Charlene M. Jackson v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 235

Animal Care Review Board

Date: May 22, 2026

Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Charlene M. Jackson Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair

For the Appellant: Charlene Jackson, Appellant For the Respondent: Jessica Holroyd, Counsel; Bailey Wintermute, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services

Heard by Videoconference: January 19, and February 27, 2026; last submissions received April 20, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Charlene Jackson (Appellant) appeals to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) a Statement of Account (SOA) issued to her by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) on November 21, 2025. The SOA related to $6,810.76 in veterinary care costs for her cat Oreo, from October 3 to October 11, 2025.

2On October 3, 2025, the Appellant took Oreo to Beattie Animal Hospital in East Hamilton (clinic) for symptoms of urinary blockage. The Appellant was unable to pay the quoted fee. The clinic contacted Animal Welfare Services (AWS) who removed Oreo from the Appellant’s care and made arrangements for treatment at Beattie Hospital in Stoney Creek (hospital).

3Following treatment, Oreo was returned to the Appellant.

4The Appellant takes the position that the cost of treatment was excessive and unreasonable because the clinic’s quote was considerably lower than that of the hospital, and that Oreo’s urethra was torn during surgery, requiring Oreo to spend a longer time in care, which resulted in increased costs. The Appellant also requested that the SOA be reduced because she lacks the ability to pay it.

5The Respondent‘s position is that the SOA should be confirmed and reflects actual and reasonable costs associated with relieving the cat’s distress. The Respondent asked the Board to deduct from the SOA the amount of $1,772.77, which was the charge for a second opinion that they sought.

ISSUE IN DISPUTE

6The issue in dispute is:

1. Should the SOA in the amount of $6,810.76 be confirmed, revoked, or varied?

RESULT

7I vary the SOA to $5,037.99, which reflects the reduction of $1,772.77 charges requested from the Respondent.

PRELIMINARY AND PROCEDURAL ISSUES

Appellant’s Adjournment Request

8At the start of the hearing on January 19, 2026, the Appellant requested an adjournment because she wanted an opportunity to retain legal counsel.

9The Respondent consented to the adjournment, and the Board granted the request, scheduling a new hearing date of February 27, 2026.

10At the same time, because the Appellant had not provided any disclosure to the Respondent or filed any documents with the Board, the Board extended the Appellant’s deadlines to do so to February 13, 2026, with the Respondent’s consent.

11When the hearing resumed on February 27, 2026, the Appellant had not retained counsel and the hearing proceeded with the Appellant as a self-represented party.

Appellant’s motion for an extension of time to file closing submissions, extend the length of submissions, and have closing submissions heard in person

12The hearing was scheduled as a one-day videoconference hearing. The evidentiary portion of the hearing concluded at 5:20 pm on February 27, 2026, and there was insufficient time for the Board to hear closing submissions.

13On consent of the parties, I issued an order on March 2, 2026, requiring closing submissions to be filed in writing according to a schedule that was consented to by the parties at the conclusion of the hearing on February 27, 2026. At that time, the parties also agreed to limit closing submissions to 5 pages. The Respondent was ordered to submit its closing submissions by March 13, 2026, and the Appellant by March 20, 2026.

14On March 13, 2026, the Respondent submitted its Closing Submissions.

15On March 24, 2026, the Appellant submitted a Notice of Motion to the Board, requesting:

1. An extension of time to file her closing submissions;
2. An increase in the length of her closing submissions; and
3. An in-person hearing to deliver closing submissions.

16I issued a Notice of Written Motion Hearing to the parties, asking for responding submissions on the motion by April 2, 2026, and reply submissions on the motion by April 8, 2026. A written motion hearing was scheduled for April 13, 2026, and the decision was released that same day, reported at Jackson v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 223.

17In the decision, I granted the Appellant’s first request and extended the date for her to file closing submissions by April 20, 2026. I dismissed the Appellant’s motion for increasing the length of her Closing Submissions, and further dismissed her motion for an in-person hearing to present Closing Submissions.

