Tribunals ontario
Animal Care Review Board
TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO
Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux
Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Lynn Freeman
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Lynn Freeman, self-represented
For the Respondent: Hoursa Yazdi, Counsel
Danielle Meuleman, Counsel
Heard by videoconference: December 4, 2025 and January 29, 2026
INTRODUCTION
1In October 2025, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) issued a Statement of Account (SOA) to the Appellant, Lynn Freeman, requiring her to pay $18,459.91 in boarding, veterinary and animal care costs related to the care of her animals.
2The Appellant’s animals were removed from her residence in August 2025 and were kept in the Respondent’s care until they were forfeited to the Crown in early October 2025 after the Appellant failed to pay an earlier statement of account.
3The Appellant appealed the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) and seeks to have it reduced because a) the amounts charged are high, unreasonable, and include accounting errors and charges for boarding deceased cats; b) supporting invoices were redacted and medical reports were not available to verify the care provided; and c) she does not have the financial means to pay the SOA.
4The Respondent argues that the SOA reflects actual and reasonable costs incurred to provide care to the animals and seeks to have the amount confirmed, except for a $50.00 charge related to storage of two euthanized cats that it asks the Board to deduct from the SOA.
ISSUE
5Should the SOA dated October 3, 2025 be confirmed, revoked, or varied?
RESULT
6Pursuant to s. 38(9)3.1 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act), I vary the SOA and order the Appellant to pay $18,300.35 to the Minister of Finance. The new amount reflects a deduction of the $50.00 cold storage fee and a further deduction of $109.56 charged in taxes.
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
7An animal owner may be served with a statement of account regarding costs incurred by the Respondent in cases where an inspector has removed or taken their animal into care or has taken steps to relieve their animal’s distress: s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act. Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act lists various costs recoverable by the Respondent.
8If an owner is issued a statement of account and appeals it, the burden of proof is on the owner to show on a balance of probabilities that the statement of account should be revoked or varied. However, the Respondent has an initial burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the statement of account reflects actual costs incurred and that those costs are reasonable (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.)).
9For the reasons that follow, I find the charges passed on to the Appellant were actually incurred and were reasonable in the circumstances. I also find that the Appellant did not provide persuasive evidence to support reducing or revoking the SOA based on her financial circumstances. Even if I had found that the Appellant had limited ability to pay, I would not have exercised my discretion to reduce the SOA in a situation where the Appellant has repeated past behaviour without much evidence of insight into her conduct or of having taken steps to prevent animal welfare concerns from arising.
Most charges on the SOA reflect actual and reasonable costs incurred
10I find the Respondent proved on a balance of probabilities that the SOA reflects the actual costs the Respondent incurred in caring for the Appellant’s cats between August 27 and October 1, 2025, the last day the cats were in care before forfeiture occurred.
11Despite some clerical errors, the invoices filed into evidence by the Respondent showed $18,459.91 in charges. A breakdown of these invoices is set out in more detail below.
Boarding costs
12The SOA listed $9,928.30 in boarding costs. The Respondent filed into evidence three invoices for boarding at two different facilities.
13Invoice 10122 from the Hamilton Burlington SPCA reflected:
medical boarding of kittens A2 and A4 for seven days at $40/day/cat, totaling $560.00;
boarding of cats D and E for one day at $30/day/cat, totaling $60.00;
half-day hospitalization for cat D at $86.65, related to a dental procedure; and
half-day hospitalization for cat E at $86.65, related to a dental procedure.
14Invoice 3114 from the Oakville & Milton Humane Society reflected boarding of nine cats for one day (October 1, 2025) at $35/day/cat, totaling $315.00.
15Invoice 3102 from the Oakville & Milton Humane Society reflected boarding of 12 cats at $35/day/cat between September 1 and 30, 2025, totaling $8,820.00.
16Invoice 3102 contained an error in the description of services but not in the overall amount charged for boarding. Although 12 cats had been removed from the Appellant’s residence, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector Stefanie Mayrl testified that only nine cats remained in care at that time because three had been euthanized. As a result, the description should have indicated that the charges related to nine cats and not 12.
17Despite this error, I find that the amount charged for boarding in Invoice 3102 did in fact reflect boarding of nine cats according to the following breakdown provided by Inspector Mayrl based on information received from the facility:
boarding of two cats (kittens A2 and A4) for 21 days at $35/day/cat; and
boarding of seven cats for 30 days at $35/day/cat, all of which totaled $8,820.00, the amount noted in the invoice.
