got from those sales to his recommended value of $755,000. He admitted more than once in his testimony that he was unprepared and could not answer fairly simple questions about his report, saying that he needed notes that he did not have access to. In a number of instances his oral testimony was inconsistent with his report, including how sale prices should be adjusted and factual aspects of properties. In his examination by MPAC he was contradicted on the size of the home at 2954 Prince of Wales Drive, and the number of storeys in 25 Burnbank Court. Mr. Brissette did not have any source data to substantiate his claims on either point, and was far from confident on the facts. I accept MPAC’s measurements of 2954 Prince of Wales Drive and MPAC’s position that 25 Burnbank is a two storey home. Mr. Brissette could not support his contrary view of those facts.

12Not only could Mr. Brissette not support the facts he was presenting, his opinions were not well explained and are not believable. He opined that the sale of 9 Cassone Court for $715,000 suggests a value of $765,000 for Mr. Quinn’s property. When asked to explain that $50,000 increase he pointed to factors that would suggest a lower value, such as the lack of a pool at 9 Cassone Court. He was unable to provide any convincing explanation of any of his adjustments to individual sale prices or any global explanation of how the sales he presented lead to a $755,000 value of Mr. Quinn’s property.

13Mr. Quinn attempted to justify Mr. Brissette’s opinions, arguing that Mr. Brissette was using the standard adjustments to property. That may be so, but an expert witness that cannot adequately explain their opinion is of limited assistance to the Board. An expert is permitted to appear before this Board and provide opinions to help the Board reach a determination of the issue in dispute. But the Board cannot, and should not, blindly accept opinions that are presented. Opinions must have a factual foundation and a witness providing an opinion should be able to explain how that opinion is formed from the evidence. It is unsafe to rely on opinions that are not explained. Mr. Brissette did not provide any adequate explanation of his conclusions and I therefore put no weight on his opinion evidence.

Points of Comparison

14The parties put seven properties before me as potential comparators for the purpose of determining the valued of Mr. Quinn’s property. MPAC presented the sales of three properties, while Mr. Quinn presented four properties. Their relevant characteristics are set out in the following table:

Address	Home Size (sq. ft.)	Year Built	Septic	Sale Date	Sale Price
1 Leeward Street	3,633	1991	Yes
9 Cassone Court	2,920	1991	No	Oct 2016	$715,000
38 Promenade Avenue	3,296	2013	Yes	June 2014	$1,125,000
25 Burnbank Court	3,787	2000	Yes	Sept 2016	$985,000
49 Fifeshire Court	2,800	1981	No	Oct 2015	$600,000
2954 Prince of Wales Drive	3,963	2003	Yes	Aug 2016	$720,000
8 Edenbrook Court	unknown	1977	No	Feb 2017	$670,000
28 Tennyson Street	2,998	1974	No	June 2016	$570,000

15Two of these properties, 9 Cassone Court and 28 Tennyson Street, sold more than a year from the valuation day of January 1, 2016. Markets change over time, making those sales a less reliable indicator of what Mr. Quinn’s property likely would have sold for on the valuation day. I also find that the age of construction of 38 Promenade Avenue, 8 Edenbrook Court and 28 Tennyson Street make them less than ideal comparisons to Mr. Quinn’s property. All three of those sales were built more than 12 years from the date of construction of the property. It is likely that the market will treat properties that differ that much in age differently. Finally, I exclude the four sales that do not have a septic system. A home that is connected a municipal sewer services will be treated differently from a home with a septic system. The only truly comparable properties are 25 Burnbank Court and 2954 Prince of Wales Drive.

16Mr. Quinn submitted that 2954 Prince of Wales Drive was the most comparable sale with its similarity in size, and reliance on septic. MPAC argues that it is in a rural area so would be valued differently than Mr. Quinn’s home, which is in the suburban area. It is also on a busy street, which Mr. Quinn’s home is not. I find that 2954 Prince of Wales Drive is slightly inferior to Mr. Quinn’s property due primarily to its location on a major street in Ottawa.

17MPAC presented 25 Burnbank Court which is very similar in size to Mr. Quinn’s home. It has a larger first floor area than Mr. Quinn’s and an effective year built of 2000 due to an extensive 2005 renovation of this 1973 home. That newer finish likely makes this property more valuable than Mr. Quinn’s. It is in a neighbourhood nearby that is of a similar density and structure. It backs on to National Capital Commission parkland on a quiet road. 25 Burnbank Court is superior to Mr. Quinn’s property.

18The evidence was unclear on how these two sales would be impacted by the nuisance factors set out by Mr. Quinn. They are both relatively close to Mr. Quinn’s property so likely have many of the same issues. Without evidence that they are differently impacted, I cannot make any adjustment for those factors. Those sales indicate that Mr. Quinn’s property would likely have sold for more than $720,000 and less than $985,000. That is a value range of $265,000. Mr. Quinn’s home is likely slightly closer to the low end of that range due to 25 Burnbank Court having both a major renovation and backing onto parkland. Mr. Quinn’s home is also worth more than 2954 Prince of Wales Drive due to the heavy traffic on Prince of Wales. I believe that those factors support a value of $800,000, which is 30.2% of the way between the two sales, much closer to the low end of the range. That value also appears reasonable when compared to all of the evidence.

19I find that the current value of Mr. Quinn’s property for the January 1, 2016 valuation day is $800,000.

Equity

20Once I have determined current value, clause 44(3)(b) requires that I determine if it would be fair to assess the property at that current value. All property in Ontario is to be assessed at its current value pursuant to subsection 19(1). It would therefore only be unfair to assess this property likewise if there was evidence that other property was being under assessed. Neither party provided evidence that property in the vicinity is consistently assessed below its current value. There is, therefore, no indication that it would unfair to assess Mr. Quinn’s property at its current value of $800,000.

CONCLUSION

21There was no indication that the nuisance factors identified by Mr. Quinn, such as aircraft noise, did not apply to all of the properties in evidence. There is therefore no need to alter the sales evidence to try to account for those factors. The sales evidence before me indicates that Mr. Quinn’s property would likely have sold for $800,000 on January 1, 2016. I find that the current value of the property is $800,000 for the 2017 and 2018 taxation years and that it is fair to assess the property at that value.

22I therefore reduce the assessment for the 2017 taxation year from $912,000 to $800,000 and I reduce the assessment for the 2018 taxation year from $866,000 to $800,000.