National Farmers Union [Request for Review], 2013 ONAFRAAT 8

Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal

Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal 1 Stone Road West

Tribunal d’appel de l’agriculture, de l’alimentation et des affaires rurales 1, chemin Stone Ouest

Guelph, (Ontario) N1G 4Y2 Tel: (519) 826-3433, Fax: (519) 826-4232 Email: appeals.tribunal.omafra@ontario.ca

Guelph (Ontario) N1G 4Y2 Tél.: (519) 826-3433, Téléc.: (519) 826-4232 Courriel: appeals.tribunal.omafra@ontario.ca

AGRICULTURE, FOOD AND RURAL AFFAIRS APPEAL TRIBUNAL

APPEAL:

National Farmers Union – Ontario

National Farmers Union [Request for Review] 2013 ONAFRAAT 8

STATUTE:

Farm Registration and Farm Organizations Funding Act, 1993

HEARING:

N/A

DATE OF DECISION:

June 7, 2013

2013-08

NEUTRAL CITATION:

2013 ONAFRAAT 8

National Farmers Union [Request for Review]

IN THE MATTER OF: SECTIONS 4 AND 5 OF THE FARM REGISTRATION AND FARM ORGANIZATIONS FUNDING ACT, 1993.

AND IN THE MATTER OF: An application to the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Appeal Tribunal by the National Farmers Union - Ontario (NFU-O) for accreditation under Subsection 4(1) of the Act.

AND IN THE MATTER OF: A request for review by the National Farmers Union - Ontario (NFU-O) from a decision of the Tribunal without reasons dated December 19, 2012 and with reasons dated April 15, 2013 under Subsection 21.2(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act and Rule 29 of the Rules of Procedure for the Tribunal.

Before: John O’Kane, Vice Chair

Background to the Request For Review

On December 19^th, 2012, the Tribunal released a decision denying the application of the National Farmers Union-Ontario (NFU-O) for accreditation under subsection 4(1) of the Farm Registration and Farm Organizations Funding Act, 1993, S.O. 1993, chapter 21 (the Act).

On April 15^th, 2013, the Tribunal released the reasons for that December 19^th decision.

On May 15^th, 2013, the Tribunal Chair received a request for review of the decision from the NFU-O. On May 17^th, 2013, the Tribunal Chair received written submissions on behalf of Minister of Agriculture and Food (the Minister) in respect of the NFU-O request for review.

The request for review and the Minister’s submissions assert that the Tribunal made errors of law, errors of fact, errors of mixed fact and law, and denied the NFU-O and the Minister procedural fairness.

Context about Requests to Review a Decision

Generally, in our legal system, parties get only one “kick at the can” and the finality principle embodies that general rule.

Subject to any statutory rights of appeal, a decision of the Tribunal is final.

Under the scheme of the Act, there is no right of appeal from a Tribunal accreditation decision.

While the absence of a statutory right of appeal would not preclude judicial review of a Tribunal accreditation decision, the absence of a statutory appeal right would be a factor a reviewing court might consider in the context of the appropriate standard of review.

Generally, once the Tribunal makes a decision, its statutory mandate is concluded and the legal principle of functus officio applies to prevent the Tribunal from reconsidering its decision. Functus officio is a sub branch of the law of res judicata meaning that the “issue” has been decided. The legal principle of res judicata is engaged to prevent a party from re-litigating the same issue more than once.

It is important to note that these ancient legal principles of finality, functus officio and res judicata, developed in the context of legal disputes between parties and in that context these principles are appropriate and make good sense. However, the distinction in the present context is that in the accreditation process under the Act, there is no real dispute between parties. Additionally, in the context of the Act, accreditation is not a “one kick at the can” issue but, rather, an ongoing or continuing issue and, therefore, the principles of finality, functus officio and res judicata, in this context, do not have the same application.

The Tribunal’s power to review a decision is set out in Rule 29 of the Tribunal’s Rules of Procedure (the Rules). The source of the jurisdiction for the Tribunal’s review power is section 21.2 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. s.22 (SPPA).

The SPPA power to internally review Tribunal decisions is a statutory codification of the common law principle enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada in Chandler v. Alberta (Association of Architects) 1989 CanLII 41 (SCC), [1989] 2 S.C.R. 848.

In Chandler, Justice Sopinka concluded that the principle of functus officio should not be inflexibly applied in the administrative law context where the tribunal has committed an error that involves a jurisdictional defect, the denial of natural justice or where the tribunal has failed to dispose of an issue before it.

