Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal 1 Stone Road West

Tribunal d’appel de l’agriculture, de l’alimentation et des affaires rurales 1 Stone Road West

Guelph, Ontario N1G 4Y2 Tel: (519) 826-3433, Fax: (519) 826-4232 Email: AFRAAT@ontario.ca

Guelph (Ontario) N1G 4Y2 Tél.: (519) 826-3433, Téléc.: (519) 826-4232 Courriel: AFRAAT@ontario.ca

AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS APPEAL TRIBUNAL

APPEAL:

James Bradley Huber and Gabrielle Gerda Huber (RE)

[Decision]

Dairy Farmers of Ontario (RE) [Decision] MNP LLP (RE) [Decision]

STATUTE:

Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER M.16

HEARING:

May 26, 2026 in writing

DATE OF DECISION:

June 12, 2026

001Highroad Farms26

NEUTRAL CITATION:

2026 ONAFRAAT 13

IN THE MATTER OF THE Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER M.16, AS AMENDED

AND IN THE MATTER OF an appeal to the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal (“Tribunal”) by James Bradley Huber and Gabrielle Gerda Huber of Highroad Farms, Cavan-Monaghan, Ontario regarding the Decision of the Dairy Farmers of Ontario dated February 27, 2026, and the Reconsideration Decision of the Dairy Farmers of Ontario dated March 17, 2026.

BETWEEN:

James Bradley Huber and Gabrielle Gerda Huber Appellants

–AND–

Dairy Farmers of Ontario Respondent

-AND-

MNP LLP Participant

Represented by Donald R. Good

Represented by Geoffrey P. Spurr Represented by Maya Poliak,

Before: Heard: May 26, 2026 in writing Glenn C. Walker, Chair, Robert Fuller, Vice-Chair and Crispin Colvin, Member

REASONS FOR DECISION

1. This is an appeal brought by the Appellants in their personal capacity of decisions of Dairy Farmers of Ontario (“DFO”). The appeal is brought pursuant to Section 16 of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.16 (“MAFRAA”).

2. On May 26, 2026, the Tribunal dismissed the appeals after requesting written submissions on the basis that the Appellants had an insufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal with reasons to follow in due course. These are our reasons.

Background

3. James Bradley Huber and Gabrielle Gerda Huber (the “Appellants”) have been carrying on a dairy operation under the name Highroad Farms since 2010 following their purchase of an ongoing operation. The Appellants hold 37.16 kg of Quota pursuant to license number 633577 and have shipped milk from their current location following a relocation in May 2022.¹

4. The Appellants’ last milk shipment to DFO occurred on November 30, 2025, following which they were notified on December 2, 2025 by DFO that they were shut off immediately from the milk market as a result of their farm being classified as Unsanitary Non-Grade A.²

5. On January 19, 2026, the Appellants were advised by DFO that as their last milk shipment occurred on November 30, 2025, to comply with the 90-day policy they must resume milk shipments by February 28, 2026, and in addition meet all reinstatement requirements, including milk and water sampling, and successfully shipping at least one bulk tank of milk.³

6. Per the policy, if the Appellants did not resume shipments within the 90-days allowed, their final opportunity to sell their total Quota would be on the March 2026 Quota Exchange, and if they did not sell their Quota on the Exchange then the Quota allotment would be cancelled by an Order of DFO. Producers whose Quota is cancelled receive no monies for the Quota.⁴

7. On January 27, 2026, DFO was contacted by MNP LLP (the “Receiver”) who advised that it had been appointed Receiver by the Superior Court of Justice for the Appellants and Highroad Farms.⁵

8. The Applicant for the Receivership is the Bank of Montreal with whom the Appellants had entered into a Credit Agreement pursuant to which they had provided security documents which stated that upon the occurrence of a default under the Credit Agreement the bank may initiate proceedings for the appointment of a receiver and manager.⁶

