Appeals under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Edith E. Innes
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair
For the Appellant: Edith A. Innes, Self-Represented
For the Respondent: Tucker Seabrook, Student-at-Law and Joanna Chan, Counsel
Heard By Videoconference: March 23 and 24, 2026
OVERVIEW
1Edith E. Innes (“appellant”) is the owners of 3 dogs: Mika, a Collie type dog, and Angel and Tinkerbell, Jack Russel terrier type dogs, all female (the “dogs”). The dogs were removed by the respondent on February 14, 2026 from the appellant’s motor vehicle (the “van”) pursuant to a Notice of Removal dated February 14, 2026 (“NOR”) made under s. 31 (1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, R.S.O. 2019, c. 13 (“PAWS Act”). The dogs remain in the respondent’s care pursuant to a Notice of Decision to Keep an Animal in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care dated February 17, 2026 (“DTK”) made under s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act.
2The appellant appealed the NOR in Board file number 18308/ACRB. The appellant appealed the DTK in Board file number 18326/ACRB. In its March 2, 2026 Case Conference Report and Order the Board ordered that these two appeals be heard together.
3In summary, the appellant appealed the NOR on the basis that she was hospitalized in February, 2026 but has now cleaned the van and the dogs are no longer exposed to unsanitary conditions.
4In summary, the appellant appealed the DTK on the basis that she has cleaned the dogs’ kennels and her van, and family members are willing to help her with the dogs if needed, she has reduced her workload, and she loves her dogs and will be able to spend more time with them and provide them with proper care.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
5The issues in dispute are:
Was the removal of the dogs necessary to relieve their distress?
Was the DTK the dogs necessary to relieve their distress?
Should the dogs be returned to the appellant?
RESULT
6For the reasons that follow, I find that:
The dogs were in distress on February 14, 2026 warranting their removal.
The DTK the dogs was necessary to relieve their distress.
The dogs should not be returned to the appellant. It is necessary for the dogs to remain in the respondent’s care to alleviate their distress.
THE LEGISLATION
Distress
7Distress is defined in s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act as “the state of being, (a) in need of proper care, water, food or shelter, (b) injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or (c) abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect”.
8In Pryde v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONSC 6632, the Court found that being “in distress” is defined as being in need of proper care, and that the phrase “proper care” includes care in compliance with the minimum standards prescribed by the PAWS Act and its regulation.
9The basic standards of care for all animals are set out in Ontario Regulation 444/19 (“Regulation”) under the PAWS Act. Specifically, s. 3(6) of the Regulation requires that every animal must be provided with adequate and appropriate space to enable the animal to move naturally and to exercise, sanitary conditions, ventilation, light, and protection from the elements, including harmful temperatures.
Removal
10Section 31(1)(a) provides that an animal welfare inspector may remove an animal from the place where it is and take possession of the animal if a veterinarian has advised in writing that relieving the animal’s distress necessitates its removal.
Keeping an Animal in Care
11After removal under s. 31(1), s. 31(6)(a) of the PAWS Act permits the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector to keep an animal in its care if it determines that it is necessary to relieve the animal’s distress.
Owner’s Right to Appeal
12Section 38 provides that an owner or custodian of an animal may appeal, among other things, an order from an animal welfare inspector and a decision by an animal welfare inspector to remove an animal from a place, subject to time limits, all as set out in s. 38 (1), s. 38 (2), and s. 3 of Ontario Regulation 447/19. Owners or custodians may also seek other relief under s. 38 (3) and (4).
Powers of the Board After Hearing Appeal
13Section 38(9) of the PAWS Act gives this Board the authority, among other authorities, after a hearing, to order that an animal removed under s. 31(1) or (2), or that was taken into care by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector under s. 31(6) or 44(8), be returned to the owner or custodian
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
The Removal of the Dogs Was Necessary to Relieve Their Distress/The DTK was Necessary to Relieve Their Distress
14I find that the removal of the dogs was necessary to relieve their distress, and that it was necessary to keep the dogs in the respondent’s care at the time of the DTK under the PAWS Act for the following reasons.
15As set out above, s. 31(1)(a) provides that an animal welfare inspector may remove an animal from the place where it is and take possession of the animal if a veterinarian has advised in writing that relieving the animal’s distress necessitates its removal.
16The Notice of Removal dated February 14, 2026 sets out that under s. 31(1)(a) a veterinarian has advised the inspector in writing that removal is necessary to relieve the animals’ distress. Specifically, the distress is described as inadequate housing conditions, unsanitary conditions, high ammonia levels of 20 ppm NHg.