18The Respondent also provided a correction to the date range noted on the SOA. Originally, the SOA indicated that the costs covered services provided between September 1 and October 1, 2025. However, Inspector Mayrl testified that there were also medical boarding costs incurred between August 27 and 31, 2025 that were included in the SOA and reflected in Invoice 10122 referenced above. It is evident that the date range on the SOA contained an error, but I accepted the inspector’s uncontradicted evidence that the medical boarding costs from late August had not been included in an earlier statement of account issued to the Appellant and there was no evidence that the Appellant had been double billed.
19I am satisfied that the three invoices add up to $9,928.30, which was the amount passed on to the Appellant for boarding services. The amount therefore reflects the actual costs incurred by the Respondent for boarding the animals.
20Turning next to consider whether the boarding costs were reasonable, I considered Inspector Mayrl’s evidence that boarding services consisted of housing the cats while they were in the Respondent’s care, cleaning and disinfecting kennels, grooming, administering medication, food and water, and daily monitoring.
21I find that this was an appropriate level of care provided to animals that had been removed, and the corresponding costs fell under at least one of the categories of costs the Respondent can recover in s. 35(2) of the PAWS Act. I also accepted Inspector Mayrl’s unchallenged evidence that the average cost of feline boarding ranges from $35 to $45/day/cat. Given that the $35, $40 and $45 daily rates charged by the two facilities in this case fell within that range, I find them to be reasonable.
22I also considered Inspector Mayrl’s evidence that one of the facilities, the Hamilton Burlington SPCA, was selected because certain cats required medical boarding and care and this facility had veterinarians on staff. Feline hospitalization rates were higher than those charged for regular boarding, which I find reasonable given the inspector’s evidence that these services were more involved and included 24-hour monitoring, nutritional supplements, IV fluids and constant medical care for cats that were underweight and had medical needs. I also considered expert evidence, which is outlined in more detail below, that indicated that the regular boarding, medical boarding, and the half-day hospitalization rates were below provincial averages and ranged from 18 percent to 58 percent of the amount the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association’s Fee Guide recommends veterinarians charge for those services.
23Overall, I find the boarding fees to be reasonable in these circumstances.
Veterinary and animal care costs
24In addition to boarding costs, the SOA listed $4,849.15 in veterinary costs, $3,572.90 in animal care costs, and $109.56 in taxes related to those services, all totaling $8,531.61. Although listed as separate categories of costs in the SOA, I will discuss veterinary and animal care costs together as they both relate to the provision of medical care, including medical examinations, diagnostic testing, medical procedures and medications.
25In finding that these costs were actually incurred, I relied on the following invoices filed into evidence by the Respondent:
Invoice 10122 from the Hamilton Burlington SPCA reflected $6,166.59 in veterinary and animal care costs, including recheck exams for two kittens, dental radiographs and extractions for two cats, anesthetic induction, maintenance and monitoring, blood collection fees, and various types of medications.
Invoice 10212 from the Hamilton Burlington SPCA reflected $2,177.02 in veterinary and animal care costs, including recheck exams for nine cats, FIV/FELV testing, antibiotics, a vaccine booster, and parasite protection. This invoice included a $50.00 cold storage fee for two cats that had been euthanized, which the Respondent requested to have deducted from the SOA.
Invoice 3102 from the Oakville & Milton Humane Society reflected $188.00 in veterinary and animal care costs, including medication administration, flea prevention and dewormer.
Reasonableness of veterinary and animal care costs and challenge to expert witness’ impartiality and independence
26The Respondent intended to rely on the expert report and opinion of Dr. Bruce Robertson, DVM, to assist the Board in determining whether the veterinary and animal care costs were reasonable.
27The Respondent asked to have Dr. Robertson qualified as an expert in veterinary medicine to provide an opinion on whether the veterinary services and products and their corresponding costs were reasonable.
28Dr. Robertson has been a licensed veterinarian in Ontario since 1994. When he prepared his expert report and at the time of this hearing, he was employed as a Regional Veterinarian with Provincial Animal Welfare Services.
29The Appellant indicated that she wished to challenge Dr. Robertson’s impartiality and independence. Although she had not provided notice of her intention to challenge the expert’s qualifications, report or statement as required by the Board’s Rules, I waived the notice requirement and permitted the Appellant to question Dr. Robertson given that the Respondent did not object and that proceeding in this manner would facilitate a more accessible process for a self-represented party.