However, in the context of this particular matter, there is an additional jurisdictional factor arising from section 29 of the Act that provides.

29. The Tribunal may reconsider any order it has made and may affirm or replace the order.

This section 29 from the Act reinforces that, in the context of the accreditation process under this Act and the Tribunal’s role in that accreditation process, a Tribunal order is not necessarily final and is subject to reconsideration and, therefore, the finality principle, functus officio and res judicata, do not have the same application as in other circumstances where the Tribunal carries out a different statutory mandate.

Under the Tribunal’s Rules, a request for review is first evaluated by the Chair or a Vice-Chair to determine whether the request merits a review hearing. The factors for that initial evaluation embodied in the Tribunals’ Rules are contained in Rule 29.09 as follows:

29.09 In deciding whether it is advisable to conduct a review of all or any part of a final decision or order, the Tribunal may consider any relevant circumstances including,

(a) whether there is significant new evidence which was not available at the time of the original appeal;

(b) whether the Tribunal made a material error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different decision;

(c) the extent to which any party to the appeal or any other person has relied upon the final decision or order;

(d) the extent to which any party to the appeal or any other person will be affected by the review process; and

(e) whether the public interest in finality of decisions is outweighed by the alleged prejudice to the requester.

The SPPA and the Tribunal’s Rules and the Act do not provide any particular test or standard of review at this preliminary evaluation stage.

Generally, internal decision reviews under the SPPA jurisdiction and the Tribunal’s Rule 29 are an extraordinary mechanism that should only be granted in exceptional circumstances, otherwise, the finality principle would become meaningless.

However, as discussed, the finality principle is relaxed in the context of this Act and this accreditation process. Therefore, in circumstances such as this, where the proceeding is not akin to a true legal dispute between opposing parties and where the issue is an ongoing accreditation process and where the Act provides the Tribunal with the power to review, affirm or replace Tribunal orders, it is unnecessary to find exceptional circumstances when considering granting a review.

In the present circumstances, in my view, the requester must satisfy me of an arguable case under the Rule 29.09 criteria for me to exercise my discretion to grant a review hearing.

While the Tribunal’s review rules¹ permit a Chair or Vice-Chair considering a request for review to consult with members of the original hearing panel, such consultation is rare if not unheard of. In more than a dozen requests for review that I have considered, I have never consulted a hearing panel and I prefer to let the decision under review speak for itself.

As will be evident throughout these reasons, it is my view that the nature of the Tribunal’s role and the Tribunal processes under this Act are sufficiently different that I found that consultation with the Vice-Chair who chaired the original hearing panel was necessary to allow me to fully consider the request for review. While the request for review raised a number of issues including errors of law; errors of fact and errors of mixed fact and law, I restricted my communication with the Vice-Chair of the previous panel to the denial of natural justice assertion advanced by the Minister.

The Minister’s Role in this Review Request

Under the Tribunal’s Rule 29.17, the Tribunal is authorized to refuse a request for review without seeking submissions from any other party to the original proceeding.

Typically, submissions from other participants to the original proceeding are only entertained at the invitation of the Chair or Vice-Chair considering the request for review.

In this case, the Minister delivered request for review submissions without any invitation from me.

In circumstances where uninvited request for review submissions are received by the Tribunal, the Chair or Vice-Chair retains discretion about whether to consider the uninvited submissions. The concerns that typically arise from such uninvited submissions relate to procedural fairness, giving the other participants an opportunity to respond to the uninvited submissions and unnecessarily prolonging the review process.

In these circumstances, I exercised my discretion to consider the Minister’s request for review submissions for two reasons. The first is the typical procedural fairness concerns are reduced in circumstances such as these where the Minister’s submissions are essentially aligned with and supportive of the submissions of the party requesting a review. The second reason is that this Act contains a review jurisdiction that is distinct from the SPPA review jurisdiction embodied in the Tribunal’s Rule 29 and given the Minister’s role under this Act, she would enjoy a right to seek her own request for reconsideration under the Act, in any event.

Scheme of the Act

The Act creates a system of registering farm businesses and accrediting qualified farm advocacy organizations. Subject to religious objection exemption, registered farm businesses are obliged to pay a prescribed fee that they direct to their choice of accredited farm organization. The purposes of the Act are explained in the title “farm registration” and “farm organization funding”.