17Inspector Gemma Brown who signed the Notice of Removal testified about the conditions that the dogs were found in on February 14, 2026. Inspector Brown’s testimony was corroborated by photos taken at the time by Inspector Brown. The photographs clearly show the dogs in the rear of the appellant’s van. Two of the dogs were in crates at the time of removal and one appeared to be loose in the vehicle. The interior of the crates were soiled with animal excrement, both urine and feces, soiled fabric material, and an overturned plastic container with no water. There was no water available to the dogs at the time of removal. The area around the crates and where the third dog was located was packed with materials including what appeared to be soiled diapers. Inspector Brown experienced the smell of the excrement coming from the van and tested the ammonia in the air at 20 ppm, which she described as high.
18At this hearing, when shown the pictures taken at the time of removal, the appellant did not dispute the conditions that the dogs were found in and acknowledged that there was excrement in the crates and in the van, no water available to the dogs at the time, and acknowledged that the dogs’ blankets, bedding and crates were unclean.
19Inspector Brown contacted Dr. Tyrrel de Langley, veterinarian, on February 14, 2026 after she had found the dogs in this condition, discussed the conditions with Dr. de Langley and sent him the photographs she had just taken. Inspector Brown also told Dr. de Langley that she had tested the ammonia level in the air at 20 ppm. Dr. de Langley issued Certificate of a Veterinarian dated February 14, 2026 (the “Certificate”) which provides that alleviating the distress of the dogs necessitates their removal from the place where they currently are pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act. Dr. de Langley’s Certificate specifies as the reason for the Certificate “unsuitable housing conditions. Three dogs housed in a van. Cage bedding consists of feces soiled blankets. Excessive ammonia levels (@20ppm), absence of water in cages.”
20Dr. de Langley testified at the hearing to the same effect and also explained that the dogs should not be housed in a van and to do so is harmful to their health. The dogs need room to move freely, exercise, they need water available to them and clean-living conditions. Dr. de Langley noted that yellow staining on the fur of the dogs is consistent with their being made to lie in their own excrement for extended periods of time. Dr. de Langley testified that in his professional opinion, the dogs were in distress on February 14, 2026 and the distress warranted their removal, as evidenced by the Certificate he signed.
21Although the appellant attempted to dispute that she did not care properly for the dogs, in cross-examination, she admitted that they had not been tended to in the days leading up to February 14, 2026 and that on that day, the dogs were trapped in the van, had no room to move freely, had been trapped in their own excrement for many days. The appellant explained that she had been hospitalized and was unable to clean the van or the dogs in the days leading up to February 14, 2026. The appellant admitted that she knew they cannot be kept confined in her van, but she kept them there in the days leading up to February 14, 2026.
22However, the appellant also admitted that she had been educated by the respondent on the need to care properly for the dogs and educated about the standards of care for the dogs in the fall of 2025 when her dogs were removed from her for the first time. The appellant admitted that the dogs were returned to her in December, 2025 on the understanding that she would not keep them in the van but that she did so anyway.
23Although the appellant’s social worker, and the appellant’s daughter were witnesses at the hearing, neither of these witnesses had any relevant testimony to support the proposition that the dogs were not in distress on February 14, 2026. The appellant’s social worker admitted that she did not see the dogs in the appellant’s van on February 14, 2026 and has never met the dogs. The appellant’s daughter also testified that she did not see the dogs and the condition they were found in on February 14, 2026.
24I prefer the evidence of Inspector Brown and Dr. de Langley. Inspector Brown saw the dogs, their physical condition, and their living conditions on February 14, 2026 and took photographs and measured the ammonia in the air inside the van. Dr. de Langley saw the photographs, spoke to Inspector Brown and was aware of the ammonia measurement of the air and gave his professional opinion that the dogs were in such distress that their removal was warranted.
25Based on the admissions of the appellant and the testimony of Inspector Brown, Dr. de Langley and the photographs and measurement of the ammonia in the air I find that the dogs were in distress on February 14, 2026 within the meaning of s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act and s. 3(6) of the Regulation, distress warranting their removal.
26Having considered the totality of the evidence before me and all submissions made by both parties, I find that the removal of the dogs was necessary on February 14, 2026 to alleviate their distress and, at the time of the DTK I find it was necessary to keep the dogs in the respondent’s care to relieve their distress.
It is Necessary for the Dogs to Remain in the Respondent’s Care to Alleviate Their Distress
27Having considered the totality of the evidence before me and all submissions made by both parties, I find it is necessary for the dogs to remain in the respondent’s care. The dogs cannot be returned to the appellant because she is unwilling or unable to sufficiently care for the dogs such that the dogs could be returned without being placed immediately back in distress. The following are my reasons.