18The Appellant filed her Closing Submissions on April 20, 2026.

Dr. Langley is accepted as an expert witness, replacing the original witness scheduled to attend

19On February 20, 2026, the Respondent emailed the Board requesting permission to replace its expert witness with another expert as the original veterinarian they had anticipated calling as an expert had gone on medical leave. A revised medical report, authored by a new veterinarian, Dr. Tyrrel de Langley, was submitted to replace the one included in the hearing materials filed with the Board.

20In response to the Appellant’s objection that the Respondent shouldn’t be allowed to replace the original veterinarian, the Respondent advised that neither expert witness was the attending veterinarian. Rather, the Respondent was relying on the professional opinion of a veterinarian for a review of the animal’s medical files and the reasonableness of the fees charged.

21I permitted the Respondent to rely on the expert report and present expert evidence from a new veterinarian. In deciding this, I considered that the Appellant had received a copy of the new expert report on February 20, 2026, and had a full week to review it. I found that there was no prejudice to the Appellant by accepting a new expert report because neither veterinarian was the attending veterinarian.

ANALYSIS

22An animal owner may be served with a statement of account regarding costs incurred by the Respondent in cases where an inspector has removed or taken their animal into care or has taken steps to relieve their animal’s distress: s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act. Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act lists various costs recoverable by the Respondent.

23If an owner is issued a statement of account and appeals it, the burden of proof is on the owner to show on a balance of probabilities that the statement of account should be revoked or varied. However, the Respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the statement of account reflects actual costs incurred and that those costs are reasonable (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.)).

24To that end, Senior Investigator Kedra Servos, Inspector Adam Bodenstein, and Dr. de Langley testified for the Respondent. They recounted the events that led to AWS’ removal of the Appellant’s cat to enable it to receive treatment for its urinary blockage, and that the procedure resulted in a urethra tear requiring additional hospitalization.

25Dr. de Langley was qualified as an expert witness before testifying. He provided his opinion on the medical records, including the necessity of the procedures, and the reasonableness of the charges reflected on the invoices and subsequently on the SOA.

26During its opening statement, the Respondent advised the Board that it was seeking to have a reduced amount of the SOA confirmed, removing the costs of taking Oreo to VCA Mississauga-Oakville Veterinary Emergency Hospital (MOVE) for a second opinion regarding the need for further surgery, bringing the new total to $5,037.99. Inspector Bodenstein later testified that he exercised his discretion to remove the MOVE invoice from the SOA, adding that it was prudent of AWS to have asked for a second opinion. MOVE decided a second procedure was not necessary.

27For the reasons that follow, I vary the SOA to $5,037.99, which reflects a reduction of $1,772.77 in veterinarian charges.

The SOA charges of the surgery and hospitalization reflect actual charges

28The following facts are not in dispute:

1. On October 3, 2025, Oreo appeared to be trying to spray, which was unusual as he was neutered. The Appellant took him to the clinic, arriving at 4:28 pm;
2. After an examination by the veterinarian, which included an X-ray, the Appellant was advised that Oreo had a urinary blockage. She was quoted $2,544.88 for treatment, including hospitalization.
3. When the Appellant advised the clinic that she could not afford the treatment, they revised the quote to $1,534.76, removing items for intravenous fluids, and hospitalization.
4. After advising the clinic that she could not afford the second quote either, the Appellant accepted the clinic’s suggestion to surrender Oreo to AWS so that AWS could have him treated. The clinic called AWS; AWS Inspector Servos met with the Appellant at the clinic at approximately 7:30 p.m. and advised her that Oreo would be returned to her once he was medically cleared.
5. The Appellant agreed to transport Oreo to the hospital for the procedure, arriving there at 8:05 pm.
6. At 9:13 p.m. on October 3, 2026, Inspector Servos contacted the Appellant, with a quote from the hospital in the range of $4,500 to $6,700, based on the need for 48-hour hospitalization following surgery. Inspector Servos also advised that urinary blockages could recur. The inspector asked the Appellant to confirm that she wished to proceed with the procedure and not to euthanize Oreo, which was the other option. The Appellant elected to proceed with the procedure.
7. On October 4, 2025, at 3:49 pm, AWS Inspector Bodenstein issued a Notice of Removal to the Appellant (signed at 9:00 pm on October 3, 2025), advising that Oreo was removed pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act, because a veterinarian had advised in writing that removal was necessary so that Oreo could have surgery to relieve his distress from the urinary blockage.
8. On October 4, 2026, at 3:51 pm, AWS Inspector Bodenstein contacted the Appellant, advising that there were complications during Oreo’s surgery, and his urethra had been torn.
9. On October 9, 2025, at 9:50 a.m., the Appellant spoke with AWS Inspector Bodenstein, who said Oreo no longer needed a catheter and could be returned to her. Arrangements were discussed. However at 3:45 pm, he provided an update from the hospital that Oreo had another blockage, and he wanted direction from the Appellant to proceed with another procedure, or to euthanize Oreo as an alternative to save the expense. She elected for the procedure.
10. On October 9, 2025, at 7:09 p.m., Inspector Bodenstein contacted the Appellant to advise that Oreo was being transferred to MOVE for the procedure.
11. On October 11, 2025, an AWS inspector contacted the Appellant to arrange to bring Oreo home. Oreo was returned, along with special food and medication.

29AWS issued the SOA to the Appellant on November 21, 2025, in the amount of $6,810.76 for Oreo’s procedure and hospitalization. An invoice from the hospital indicates a discounted total after taxes of $5,037.99 for services between October 3 and 9, 2025. A second invoice, from MOVE for services between October 9 and 11, 2025 indicates a discounted total after taxes of $1,772.77.

30I find that the reduced SOA in the amount of $5,037.99 was actually incurred, as it was supported by the invoices.

The costs of the surgery and hospitalization were reasonable

31For the reasons that follow, I find that the hospital rates were reasonable despite being higher than those of the clinic. I also find that the procedure for the blocked urinary, and the resulting additional costs from the torn urethra during surgery are the Appellant’s responsibility.

a) The hospital rates for the surgery are reasonable

32Dr. de Langley testified regarding his examination of the medical records, that, left untreated, a blockage would result in acute renal failure, and acute electrolyte imbalance, leading to cardiac failure and ultimately death.

33Dr. de Langley compared the clinic’s first quote to that of the hospital ($2,544.88 to $4,500 - $6,700), and provided the following comments:

1. Emergency hospital fees are generally higher than those of a clinic; urgent care is typically not available at a clinic.
2. The hospital charges an emergency fee, embedded in the hospitalization fee;
3. The hospital’s quote included 2 radiographs with interpretation, while the clinic’s quote included a single radiograph with no interpretation;
4. The hospital’s quote included multiple days of hospitalization, while the clinic’s quote included a single day.
5. If the urethra had been torn at the clinic, the clinic would have had to transfer Oreo to an accredited hospital, as it could not do overnight hospitalization.
6. If a clinic encounters complications, additional charges are invoiced.

34Dr. de Langley reviewed all the items in the invoices in detail, comparing them both as necessary tests or procedures, justifying the length of hospitalization, and comparing the charges to the suggested rates set out in the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association 2025 Ontario Suggested Fee Guide (Fee Guide).¹ His conclusion was that the fees charged were in keeping with or below those in the Fee Guide. He added that the hospital discounted the final cost by approximately $2,700, bringing it to $5,037.99, which was within the range of $4,500 to $6,700 quoted by the hospital.

35I am satisfied that the Respondent met its initial evidentiary burden to prove that the charges on the SOA related to costs incurred pursuant to s. 35 of the PAWS Act and were reasonable. The clinic was unable to perform the surgery after 6:00 pm, and it was necessary for the procedure to be conducted at the hospital, which was accredited for after-hours urgent care.