Under the Act, farm organization accreditation is not a one-time event but, rather, a matter of continuing concern. That is evident from the statutory provisions that limit accreditation to three years² and that require regular re-accreditation³. That is also evident from the statutory provisions that empower the Tribunal, essentially of its own volition⁴, to conduct a review of a farm organization’s accreditation with the power to revoke a farm organization’s accreditation or impose conditions for maintaining accreditation⁵.

Accreditation of a qualified farm organization in the context of this Act can be likened to a licensing process. Here, rather than government staff administering the process, the government has designated the Tribunal as the body charged with accreditation decisions.

The Tribunal’s mandate and processes are defined by the context of this scheme.

Accreditation Process under the Act

The farm organization accreditation process begins with an application to the Tribunal⁶. The Tribunal is required to give notice of any such application to the Minister and to all other accredited farm organizations⁷. Upon receipt of a qualified accreditation application, the Tribunal is required to hold an accreditation hearing⁸ and to receive submissions from any person or organization entitled to notice under the Act⁹.

The Act expands on the hearing process under the heading “Procedure on Appeal”. The use of the word “appeal” in that heading is a misnomer because the accreditation hearing is not a true “appeal” but rather a hearing of first instance and unlike an appeal, the hearing concerns accreditation and not the resolution of a dispute between parties.

It is noteworthy under that “Procedure on Appeal” part of the Act that the legislature particularized the Tribunal’s role, in relation to a matter before it, to include:

• the power to gather information¹⁰

• the power to inspect documents¹¹

• the power to question any person¹²

• subject to observing procedural fairness:

o the power to accept submissions from persons not otherwise entitled to make submissions¹³

o the power to consider any relevant information obtained by the Tribunal¹⁴

• the power to reconsider any order the Tribunal has made¹⁵

• the power to affirm or replace any order the Tribunal has made¹⁶

The Tribunal’s role and powers as specified by the Legislature under that part of the Act are extremely broad and much wider than when the Tribunal sits in a more conventional appellate capacity. While the Tribunal is required to hold an accreditation hearing on a qualified application, the nature of its role under the Act is clearly different. Under this Act, the Tribunal’s role is part administrative in nature and part quasi-judicial in nature.

The Supreme Court of Canada recognized that administrative tribunals such as the Tribunal can have different roles and responsibilities depending on the legislative scheme¹⁷.

Again where the Board in its statutory roles takes on the complexion of a department of the executive branch of Government concerned with the execution of a policy laid down in broad concept by the Legislature, and where the Board has the delegated authority to issue regulations or has a broad discretionary power to license persons or activities, the trappings and habits of the traditional Courts have long ago been discarded.

In the context of this Act, the accreditation process and decision is akin to a licensing process and decision.

However, it is equally noteworthy that the scope of the Tribunal’s decision making responsibility under the Act is narrowly circumscribed. Subsection 6(1) of the Act provides that if the Tribunal determines that a farm organization meets the “prescribed criteria”, the Tribunal is obliged to make an accreditation order. Conversely if the Tribunal determines that a farm organization does not meet the “prescribed criteria”, the Tribunal is obliged to refuse accreditation.

Under paragraph 9 of subsection 33(1) of the Act, the Lieutenant Governor in Council is given the power to make regulations “respecting the criteria to be used for accrediting farm organizations”.

In Ontario Regulation 723/93, the Lieutenant Governor in Council in subsection 5(1) prescribed the farm organization accreditation criteria as:

• an annual membership fee of at least $195.00, including taxes

• incorporation under a general or special Act of the legislature

• its purpose is to represent persons carrying on farming businesses

• it provides advice and analysis to governments, administrative tribunals or advisory bodies concerning agricultural issues

• the development of programs or policies that are of interest to persons carrying on farm businesses

• it has entered into an agreement or agreed to enter into an agreement with the Minister of Agriculture and the accredited farm organizations to provide special funding to the francophone farm organization entitled to funding under sections 12 or 13 of the Act

In subsection 5(2) of that Regulation, the Lieutenant Governor in Council prescribed that a farm organization does not meet the criteria if its representation of farming businesses is restricted to only those raising certain crops, livestock or poultry or only the production of certain agricultural products.

The Tribunal’s Determination on Standing

The Tribunal refused to accredit the NFU-O primarily due to its determination that the NFU-O did not have standing to make an application for accreditation under subsection 4(1) of the Act.

While the Tribunal did go on to consider the accreditation criteria set out in subsection 5(1) of Ontario Regulation 723/93, its primary reason for refusing the NFU-O accreditation was the standing issue, and the Tribunal devoted thirty-five pages of analysis in its Reasons for Decision to the standing issue. Most of that analysis focused on whether NFU-O was “representing” farmers in the province.

