Animal Care Review Board
Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13
Between:
Donald Bell
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Alisa Chaplick, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Did not attend
For the Respondent: Jason Kirsh, Counsel
Christopher Chew, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services
Heard by videoconference: April 14, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Donald Bell (the “Appellant”) was the owner of a dog named Echo (the “Dog” or the “animal”) who was an approximately 6-year-old male husky-type dog.
2A Notice of Removal of Animal(s) (“NOR”) dated March 1, 2026, was served on the Appellant by Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) and AWS removed the Dog from the custody of the Appellant. The removal occurred pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019 S.O. 2019, c.13 (“PAWS Act”), after a veterinarian had advised the inspector in writing that removal was necessary to relieve the animal’s distress.
3On March 9, 2026, AWS served the Appellant with a Statement of Account (“SOA”) in the amount of $5,729.30, for the cost of veterinary care for the Dog, pursuant to s. 35 of the PAWS Act.
4On March 12, 2026, the Appellant submitted a Notice of Appeal (“Appeal”) of the NOR to the Animal Care Review Board (“Board”).
5The parties participated in a case conference on March 18, 2026, regarding the Appeal of the NOR, and hearing dates were set and included in a Case Conference Report and Order (“CCRO”) released to the parties on March 27, 2026. The case conference will be discussed further below.
6A Notice of Electronic Hearing dated April 7, 2025, was released to the parties, advising that a 1.5-day videoconference hearing was set, with 0.5 days scheduled to take place on April 14, 2026, and 1 day scheduled to take place on April 16, 2026.
7On April 2, 2026, the Respondent brought a motion seeking an order from the Board dismissing the Appeal of the NOR (the “Motion”). The Motion stated that the Dog had been forfeited to the Crown and the Board lacks jurisdiction to order the return of the forfeited animal to the Appellant. The Motion also stated that the Appeal was moot as there was no available remedy. In addition, the Motion stated that the Board should not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matter.
8The Motion was heard orally at the start of the April 14, 2026 hearing date. I delivered oral reasons granting the motion with written reasons to follow. These are the written reasons.
ISSUES
9The issues to be decided are as follows:
a. Does the Board have jurisdiction to return an animal to a previous owner after it has been forfeited to the Crown?
b. Is there a remedy available that the Board can grant?
c. Should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the matter even though it is moot?
RESULT
10The Appeal of the NOR (Board file 18408/ACRB) is dismissed without a hearing as the animal was forfeited to the Crown and the Board lacks jurisdiction to return the forfeited animal to a previous owner. In addition, the Appeal is moot as there is no remedy that the Board can grant. The Board will not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matter.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE – APPELLANT’S NON-ATTENDANCE AT HEARING
11The Appellant did not attend the hearing on April 14, 2026. This was despite the CCRO and the Notice of Electronic Hearing, as discussed further below. It was also despite the fact that on April 10, 2026, the Board sent an email to the parties reminding them of the hearing. In addition, on April 13, 2026, the Appellant emailed the Board stating that he would be in attendance at the hearing.
12While the Appellant did not attend the hearing on April 14, 2026, the Respondent was in attendance at the hearing. I waited from the start of the hearing at 9:30 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., at which time I asked the Respondent for submissions regarding whether the Board should hear the Motion without the Appellant present. The Respondent argued that the Motion should be heard without the Appellant present. The Respondent’s arguments included the applicability of s. 7(3) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (“SPPA”) regarding the effect of non-attendance at a hearing, which provides that, in this circumstance, the Board could proceed without the Appellant’s participation.1
13The Respondent also stated that the Appellant had a pattern of not adhering to the Board’s process and noted the Appellant’s conduct at the case conference. In particular, the Respondent noted paragraphs 6-8 of the CCRO, written by the case conference adjudicator, which state:
6The Appellant was assured multiple times that he would have an opportunity to respond. However, the Appellant repeatedly spoke over me as I reminded him of the Board’s direction to avoid interruptions and allow myself and Respondent’s counsel to speak. The Appellant then uttered profanities prior to disconnecting from the call.
7The Board attempted to reach the Appellant to request that he rejoin the case conference. When the Board reached the Appellant, he spoke to the Board’s Case Management Officer in a disrespectful manner and stated that he refused to reconnect.
8Given the conduct of the Appellant and his choice not to participate any further in the case conference, I continued the case conference in his absence and a number of orders were issued. Should the Appellant disagree with or should he seek to make any amendments to the orders, he is to contact the Board to request changes for consideration by the Board.
14After the case conference, the Appellant emailed the Board; however, the emails did not pertain to the dates in the CCRO, such as the disclosure dates and the hearing date. The first email, sent on March 19, 2026, included an apology from the Appellant and the Appellant stated that he wanted Echo back. The second email, also sent on March 19, 2026, included a statement from the Appellant that he would be without his phone for one week due to a cracked screen. I find that these emails do not impact any of the orders contained in the CCRO.
15With respect to whether the Board should hear the matter without the Appellant present, the Respondent also stated that the Board sent a Notice of Electronic Hearing to the Appellant, dated April 7, 2026, which stated in bold, “If you fail to attend the hearing, the Board may proceed in your absence and make a decision without further notice to you.”
16I agreed with the Respondent that I would hear the Motion, with written reasons to follow. In particular, I agreed that pursuant to s. 7(3) of the SPPA, cited above, I could proceed in the Appellant’s absence. I was satisfied that the Appellant had received reasonable notice by way of the Board’s Notice of Electronic Hearing, followed by a hearing reminder from the Board. My decision that the Board could proceed in the Appellant’s absence is bolstered by the bold wording in the NOH, noted above. It is also bolstered by the fact that, as noted, the Board sent the Appellant a hearing reminder and the Appellant emailed the Board stating that he would be in attendance at the hearing.
17On April 14, 2026, after the oral decisions were rendered at the hearing (both to proceed with the hearing in the Appellant’s absence and with respect to the substance of the Respondent’s motion, which was successful) the Appellant emailed the Board. He stated that he was unavailable until April 28, 2026 but, “this has no bearing on me wanting to proceed with [E]cho being returned to me…”. However, as noted, by this time, I had already rendered the oral decisions on the matter. Accordingly, the Appellant’s April 14, 2026 email had no bearing on my decisions.
ANALYSIS AND REASONS
18The motion, discussed below, was heard immediately prior to the merits hearing. The matter was disposed of at the motion stage and, as a result, the hearing on the merits was cancelled.
a. The Board does not have jurisdiction to return an animal to a previous owner after the animal has been forfeited to the Crown
19The Respondent argued, and I agree, that the animal has been forfeited to the Crown and the Board no longer has jurisdiction to return the animal.
20As noted, the evidence available to me on the motion indicated that the Appellant had been served with a SOA requiring him to pay costs related to the care of the animal.
21Section 38(2) of the PAWS Act and sections 1 and 3 of O. Reg. 447/19 “Ministerial Prescriptions” require an appeal of a statement of account to be filed with the Board within 10 business days, or for the statement of account to be paid within 15 business days, after service of the statement of account. If the owner neither appeals nor pays the statement of account by those deadlines, the animal is forfeited to the Crown.
22The Respondent argued that the final day for the Appellant to file an appeal of the SOA with the Board was March 23, 2026. No appeal was filed within that time. The final day to pay the SOA was March 30, 2026. No payment was received.
23On March 31, 2026, the Dog was forfeited to the Crown due to the Appellant’s failure to pay the SOA within the required timeframe, pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act. The Respondent provided the Board a copy of a “Forfeiture Letter” dated April 2, 2026, from AWS to the Appellant, advising the Appellant of this development.
24The Respondent argued that the purpose behind these provisions is clear: if a statement of account is not paid within the prescribed period, the animal(s), or in this case, the animal, that is the subject of that statement of account is forfeited to the Crown. Forfeiture stops ongoing costs of care to the Crown where the owner/custodian is unable or unwilling to pay the costs incurred to date. It also prevents additional costs form accruing for the Appellant. Forfeiture of the animal to the Crown allows the Respondent to transfer ownership of the animal to another owner who then assumes responsibility for care of the animal.
25The Respondent stated that forfeiture occurs by automatic operation of the statute (the PAWS Act) and is not subject to any action taken by the Crown or the Respondent to initiate or finalize the forfeiture process. The legal implication of forfeiture is stated in the Ontario Divisional Court’s decision in Guillaume v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 5782 (“Guillaume”), cited by the Respondent, where the court explained the following at paragraph 9 regarding forfeiture and the PAWS Act:
…Once animals are forfeited to the Crown, they become the property of the Crown and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals. Subsection 63(1) of the Act provides that the CAWI is authorized by the Crown to “deal with the animal as if the [CAWI] were the owner[.]”
26The Respondent argued that once forfeiture occurs, the Crown becomes the legal owner of the animal while the animal remains in the custody of the Respondent pursuant to s. 63(1) of the PAWS Act.
27The Respondent stated that the powers of the Board on an appeal of a notice of removal are set out at s. 38(9)2. of the PAWS Act. On such an appeal, the only remedy the Board has jurisdiction to grant is the return of the removed animal. However, the Board may only order that the animal be returned to the animal’s owner or custodian. Upon forfeiture of the animal, the Crown is the animal’s owner, and the Respondent is the custodian.
28The Respondent argued that the cumulative effect of these provisions is that the Board has no authority to return the forfeited animal to an Appellant given that the Appellant is no longer the animal’s owner or custodian.
29The Respondent stated that as per the caselaw, it is not possible to make an order unwinding forfeiture.2 As noted, the Respondent stated that the Dog forfeited to the Crown on March 31, 2026, pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act given that the Appellant neither appealed nor paid the SOA within the prescribed time periods. Accordingly, the Appellant is no longer the owner or custodian of the Dog and the Board has no authority to return the forfeited animal to the Appellant.
30I agree with the Respondent’s arguments. The Board has no jurisdiction to order the animal’s return. As noted by the Respondent, the SOA was served on March 9, 2026, making March 23, 2026 the 10-business day deadline for appeal, and March 30, 2026, the 15-business day payment deadline of the SOA. As the SOA was neither paid, nor appealed, within these timeframes, the Dog was forfeited to the Crown on March 31, 2026, pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act.
