Masood v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 242

Tribunals Ontario / Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario

Animal Care Review Board / Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

RECONSIDERATION DECISION

Before: Tassia Poynter, Vice-Chair Date of Order: June 15, 2026 Case Name: Masood v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 218

For the Appellant/Applicant: Zohaib Masood, Self-represented For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1On March 10, 2026, Zohaib Masood (the Appellant) filed a request for reconsideration of the decision of the Animal Care Review Board (Board) in Masood v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 218 (Decision).

2In the Decision, I dismissed the Appellant’s appeal of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent)’s decision to keep a white tiger cub named Atlas and a male spotted hyena named Marilyn in its care (DTK appeal). I also dismissed the Appellant’s application for return of the animals (Application).

3The grounds for a request for reconsideration are outlined in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission’s Rules of Procedure (Rules). To grant a request for reconsideration, the Board must be satisfied that one or more of the following criteria are met:

a. The Board acted outside its jurisdiction or violated the rules of procedural fairness;

b. The Board made an error of law or fact such that the Board would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made;

c. The Board heard false evidence from a party or witness, which was discovered only after the hearing and likely affected the result; and/or

d. There is evidence that was not before the Board when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

4In his request for reconsideration, the Appellant submits that I violated the rules of procedural fairness (Rule 18.2 (a)) and made an error of law or fact such that the Board would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made (Rule 18.2 (b)). Specifically, the Appellant submits:

a. my interpretation of distress under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act) was incorrect and that I applied a standard closer to “preferred husbandry practices”;

b. I relied extensively on guidelines of the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA) in a manner that “materially elevated the standard” of care that I applied to the Appellant;

c. I applied an “improperly strict threshold” in assessing the Appellant’s remedial efforts following the removal of the animals and failed to give consideration to the circumstances in which the animals are now being kept;

d. I inappropriately placed significant weight on veterinary findings made after the animals were removed; and

e. I improperly concluded that the Appellant lacks sufficient expertise to care for the animals.

5The Respondent was invited to make written submissions on the Appellant’s request for reconsideration, and it filed them with the Board on April 9, 2026. In its submissions, the Respondent asks the Board to confirm the Decision and dismiss the Appellant’s request for reconsideration on the basis that it does not establish any of the grounds for reconsideration. The Appellant was invited to make reply submissions and he filed them with the Board on April 16, 2026.

RESULT

6The Appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

7The test for reconsideration under Rule 18.2 of the Rules involves a high threshold (see: Flanders and Mogck v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 116 at para. 11).

8The reconsideration process is not an opportunity for a party to re-litigate its position if it disagrees with the Board’s decision. The requestor must show how or why the decision falls into one of the categories in Rule 18.2 of the Rules.

A. The Board did not make an error of law or fact

9For the reasons set out below, I find that I did not make an error of law or fact such that I would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. Rather, I find that the Appellant’s submissions are focused on his disagreement with my reasons for decision and that his request for reconsideration is an attempt to re-litigate the DTK appeal and Application.

i. The Board did not incorrectly apply and interpret “distress” under the PAWS Act.

10I find that I correctly applied and interpreted distress as defined in the PAWS Act in the Decision.

11Distress is defined in section 1(1) of the PAWS Act as the state of being: (a) in need of proper care, water, food or shelter; (b) injured, sick, in pain or suffering; or (c) abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.

12The PAWS Act’s Standards of Care and Administrative Requirements regulation, O. Reg. 444/19 (the Regulation) sets out the standards of care for all animals, in addition to the standards of care for captive wildlife, and standards for enclosures for captive wildlife.

13The Appellant argues that:

a. I concluded that Atlas and Marilyn (the animals) were in distress largely based on speculative concerns regarding husbandry practices and enclosure design;

b. by considering enclosure expectations, husbandry practices, and social grouping preferences, I expanded the definition of distress beyond section 1(1) of the PAWS Act; and

c. the evidence before me did not meet the threshold for distress as defined in the PAWS Act and that I instead applied a standard closer to preferred husbandry practices rather than the test for distress.

14I disagree with the Appellant’s arguments. As set out by the Respondent in its submissions on the Appellant’s request for reconsideration, I concluded the animals were in distress because I found they lacked appropriate food and water (paras. 29-50 of the Decision); were provided with inappropriate care, facilities, and services for the general welfare of captive wildlife; lacked an appropriate daily routine; were kept in incompatible social groups (paras. 51-86 of the Decision); and had inadequate and inappropriate enclosures (paras. 87-118 of the Decision). All these findings are connected to the definition of distress under the PAWS Act and/or the requirements set out in the Regulation. These findings do not expand the definition of distress beyond the PAWS Act; rather they are rooted in the PAWS Act and consider what the Regulation to the PAWS Act requires.