In the context of this Act, and the Tribunal’s accreditation decision, the Tribunal concluded that while NFU-O was an “organization” as set out in subsection 4(1), it was not “representing farmers in the province”, as set out in subsection 4(1) and, therefore, NFU-O did not have the “standing” required of subsection 4(1) and the Tribunal refused NFU-O accreditation under the Act.

Material Error of Law – Standing

The Request for Review asserts that the Tribunal wrongfully determined that it had jurisdiction to determine standing under subsection 4(1) of the Act and asserts that determination was a material error of law and that if the Tribunal had not made that error, it would likely have reached a different decision. The Minister’s submission makes a similar assertion.

It is trite, but bears repeating, that the Legislature does not use superfluous language in legislation. The Legislature is presumed to intend that all the words it used in an enactment would be given effect and would have meaning.

“Every word in a statute is presumed to make sense and to have a specific role to play in advancing the legislative purpose.”¹⁸

The words of subsection 4(1) of the Act in issue are “any organization representing farmers in the province may apply”. That language can be contrasted with language such as “any person may apply”. That latter language accords with a simple enabling provision but also illustrates that the Legislature intended something more by using the words it did in subsection 4(1).

Therefore, to give plain meaning to the words used by the Legislature, subsection 4(1) of the Act must be interpreted as a threshold containing two requirements for applications for accreditation. The first is the applicant must be an “organization”, ruling out applications from individuals. The second is that the organization be “representing farmers in the province”, ruling out applications from, for example, an organization representing farm implement dealers.

As noted previously, the Tribunal is both the administrative gatekeeper of the accreditation applications as well as the quasi-judicial decision-maker concerning accreditation. In addition, as noted previously, the Act gives the Tribunal very broad investigatory powers under sections 26 and 27.

It follows, in my view, that those broad investigatory powers include investigating whether an applicant is an “organization” and whether an applicant is “representing farmers in the province.”

Therefore, I am satisfied that the Tribunal had jurisdiction under subsection 4(1) of the Act to determine whether NFU-O had standing to make an accreditation application.

I am not convinced that the NFU-O or the Minister has made an arguable case that the Tribunal committed an error of law in its standing determination under subsection 4(1) of the Act.

Material Errors of Law – Raising Matters on Tribunal’s Own Initiative

The NFU-O’s review request also asserted that the Tribunal committed a series of material errors of law, all of which relate to the Tribunal’s inquiry and investigations of the NFU-O. The NFU-O’s review request characterized these several material errors of law as the Tribunal raising matters on its own initiative.

As noted previously, sections 26 and 27 of the Act, give the Tribunal wide powers to inquire and investigate in the context of accreditation applications.

The materials reviewed in considering the NFU-O’s review request included a series of four procedural orders made by the Tribunal between June and December, 2012. A fair summary of those procedural orders is that the Tribunal was, during that period, seeking further information about the NFU-O, its structure and governance, its membership, and its operations.

In my view, such inquiries and investigations in the context of an accreditation application are authorized by sections 26 and 27 of the Act. That those issues were raised by the Tribunal is understandable in a context where there is no “other party” to raise such issues.

Therefore, I am unconvinced that NFU-O has made an arguable case that the Tribunal’s inquiries and investigations amounted to material errors of law.

Material Errors of Fact

Allegations of material errors of fact are, in my view, the most difficult for NFU-O to make and the most difficult for me to evaluate at this preliminary stage.

There is no verbatim recording of the hearing and there is no transcript of the oral evidence. As a result of that, I am in a much less informed position than the Tribunal to make determinations of fact.

In my view, a party making a request for review would need to demonstrate that there was no evidence upon which the Tribunal could have made any of the impugned findings of fact. (Emphasis added)

In the present circumstances, the NFU-O has not convinced me that there was no evidence upon which the Tribunal could have made those findings of fact.

Therefore, I am unconvinced that NFU-O has made an arguable case that the Tribunal made any material errors of fact.

Denial of Procedural Fairness

The Tribunal’s Rule 29 regarding a request for review does not list procedural fairness explicitly as a basis for review; however, it is my view that a breach or denial of procedural fairness is an error of law and therefore subsumed within Rule 29.09 (b).

