Black v. Chicken Farmers of Ontario, 2014 ONAFRAAT 34

Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal 1 Stone Road West

Tribunal d’appel de l’agriculture, de l’alimentation et des affaires rurales 1 Stone Road West

Guelph, (Ontario) N1G 4Y2 Tel: (519) 826-3433, Fax: (519) 826-4232 Email: AFRAAT@ontario.ca

Guelph (Ontario) N1G 4Y2 Tél.: (519) 826-3433, Téléc.: (519) 826-4232 Email: AFRAAT@ontario.ca

AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS APPEAL TRIBUNAL

APPEAL:

Black v Chicken Farmers of Ontario

Black v CFO [Request for Review] 2014ONAFRAAT34

STATUTE:

Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act

HEARING:

N/A

DATE OF DECISION:

December 23, 2014

2014-34

NEUTRAL CITATION:

2014ONAFRAAT34

Black v Chicken Farmers of Ontario [Request for Review]

IN THE MATTER OF SECTION 16 OF THE MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS ACT, R.S.O. 1990, CHAPTER M.16, AS AMENDED.

AND IN THE MATTER OF: An amended appeal to the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal by Glenn Black, Providence Bay, Ontario, concerning Chicken Farmers of Ontario Regulation No. 2425-2013 and the 300 bird chicken exemption policy and various other issues related to the supply management system for chicken and the regulation of the chicken industry; as well as costs, damages, awards and judgments requested by the appellant.

AND IN THE MATTER OF: A decision of the Tribunal dated September 24, 2014 in which the Tribunal refused to hear Glenn Black’s amended appeal.

AND IN THE MATTER OF: A request for review by Glenn Black of the Tribunal’s decision under Subsection 21.2(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure for the Tribunal.

Before: Glenn Walker, Vice-Chair

Background to the Review Request

As Vice-Chair succinctly stated in his decision of September 24, 2014, the Tribunal first

considered Mr. Black’s appeal at a May 14, 2014 motion hearing. That motion, made by the Chicken Farmers of Canada (“CFO”), sought to dismiss or limit Mr. Black’s appeal.

Rather than dismiss the appeal, the Tribunal, in its decision of May 21, 2014, struck Mr. Black’s Appeal Notice and provided leave to re-file the appeal within 60 days of the decision with a direction that Mr. Black’s appeal be restricted to CFO Regulation No. 2425-2013 and a CFO policy known as the 300 bird exemption policy.

The Tribunal gave that direction to Mr. Black in a decision that explained in detail the Tribunal’s jurisdiction and how most of what Mr. Black sought in his initial appeal was not justiciable before the Tribunal.

Mr. Black then proceeded to file a 98 page Revised Notice of Appeal (“RNOA”). The initial Appeal Notice comprised 21 pages. After filing the 98 page RNOA, Mr. Black then sent the Tribunal a two page Notice of Appeal and finally, incorporated into his recent written submissions was yet another Notice of Appeal of just over two pages.

After receiving the RNOA, the Tribunal received a request from CFO to schedule another motion to dismiss Mr. Black’s appeal. Rather than schedule the requested motion, the Tribunal on its own initiative issued a Notice of Intention to Refuse to Hear Appeal to the parties and provided Mr. Black and CFO an opportunity to file written submissions.

In that Notice of Intention, the Tribunal cautioned Mr. Black he had one last opportunity to persuade the Tribunal that the appeal was not “frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith”.

In addition, the Tribunal directed Mr. Black to provide written submissions dealing with whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to grant the relief set out in section 11 of the RNOA. Section 11 of the RNOA is entitled Requested Orders. A copy of that Section is appended to this decision as Appendix 1.

Context about Requests to Review a Decision and the Tribunal’s Rules

Generally, in our legal system, parties get only one “kick at the can” and the finality principle embodies that general rule.

Subject to any statutory rights of appeal or an application for a judicial review, a decision of the Tribunal is final.

The Tribunal’s power to review a decision is set out in Rule 29 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure (the Rules). The source of the jurisdiction for the Tribunal’s review power is section 21.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act. (SPPA).