9. The Receivership Order relates to all assets, undertakings and properties of the debtors (the Appellants) acquired for, or used in relation to the farming business carried on by the debtors including the farm property.⁷

10. On February 6, 2026, the Receiver requested an exemption to policy to sell Highroad Farms as an ongoing operation, despite the Appellants being shut off and not having shipped milk from their current location for a minimum of 5 years and an exemption to the 90-day last chance to sell policy as well as to be provided with an extension to the deadline to sell the quota associated with the licence on the Quota Exchange.⁸

11. On approximately February 25, 2026, the Appellants and their counsel requested that DFO conduct a farm inspection at Highroad Farms for the purpose of determining if the farm satisfies prescribed Grade A requirements. Given the existence of the Receivership Order, DFO suggested that counsel for the Appellants make inquiries of the Receiver in relation to their request.⁹

12. The request from the Receiver for the exemptions was considered by the DFO Board and denied in its decision letter dated February 27, 2026.¹⁰

13. On the same day Gabrielle Huber, one of the Appellants, emailed DFO seeking reconsideration of the decision of February 27, 2026.¹¹

14. Communications then ensued among DFO, the Receiver and counsel for the Appellants (not the present counsel) concerning the right of the Appellants to request a reconsideration of the decision.

15. Appellants’ counsel took the position that the existence of the receivership does not automatically extinguish the Appellants’ standing to seek reconsideration of a regulatory decision that may result in the permanent cancellation or forced sale of quota without compensation.¹²

16. The Receiver, through its counsel, responded to the Appellants’ counsel as follows:

Your client was in violation of the express terms of the Receivership Order when he requested a further inspection from the DFO without the Receiver’s knowledge or consent. Your clients continue to interfere with the Receivership Order when they continue to correspond with the DFO regarding the quota.

Please cease and desist any further correspondence with the DFO regarding the quota forthwith. If your clients continue to interfere with the Receiver’s actions we will have no choice but to bring a motion holding your clients in contempt of Court.¹³

17. On March 11, 2026, the Receiver submitted an application for reconsideration of the February 27, 2026 decision of the DFO Board. The Board held the reconsideration hearing on March 17, 2026 and released its decision the same day upholding its original decision.¹⁴

18. On or about March 23, 2026, the Tribunal received a request for an appeal of the DFO Board Decision and the DFO Board Reconsideration Decision directly from the Appellants.

19. The Tribunal advised the Appellants that in view of the Receivership the Tribunal could not accept an appeal from the Appellants in their personal capacity. It appears that the Receiver had made a business decision not to appeal the Board’s decisions to the Tribunal.

20. On April 13, 2026, the Appellants forwarded to the Tribunal a letter addressed to them and dated March 31, 2026 from counsel for the Receiver indicating that the Receiver did not object to the Appellants filing an appeal of the Reconsideration Decision at their expense provided that the appeal was commenced on or before April 10, 2026.

21. The Tribunal took the position that since the initial request to appeal had been received from the Appellants on March 23, 2026, the condition imposed by the Receiver had been met and the Tribunal accepted the appeal.

22. A Pre-Hearing Conference was immediately scheduled with Notice given to DFO, the Appellants and to the Receiver. The Tribunal was made aware by DFO and the Receiver that it was urgent that a decision on the appeal be decided as soon as possible as it would be in the best interest of the creditors to sell the assets without undue delay. Accordingly, the Tribunal agreed to expedite the process.

23. The Receiver requested participant status for the appeal and by order of the Tribunal dated May 15, 2026, the Receiver was added on consent as a participant with its participation limited to opening and closing statements at the hearing.

24. On its own motion the Tribunal raised the issue as to whether the Appellants had sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal and the Tribunal requested written submissions from the parties on this issue.

The Issue

25. Do the Appellants in their personal capacity have sufficient interest in the subject matter of this appeal to have their appeal heard by the Tribunal?