36While I recognize that the Appellant believes the SOA should be varied to the second, lower quote she received from the clinic, I note that the second quote did not include any hospitalization, and there was no evidence from a clinic representative to testify regarding the quotes, or what would have happened had there been complications. I note as well that AWS inspectors provided regular updates to the Appellant, even though Oreo was in their care, meaning they were authorized under the PAWS Act to authorize medical care. They still provided the Appellant with euthanization as an alternative to costly surgery; she authorized/directed them to proceed with the surgery. Finally, the Appellant did not provide evidence of a comparable quote for the same procedures and hospitalization.

37On the issue of whether the clinic could have conducted the procedure on Oreo, I accept the evidence of Inspector Servos who testified that when she arrived at the clinic at approximately 7:30 pm, the clinic advised her that it was past the clinic’s closing hours of 6:00 p.m. and the surgery could not be done that day. I accept Dr. de Langley’s evidence regarding the urgency of the surgery, and the need for Oreo to be transferred to a hospital licensed for after-hour care.

38The Appellant apparently understood the urgency of the surgery, as she agreed to transport Oreo herself to the hospital.

39In conclusion, I find that the hospital rates, though higher than the clinic’s, were justified because a hospital provides urgent care and a clinic does not. The hospital quote was higher than the clinic’s because it included additional services, and additional days of hospitalization.

b) The catheterization procedure caused a tear in the urethra

40Dr. de Langley testified that Oreo had classic signs of urethra blockage, and the initial procedures were appropriate. He explained that catheterization was attempted several times unsuccessfully, with a variety of catheters. A urethral tear developed, which is uncommon, but not rare. Had the tear not occurred, a catheter would have been left in place for 24-48 hours to ensure urination. Because of the tear, an additional 3-5 days of hospitalization were required.

41Dr. de Langley opined that tears could occur when the urethra is being inserted when there is a blockage, because the urethra is lined by cells which become inflamed/irritated as a response to the blockage. He explained the standard process used to insert a catheter, and the progression of different types of catheters if one is met with resistance. If this process is necessary, there is a risk that tender tissue can be further damaged, and potentially torn. He also testified that the cause of the tear during catheterization depends on how long the blockage was there and what caused it, and whether the urethra had been constricted due to irritation.

42Based on his review of the medical records, Dr. de Langley noted that on October 8, 2025, a technician observed that Oreo had removed the catheter. The records showed that on October 9, 2026, Oreo was unable to urinate with palpation, which urgently called for removal of his penis.

43Inspector Bodenstein took Oreo to MOVE for a second opinion, requiring further tests, leading to their decision that the procedure recommended by the hospital (removal of the penis) was not necessary.

44Dr. de Langley concluded that the procedure to remove the blockage was reasonable and necessary, and performed to the expected standard. The urethra tear was unusual, but not rare, and resulted from complications related to the blockage.

45I am not persuaded by the Appellant’s argument, that the urethra tear was a veterinarian mistake and she should not bear the cost of the additional hospitalization.

46I accept Dr. de Langley’s opinion that the torn urethra could have happened with any veterinarian given the circumstances, and was not a mistake. The Appellant acknowledged that the first veterinarian explained that there were risks involved with the procedure, and that the quote she initially received was based on “if everything went smoothly”.

47For this reason, I find that the costs of the procedure, and the additional days of hospitalization (beyond the typical 24-48 hours) were a consequence of the tear, the need for the catheter to stay in place, and monitoring for additional complications. There was no evidence to establish that the torn urethra was a veterinarian mistake.

48In conclusion, I find that the hospital procedures were necessary, and the costs were reasonable, particularly as the hospital discounted its final costs.

49I vary the SOA to $5,037.99, as revised by the Respondent, for the reasons stated above.

The Appellant’s Additional Arguments

50The Appellant raised several arguments in the hearing and in her closing submissions, including:

1. The Inspector’s request to inspect her home before returning Oreo is an overreach as she has not been accused of neglect.
2. Her belief that the documents from the hospital were tampered with.

