Chantel Hooper v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 224

Tribunals ontario

Animal Care Review Board

TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO

Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2026-04-15

Appeal and application under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Chantel Hooper

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

DECISION AND REASONS

Adjudicator: Alisa Chaplick, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Chantel Hooper, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Alice Liu and Kelly Fan, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference: October 21, November 17 (adjourned) and December 29, 2025; January 19 (adjourned), February 20 (adjourned) and March 5, 2026

OVERVIEW

1A videoconference hearing commenced before the Animal Care Review Board (“Board”) in the following two matters on October 21, 2025:

1. Board File number 17741, pertaining to an Application to Revoke an Order (the “Application”); and

2. Board File number 17742, pertaining to an appeal of a Notice of Non-Compliance (the “Appeal”).

2There was a motion by the Respondent to dismiss both matters due to mootness dated March 3, 2026, as discussed below.

3Chantel Hooper, the Appellant, owned various cats and dogs (collectively referred to as the “Animals”). Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) became involved after a complaint was made regarding alleged distress of the Animals, leading to various orders being issued. These orders were later revoked and a new Order, called “Notice of Revocation and/or Replacement of an Order to the Owner or Custodian of Animal(s)” dated August 20, 2025 (the “Order”), was issued by Inspector Lori Lamb pursuant to s. 30(1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act). This Order required the Appellant to provide veterinary care for the Animals by certain dates, specifically by September 11 or October 7, 2025, depending on the Animal, with special attention to certain issues outlined in the Order. The Order also required the Appellant to provide a clean and sanitary environment, as well as adequate food and water to maintain the Animals’ health by September 11, 2025.

4On September 20, 2025, the Appellant wrote to the Board to request that the Order be revoked on the basis that the animals were not in distress and stated that the Order should not have been issued in the first place. This is the subject of Board File No. 17741 (i.e. the Application).

5A “Notice of Non-Compliance for Failure to Comply with the Order(s)” (the “Notice”) was issued to the Appellant on September 17, 2025. The Appellant appealed this instrument, which is the subject of Board File No. 17742 (i.e. the “Appeal”).

6A case conference took place regarding these matters on October 1, 2025. At the case conference, the parties consented to the following proceedings being combined pursuant to section 9.1(1)(a) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (“SPPA”):

1. Board File number 17741, pertaining to the Application; and

2. Board File number 17742, pertaining to the Appeal of the Notice.

7Immediately prior to the merits hearing regarding the above matters, on October 21, 2025, I heard two motions brought by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (“Respondent”) – one concerning Board File number 17741 and the other concerning Board File number 17742, as discussed below. I reserved my decisions on both motions to be addressed with written reasons at the conclusion of the merits hearing.

8While the hearing progressed, additional hearing dates were added as needed. There were also adjournments granted for various reasons, as discussed below.

9In addition, the Respondent submitted a Notice of Motion to the Board dated March 3, 2026, to dismiss Board File numbers 17741 and 17742, which it requested to be heard at the hearing continuation date of March 5, 2026 (“Motion to Dismiss”). In the Motion to Dismiss, the Respondent argued that the matters were moot because the Order at issue was revoked and that the Board should not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters. As discussed below, I agreed that the matters were moot, and the Board should not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters.

BACKGROUND

10AWS issued a Notice of Revocation of an Order to the Owner or Custodian of Animal(s) dated February 27, 2026, and emailed it to the Appellant that same day (“Revocation”). The Revocation stated that no action was required with respect to the Order at issue in this matter.

11Although the Order was revoked, the Respondent also provided the Appellant with a “Letter of Recommendation” dated February 27, 2026, which was addressed to the Appellant and signed by AWS Regional Supervisor Joshua Matson. The Letter of Recommendation thanked the Appellant for her cooperation the day before and for assisting the veterinarian. The Letter of Recommendation also consisted of a summary of findings and recommendations from the examinations of the Appellant’s animals conducted by AWS veterinarian Dr. Robertson the day before. It stated that all dogs were found to have overgrown nails that required trimming and that one cat was identified as needing grooming, including hair to be trimmed around the hind end.