Under the Tribunal’s Rules, a request for review is first evaluated by the Chair or a Vice-Chair to determine whether the request merits a review hearing. The factors for that initial evaluation embodied in the Tribunals’ Rules are contained in Rule 29.09 as follows:

Evaluation of request for review

29.09 In deciding whether it is advisable to conduct a review of all or any part of a final decision or order, the Tribunal may consider any relevant circumstances including:

a. whether there is significant new evidence which was not available at the time of the original appeal;

b. whether the Tribunal made a material error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different decision;

c. the extent to which any party to the appeal or any other person has relied upon the final decision or order;

d. the extent to which any party to the appeal or any other person will be affected by the review process; and

e. whether the public interest in finality of decisions is outweighed by the alleged prejudice to the requester.

Rule 29.09 provides that in determining the prudence of a review I may consider any relevant circumstances including those listed in subsections (a) to (e) of that Rule.

Generally, internal decision reviews under the SPPA jurisdiction and the Tribunal’s Rule 29 are an extraordinary mechanism that should only be granted in exceptional circumstances, otherwise, the finality principle would become meaningless.

Glenn Black’s Reasons for the Request for Review

Mr. Black is seeking a request for review for the following reasons:

1. He feels he has been denied fundamental justice by having his appeal summarily dismissed without just cause.

2. He feels there are significant adverse consequences to him and the general public as a result of the dismissal of his appeal before a hearing of the matters raised in the appeal.

3. His efforts and costs in preparing, filing and advancing his appeal will be wasted if his appeal and the issues raised are summarily dismissed and not heard.

4. He feels there is no other adequate, timely, and affordable forum for his appeal to be addressed.

5. He feels that it is against the public’s best interest and public policy for his appeal to be dismissed without a public hearing of the issues raised in the appeal.

6. He believes he has reasonable and probable grounds to believe the Tribunal made a material error of law and/or fact in its decision.

7. He believes the Tribunal did not receive, or did not correctly apprehend, or did not adequately consider all of the submissions and evidence put before the Tribunal.

8. He believes the Tribunal did not decide on all of the issues properly before the Tribunal.

9. He feels the Tribunal has not yet provided full and comprehensive reasons for its decision.

10. He feels the Tribunal’s decision contains:

• errors of law;

• errors of fact;

• errors of both law and fact;

• misapprehension of the evidence before it;

• erroneous and unsupported assumptions;

• findings of facts and resulting decisions that are not adequately supported nor

logically derived from the evidence before it; and

• other good and sufficient reasons;

Findings and Analysis

Documents and Evidence Considered

As part of considering Mr. Black’s review request, I have read and considered the materials referred to in the appendix attached hereto as Appendix 2. Although I am permitted by the Rules to confer with members of the appeal panel, I chose not to do so allowing the decision to stand on its own. Furthermore, I have chosen not to receive and consider submissions from the parties and rely upon Rule 29.17 of the Rules which provides that the Tribunal may refuse a request to review a final decision or order without seeking submissions from any other party to the appeal.

Focus of the Request for Review

Mr. Black’s letter to the Tribunal requesting a review begins with the following paragraph:

“This letter is to respectfully request clarification of ambiguities in the Tribunal’s decisions, to receive sufficient written reasons for the Tribunal’s decision, to request re-opening of the hearing of this appeal, and to request review and/or reconsideration of the Tribunal’s decisions for the above captioned appeal; all of these requests based upon the following reasons:…” (emphasis mine)

There have been two decisions issued by the Tribunal in this matter. The first was a decision of the Tribunal on the motion hearing held on May 14, 2014. That decision was released on May 21, 2014. The second decision was the decision of the Tribunal released on September 24, 2014 refusing to hear Mr. Black’s amended appeal.

Rule 29.13 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure provides: “The Chair of the Tribunal, or a Vice-Chair designated by the Chair, shall consider each request for review of a final decision or order and decide whether a review should be conducted.” (emphasis mine)

The order made by the Tribunal on May 21, 2014 could be construed to be either an interlocutory or a final order or decision depending on whether or not Mr. Black filed an amended Notice of Appeal as provided by the order. If he had not filed an amended Notice of Appeal, then the May 21, 2014 order would have been final. However, since Mr. Black filed an amended Notice of Appeal within the time provided, the order is considered to be interlocutory as it does not completely dispose of the appeal. I note that no appeal or application for judicial review was made with respect to the Tribunal’s decision of May 21, 2014. There is therefore only one final decision of the Tribunal for which Mr. Black can request a review pursuant to Rule 29.13 of the Rules of Procedure. This consideration of the request for review will be limited to the decision dated September 24, 2014 despite the fact that Mr. Black’s request appears to relate to any decision made by the Tribunal in these proceedings. This is an important point for Mr. Black to understand as it substantially narrows the submissions and the documentary material which I must consider, and makes many of Mr. Black’s submissions irrelevant to the issue at hand.