31In addition, as noted by the Respondent, I am bound by the Divisional Court decision in Guillaume, cited above, which states that once an animal has forfeited to the Crown, it becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner or custodian ceases to have rights of ownership or possession of the animal.
32In addition, as noted by the Respondent, it is not possible to make an order unwinding forfeiture.
33Based on the above, I have no jurisdiction to order the return of the forfeited animal to the Appellant since he is no longer the animal’s owner or custodian.
b. The Appeal is moot as there is no available remedy that the Board can grant
34The Respondent stated that the doctrine of mootness reflects the general policy that a decision maker may decline to decide a case that presents no “live controversy” affecting the parties’ rights.3 The Respondent argued that there is no live controversy affecting the parties’ rights in this Appeal.
35The Respondent noted that in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC) at 353 (“Borowski”), the Supreme Court of Canada set out a two-stage test for determining if a matter is a live controversy and, if not, whether the decision maker should exercise its discretion to hear the matter in any event. The test is as follows:
First, it is necessary to determine whether the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared, and the issues have become academic.
Second, if the response to the first question is affirmative, it is necessary to decide if the court should exercise its discretion to hear the case.4
36Regarding the first stage, the Respondent states that the Dog was forfeited to the Crown on March 31, 2026, and the Appellant ceased to have any rights of ownership or custody. The last live controversy or dispute expired on that date and the matter is moot.
37I agree with the Respondent that because the Dog was forfeited to the Crown on March 31, 2026, the last live controversy expired on that date and the matter is moot. As per the first stage of Borowski, the required tangible dispute has disappeared, and the issues have become academic.
c. The Board will not exercise its discretion to hear the moot Appeal
38Regarding the second stage of the Borowski test, noted in paragraph 35 above, the Respondent argued that the Board should decline to exercise its discretion to hear the moot Appeal.
39The Respondent noted that when deciding whether to hear moot matters, a decision maker must consider the following three factors set out in Borowski:
i. The presence of an adversarial context;
ii. The concern for judicial economy; and,
iii. The need for the Court or Board to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework.5
40The Respondent stated that as part of the analysis, the Board must consider the expenditure of scarce resources. The Respondent also stated that the onus is on the Appellant, if he is seeking to have the moot issue heard, to convince the decision maker that the circumstances justify a departure from the general practice of not hearing moot matters.
41With respect to factor (i) in Borowski, the presence of an adversarial context, the Respondent argued that there is no adversarial context. Further, the Respondent stated that language of the PAWS Act and the significant caselaw that has developed before the courts, and the Board, is unambiguous. The Respondent stated that any decision of the Board on a pure question of law, absent the ultimate remedy (i.e. the return of the animal) has no precedential effect as it is not binding on any future Board, any court or the Legislature. I agree with the Respondent that there is no remaining adversarial context in this matter. Once the Dog was forfeited to the Crown, there was no remedy that the Board could grant, and the adversarial context in this matter was gone.
42With respect to factor (ii) in Borowski, concern for judicial economy, the Respondent argued that concern for judicial economy and the Board’s own mandate to provide “efficient, proportional, and timely resolution”6 of matters before it, favour allocating the Board’s scarce adjudicative recourses to other matters where there are live issues in dispute between the parties and where the Board has jurisdiction to grant tangible remedies.
43I agree with the Respondent that the Board has scarce resources that are better allocated to cases where there are live issues in dispute between the parties and where the Board has jurisdiction to grant tangible remedies. I am also aware that, as per factor (iii) of Borowski, I the need to be sensitive to the Board’s role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework. I am exercising this sensitivity to the Board’s role by not hearing the moot matter in this case, as I do not wish to encroach on the role of the legislature.
44Furthermore, since the Appellant did not attend the hearing or make any submissions on the issue of whether the moot matter should be heard, he has not met his onus to have the moot matter heard. For the above reasons, the Board declines to hear the moot matter.
ORDER
45The Appeal of the NOR (Board file 18408/ACRB) is dismissed without a hearing as the animal was forfeited to the Crown and the Board lacks jurisdiction to return a forfeited animal. Furthermore, the Appeal is moot as there is no remedy that the Board can grant. The Board will not exercise its discretion to hear the moot Appeal.
46The Board’s file 18408/ACRB is now closed.
Released: May 12, 2026
___________________________
Alisa Chaplick
Vice-Chair
Footnotes
- Section 7(3) of the SPPA states: Where notice of an electronic hearing has been given to a party to a proceeding in accordance with this Act and the party neither acts under clause 6 (5) (c), if applicable, nor participates in the hearing in accordance with the notice, the tribunal may proceed without the party’s participation and the party is not entitled to any further notice in the proceeding.
- Windrift Advntures Inc. v. Ontario (Animal Care Review Board), 2024 ONCA 89 at para. 9.
- Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC) at 353.
- Ibid.
- Ibid at pgs. 358-363.
- Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission Rules of Procedure at Rule 3.1(b).