Applicable Statute and Rules

26. Subsection 16(4) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.16 provides as follows:

(4) The Tribunal may refuse to hear the appeal or, after a hearing has commenced, refuse to continue the hearing or make a decision if it relates to any order, direction, policy, decision or regulation of which the appellant has had knowledge for more than one year before the notice is filed under subsection (2.1) or, if in its opinion,

(a) the subject matter of the appeal is trivial;

(b) the appeal is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith; or

(c) the appellant has not a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal.

27. Rules 33.01 and 33.02 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure state that:

33.01 Dismissal without a hearing

The Tribunal may dismiss an appeal without a hearing on its own motion, if, in the Tribunal’s opinion,

a) the proceeding is frivolous, vexatious or is commenced in bad faith;

b) the proceeding relates to matters that are outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal; or

c) some aspect of the statutory requirements for bringing the proceeding has not been met.

33.02 Dismissal under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act

In addition to the reasons for dismissing a proceeding without a hearing described in Rule 33.01, the Tribunal may dismiss a proceeding under the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act or, after a hearing has commenced, refuse to continue the hearing or make a decision if it relates to any order, direction, policy, decision or regulation of which the appellant has had knowledge for more than one year before the notice of appeal is filed or, if in the Tribunal’s opinion, the appellant does not have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal.

Analysis

28. The Tribunal must determine in its opinion whether the Appellants in their personal capacity have a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal. If the Tribunal determines that they do not, it may refuse to hear the appeal pursuant to Subsection 16(4)(c) of the MAFRAA and it may dismiss the appeal under Rule 33.02.

Subject Matter of the Appeal

29. What is the subject matter of appeal? The subject matter must be determined from the decisions of the DFO Board (“Board”). Both decisions deal with a request for exemptions from two Quota policies which would permit the sale of the farm and the quota as an ongoing operation.

30. The first policy requires that producers who have ceased to supply milk to DFO must resume shipments within 90 days, failing which they must sell their quota on the first exchange following the 90th day. The Appellants did not resume shipping milk within the 90-day period after November 30, 2025.

31. The second policy requires that in order to be able to transfer the quota as part of the sale of an ongoing operation, the seller must have produced milk continuously for a period of five years at the same farm location. The Appellants have only produced milk at their present location since 2022.

32. Accordingly, the Receiver would need exemptions from both these policies in order to sell the farmland and quota together as an ongoing operation.

33. In seeking the exemptions, the Receiver was seen by the Board to be concerned with maximizing the asset value of the dairy farm enterprise by being able to sell it as an ongoing operation.¹⁵

Sufficient Interest

34. Based on the submissions of the parties, two different arguments for sufficient interest have been put forward. The first, advanced by the Appellants, is that they have a sufficient personal financial interest in bringing this appeal. The second, advanced by DFO, is that the Appellants do not have a sufficient legal interest in this appeal, or to put it in another way, they do not have standing.

35. The Merriam-Webster dictionary tells us that “sufficient” means enough to meet a need, achieve a goal, or satisfy a specific requirement. It implies having exactly what is necessary, without necessarily providing an abundance.

36. For the Appellants the goal is to have the farm and the quota sold as an ongoing operation to give them a financial benefit. As will be seen below, DFO argues that the Appellants do not have legal standing in this appeal, and it is therefore impossible for them to achieve their goal of having the farm and quota sold together as an ongoing operation.

Financial Interest

37. The Appellants argue that they have a financial interest in pursuing this appeal. They submit that if the appeal is successful and both exemptions are granted, the dairy operation can be sold as an ongoing operation and this will maximize the sale price. They posit that the asset values exceed the debts of the estate so that surplus funds will come back to them as a financial benefit.

38. The Appellants claim that their farm assets have the following approximate values:

Farmland $2,460,000

Cattle $ 400,000

Quota $ 880,000

Equipment etc. $ 450,000

Total: $4,190,000¹⁶

39. The farmland was appraised by Antec Appraisal Group on November 24, 2025 at $2,460,000. It was subsequently evaluated by Realty Wealth Group Brokerage Inc. on May 21, 2026 at approximately $2,400,000.¹⁷

40. No valuation was provided for the cattle. We have not been advised as to how many head of cattle are involved and their condition for sale.¹⁸

41. The sale price of the quota is fixed by DFO and will not be based on the open market value.

42. There was no list of “Equipment etc.” or valuation provided. Certain equipment is leased.¹⁹

43. As of August 17, 2025 the bank reported that $2,428,191 plus accruing interest and costs was due and owing on the credit facilities.²⁰ As of January 15, 2026 interest arrears were $51,411.²¹

44. Property tax arrears on the farmland were $19,778 as of January 15, 2026.²²

45. There is possibly other farm-related debt that has not been disclosed such as arrears on equipment leases etc. In addition, there will be the realtor and lawyer fees on the sale of real estate and the fees and disbursements of the Receiver to be paid from sale proceeds.

46. It is possible that there may be a surplus coming to the Appellants but that is difficult to ascertain because of the lack of detail provided by the Appellants in their submissions.

47. More importantly, the Appellants have failed to demonstrate that the sale of the dairy operation as an ongoing operation will be greater than the sale of the assets individually which appears to be the basis for their appeal.

48. Because of the lack of financial information and the failure by the Appellants to show that the sale of an ongoing operation would financially benefit them, the Tribunal finds that the Appellants have not established a sufficient interest in the subject matter of the appeal.

Legal Interest.

49. DFO’s position on the issue of sufficient interest is that in bringing this appeal the Appellants are overstepping their role as debtors in a receivership. If permitted to continue, DFO alleges that the appeal constitutes a collateral attack on the Receiver’s discretion and authority, over which the Ontario Superior Court of Justice exercises exclusive jurisdiction.

50. Pursuant to the Receivership Order the Receiver has sole control over the farm assets and the sale thereof. In furtherance of that authority the Receiver requested exemptions from policy which would allow it to sell the farm as an ongoing operation. That was a business decision made by the Receiver.

51. After being unsuccessful, the Receiver could have appealed the Board decision to the Tribunal. It made a business decision and chose not to.

52. That was a decision that was solely within authority of the Receiver. Although the Receiver did not object to the Appellants bringing this appeal, it did not assign its right to appeal to the Appellants.

53. The Appellants as debtors in a receivership fail to appreciate the limitations of their role. They had the right to oppose the appointment of the Receiver. They did not. They have the right to pay out the Bank of Montreal debt and redeem the equity of redemption. They have the right to surplus proceeds of sale after payment to all business creditors and the costs of the Receiver. They have the right to object when the Receiver applies to the Court for approval of the sale of the farmland or any other asset valued at over $50,000 and they have the right to object to any final settlement of accounts. Any such objections are made to the Court who oversees the Receiver’s conduct.

54. Since the Receivership Order was made, the Appellants have continually attempted to interfere with the Receiver’s sole discretion by requesting an inspection of the farm by DFO, by attempting to request a reconsideration of the DFO Board’s initial decision and by contacting the Tribunal to personally seek an appeal. The Receiver has had to threaten to bring a motion for contempt.

55. The Appellants have no right to appeal the DFO Board’s decisions. That right is vested in the Receiver who has chosen not to do so.

56. Even if this appeal was to proceed, the Appellants could not control how the farm assets were sold, together or separately. That is a business decision to be made by the Receiver subject to any objection they might have to the Court.

57. The Tribunal finds that the Appellants do not have any interest in the subject matter of this appeal let alone a sufficient one. To put it another way, the Appellants do not have the authority or standing to bring this appeal.

Comments on the Appellants’ Submissions

58. In his affidavit Mr. Huber states that he and his wife, together with their counsel, attended the reconsideration hearing before the Board but were absolutely denied the right to make representations concerning their appeal. In his submissions counsel for the Appellants argues that this was a breach of natural justice and that the Appellants should have been allowed to speak as they had an equitable interest (mistakenly called the equity of redemption) in the proceeds of the sale.

59. This is a further example of the Appellants’ failure to recognize the distinction between the Debtor and the Receiver.

60. That hearing was not a reconsideration hearing requested by the Appellants but by the Receiver. The Appellants were not parties to the hearing but were there as invited observers. As they were not parties to the proceedings, there was no breach of natural justice in their being denied the ability to address the Board.

61. Then Appellants have a right to surplus proceeds. Whether or not they receive surplus proceeds, any complaints they have should be made to the Court.

62. The Appellants, in their Reply Submissions, ask that the Tribunal strike the Affidavit of Carol Mascaro and/or request the right to cross-examine Ms. Mascaro, while acknowledging that this would significantly delay these proceedings to the detriment of nearly all parties.

63. They argue that the affidavit deals with issues and correspondence that are not relevant to the issue of sufficient interest. The Tribunal refuses to strike the affidavit and finds that it provides relevant background information so that the Tribunal has a factual context in which to make its decision on the issue of sufficient interest.

64. The Mascaro affidavit provides detailed information about the history of this matter and is supported by 16 exhibits. It is difficult for the Tribunal to understand how any cross-examination on the affidavit would be of assistance to the Appellants. The Appellants do not allege that anything in the affidavit is untrue or unreliable but merely argue that the failure to allow cross-examination would be a denial of natural justice.

65. Having reviewed the affidavit in detail, the Tribunal finds that cross-examination would be a waste of time and the denial to cross-examine will not be a breach of natural justice in these circumstances.

66. The Appellants further submit that “DFO has placed the Tribunal in an untenable position by presentation at this time of this highly prejudicial purported evidence, including hearsay evidence, since the Tribunal now has evidence before it that was not relevant to the issue of “sufficient interest” but has now been contaminated by this evidence which could hamper its ability to provide the Appellants with a fair hearing.”

67. The Tribunal has already found that the evidence in this affidavit is relevant to the issue of sufficient interest as it provides a necessary factual context. This evidence may not be required to support the Appellants’ arguments on sufficient interest, but it is necessary to inform the Tribunal concerning DFO’s arguments.

68. The Tribunal would also expect this evidence to be provided by DFO at any hearing. We fail to see how the Tribunal could be contaminated. If a hearing were to take place, replacing this panel with a differently constituted panel would solve any problem of bias.

DATED at Hamilton, Ontario this 12th day of June 2026.

This document is also available in French. Please contact the Tribunal at 519-826-3433 or by email at AFRAAT@ontario.ca to request a copy in French.

Ce document est également disponible en français. Veuillez contacter le tribunal au 519 826-3433 ou par courriel à AFRAAT@ontario.ca pour demander une copie en français.

Footnotes

1. 1Affidavit of Carol Mascaro sworn May 20, 2026, para. 5
2. 2Ibid., para. 6
3. 3Ibid., para. 8 and Exhibit “C”
4. 4Ibid.
5. 5Mascaro, idem para. 9
6. 6Affidavit of Sue Segato sworn May 20, 2026 Exhibit “B”
7. 7Mascaro, idem, Exhibit “D”
8. 8Idem, para. 10
9. 9Ibid, Exhibit “F”
10. 10Ibid, para. 11
11. 11Ibid, para. 13
12. 12Ibid, para 14, Exhibit “H”
13. 13Ibid, Exhibit “I”
14. 14Ibid, para. 17 and 20
15. 15DFO Board Decision February 27, 2026
16. 16Affidavit of Brad Huber sworn May 15, 2026, para. 6
17. 17Property Valuation submitted as part of the Appellants’ Reply Submissions
18. 18Mascaro idem para. 7 and Exhibit “B”
19. 19Segato, idem Exhibit “B”
20. 20Ibid
21. 21Segato, idem Exhibit “C”
22. 22Ibid