Decision of the Tribunal dated September 24, 2014

In the Tribunal’s motion decision released May 21, 2014, the Tribunal carefully explained to Mr. Black that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with most of the remedies requested by Mr. Black and instructed him that, if he wished to proceed before the Tribunal, he would need to file an amended Notice of Appeal “restricted to challenging CFO regulation No. 2425-2013 and the 300 bird chicken exemption policy”. In the Tribunal’s Reasons for the Notice of Intention to Refuse to Hear Appeal, the Tribunal found that Mr. Black had failed to focus his appeal on that single CFO regulation and policy as directed by the May 21^st decision and that the RNOA was an agglomeration of treatises or manifestos. The Notice of Intention put Mr. Black on notice that unless the Tribunal could be convinced otherwise by him in his written submissions, the Tribunal would refuse to hear the RNOA on the grounds that it was frivolous, vexatious or not made in good faith, and that the RNOA sought to litigate issues outside of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. After considering Mr. Black’s submissions in response to the Notice of Intention to Refuse to Hear Appeal, the decision of the Tribunal stating that it refused to hear the appeal was issued on September 24, 2014. That is the decision, and the only decision, that is the subject of this consideration for the request for review.

Standard of Review

In reviewing the decision of September 24, 2014, it is not, in my opinion, my task to decide whether or not the decision is wrong but, whether I am convinced on a balance of probabilities that the Tribunal made a material error of fact or law such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different decision and that the decision therefore merits a fuller review.

Issues to be Considered

1. Is Glenn Black’s appeal trivial or frivolous?

2. Is Glenn Black’s appeal vexatious?

3. Is Glenn Black’s appeal not made in good faith?

Some of Mr. Black’s reasons for his request for review set out on page three of this decision can be dealt with rather succinctly. Others will be addressed by the discussion below of the issues to be decided.

Having reviewed all of the material before me and the decision that is the subject of the request for review, I find that the Tribunal considered all of the submissions and evidence put before it, including the RNOA in all three of its versions, and correctly apprehended these submissions and evidence. I further find that the Tribunal provided full and comprehensive reasons for its decision of September 24, 2014. I further find that Mr. Black’s efforts and cost in preparing, filing and advancing this appeal would not have been wasted if he had heeded the previous instructions from the Tribunal to restrict the subject of the appeal to challenging the CFO Regulation No. 2425-2013 and the 300 bird chicken exemption policy. Had he done this, then his appeal could have been addressed in a timely manner and in an affordable forum.

Overview of the Request Consideration

In refusing to hear Mr. Black’s appeal, the Tribunal relied upon Section 16(4) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act (the “Act”) which provides as follows:

“Tribunal May Refuse to Hear Appeal

(4) The Tribunal may refuse to hear the appeal or, after a hearing has commenced, refuse to continue the hearing or make a decision if it relates to any order, direction, policy, decision or regulation of which the appellant has had knowledge for more than one year before the notices filed under Subsection (2.1) or, if in its opinion,

(a) The subject-matter of the appeal is trivial;

(b) The appeal is frivolous or vexatious or is not made in good faith; or

(c) The appellant has not a sufficient interest in the subject-matter of the appeal.”

The grounds relied upon by the Tribunal in refusing to hear the appeal are set out in Subsection 16(4)(b). They are disjunctive, meaning that if any one of those reasons can be established, the Tribunal may exercise its discretion to refuse to hear the appeal. In its decision, the Tribunal found that Mr. Black’s appeal was not only frivolous but also vexatious and not made in good faith. The Tribunal therefore found that there were three reasons why it should not proceed with the appeal when in law it only required one reason.

Is Mr. Black’s Appeal Frivolous?

Black’s Law Dictionary definition of frivolous is “lacking a legal basis or legal merit; not serious; not reasonably purposeful.” The law is well established that a Court will only dismiss or stay an action as being frivolous in the clearest of cases or if, on the face of the action and circumstances, it is plain and obvious that the case cannot succeed. (Lehan v. The Corporation of the City of St. Catherines [2009] O.J. No. 4643)

The Tribunal in its decision states as follows:

“An appeal that is trivial or frivolous is one that is not serious. The Tribunal was established to provide parties aggrieved by a decision of the CFO a forum to consider that dispute. While Mr. Black’s appeal did raise a dispute over CFO’s 300 bird exemption, he used that possibly serious dispute as a toe-hold to gain a platform for his personal political manifesto. After the Tribunal directed Mr. Black to reframe his appeal about just that issue, Mr. Black chose to ignore the Tribunal and filed an RNOA that was as expansive as the original appeal. The attitude displayed in Mr. Black’s conduct communicates a lack of seriousness about the 300 bird exemption issue; a lack of seriousness about the Tribunal process; and, a lack of seriousness about the Tribunal’s previous decision.