12The Letter of Recommendation stated that no medical treatments were required or administered at that time and that basic “husbandry recommendations” were discussed based on the findings above. As noted, the Letter of Recommendation provided recommendations for nail trimming for the dogs, cat grooming and ongoing care of the Animals. The Letter of Recommendation stated that failure to provide appropriate care may result in further enforcement under the PAWS Act.

ISSUES

13The issues to be decided, pursuant to the Motion to Dismiss are as follows:

1. Is the dispute between the parties’ moot?

2. If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters?

RESULT

14Due to the Revocation of the Order, the matters are moot. The Board will not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters.

ACCOMODATION REQUEST

15On October 10, 2025, the Appellant submitted an Accommodation Request to the Board. The Appellant’s Accommodation Request included a request for breaks as needed and a request to ask for questions to be reworded or repeated as needed. In addition, the Appellant requested adequate time to make arguments without being rushed. In the Accommodation Request, the Appellant also asked for permission to record the hearing for personal accessibility purposes.

16In response, I advised the Appellant, at the beginning of day 1 of the hearing, and at the beginning of each day that proceeded thereafter, that I reviewed her Accommodation Request and wanted to give her what she needed from an accommodation perspective. I advised the Appellant to ask for breaks as needed and for matters to be repeated as needed. I also advised the Appellant that if she had an issue with a question asked by the Respondent, she had the right to object. I advised that if she had questions during the hearing, I could provide guidance on certain procedural issues, but I could not provide legal advice. I also advised that I could give her time to make her arguments, but I could also exclude testimony and submissions on matters that were not relevant. Furthermore, I made an exception to the Board’s general rule that no telephones were allowed to be on during the hearing because the Appellant asked to record the hearing on her telephone. I gave her permission to do so. In addition, I advised the Appellant to let me know if her accommodation needs changed as the hearing progressed.

Appellant’s Request for Time to Make Submissions After March 5, 2026 Hearing Date

17After the parties’ arguments regarding the motion on the March 5, 2026 hearing date, I provided an oral decision stating that the matters that were the subject of Board File numbers 17741 and 17742 were moot and that the Board would not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters, with written reasons to follow. These are the written reasons.

18In addition, during the motion made on the March 5, 2026 hearing date, the Respondent had argued that due to the Revocation of the Order, there were no remedies available for the Board to grant the Appellant. In response, the Appellant requested time to look into remedies that may be available to her. I reserved my decision on whether to grant the Appellant additional time to look into remedies. Before a decision on this request was released, the Appellant sent communication to the Board, which the Board received on March 6, 2026, on the issue of possible remedies. While I had not yet made a decision regarding whether the Appellant could provide further submissions regarding remedies, I reviewed the submissions that the Board received from the Appellant on March 6, 2026. These submissions will be discussed below. I note that the Appellant made written submissions regarding possible remedies both before and after the March 6, 2026 hearing date and made oral submissions regarding the issue at the March 6, 2026 hearing date. I find that the Appellant has now been granted sufficient time and opportunity to make submissions regarding remedies.

1. The Dispute Between The Parties is Moot

19A continuation of the hearing on the merits was scheduled for March 5, 2026. However, as the Motion to Dismiss was potentially dispositive of the matters at issue in the hearing on the merits, I agreed to hear the Motion to Dismiss at the start of the March 5, 2026 hearing date.

20After hearing the parties’ submissions regarding the Motion to Dismiss on March 5, 2026, I made an oral decision dismissing the matters due to mootness. I stated that I would reserve on my decision regarding whether the Board would exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters. I also stated that I would reserve my decision on a request by the Appellant for the Board to allow her to look into possible remedies available to her, as discussed herein.

21In particular, regarding the Motion to Dismiss which I heard at the start of the March 5, 2026 hearing date, the Respondent stated that Board File numbers 17741 and 17742 were moot as the Order at issue had been revoked. The Respondent stated that in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 (“Borowski”), the Supreme Court of Canada set out a two-stage test for determining whether matters presented live controversy and, if not, whether the decision maker should exercise its discretion to hear the matters in any event as follows:

• First it is necessary to determine whether the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared, and the issues have become academic.

• Second, if the response to the first question is affirmative, it is necessary to decide if the court should exercise its discretion to hear the case.¹

22With respect to the first stage of the Borowski test, the doctrine of mootness reflects the general policy that a decision maker may decline to decide a case that presents no “live controversy” affecting parties rights.² The Respondent stated that because the Order was revoked, there was no live controversy affecting the party’s rights on this Application or Appeal. In particular, the Respondent argued that the only statutory remedies available to the Board, with respect to the Application and Appeal that were before me, were to confirm, revoke or vary the Order, pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act. The Respondent argued that because the Order at issue was revoked, there was no remedy available for the Board to grant.

23The Appellant agreed that the matters were moot and stated that she was arguing that the matters were moot from the beginning of the proceedings. Nevertheless, the Appellant argued that the Board should exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters as discussed below. I agreed with the parties that the matters were moot. In particular, since the Order was revoked, the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared and there is no remedy that the Board can grant, making the matters moot.

2. The Board should not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters

24Regarding the second stage of the Borowski test, cited in paragraph 21 above, the Respondent argued that a decision maker should only entertain moot matters under special circumstances.³ Citing Borowski, the Respondent stated that when deciding whether to hear moot matters, a decision maker must consider the following three factors:

i. The presence of an adversarial context;

ii. The concern for judicial economy; and,

iii. The need for the Court or Board to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework.⁴

25The Respondent stated that as part of the analysis, the Board must balance the expenditure of scare resources against the social costs of “continued uncertainty in the law.”⁵ The Respondent also stated that the onus was on the party seeking to have the moot matters heard to convince the decision maker that the circumstances justified a departure from the general practice of not hearing moot matters.⁶ My application of these three factors noted in Borowski is directly below.

i. The presence of an adversarial context

26The Respondent stated that in this case, there was no remaining adversarial context and no uncertainty in the law. The Respondent argued that the language of the PAWS Act and the significant caselaw that has developed before the courts and the Board is clear. The Respondent also stated that any decision of the Board on a pure question of law (i.e. regarding the Revocation) is not binding on any future board, any court or the legislature.

27The Appellant, on the other hand, stated that she was subjected to retaliatory conduct, harassment and malice, as well as a pattern of escalation by AWS which the Appellant stated did not align with the condition of her Animals. The Appellant wanted the alleged conduct to be addressed by the Board. I do not have the jurisdiction to deal with this alleged “adversarial context” – i.e. the Appellant’s allegations regarding harassment, retaliation and escalation on the part of AWS regarding these matters, as it is outside of my statutory jurisdiction. I note that there is a separate process outlined in the PAWS Act, regarding complaints about AWS inspectors, which I believe the Appellant is availing herself of.

28In addition, the Appellant stated that she wants a decision to be made on the merits of these matters because it could strengthen a claim she made to the Ombudsman and could assist with respect to any civil steps she may take. I find that while these may be considered remaining “adversarial contexts”, the Board should not hear or make findings regarding these moot matters, for potential utilization in a complaint to the Ombudsman and a civil proceeding. The Ombudsman’s office and the civil court have procedures that are different from the Board’s procedures and are not dependent on a Board decision regarding moot matters. The Board will not hear these moot matters to make findings that may or may not assist the Ombudsman’s office and in any possible civil proceedings. The Board finds that there is no adversarial context that would justify hearing the moot matters.

ii. The concern for judicial economy / iii. The need for the Court or Board to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework

29The Respondent stated that concern for judicial economy and the Board’s own mandate to provide efficient, timely and proportional resolution of matters before it, favour allocating the Board’s scarce resources to other matters where there are live issues in dispute between the parties and where the Board has the jurisdiction to grant tangible remedies.