When the law courts are asked to judicially review administrative tribunal decisions, careful consideration is given to the appropriate standard of review courts should apply. However, in the law courts, the one constant is that a breach or denial of procedure fairness is a matter of fundamental jurisdiction and, therefore, the courts need not engage in standard of review considerations. That confirms that a breach or denial of procedural fairness typically results in a decision being fatally tainted.

Procedural fairness is not a “one size fits all” concept. Procedural fairness is a flexible concept that adapts to varying circumstances.

There are many court decisions that inform an understanding of procedural fairness. One such decision of the Court of Appeal for Ontario is informative despite the fact that it arose under different legislation and in a different factual context. The importance of the following passage is that it distills succinctly the elements within procedural fairness.

In any event, procedural fairness dictates that the complainant and other parties who may be affected by a decision of the Commission be given notice of the facts, arguments and considerations upon which the decision is to be based and an opportunity to make submissions. . . .If the Commission were to proceed on a different recommendation or to base its decision on factors or considerations undisclosed to the complainant and the others there would be no opportunity to respond and the right to fairness would be infringed.¹⁹

In the context of the accreditation process established by this legislative scheme, and in the context of the nature of accreditation applications such as this where there is frequently no opposing party, and in the context of the Tribunal exercising both investigatory powers and deliberative and decision-making powers, the Tribunal must take each mandated step cognizant of the requirements of procedural fairness.

An example of the procedural fairness dictated by the context of this Act is the Tribunal’s Interim Order of August 10^th, 2012 (the First Interim Order). That First Interim Order was issued after the July 18^th, 2012 hearing. That First Interim Order reflects the Tribunal’s consideration then on the word “member” in the context of the scheme of the Act and regulations. The Tribunal in that First Interim Order flagged that concern as follows:

Given that this issue was raised late in the hearing, that the NFU-O was not represented by counsel, and that this is a legal issue involving statutory interpretation, the Tribunal considers it appropriate to give the NFU-O an opportunity to make written submissions ...

As revealed in that passage, the Tribunal, while deliberating and considering the accreditation application, appreciating that the applicant before it was not represented by legal counsel and confronted with the legal interpretation that might be given to the word “member”, recognized that procedural fairness, in the context of the accreditation process under this Act, required that NFU-O be given the opportunity to make submissions about the word in issue.

It is also apparent from that First Interim Order, that the Tribunal was continuing an investigative process and was requiring additional evidentiary materials and giving NFU-O procedural fairness notice about that.

The Tribunal’s deliberations and consideration of the NFU-O accreditation continued as reflected in a Second, Third and Fourth Interim Orders issued during November and December 2012. In each of those Interim Orders, the Tribunal communicated to NFU-O that it was considering a particular issue, and invited either written submissions on a legal point or directed additional evidentiary materials.

The Fourth Interim Order scheduled a hearing for December 14^th, 2012 and that Order specifically raised “four areas of concern under the current legislative scheme for accrediting farm organizations”. By this point in the proceedings, the NFU-O was represented by legal counsel and by the December 14^th hearing, the Minister had also elected to participate through legal counsel. Those areas of concern are reproduced below:

1. Section 4(1) of the Act provides that "[a]ny organization representing farmers in the province may apply to the Tribunal to become an accredited farm organization for the purposes of this Act." Based on the evidence provided to date, the Tribunal has been unable to satisfy itself that the NFU-O is an organization "representing farmers in the province" as required under section 4(1) of the Act. It is unclear to the Tribunal whether the activities claimed by the NFU-O as representing farmers in Ontario are in fact carried out by the NFU-O, an Ontario corporation, or by the National Farmers Union (the "NFU"), a federal corporation based in Saskatoon with which the NFU-O is affiliated. The NFU appears to operate in Ontario through a regional organization known as "NFU Region 3," which appears legally to be part of the NFU and not part of the NFU- O. In addition, it is not clear to the Tribunal whether the NFU-O's activities, separate and apart from any activities of the NFU or NFU Region 3, consist of much more than accessing funding under the Act and then disbursing those funds to various entities, with the majority of the funds apparently being disbursed to the NFU pursuant to a memorandum of agreement between the NFU and the NFU-O.
2. A related concern arises under section 5(1)3 of Ontario Regulation 723/93, as amended (the "Regulation"), which requires a farm organization seeking accreditation to have as its purpose "to represent persons carrying on farming businesses." While the NFU-O's stated purpose may be to represent persons carrying on farming businesses, it is not clear to the Tribunal whether this is the NFU O's actual purpose or whether the actual purpose is to access funding under the Act in order to allow the NFU and NFU Region 3 to carry on their activities.
3. Similarly, section 5(1)4 of the Regulation requires a farm organization seeking accreditation to provide "advice and analysis to governments, administrative tribunals or advisory bodies concerning agricultural issues and the development of programs or policies that are of interest to persons carrying on farming businesses." It is not clear to the Tribunal from the evidence provided to date whether the NFU-O, as opposed to the NFU or NFU Region 3, provides advice and analysis to governments, administrative tribunals, or advisory bodies as required under section 5(1)4 of the Regulation.
4. Section 5(1)1 of the Regulation requires a farm organization seeking accreditation to have an annual membership fee of at least $195, including applicable taxes. The evidence to date indicates that the NFU-O has "associates" who pay an annual fee of less than $195. The evidence is unclear as to whether the NFU-O's associates are members or have some other status that does not amount to membership in the NFU-O.