15As set out in paragraph 48 of the Decision, I also considered and did not accept the Appellant’s argument that the description of the animals as “bright, alert, and ambulatory” in some of the email reports from the institutional zoo facility where the animals were being temporarily boarded following their removal contradicts a finding of distress. The Appellant repeated this argument in his reconsideration request, and I find no reason to depart from my conclusion in the Decision.

ii. The Board did not rely extensively on guidelines of the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA) in a manner that “materially elevated the standard” of care

16I find that my consideration of the “Tiger Care Manual”, published by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums (AZA Guide) did not materially elevate the standard of care for the animals that I applied in the Appellant’s case beyond what the PAWS Act requires.

17I find it was appropriate for me to consider the AZA Guide in determining if the standards of care for basic care and adequate and appropriate enclosures for captive wildlife had been met for Atlas, specifically.

18The Respondent submits that the PAWS Act does not restrict what evidence the Board can and cannot consider and how it may exercise its jurisdiction relating to factual findings (Flanders and Mogck v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 116 at para. 15). The Respondent also submits that the Board has held that guides or manuals regarding the care of animals can be used as reference tools (Steinberg v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 CanLII 7569 (ON ACRB) at paras. 51-53 and Nicholls v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 31 at paras. 17-18). I agree that such guides, including the AZA Guide in this case, can be appropriate reference tools.

19I do not agree with the Appellant’s submission that I turned the AZA Guide into a determinative legal benchmark or a required level of care, rather than a reference tool.

20The Appellant relied on Pryde, Spottiswood and Pierce v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2021 ONACRB 12 in support of his argument, but that case can be distinguished from this one for several reasons. First, the appellants in that case called an expert witness in canine behaviour with expertise in sled dogs, which was the subject matter underlying that appeal. Second, the appellants in that case also provided evidence regarding other codes of care in respect of dog tethering systems. The Board considered that evidence but found that the PAWS Act and the Regulation contained specific requirements for tethers which the appellants had not provided to their animals.

21In this case, the Appellant did not put forward any evidence – expert or otherwise – at the hearing to contradict the AZA Guide as it relates to the appropriate size or features of an enclosure for a tiger cub. In the absence of such evidence, I preferred the evidence of Dr. Pauline Delnatte, who I qualified as an expert witness. Dr. Delnatte referenced the AZA Guide as part of her testimony.

22At paragraph 117 of the Decision, I also addressed the Appellant’s arguments, which he repeated in his request for reconsideration, regarding the non-binding nature of the AZA Guide:

I agree with the Appellant’s argument that the AZA Guide is not law in Ontario and that the PAWS Act does not require perfection. That said, I do not accept the Appellant’s argument that the Respondent sought to impose unreasonable standards of idealized care on the Appellant in relation to the enclosures of either animal. I accept the Respondent’s argument that Dr. Delnatte’s reliance on the AZA guide was reasonable in determining the expected standards of care and what is adequate and appropriate for tigers as a species. I also find that the standards for enclosures described by Dr. Delnatte in her testimony were applicable and appropriate considering the species-specific requirements for hyenas, including their sensitivity to colder temperatures.

23Accordingly, I find that my consideration of the AZA Guide did not materially elevate the standard I applied in the Appellant’s case beyond what the PAWS Act requires.

iii. The Board did not apply an “improperly strict threshold” in assessing the Appellant’s remedial efforts; the animals’ current circumstances are not evidence before the Board

24I find that I considered whether the Appellant had proved on a balance of probabilities that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in the Respondent’s care were no longer present. I disagree that a balance of probabilities is an improperly strict threshold or evidentiary standard.

25In his request for reconsideration, the Appellant reiterated his arguments that the removal and decision to keep Atlas and Marilyn in the Respondent’s care was disproportionate and that I ought to have considered whether:

a. conditions could have been imposed in lieu of the removal;

b. the Appellant’s partial compliance mitigated risk; and

c. whether continued detention was necessary.

26The Appellant further argues that because I based my conclusions on improvements that were still underway at the time of the hearing, I applied an improperly strict threshold. I disagree.

27As set out above, the Appellant had the onus to prove on a balance of probabilities that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in the Respondent’s care were no longer present. For the reasons set out in paragraphs 122 to 139 of the Decision, I found that he had not done so based on the Appellant’s evidence at the hearing.

28The Appellant also argued that it was an error for me not to consider the circumstances in which Atlas and Marilyn are now being kept. The Appellant stated that the enclosures in which the animals are now kept are far smaller than the enclosures he provided for them.

29The Appellant’s request for reconsideration is not based on Rule 18.2(d), which is that there is evidence that was not before the Board when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

30In any event, I note that notwithstanding the Appellant’s submissions that suggest changes were made after the hearing concluded, the Appellant has not provided any new evidence as part of his request for reconsideration that demonstrates that he made any further improvements or efforts since January 7, 2026, the last date of the hearing, to address the conditions that caused Atlas and Marilyn to be kept in the Respondent’s care.