30The Respondent also stated that the only remedies available to the Board under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act with respect to the Order at issue were to confirm, revoke or modify the Order.⁷ In addition, the Respondent submitted that there were no special circumstances in this case that would justify the Board hearing the moot matters. The Respondent also submitted that the matters should not be adjourned for the Board to set a date for the continuation of the merits hearing, if the motion was unsuccessful, as there have already been adjournments. As noted, and as discussed further below, I agree with the Respondent that due to the Revocation, the matters are now moot.

31The Appellant stated that she agreed that the matters are moot but still wishes to continue with the hearing on the merits. She stated that she has a public online platform with a significant number of social media followers. She stated that due to these matters, and the allegations made by the Respondent and AWS, she has endured reputational damage, has received threats to her safety, has been doxed and has had her address shared publicly. She also stated that she lost income related to her public platform. In addition, the Appellant stated that she was very distressed by any suggestion that her animals were mistreated.

32The Appellant also stated that she was overwhelmed because Danielle Meuleman, who acted as counsel for the Respondent for the majority of the hearing, was not counsel on the March 5, 2026 hearing date. The Appellant stated that she found it difficult to proceed on March 5, 2026, given that change. The Appellant stated that she thrives on continuity and viewed the lack of continuity in the counsel for the Respondent during the different hearing dates in this matter as unfair. In addition, the Appellant stated that she was advised shorty before the March 5, 2026 hearing date that Ms. Meuleman would not be present. She stated that she believed the shifting of representatives on the Respondent’s side was a “powerplay”. I note that the Board does not have the power to compel the Respondent to have certain counsel handle a particular case or to compel the same counsel to be present on behalf of the Respondent at every hearing date.

33The Appellant also stated that she is a low-income individual and spent money to send documents to the Board on a USB key on more than one occasion. She stated that she wanted to look into whether she can be reimbursed for this expense. The Appellant also stated that she believes the Board has more powers than those outlined in the PAWS Act as that she believes that, for example, pursuant to the SPPA, the Board has the right to control the hearing process and to weigh credibility. In addition, although the Appellant acknowledged that there had been adjournments during the merits hearing, she stated that they were not all because she requested them and stated and that one adjournment occurred due to illness on the part of the adjudicator.

34The Appellant also stated that she had difficulty obtaining documentation from AWS and had to file a “Freedom of Information request” to obtain records related to her own case, and that the request is still in progress. The Appellant stated that this made it difficult for her to understand and respond to the allegations against her. The Appellant also stated that some of her Animals were removed from her home, and she was without access to them for approximately one month, which caused her and her family considerable distress. In addition, the Appellant stated that she has been asserting that these matters were moot from the start of her involvement with AWS regarding these matters, as she believes that her Animals were never in distress. The Appellant also stated that she wants a finding that her Animals were never in distress to be made, so that it is on record with the Board.

35In addition, the Appellant stated that she had previously received a Statement of Account from AWS. The Appellant stated that she was not informed of any appeal rights by AWS when the Statement of Account was served. In addition, the Appellant stated that she relinquished her rights to various Animals, as she was pressured to do so by AWS, and could not afford to pay a Statement of Account that was served on her by AWS, in the amount of approximately $3000. The Appellant also stated that she wanted to look into whether the Board can grant her any remedies regarding the Statement of Account. In addition, the Appellant asked the Board to consider whether it had jurisdiction to review the Statement of Account and to review the processes implemented by AWS regarding issuing the Statement of Account. She also asked the Board to consider whether the alleged lack of information that AWS provided to her regarding possible avenues for next steps regarding the Statement of Account was procedurally fair.

36In addition, the Appellant stated that everything occurring from the moment the Statement of Account was issued, going forward to the hearing on the merits in these matters, should be looked into. The Appellant also stated that she wants the credibility of various individuals to be weighed and alleged that AWS made conflicting statements during their interactions with her. The Respondent, on the other hand, stated that they believe the Statement of Account that the Appellant was referring to was served on the Appellant in July of 2025 and the Appellant is out of time to appeal this Statement of Account and has not paid the Statement of Account.