50I make no finding on the first issue. This has no bearing on this appeal.

51On the second issue, I prefer the evidence of the Respondent. While the Appellant raised the issue that she believed the documents from the hospital that formed part of the Respondent’s evidence had been tampered with, and provided examples of different font sizes and different logo colours, I accepted the Respondent’s response that this occurred when counsel “synthesized” information. There is no evidence that the documents were falsified.

The Appellant did not prove inability to pay

52For the reasons that follow, I make no further reductions to the SOA as I am not persuaded by the Appellant’s evidence that she lacks the ability to pay the SOA.

53Section 35 of the PAWS Act states that an owner is responsible for costs incurred in relation to an animal where it has been removed and provided care to relieve its distress. Section 35(3) states that an owner is obligated to pay a statement of account unless the Board varies or revokes it on appeal. This statement makes it clear that the PAWS Act intends owners to be held accountable for costs incurred by the Respondent in caring for animals removed from their owners.

54Section 38(9) does not limit the factors that the Board may consider in a SOA appeal. Inability to pay a SOA is a factor that the Board will consider.

55The Appellant submitted that I should vary or revoke the SOA because she lacks the ability to pay it. She advised that she receives support through the Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) and has no other source of income. She provided no direct oral evidence to support her position, or documentation regarding her income or expenses.

56The Appellant responded to my questions regarding the amount of her ODSP payments and key monthly expenses (rent, hydro, phone, house insurance and food). Based on the Appellant’s oral evidence, her ODSP is her only source of income, and at $806 per month for her and her child, it does not cover the $1,304.95 in basic expenses.

57The Respondent advised that in settlement negotiations the Appellant did not provide any documentation to establish her financial status. The Appellant responded that the Respondent had no business requesting two years of records.

58I agree that the Respondent and the Board require records to better establish the Appellant’s financial status – a full record of her savings, and her income, including details of financial support from her father, and statements to reflect her actual expenses. On the face of it, the Appellant has at least $500 a month in expenses which she cannot pay, noting that these do not include monthly supplies or veterinary care for Oreo. Longer term records would provide context if this were a short-term or long-term situation, and reflect on the Appellant’s actual ability to pay the SOA.

59I agree with the Respondent’s reference to Windrift Adventures Inc. v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (at para 85), which stated “there is nothing unreasonable about a tribunal refusing to accept evidence about impecuniosity that is unsupported by any documentary evidence”.

60I find that the Appellant has not proven her inability to pay.

61I also find that the Respondent consulted with the Appellant throughout the period following the removal of Oreo, advising her of costly surgery and the alternative, which was humane euthanasia. In both cases, the Appellant authorized the surgery. When questioned by the Respondent why she agreed to the surgery, she responded that she was forced to do it because she knew she could appeal it.

62While I recognize the Appellant was presented with a terrible choice, she was aware that Oreo’s condition was very serious, and that surgery could resolve this but at a cost exceeding her financial means. I recognize also that Oreo’s condition was not caused by the Appellant, but that she must bear the responsibility for his care and treatment. The Respondent provided the only other option available, humane euthanasia. Ultimately, knowing her options, she authorized the surgery.

63In conclusion, I confirm the SOA in the amount of $5,037.99, as revised by the Respondent, because the Appellant did not meet her onus to prove that she lacked the ability to pay it and because the Appellant authorized the surgery.

64Section 35(5) of the PAWS Act provides that before the expiry of the statutory deadline to pay the confirmed amount of the SOA, the parties may negotiate a written agreement to extend the payment period of the SOA, or to reduce the amount, or both. The parties are encouraged to consider this, taking note that the deadline is 15 business days from the date this decision is released.

ORDER

65The Board varies the SOA and orders the Appellant to pay $5,037.99 to the Minister of Finance.

Footnotes

1. 1The Fee Guide is developed by the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association based on an average of rates charged across Ontario for various veterinary and boarding costs. While veterinarians may use the Fee Guide to set their own rates, they are not required to.