That attitude, as reflected in the RNOA informs our view that Mr. Black’s appeal is trivial or frivolous.”

I find that all of the issues raised in the RNOA, with the exception of the dispute over the CFO’s 300 bird exemption, can, on the evidence and submissions before me, be found to lack legal merit and are thus not serious. Is it possible for me to say that another panel, based on the same evidence and submissions, could have possibly continued to hear the appeal based on the issue of CFO’s 300 bird exemption? Or would they have refused to continue to hear the appeal on the grounds that the only possibly serious issue was being used by Mr. Black as a “toe-hold to gain a platform for his personal political manifesto”?

I am convinced that Mr. Black has made an arguable case that the Tribunal committed an error of law in refusing to hear the appeal, on the limited issue of CFO’s 300 bird exemption, on the grounds that the appeal as a whole was trivial or frivolous.

Is Mr. Black’s Appeal Vexatious?

In Currie v. Halton Regional Services Police Board (2003 CanLII 7815 (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 4516 (CA)) the Court of Appeal of this province identified characteristics of vexatious proceedings which include, among others;

(a) The bringing of one or more actions to determine an issue which has already been determined by a Court of competent jurisdiction;

(b) Where it is obvious that an action cannot succeed, or if the action would lead to no possible good, or if no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief;

(c) In determining whether proceedings are vexatious, the Court must look at the whole history of the matter and not just whether there was originally a good cause of action.

The Tribunal in its decision stated the following in relation to vexatious proceedings:

“The categories of vexatious proceedings are relatively large and remain flexible to allow Courts and Tribunals to respond appropriately. As reflected in the Lang Michener v. Fabian case sited by Mr. Black, the Courts recognize as vexatious an action that cannot succeed or one where no reasonable person can reasonably expect to obtain relief. That direction must be tailored to the Tribunal. As discussed previously, the Tribunal is without jurisdiction to grant Mr. Black any of those twelve areas of relief set out above. Therefore, in this Tribunal context, an appeal seeking such relief cannot succeed and is properly described as vexatious.”

I agree that with respect to the eleven areas of relief set out on pages two and three of the Tribunal’s decision of September 24, 2014, it is obvious that the appeal could not succeed with respect to those requested remedies. However, does that make the whole appeal, including the issue of CFO’s 300 bird exemption vexatious?

If the appeal were to have proceeded on the sole issue of CFO’s 300 bird exemption, which was included in the relief requested in the RNOA, there is an arguable case that the appeal may have been successful on that point alone. Even considering, the “whole history of the matter” as referred to in Currie above, there is a possibility that this might be an instance of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. I therefore conclude that Mr. Black has made an arguable case that the Tribunal committed an error of law in determining that the whole appeal is vexatious.

Is Mr. Black’s Appeal Not Made in Good Faith?

Section 16(4) of the Act provides that the Tribunal may refuse to hear an appeal which is “not made in good faith”. The term “good faith” is not defined in the Act. As there appears to be a lack of applicable jurisprudence with respect to the meaning of “not in good faith” relating to the stay or dismissal of a proceeding, I have sought the assistance of the case law relating to Rule 21.01(3)(d) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. This Rule provides that a Court may stay or dismiss an action which is found to be frivolous or vexatious or is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

I find for the purposes at hand that “not in good faith” is tantamount to the concept of abuse of process. “The doctrine of abuse of process has been utilized by the Courts in various ways in order to maintain the integrity of the adjudicative function. In particular, it has been invoked in civil proceedings and circumstances where the Court’s procedure has been misused in such a way that the administration of justice would be brought into disrepute.” (Taylor Made Advertising Ltd. v. Atlific Inc., 2012 ONCA 459, 2012 ON CA 459)

The Courts have an inherent power to prevent abuse of its process by staying or dismissing actions. Likewise, this Tribunal has the statutory power to make orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes. (Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure Rule 23(1))

The Tribunal decision which Mr. Black has requested be reviewed contains the following statements with respect to the issue of good faith:

“Examining the motive(s) of the appellant is required to determine if an appeal is not made in good faith. Mr. Black’s motives advancing the appeal can be gleaned from a review of the original notice of appeal and the several hundred pages that accompanied that document, the Revised Notice of Appeal and the additional two shorter appeal notices, as well as from his oral submissions made at the original motion hearing. The original motion decision discussed that Mr. Black’s appeal revealed a significant animus toward the chicken regulatory regime in Ontario and in Canada.