30The Appellant raised the following concerns about Dr. Robertson’s independence and impartiality. First, as an employee of Provincial Animal Welfare Services, Dr. Robertson was “not an independent source.” Second, Dr. Robertson had prior involvement in this case because he signed a certificate advising removal of the animals and had also been involved in other cases involving the Appellant.
31Dr. Robertson estimated that he had been involved two to three prior times in matters involving the Appellant and was retained to either give opinions or perform exams on animals. As to the events giving rise to this case, his involvement prior to preparing an expert opinion was limited to signing a certificate advising removal of the animals from the Appellant to alleviate their distress. He had not examined or provided treatment for any of the animals.
32Dr. Robertson was asked by the Appellant whether he recalled a prior interaction at the Appellant’s home where he had forced sliding glass doors out of their frames. Dr. Robertson had no recollection of this event.
33The Appellant also questioned Dr. Robertson on whether he previously testified about Health Canada ammonia standards that did not exist, to which he responded that he had provided testimony about ammonia levels. Although the Board did not receive a complete answer to the question posed, there was ultimately no evidence before the Board to suggest that Dr. Robertson had provided false testimony in a previous proceeding, as argued by the Appellant.
34The Respondent submitted that Dr. Robertson has routinely provided evidence before the Board and that evidence has been accepted, including while he was employed by Provincial Animal Welfare Services. Counsel argued that expert opinions always involve a retainer, whether contractual or employment, and that this does not impact on a professional who has signed a declaration. Further, Dr. Robertson’s involvement in signing the certificate of removal had no bearing on his ability to be an independent expert reviewing charges that another veterinarian had charged.
35Neither party provided case law on the issue.
36In the circumstances of this case, I did not find that Dr. Robertson lacked independence or impartiality to render his evidence inadmissible at the threshold stage. Dr. Robertson had signed an Acknowledgement of Expert’s Duty in which he acknowledged his duty to assist the Board and to provide opinion evidence that was fair, objective and non-partisan. In addition, neither the arguments about his employment relationship with the party calling him as an expert nor the arguments about his previous involvement in this or other matters persuaded me that he had not reached an independent conclusion on the reasonableness of the services and the costs.
37There was nothing to suggest that Dr. Robertson’s employment was conditional on his providing a favourable opinion to the Respondent or that he would suffer any employment consequences if he concluded, for example, that some or all of the services provided by the external service providers were unnecessary or improper, and that some or all of the resulting costs were unreasonable.
38I also considered that Dr. Robertson had issued a certificate advising removal of the animals; however, a decision to remove animals is ultimately one that rests with inspectors, and in any event, this was not a hearing into whether the removal was properly carried out. Dr. Robertson had also not provided care or billed for services provided to the animals, which made it more likely that he had distance and objectivity when reviewing other practitioners’ medical records and the facilities’ billings. I also considered that much of Dr. Robertson’s assessment of the reasonableness of the costs would be based on the 2025 Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Fee Guide. The Fee Guide is an annual publication of recommended fees for veterinary services in Ontario and is therefore an independent benchmark.
39For all these reasons, I did not exclude Dr. Robertson’s expert evidence but invited the parties to make additional submissions when considering what weight was to be given to his expert opinion. To the extent that the Appellant revisited some of her arguments in closing submissions, these did not persuade me that I should place less weight on Dr. Robertson’s evidence, for the same reasons noted above.
Board relies on expert evidence to find that most veterinary and animal care costs were reasonable
40After reviewing the relevant invoices and the animals’ medical records, prepared by the treating veterinarians at the Hamilton Burlington SPCA, Dr. Robertson prepared an expert report and testified that the products and services were reasonably required to treat the conditions the attending veterinarians had identified. For example, he noted that two cats were diagnosed with upper respiratory infections and were properly treated with antibiotics. Another cat had significant dental disease, underwent a procedure under anesthesia, required numerous extractions, and was given pain medication.
41The Appellant questioned the need for and accuracy of FIV testing, which was one of the diagnostic tests included in the invoice. Dr. Robertson testified that testing for feline retroviruses helps practitioners understand why a cat with dental disease, for example, may be recovering more slowly from their procedure. I accepted his evidence for why certain diagnostic testing was carried out and how it informed the treatment and recovery plan.
42Dr. Robertson then compared the veterinary and animal care costs charged for the cats to those set out in the 2025 Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Fee Guide Small Animal Edition.
43Dr. Robertson’s evidence was that the costs charged in this case were all below the suggested pricing in the Fee Guide. For example, the costs of dental radiographs, dental nerve block, dental extractions and anesthetic maintenance and monitoring were approximately 80 percent of the Fee Guide’s suggested amounts. The fact that the fees charged in this case were in line with the Fee Guide’s recommended pricing made it more likely than not that they were consistent with industry standards and reflected average prices for veterinary care. As a result, I found these costs to be reasonable in the circumstances.