31There was no evidence before me at the hearing, nor is there any evidence on this request for reconsideration regarding the size of the animals’ enclosures while they were kept in the Respondent’s care. Even if I were to accept that such information is relevant to the Appellant’s application, it is not possible for me to consider information that is not before me.

iv. The Board did not place an inappropriate amount of weight on veterinary findings made after the animals were removed

32I find that I appropriately considered the post-removal veterinary findings as one factor among many in determining whether the Appellant had met the standards of care for food and water for Atlas and Marilyn.

33In his request for reconsideration, the Appellant reiterated his argument that the post-removal veterinary findings could not be clearly linked to his husbandry practices during the relevant period. I disagree.

34I addressed this argument in the Decision at paragraph 47:

In addition, I find that the post-removal veterinary findings confirm the presence of metabolic bone disease in Atlas and were suggestive of limb deformities in Marilyn. I accept Dr. Delnatte’s interpretation of these findings as being caused by deficiencies in the animals’ diets. Further, even though these findings were not available to the Respondent at the time the DTK was issued, I find that it was reasonable for the Respondent to rely on Dr. Delnatte’s suspicion of these findings based on her November 18, 2025 assessment of the animals in issuing the DTK.

35I also specifically addressed the evidence before me regarding whether the animals’ limb deformities could be caused by genetic factors or anything other than an inappropriate diet at paragraph 39 of the Decision.

v. The Board did not improperly conclude that the Appellant lacks sufficient expertise to care for the animals

36I find that I appropriately considered the evidence before me at the hearing in respect of the Appellant’s knowledge and expertise in caring for the animals.

37In his request for reconsideration, the Appellant correctly states that no expert evidence was presented that specifically assessed his knowledge, qualifications, or ability to implement improved husbandry practices.

38Indeed, the only evidence before me at the hearing on this point was the Appellant’s statements in cross-examination that his experience and education with exotic animals consisted of practical, hands-on experience and that he had worked alongside a veterinarian.

39At paragraph 127 of the Decision, I stated my view that “[…] the Appellant currently lacks sufficient knowledge to develop and/or oversee an appropriate daily routine for either animal”. The Decision does not state that the Appellant has no expertise or veterinary support.

40In his request for reconsideration, the Appellant states that at the hearing he testified that he worked with an exotic veterinarian and that veterinary input formed part of the care he provided.

41As noted above, I was aware of this evidence based on the Appellant’s testimony at the hearing and considered it in making my findings.

42For the reasons set out above, the Appellant’s request for reconsideration does not meet the criteria under Rule 18.2(b) of the Rules and I dismiss it on that basis.

B. The Board did not violate the rules of procedural fairness

43In his submissions, the Appellant states that his request for reconsideration is also based on the ground that I violated the rules of procedural fairness.

44The Appellant did not provide any further submissions and/or supporting case law with his request for reconsideration regarding his position that I violated the rules of procedural fairness. Instead, the Appellant focused the entirety of his submissions on the alleged error of fact or law.

45Procedural fairness generally encompasses the following:

a. Ensuring that the parties understand the case they have to meet; and

b. Ensuring that the parties have an opportunity to be heard and to respond (see: Windrift Adventures Inc. et al. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 171 at para. 16).

46I find that the Appellant has not proven on a balance of probabilities that I breached the rules of procedural fairness because his submissions do not specify how I violated the rules of procedural fairness in the Decision. Making bald statements without further supporting submissions and/or evidence is insufficient to grant a request for reconsideration. Moreover, I explained the onus/burden of proof on the DTK appeal and Application to the parties at the outset of the hearing, and both parties were given equal opportunity to call witnesses, file and present evidence, and make oral submissions at the hearing.

47For the reasons set out above, the Appellant’s request for reconsideration does not meet the criteria under Rule 18.2(a) of the Rules and I dismiss it on that basis.

C. Forfeiture of the Animals

48Both parties raised as an additional issue the fact that Atlas and Marilyn were forfeited to the Crown on January 15, 2026, due to the Appellant neither paying nor appealing a Statement of Account in the amount of $5,840.00 dated December 21, 2025 for boarding and veterinary costs for the animals. For clarity, this forfeiture occurred after the hearing of the DTK appeal and Application underlying the Decision had concluded but before the Decision was released. The parties did not raise the issue of forfeiture prior to the release of the Decision.

49The Appellant argues that forfeiture of the animals does not preclude the Board from reconsidering its Decision. The Appellant further argues that because the Decision was affected by a material legal error, the consequences flowing from the Decision, including forfeiture from not appealing or paying the Statement of Account, cannot be determinative.

50The Respondent argues that since the Appellant is no longer the owner of Atlas and Marilyn, the Board does not have jurisdiction to order their return.

51Given that I dismiss the request for reconsideration on the basis that it does not meet the criteria of Rule 18.2, it is unnecessary to decide this issue because it is moot.

CONCLUSION

52For the reasons set out above, the Appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Tassia Poynter, Vice-Chair