37There was no Statement of Account appeal before me. There was also nothing before me to decide regarding removal of any of the Appellant’s Animals. Accordingly, I have no jurisdiction to make rulings on those matters and it would be improper for me to do so. While I agree with the Appellant that I have various powers under the SPPA, those powers do not change the fact that the remedies available to me are the remedies under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act. As noted, in this case, these remedies are to confirm, revoke or modify an order, and the Order at issue has now been revoked, so the Board is without a remedy in these matters. In addition, I do not have the power to make findings on any alleged reputational damage.

38Furthermore, when analyzing these matters in the context of concern for judicial economy, I note that a number of hearing days have already been dedicated to these matters, and considerable time and resources have been spent on these matters by the Board and the parties. In addition, while the Applicant requested that the Board make findings regarding a Statement of Account that was issued to her by AWS, there was no Statement of Account appeal before me. While the Appellant made arguments including that the Statement of Account was not properly explained to her, this is outside of the scope of the matters that were before me. I do not have jurisdiction to make findings regarding the Statement of Account or anything that occurred after that, as requested by the Appellant, other than regarding the matters before me. In addition, while the Appellant did send documents to the Board on a USB key and I recognize that she incurred costs in doing so, I am without the power to award costs or reimbursements in these matters.

39As noted above, when revoking the Order, AWS’ only recommendations to the Appellant were related to “husbandry” issues. However, I am unable to conclude that the Appellant’s animals were never in distress for reasons including that I was not involved in the matter from the outset and that it is beyond the scope of this hearing.

40The Appellant requested that the Board make findings regarding the credibility of the individuals involved in these matters. I will not be making findings regarding credibility in these moot matters, but I note that this Decision and Reasons, which forms part of the public record, clarifies that the Order at issue was revoked. It also clarifies that when the Order was revoked, the only recommendations made to the Appellant were regarding “husbandry” matters. This Decision and Reasons will be available on the public website, CanLII.org. As this Decision and Reasons is a matter of public record, both parties are free to publish it and disseminate it as they see fit, if they wish to do so.

41As noted, my concern for judicial economy militates in favour of the Board not hearing the moot matters, given the time the Board has already spent on these matters and given that any Decision and Reasons that the Board might release regarding these matters would be unlikely to be of precedential value, as s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act clearly articulates the Board’s powers regarding these matters. In addition, as per the Borowski test, I recognize the Board’s role as the adjudicative branch of our political framework. I believe it would be improper for me to make any comments herein regarding the Board’s powers pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, as I believe this would be encroaching on the role of the legislature.

CONCLUSION

42The matter is moot, and the Board will not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters. While I am sympathetic to the Appellant’s position, and the impact that this process had on her and her family, I note that ultimately the Order was revoked. There is no additional remedy that I can impart in this matter. While I know that the Appellant wanted the moot matters to be heard on the merits, I cannot justify doing so, based on my findings when applying the Borowski test above.

43In addition, because of the Revocation, I need not make any decisions on the Respondent’s motions noted in paragraph 7 herein.

ORDER

44Due to the Revocation of the Order, the matters before the Board are moot. The Board will not exercise its discretion to hear the moot matters.

Footnotes

1. 1Borowski, supra at pg. 353.
2. 2Borowski at pg. 353; R. v. Smith, 2004 SCC 14, at para 32 and Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 (“Doucet-Boudreau”) at para. 17.
3. 3Mapara v. Ferndale Institution (Warden), 2014 BCCA 49 at. para. 16; Borowski, supra.
4. 4Borowski, supra at pgs. 358-363
5. 5Doucet-Boudreau, supra at para. 21.
6. 6Payne v. Wilson, 2002 CanLII 45002 (ON CA), at para. 18.
7. 7The Respondent previously took the position that the Board does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal of the Notice. On the March 5, 2026 hearing date, the Respondent advised that it maintains this position.