28This is the second time in the last five months that the respondent has found the dogs to be in distress and living in the appellant’s van.
29The dogs were removed from the appellant in the fall of 2025 and returned to her in December, 2025 on the understanding that the appellant would have them living with her in a clean apartment and not kept in her van. Although the appellant agreed to this, the dogs were in distress again by February 14, 2026, and living in the van in unsanitary conditions, without access to water and with inadequate space for them to move freely and exercise, and in poor air quality due to high ammonia content.
30Carly Atrooshi, Regional Supervisor for the respondent, testified that she was aware of the first removal of the dogs in 2025, the return of the dogs to the appellant in 2025 on the understanding that she would care for them in her clean apartment, but yet the dogs were found in distress and living in the van only a few months later in February, 2025.
31Ms. Atrooshi testified that she approved the issuance of the DTK after the second removal of the dogs on February 14, 2026 because the dogs required care that the appellant either could not or would not provide, and because the appellant was in breach of the understanding that led to the return of the dogs to her in December, 2025.
32The February 17, 2026 DTK signed by Ms. Atrooshi sets out her grounds for the DTK. Ms. Atrooshi explained the grounds in her testimony including that based on the observations of the inspectors, the dogs were being kept in unsanitary conditions, without access to water, space to move naturally and to exercise and had not been given the care necessary for their general welfare such as nail trims. The dogs were being housed in the vehicle for extended periods of time and exposed to feces, urine, garbage, and soiled bedding. All dogs had evidence of stained fur, consistent with lying in their excrement.
33Ms. Atrooshi testified that the appellant demonstrated a pattern of neglect and had demonstrated that she is unable to provide the dogs with the basic standards of care required to ensure they are not placed in a state of distress. Further, the appellant had failed to comply with previous orders issued by the respondent and attempted to evade the respondent.
34Ms. Atrooshi testified that as a result of this pattern of neglect, she believes that the conditions the dogs were kept in would recur if the dogs were returned to the appellant.
35Ms. Atrooshi testified that although the appellant had been hospitalized herself before the second removal, the conditions in which the animals were kept had occurred over a period of time more than a few days. This opinion was also expressed by Dr. de Langley in his testimony.
36The appellant’s testimony largely consisted of her statement that she loves the dogs and relies on them for emotional support. The appellant filed a letter from her family physician to this effect and her social workerand her daughter gave similar testimony. However, none of this testimony is relevant to the issue I have to decide - whether the dogs should be returned to the appellant.
37The appellant testified at the hearing that she used to keep the dogs in the van with her for eight hours a day but will cut down that time to six hours a day, and will let the dogs occupy the apartment with her when she does not have them in the van. However, this testimony is inconsistent with the appellant’s statement that her landlord does not want the dogs to be in her apartment and she needs to find a new place to live.
38Even if the appellant finds a new place to live, there is no persuasive evidence before me that the van will be a clean, sanitary and suitable habitat for the dogs for even six hours a day. Nothing in the evidence supports this suggestion and it remains the appellant’s opinion only. Dr. de Langley testified that the dogs need room to stretch and to move naturally and I accept his evidence given his training and experience as a veterinarian.
39The appellant suggested that her daughter would care for the dogs when she is unable and make sure they are walked. However, the appellant’s daughter admitted that she lives approximately one hour away from the appellant, has some health concerns she is dealing with herself, and cannot be relied on to care for the dogs.
40It is clear from the evidence at this hearing and the pattern of conduct of the appellant over the last five months that returning the dogs to the appellant is more likely than not to expose them to distress again.
41I find that the respondent’s decision to keep the animals in care was reasonable in these circumstances and should continue.
42It is clear from the evidence that the dogs require sanitary bedding and living conditions, food and water, and room to move freely and exercise. Dr. de Langley, Ms. Atrooshi, and Inspector Brown all testified to that effect.
43To return the dogs to the appellant at this time is more likely than not to place them back into a situation where they will be housed in the appellant’s van or at least spending most of their time in the appellant’s van, are likely to be confined, kept in unsanitary conditions and they will be placed immediately back in distress. As a result, I am not prepared to return the dogs to the appellant.
CONCLUSION
44I find that the dogs were in distress on February 14, 2026 warranting their removal and I find that it was necessary to keep the dogs in the respondent’s care at the time of the DTK. I also find that the dogs are likely to be placed in distress if returned to the appellant.
ORDER
45For the reasons set out above and pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, I decline to order that the dogs be returned to the appellant. The NOR and DTK appeals are dismissed.
Released: May 1, 2026
Avril A. Farlam, Vice-Chair