The Minister asserts that the Tribunal made errors in law by failing to indicate at any point that it was considering the meaning to be given to the word “representing” in subsection 4(1) of the Act and by failing to give the Minister and the NFU-O an opportunity to make submissions on the interpretation of “representing” and, as a result, the Minister and NFU-O were denied procedural fairness.

In addition to participating at the hearing on December 14^th to make oral submissions, the Minister also filed thirty-seven pages of written argument plus seventeen case authorities and two textual authorities. The latter included passages from Sulllivan on the Construction of Statutes about interpreting legislation. The Minister’s written submissions included argument about statutory interpretation. The Vice-Chair of the Tribunal panel conducting the December 14^th hearing confirmed to me that both the Minister and the NFU-O made oral arguments at the conclusion of the evidence on December 14^th, 2012.

Extracting from the Court of Appeal’s reasons in the Payne case, I asked myself whether, in the context of the Act and in the context of the four Interim Orders and particularly the wording reproduced above from the Fourth Interim Order, it was arguable that the Tribunal proceeded on “undisclosed considerations” in respect of the words “representing farmers in the province”.

In my view, by the December 14^th hearing, neither the Minister nor the NFU-O could be under any misapprehension that the Tribunal had focused its accreditation concerns, in part, on the words “representing farmers in the province” from subsection 4(1) of the Act.

While the Fourth Interim Order focused on evidentiary matters related to those words, I do not accept that is arguable that the Minister or the NFU-O, reading that Order, would not appreciate that whatever the evidentiary issues might be, the Tribunal would need to interpret what those words meant in the context of the Act. I do not accept that the Tribunal proceeded on any “undisclosed consideration”.

In my view, even if the Minister and the NFU-O did not have actual notice that the Tribunal would be interpreting the meaning of “representing”, the Minister and the NFU-O had constructive notice that the Tribunal would interpret “representing”.

In these circumstances, where the proceeding had evolved through the four Interim Orders issued by the Tribunal, where both participants were represented by legal counsel, where the Tribunal had in that Fourth Interim Order focused on the issue of “representing farmers in the province” from subsection 4(1) of the Act, where the participants had the opportunity at the December 14^th hearing to deliver both oral and written argument, I do not believe that procedural fairness requires the Tribunal to issue further notice to the participants that “the Tribunal will be considering what the word representing means in this hearing and the NFU-O and the Minister should have come prepared to make submissions on that issue”.

Therefore, I am unconvinced that the Minister has an arguable case that there was any denial of natural justice.

Decision of the Tribunal

The NFU-O request for review, supported by the Minister’s submissions is hereby denied.

Dated at Brampton, Ontario this 7^th day of June, 2013.

Footnotes

1. 1Rule 29.14
2. 2Subsection 6(2)
3. 3Subsection 4(2)
4. 4Subsection 8(1)
5. 5Subsection 10(2)
6. 6Subsection 4(1)
7. 7Subsection 4(4)
8. 8Subsection 5(1)
9. 9Subsection 5(2)
10. 10Section 26
11. 11Ibid
12. 12Ibid
13. 13Subsection 27(1)
14. 14Subsection 27(2)
15. 15Section 29
16. 16Ibid
17. 17Innisfil (Twp) v. Vespra (Twp) (1981) 1981 CanLII 59 (SCC), 123 D.L.R. (3d) 530 at pp. 546-547
18. 18Sullivan, Ruth, The Construction of Statutes, 5^th Ed., at p.210
19. 19Payne v. Ontario Human Rights Commission 2000 CanLII 5731 (ON CA), [2000] O.J. No. 2987 (O.C.A.), at para.156