44Where there was no comparator listed in the Fee Guide, for example in the pricing of dispensed and administered medications, Dr. Robertson relied on his prior experience as a veterinarian in private practice when reviewing those fees and concluding that they did not stand out as being excessively high. They were, in his opinion, reasonably of market value. Relying on Dr. Robertson’s uncontradicted evidence and considering that the facility’s other fees were consistent with industry practices, I find it is more likely than not that the net price of medications charged by the Hamilton Burlington SPCA was also reasonable.
Appellant’s arguments about high and unreasonable fees, overcharging, accounting errors, redacted invoices and unavailable medical reports
45The Appellant questioned Dr. Robertson on whether it was reasonable for the facility to charge for vaccines when they had already charged for a previous vaccine. I accepted Dr. Robertson’s evidence that animals typically receive multiple vaccines and there may be charges every time a vaccine is administered. There was also nothing to suggest that the SOA contained duplicative charges for the same vaccine administration.
46The Appellant also questioned the safety of vaccines and asked Dr. Robertson whether multiple vaccines can negatively impact a cat’s health. Dr. Robertson testified that there was nothing in the medical records to indicate inappropriate administration of vaccines or departures from vaccine protocols. Overall, I did not find this line of questioning undermined the reliability of the expert witness’ conclusions.
47The Appellant’s grounds of appeal included an argument that the invoices provided to her were redacted, and medical reports were not available to verify the care provided to the cats. I was not persuaded by these grounds of appeal. It was apparent from the record that the cats’ medical reports were disclosed and available to the Appellant. And while the Appellant had initially received invoices where the clinic information was redacted, unredacted invoices were later provided to the Appellant after she appealed the SOA and therefore her ability to test that evidence was not prejudiced.
48The Appellant also argued that the invoices contained accounting errors. For example, the Appellant questioned why one of the facilities, which was a registered charity, had charged taxes on certain items.
49The SOA listed $109.56 in taxes: $44.64 from Invoice 10122 and $64.92 from Invoice 10212, both issued by the Hamilton Burlington SPCA. On Invoice 10122, HST of 13% was charged for an Azithromycin suspension, IDEXX diagnostics, feline Metacam and a Buprenorphine suspension. On Invoice 10212, HST of 13% was charged on NexGard Combo Application, Clindamycin and IDEXX diagnostics.
50The Respondent took the position that taxes were clearly identified on the invoices and that it was not incumbent on the Respondent to explain what HST was or provide a detailed explanation of taxes applied given that these are standard taxes on goods and services in Ontario. The Respondent submitted that it benefited the Appellant not to have to pay taxes on all the goods and services the facilities billed for.
51I did not find these submissions to be responsive to the Appellant’s concern that it was unclear how the registered charity determined what to charge HST on. It is not persuasive for the Respondent to take the position that the Appellant could have been charged more in tax when the Appellant takes issue with having been charged tax at all.
52The Respondent did not provide a coherent explanation for why certain items had HST applied to them and others (sometimes in the same category) did not. Inspector Mayrl’s response in cross-examination that how taxes get applied is a question for the facility is at odds with how she approached her review of other costs that needed clarification or correction. As a result, I did not find these charges to be transparent and I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s evidence of the reasonableness of the taxes charged by the registered charity. I therefore deduct the $109.56 in taxes from the SOA.
53Regarding the Appellant’s argument that there were boarding charges for deceased felines, I previously found that there was a clerical error in Invoice 3102. The error in the description of services, as mentioned previously, gave the impression that the facility charged for boarding 12 cats when in fact three of those cats had been humanely euthanized and only nine were being boarded on the relevant dates.
54Ultimately, this was clarified by Inspector Mayrl, who provided a breakdown of what the facility had charged for the remaining nine cats, which was consistent with the amount reflected in that invoice. If the Appellant’s argument regarding boarding for deceased felines was not related to Invoice 3102 but was related instead to the cold storage fee for cats that had been euthanized, the Respondent requested that the storage fee be deducted from the SOA, and I have varied the SOA by that amount.
55Overall, I find that almost all of the costs of the SOA were well-supported by evidence and were reasonable in the circumstances, except for $109.56 in taxes and the $50.00 cold storage fee.