Implicit in the original motion decision was the Tribunal rejecting giving Mr. Black a platform to advance and debate his personal political agenda. Explicit in the original motion decision was that if Mr. Black genuinely wished to pursue an appeal that the Tribunal could consider, he was to restrict the appeal to the 300 bird exemption and the related regulation.

A careful examination of the RNOA reveals that Mr. Black is bent on pursuing his own agenda despite the Tribunal’s direction and advice. That conduct suggests to us that the 300 bird exemption is not the real motive behind Mr. Black’s appeal. The real motive appears to be to gain that platform to advance and debate a personal political agenda. In these circumstances we find that to be in bad faith.”

Mr. Black has been given several opportunities to bring the subject matter of his appeal within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. From the reading of his material, I believe Mr. Black to be an intelligent person. His failure to react appropriately to the Tribunal’s direction and advice, given on several occasions, leads me to believe that his real agenda is as stated by the Tribunal in its decision quoted above. Up to and including his request for review document, he has insisted on bringing forward issues which this Tribunal has no jurisdiction to deal with. I am convinced that his intention is, as stated by the Tribunal’s decision, to use the 300 bird exemption to gain a “toe-hold” and then to advance and debate his own personal political agenda. I find that to be not only an abuse of the process of the Tribunal but to be in bad faith. I am not convinced that Mr. Black has made an arguable case that the Tribunal committed an error of law in determining that it should refuse to hear his appeal on those grounds.

Mr. Black also made a request pursuant to Section 16(15) of the Act, which provides that the Tribunal may, on its own motion or upon the request of any person who is aggrieved by the decision, reopen the hearing and make a new decision. This provision is permissive and not mandatory as dictated by the use of the word “may”. For the reasons given above, the Tribunal refuses to exercise its discretion to reopen the hearing and continue with the appeal.

Summary

The Tribunal had grounds to refuse to hear the appeal on the basis that the appeal was not brought in good faith. As stated above, only one of the three grounds of frivolous, vexatious or not in good faith need be found in order to give the Tribunal the authority to exercise its discretion not be hear the appeal.

Decision of the Tribunal

Glenn Black’s request for review is hereby denied.

Dated at Ridgetown, Ontario this 23^rd day of December, 2014.

Appendix 1

11. Requested Orders from Glenn Black RNOA

The Appellant relies upon and respectfully requires the following findings, rulings,

Orders, declarations, injunctive relief, monetary relief, judgements, and awards

against the Respondent CFO:

1. Declaration of the wrongful actions and inactions of the Respondent, and the

findings of fact and interpretations of law that support such declarations;

b. Orders by the Tribunal that are restorative or corrective so as to prevent,

eliminate, mitigate, or cure the defects, illegal acts, abuses of power, conflicts

of interest, bad faith, torts, injustices, and other ailments in the actions and

inactions of the Respondent;

c. Orders by the Tribunal to clarify, correct, and interpret the responsibilities,

authority, reporting, key performance indicators, measurements, audits,

inspections, risk management, cost-benefit analysis, avoiding conflict of

interest, avoidance of bad faith, efficiency, effectiveness, purpose, Mission,

priorities, limitations, and constraints on the policies, procedures, rules,

decisions, actions, and inactions of both CFO;

d. Orders by the Tribunal to raise the quota-exempt chicken limit from 300

birds per year per farm property, to:

i. 2,000 birds/yr/farm;

ii. Or, in the alternative, to 1,295 birds/yr/farm.

e. Recommendations by the Tribunal that under the Chicken Regulations, those

raising quota-exempt chickens in Ontario should be eligible to be members in

CFO on an equal basis to chicken quota-holders, and thereby can run for

office.

f. The Tribunal making written recommendations to the Ontario’s Minister of

Agriculture on improvements and recommended interpretations of agriculture

policies, programs, initiatives, priorities, Farm Products Marketing Act, and

regulations;

g. Award of damages for the losses the Appellant incurred due to the wrongful

actions and inactions of the Respondent;

h. Damages for the lost business, profits, prestige, good will, mental anguish,

pain and suffering, and other benefits that the Appellant would otherwise

have enjoyed had it not been for the Respondent’s wrongful actions and

inactions;

i. In the alternative, with the waiver of tort by the Applicant, judgement that the

Respondent shall provide a full accounting for the Applicant and all others

similarly situated, and under the laws of equity the disgorgement of unjust

income, profits, and other benefits received by the Respondent, for the

benefit of the Applicant and all others similarly situated;

j. Judgement in favour of the Appellant that by the Respondent’s duty owed

and tortuous actions, the Respondent are deemed to have created a

constructive trust in favour of the Applicant, and the Applicant seeks a Court

declaration of the existence of this constructive trust, a full accounting by the

Respondent for this constructive trust, and the liquidation and payout of said

constructive trust in favour of the Applicant and all others similarly situated.

k. Declaration as to the other forms of trust that exist or were created in favour

of the Appellant and all others similarly situated, and an order for the full

accounting for those trusts;

l. Judgement against the Respondent for exemplary and punitive damages;

m. Tribunal costs and legal costs on the basis of full reimbursement, or in the

alternative, solicitor-client and cost recovery for disbursements by the

Appellant against the Respondent and in favour of the Applicant and all other

similarly situated;

n. Other costs, findings, declarations, awards, and judgements that the Applicant

may request, and/or that the Court sees fit to award.

APPENDIX 2

1. Glenn Black’s request for review dated October 24, 2014.

2. Original Notice of Appeal dated March 14, 2014 (20 pages).

3. Appeal Factum (250 pages, more or less).

4. Letter from CFO dated March 27, 2014 advising that CFO will be filing a Motion that the Tribunal ought not to hear the appeal.

5. Notice of Motion from CFO dated April 15, 2014.

6. Affidavit of Chris Horbasz sworn April 15, 2014 and Exhibits thereto.

7. Written submissions of CFO with respect to the Motion.

8. Submissions Brief from CFO with respect to the Motion.

9. Notice of Constitutional Question from Glenn Black dated April 28, 2014.

10. Letter from Attorney General for Ontario dated May 8, 2014 advising they do not intend to intervene.

11. Letter from the Department of Justice Canada dated May 13, 2014 advising they do not intend to intervene.

12. Letter from the Ontario Farm Products Marketing Commission responding submission dated May 2, 2014.

13. Glenn Black’s submissions with respect to CFO Motion received May 2, 2014.

14. Affidavit of Glenn Black and Exhibits thereto.

15. Petition circulated by Glenn Black.

16. Glenn Black’s “viva voce” arguments presented at Motion hearing on May 14, 2014.

17. Decision of the Tribunal dated May 21, 2014 arising from the Motion hearing on May 14, 2014.

18. Glenn Black e-mail dated July 17, 2014 providing electronic copy of his amended Notice of Appeal, Affidavit and Notice of Constitutional Question.

19. Letter from Gloria Marco Borys dated July 21, 2014 acknowledging receipt of amended Notice of Appeal.

20. Glenn Black e-mail dated July 21, 2014 concerned that his 98 page amended Notice of Appeal would not be accepted and therefore submitting a two page version.

21. E-mail from Gloria Marco Borys dated July 21, 2014 advising that the Tribunal is prepared to accept his 98 page Notice of Appeal as having been received on July 17, 2014.

22. Amended Notice of Appeal (98 pages).

23. Affidavit of Glenn Black sworn July 17, 2014.

24. Notice of Constitutional Question from Glenn Black dated July 17, 2014.

25. CFO letter dated July 24, 2014 objecting to the revised Notice of Appeal.

26. Letter from Glenn Black dated July 25, 2014 responding to CFO’s letter of objection.

27. Notice of Intention to Refuse to Hear Appeal dated July 31, 2014.

28. Glenn Black’s response to Tribunal’s Notice of Intention to Refuse to Hear Appeal.

29. 1,085 page submission on case law, statutes, etc. with respect to Glenn Black’s response to Tribunal’s Notice of Intention to Refuse to Hear Appeal.

30. CFO responding submission received October 22, 2014.

31. Decision of the Tribunal Re: refusal to hear dated September 24, 2014.

32. The Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure.

33. Section 16 of the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Act.