Date: 06/09/2026

Appeals under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c.13.

Between:

MJ Ryan

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

AMENDED DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Debra Backstein, Vice-Chair

For the Appellant: MJ Ryan, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Alice Sandiford, Student-at-Law and Erin MacGillivray, Counsel

Heard By Videoconference: April 8 and 9, 2026

OVERVIEW

1MJ Ryan (“Appellant”) appeals a Notice of Removal (“NOR”) and a Statement of Account (“SOA”), issued by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (“Respondent”) pursuant to the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (“PAWS Act”).

2The Appellant appealed the NOR to the Animal Care Review Board (“Board”) in file number 18303/ACRB. The Appellant appealed the SOA in Board file number 18346/ACRB. In its March 6, 2026 Case Conference Report and Order, the Board ordered that the appeals be heard together pursuant to clause 9.1(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.

3The appeals arise from the removal of the Appellant’s Basset Hound type dog, named Truly, on February 14, 2026. In the NOR, Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) alleges that Truly was in critical distress and that removal was justified under s. 31(1)(b) of the PAWS Act, due to severe Baclofen toxicity and associated complications.

4Following the removal, Truly was transported to Walker Road Animal Hospital (“WRAH”) for emergency veterinary treatment and hospitalization and remained in the Respondent’s care until February 17, 2026, when she was returned to the Appellant.

5On February 20, 2026, the Respondent issued the SOA in the amount of $3,859.42 for veterinary and related care costs incurred while Truly was in care.

6The Appellant submits that Truly was not in critical distress at the time of removal, that Truly was improving prior to her removal and that some of her subsequent medical complications were caused by AWS during the removal itself.

7The Appellant further submits that the SOA is unreasonable and excessive, that Truly remained hospitalized longer than medically necessary and that she lacks the financial means to pay the amount owing.

8The Respondent submits that the removal was necessary to relieve Truly’s critical distress and seeks confirmation of the NOR. The Respondent further submits that the veterinary and related costs were incurred and that the majority of them were reasonable and necessary.

9The Respondent acknowledges that certain fees with respect to hospitalization and boarding charges should be reduced and accordingly, seeks to have the SOA varied by $931.82 to $2,927.60.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

10The issues in dispute are:

1. Was the removal of Truly necessary to relieve her distress?

2. Should the SOA dated February 20, 2026, in the amount of $3,859.42 be confirmed, revoked or varied?

RESULT

11For the reasons that follow, I find that:

1. Truly was in critical distress on February 14, 2026, warranting her removal.

2. The SOA is varied to $2,927.60.

NOTICE OF REMOVAL

THE LEGISLATION

12Section 31(1)(b)(ii) of the PAWS Act authorizes an animal welfare inspector to remove and take possession of an animal for the purpose of relieving its distress if the inspector has inspected the animal and has reasonable grounds for believing that the animal is in critical distress.

13Under the PAWS Act, “critical distress” is defined in s.1(1) as distress that requires immediate intervention in order to prevent serious injury or preserve life. “Distress” is defined as (a) in need of proper care, water food or shelter; (b) injured, sick, in pain or suffering or (c) abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

Was Removal Necessary to Relieve Critical Distress?

14I find that Truly was in critical distress on February 14, 2026 and that her removal was necessary to relieve that distress.

15The evidence of both the Appellant and Respondent at the hearing confirmed that on February 13, 2026, Truly had ingested a significant quantity of Baclofen (600 mg), a prescription muscle relaxant. The Appellant had found Truly unconscious in the backyard and had attempted to orally administer peroxide to her while she was unconscious. Truly was taken by the Appellant to Thames Valley Animal Hospital (“TVAH”), for emergency treatment.

16The veterinary records of TVAH documented that Truly presented with severe Baclofen toxicosis. The records document respiratory compromise, an absence of neurological reflexes consistent with severe central nervous system depression, and profound cardiovascular and thermoregulatory depression secondary to toxicity. Further, there was suspected gastrointestinal bleeding as well as aspiration pneumonia.

17The TVAH records further established that Truly’s prognosis was grave and euthanasia was discussed. The Appellant ultimately declined euthanasia as well as continued emergency veterinarian treatment and monitoring and took Truly home for further care against medical recommendation.

18The Appellant testified on her own behalf and stated that after returning home with Truly, she attempted continued care for Truly on her own. She testified that Truly remained unconscious or minimally responsive for portions of the evening but that she administered medications and fluids to her. She further testified that she monitored Truly overnight and attempted to keep her comfortable and hydrated. The Appellant further testified that Truly demonstrated some periods of responsiveness which led the Appellant to believe that Truly’s condition was improving and that she did not require further veterinary intervention.

19Alyssa Dougherty (“S.I. Dougherty”), a senior investigator with AWS, testified on behalf of the Respondent. She stated that AWS became involved in the matter following Truly’s discharge from TVAH. She stated that there were concerns regarding Truly’s condition and the refusal of recommended emergency veterinary treatment. As a result, S.I. Dougherty attended the Appellant’s residence to conduct a welfare check on February 14, 2026.

20S.I. Dougherty testified that upon attendance at the residence, she observed Truly to be alive but breathing heavily, lethargic and confused. She noted that Truly collapsed following exertion. S.I. Dougherty believed that Truly required immediate veterinary intervention and removed her pursuant to s. 31(1)(b)(ii) of the PAWS Act. She then transported her to Walker Road Animal Hospital (“WRAH”) for emergency veterinary treatment and hospitalization.

21Dr. Kyle Goldie testified on behalf of the Respondent and was qualified at the time of the hearing as an expert in veterinary medicine. Dr. Goldie confirmed that he was not a treating veterinarian for Truly, but that he had reviewed the medical documentation from both TVAH and WRAH in forming his opinions regarding critical distress.

22Dr. Goldie testified that the quantity of Baclofen ingested by Truly had the potential to be fatal and that there is no antidote. He stated that the treatment for Baclofen toxicosis was supportive care and monitoring while the drug metabolized through the body.

23Dr. Goldie further testified that the clinical signs associated with Baclofen toxicosis could persist for 24 to 96 hours and that animals may deteriorate rapidly despite temporary periods of responsiveness. He opined that Truly required ongoing monitoring of her neurological status, respiratory function, hydration and response to treatment. He testified that the aspiration pneumonia represented an additional serious complication that increased the risks associated with Truly’s condition. He concluded that Truly’s removal from TVAH against veterinary advice despite her ongoing critical condition increased the concern regarding her medical stability and need for immediate veterinary intervention.

24I do not accept the submissions of the Appellant wherein she stated that the removal was unnecessary as Truly appeared to improve after returning home from TVAH and, therefore, no further emergency veterinary intervention was necessary.

25I accept the evidence of S.I. Dougherty and Dr. Goldie. Their evidence was consistent with the veterinary documentation and with Truly’s clinical presentation as reflected in the TVAH and WRAH records.

26Having considered the totality of the evidence, I find that Truly was in critical distress within the meaning of the PAWS Act. I find that Truly was sick and suffering as a result of severe Baclofen toxicosis, respiratory compromise, and suspected aspiration pneumonia. I further find that her condition required immediate veterinary intervention in order to preserve her life and prevent serious injury. I accept Dr. Goldie’s evidence that animals suffering from Baclofen toxicity may deteriorate rapidly despite temporary periods of responsiveness and that Truly required ongoing monitoring and supportive care. I find that S.I. Dougherty had reasonable grounds to believe that Truly was in critical distress and that immediate intervention was necessary to relieve that distress within the meaning of s.31(1)(b)(ii) of the PAWS Act.

27Accordingly, I confirm the NOR.

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT

THE LEGISLATION

28Sections 35(1) and 35(3) of the PAWS Act provide that an owner is responsible for costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector and set out in a statement of account, where an inspector has taken steps to relieve an animal’s distress, removed an animal or kept an animal in care.

29Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act identifies various recoverable costs including a) costs incurred to relieve the animal’s distress; (b) costs incurred in removing the animal or taking it into care; (c) costs of providing care for an animal that has been removed; (d) costs of providing care for an animal that the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector has kept or taken into care; and (e) costs of taking any prescribed action in relation to the animal.

30On an appeal, the Board may confirm, revoke, or vary a statement of account pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act.

31As explained by the Divisional Court in Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.), the Respondent bears the initial evidentiary burden to establish that the statement of account reflects actual costs incurred and that those costs were reasonable and necessary. Once that burden is met, the Appellant must demonstrate on a balance of probabilities that the statement of account should be revoked or varied.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

WERE THE COSTS INCURRED?

32Following Truly’s removal from the Appellant’s residence on February 14, 2026, Truly was transported to WRAH for emergency veterinary treatment and hospitalization.

33The Respondent relies on Invoice #263293 from WRAH. The invoice reflects charges totaling $3,859.42 for emergency examinations, diagnostics, radiographs, bloodwork, medications, oxygen support, IV fluid therapy, hospitalization, nebulization treatments and medical boarding.

34S.I. Dougherty testified that in preparing the SOA a clerical error was made and all charges were categorized as transportation costs. It was clarified that the charges should have been properly categorized as veterinary charges.

35S.I. Dougherty also confirmed that the amounts reflected in the SOA were derived directly from the WRAH invoice.

36The Appellant did not dispute that the veterinary services reflected in the invoice were provided.

37I am satisfied that the Respondent has established that the charges in the SOA were actually incurred.

WERE THE CHARGES REASONABLE?

38The Respondent does not seek confirmation of the SOA in its original amount of $3,859.42. The Respondent acknowledged that reductions to portions of the charges were appropriate and requested the SOA be varied by $931.82, resulting in a proposed SOA amount of $2,927.60. The Respondent relied on Dr. Goldie’s evidence regarding the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Suggested Fee Guide (“OVMA guide”) and Truly’s transition from hospitalization to medical boarding.

a. Veterinary Charges:

39In assessing the necessity and reasonableness of the veterinary treatment provided, I accepted the evidence of Dr. Goldie. Dr. Goldie testified that Truly suffered from severe Baclofen toxicity which was a life-threatening medical emergency that required immediate and ongoing veterinary intervention, support and monitoring.

40The Appellant submitted that Truly’s aspiration pneumonia and respiratory deterioration were caused by the removal and transport process, including being moved and exposed to cold weather while in a medically compromised state. She therefore argued that charges associated with the pneumonia were not reasonable.

41Dr. Goldie testified that Truly’s aspiration pneumonia most likely occurred prior to the removal when peroxide and fluid were administered by the Appellant, to try to induce vomiting, while Truly was unconscious. Dr. Goldie explained that the administration of fluids under these circumstances created a significant risk of aspiration into the lungs.

42I accept Dr. Goldie’s evidence which was consistent with the veterinary records. There was no veterinary evidence before the Board establishing that Truly’s aspiration pneumonia or respiratory deterioration was caused by the removal or transport process. I therefore find that the veterinary treatment provided to Truly in relation to the Baclofen toxicosis, respiratory issues, pneumonia and ongoing recovery was necessary and reasonable. I accept Dr. Goldie’s evidence that Truly’s condition was life-threatening, that she required ongoing supportive care and monitoring following removal, and that the treatments reflected in the veterinary records were directed at addressing those medical concerns and preventing further deterioration.

b. Hospitalization Charges

43The hospitalization invoice reflects the following charges billed at an hourly rate:

a. February 14, 2026 - 7 hours hospitalization and IV fluid therapy - $178.08;

b. February 15, 2026 - 8 hours hospitalization and IV fluid therapy - $203.52;

c. February 15, 2026 - additional 8 hours hospitalization and IV fluid therapy - $203.52;

d. February 15, 2026 - additional 8 hours hospitalization and IV fluid therapy - $203.52; and

e. February 16, 2026 - 5 hours hospitalization and IV fluid therapy - $127.20.

44Dr. Goldie reviewed the hospitalization and IV fluid therapy charges which were billed using an hourly rate of approximately $25.44 per hour. He testified that the OVMA guide rate for comparable services was approximately $13.63 per hour.

45Based on Dr. Goldie’s evidence, the Respondent acknowledged that the hospitalization charges exceeded the range reflected in the OVMA guide and submitted that those charges should be reduced by $425.16.

46I accept that Truly required hospitalization and monitoring following her removal and that charges were necessary. However, I also accept Dr. Goldie’s evidence that portions of the hospitalization charges exceeded those suggested in OVMA guide. While the OVMA guide is not binding on veterinary clinics, it provides a useful benchmark when assessing the reasonableness of veterinary charges. In the absence of evidence justifying a higher hourly rate in the circumstances of this case, I accept Dr. Goldie’s opinion that the OVMA guide rate represents a reasonable charge for the hospitalization services provided. Applying that rate to the hours billed results in hospitalization charges of $490.68, rather than $915.84. I therefore vary the SOA by reducing the hospitalization charges by $425.16.

c. Medical Boarding Following Stabilization:

47The Appellant submits that Truly improved substantially following the initial emergency treatment and no longer required the extent of care reflected in the later hospitalization and boarding charges. She further submits that, but for the Family Day long weekend, AWS would have been available to transport Truly home on February 16, 2026. Accordingly, she argues that the charges incurred after that date were unnecessary and unreasonable.

48I accept Dr. Goldie’s evidence that Truly’s condition improved significantly following the initial emergency treatment and that she transitioned from hospitalization to medical boarding during the early morning hours of February 16, 2026. Dr. Goldie testified that, had transportation been available, Truly could have been discharged on February 16, 2026.

49I further accept, however, that Truly continued to require some supportive veterinary care following her transition to medical boarding. Dr. Goldie testified that the remaining hospitalization and intravenous fluid therapy provided during the early morning hours of February 16 formed part of Truly’s stabilization and recovery process. I also accept his evidence that the discharge medications prescribed to Truly, namely Clavaseptin and Zeniquin, were necessary components of her ongoing treatment following discharge.

50I find that the remaining charges incurred after Truly transitioned to medical boarding were not incurred because of ongoing medical need requiring hospitalization-level care. Rather, the evidence establishes that Truly remained at WRAH primarily because transportation was unavailable to return her to the Appellant on February 16, 2026. In the circumstances, I find it unreasonable to require the Appellant to bear the full cost of boarding and related treatment charges incurred after Truly was medically ready for discharge.

51Accordingly, I vary the SOA by removing all charges incurred on February 16 and February 17, 2026, except for a) the remaining hospitalization and intravenous fluid therapy charge on February 16 in the amount of $127.20; b) Clavaseptin in the amount of $90.28; and c) Zeniquin in the amount of $171.90.

THE APPELLANT’S ABILITY TO PAY

52The Appellant submits that the SOA should be revoked or varied due to her limited financial means and inability to pay.

53Pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, the Board may confirm, revoke, or vary a statement of account on appeal. The Board can consider ability to pay as a relevant factor in exercising this discretion: Ontario Chief Animal Welfare Inspector v. Ishankova, 2023 ONSC 1284 (Div. Ct.).

54However, financial hardship alone does not relieve an owner of responsibility for otherwise reasonable costs incurred in relieving an animal’s distress and providing necessary care under the PAWS Act. Rather, the Board must consider the evidence regarding financial circumstances together with the statutory cost recovery framework established by the legislation.

55The Appellant testified that she receives CPP and OAS benefits and modest rental income from individuals residing in her home. She testified that her financial resources are limited and that she struggles to meet her ongoing expenses including property taxes, utilities, maintenance costs associated with her home, a line of credit debt and credit card debt.

56The Respondent submits that financial circumstances alone do not justify any additional reduction of the SOA. The Respondent submits that while the Appellant raised concerns regarding financial hardship, the evidence provided was limited and did not provide comprehensive financial disclosure regarding her income, assets, liabilities and monthly expenses that would provide a complete picture of her overall financial circumstances.

57I accept that the Appellant experiences financial constraints. However, the evidence before the Board does not provide a sufficiently complete picture of her overall financial circumstances to permit the Board to conclude that a further reduction of the SOA is warranted on the basis of inability to pay. The evidence regarding the Appellant’s income, assets, liabilities and monthly expenses was limited. Having regard to the seriousness of Truly’s medical condition, the necessity of the treatment and the statutory cost recovery framework established by the PAWS Act, I am not satisfied that the Appellant has met her burden of establishing that a further reduction of the SOA should be granted.

ORDER

58For the reasons set out above and pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, I vary the SOA and order the Appellant to pay $2,927.60 to the Minister of Finance.