Ability to pay is not a basis for reducing or revoking the SOA
56For the reasons that follow, I am not persuaded that the Appellant has limited financial resources and that the SOA should be reduced as a result. Even if I were to find that the Appellant had limited resources, it would not be appropriate in the circumstances of this case to eliminate the Appellant’s liability for these costs by exercising my discretion to vary or revoke the SOA.
57The Appellant testified about her household finances, including that she and her husband receive Old Age Security (OAS) pensions of up to $19,000 a year. Her evidence was unclear whether this amount was cumulative or per person. The Appellant testified that she also qualifies for the Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) and submitted that this was another piece of information that showed she was a low-income individual. She also said she accesses a food bank.
58The Appellant testified that her husband was laid off without a pension after 35 years of working for his company and that the Appellant herself had no pension plan from that same employer because the company went into bankruptcy protection. The Appellant also testified that her husband’s health conditions contributed to their financial difficulties because it resulted in him being unemployed for almost three years and led to costs for medical care. Those costs were not enumerated and there was no documentary evidence substantiating these statements.
59The Appellant also referenced several legal proceedings she had been involved in, including a proceeding with the Public Guardian and Trustee that she said cost her $48,000 in legal expenses. Although she was awarded costs in that matter, she testified that she was “still out of pocket” but did not specify by how much. The Appellant also indicated that she sold a boat to ensure that her cats received proper veterinary care and were spayed and neutered.
60The Respondent submitted that the Board should place little to no weight on the Appellant’s evidence of her financial circumstances, which it argued was difficult to reconcile and did not provide a clear picture of her financial situation.
61The Respondent encouraged the Board to consider that this was the sixth statement of account issued to the Appellant by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector. The Respondent cited the Board’s decision in Freeman and McDonough v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 102, where the Board reviewed an earlier statement of account issued to the Appellant and her husband and reduced it from $200,525.96 to $20,052.59 after finding inability to pay. The Respondent indicated that in that matter, the adjudicator relied on documentary evidence, including notices of assessment, that the Board did not have available in this matter in finding that the Appellant had limited ability to pay.
62With reference to that decision, the Respondent added that another reason the Appellant’s evidence should be given little weight is because when she was asked whether she owed or had previously paid any money to the Respondent, she could not recall this prior decision and did not believe that she owed anything. According to the Respondent, this showed that there were gaps in the Appellant’s evidence.
63I agree with the Respondent that the Appellant’s testimony, paired with the lack of documentation to substantiate her current income and expenses, lacked specificity and did not provide a complete picture of her financial circumstances. For example, the Appellant indicated that she received an OAS pension and had qualified for GIS, which might be evidence that she has a low annual income, but it does not account for what the Appellant has by way of total assets or savings.
64There were also instances where the Appellant’s testimony was inconsistent, which detracted from the reliability of her evidence. For example, at times she stated that she “lost” her home and at other times she stated that she had “sold” her home. It was unclear if the first statement was an attempt to paint a bleaker picture of her financial situation or to simply indicate that she no longer had the home. There was also no information on whether any funds were available to the Appellant from the sale of that home, which is often someone’s most significant asset. Overall, I did not have complete and reliable evidence to find that the Appellant does not have the resources to pay the SOA.
65Even if I had found that the Appellant had limited ability to pay, in this case I would not exercise my discretion to reduce or revoke the statement of account based on that factor. The Divisional Court’s decision in Ontario (Chief Animal Welfare Inspector) v Ishankova, 2023 ONSC 1284 affirmed that the Board may consider an animal owner’s ability to pay as a factor when reviewing a statement of account. However, it is also clear from that decision and this Board’s jurisprudence that ability to pay must be considered in a manner consistent with the purposes of the PAWS Act and in a way that avoids routine cost-shifting to the taxpayer (see Vernigorova v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 208). The purposes of the PAWS Act include promoting owner accountability and ensuring animal welfare.
66In light of these considerations, I placed significant weight on the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant chose to get more animals despite saying that she lives below the poverty line and despite seeing the financial consequences of her earlier decisions. The history before this Board shows that 83 cats were previously removed from the Appellant’s home and resulted in substantial care costs to the Respondent.
67In a case where there is no demonstrated change in behaviour and no attempt by the Appellant to mitigate or prevent animal care concerns, meaningful accountability requires that the Appellant be responsible for the full costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector in caring for her animals and that she should not benefit from further reductions.
ORDER
68Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9)3.1 of the PAWS Act, the Board varies the SOA and orders the Appellant to pay $18,300.35 to the Minister of Finance.
Released: March 27, 2025
Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair