Appeals under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Sylvie Trépanier
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: François Henrie, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Cal Rosemond, Counsel
For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Counsel
Heard by Videoconference: December 11 and 22, 2025 and January 16, 2026
OVERVIEW
1The appellant, Sylvie Trépanier, operates an exotic animal business called Lancaster Exotic Pet and Supplies.
2On August 21, 2025, Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) removed fourteen animals from the appellant’s property. On October 2, 2025, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (“respondent”), decided to keep some of those animals in care (“DTK”). On October 2, 2025, the respondent also issued the appellant a Statement of Account (“SOA”) in the amount of $13,358.44 for the boarding, feeding and care provided to her animals.
3The appellant appeals the DTK and the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (“Board”). She argues that she took the necessary steps prescribed AWS to make sure the habitats of the seized animals were up to the proper standards. Therefore, at the time of the DTK, she submits that she was compliant and should have had the animals returned to her. She also argues that she should not have pay the SOA since the animals should have been returned to her. She alternatively argues financial hardship to pay the SOA.
4The respondent argues that the listed animals in the DTK of October 2, 2025, needed to keep the animals in care to alleviate their distress, and had reasonable grounds to believe that if returned, the animals may be returned into distress. The respondent asks the Board to do deny the appellant’s appeal of the DTK and to confirm the SOA.
5On consent of the parties, the appeals were heard at the same time pursuant to s. 9.1(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. 22.
6The matters proceeded to a videoconference hearing, which was conducted in French and English, with the help of an interpreter for the appellant. Ultimately, the appellant indicated that the interpreter assisting her could be released as the parties were able to interact directly with the Board and each other in the language of their choice.
ISSUES IN DISPUTE
7The issues to be decided are:
Decision to Keep Appeal (17822/ACRB):
a) Were the animals in distress and was it necessary for the respondent to keep the animals in its care to relieve their distress?
b) Did the respondent have reasonable grounds to believe the animals may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant when it decided to keep them in care?
SOA Appeal (17823/ACRB):
c) Should the SOA dated October 2, 2025, in the revised amount of $11,709.69 be confirmed, revoked, or varied?
RESULT
8The appeal of the Decision to Keep is denied because at the time it was issued, the animals were still in distress, and the appellant’s premises were not ready for the return of the animals. Returning the animals would have placed them in distress.
9The Board confirms the revised Statement of Account in the amount of $11,709.69, as requested by the respondent.
ANALYSIS
Preliminary Issues
10The appellant did not file any will-say statement by start of these proceedings. The appellant’s counsel indicated that his client would be testifying in person to provide her evidence. The requirement to file a witness statement was not a matter of choice. Ther Board required the parties to do so in the Case Conference Report and Order of October 28, 2025, the Adjournment Order of November 21, 2025, and repeatedly during the Hearing. Giving in person evidence and a will-say statement are not alternatives to each other. A will-say statement summarizes the evidence a witness is expected to give during a hearing and informs all the parties of what a witness will testify, avoiding any surprises and streamlining the process. It is a matter of fairness to all parties.
11Furthermore, the appellant only filed 8 documents prior to the December 11, 2025, the first day of hearing. She also filed a significant volume of documents just a few days before the third day of Hearing on January 16, 2026. The Tribunal ruled that many of the documents were available to the appellant well before the CCRO of October 20, 2025, and would not be admitted. For any document she did not have in her possession prior to the date of hearing their admissibility would be determined on a case-by-case basis.
Decision to Keep in Care
12The respondent is required to show on a balance of probabilities that the Decision to Keep in Care was made in accordance with s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act.
Applicable sections of the PAWS Act
13Under s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act, the respondent may decide to keep an animal that was removed under s. 31(1) in its care if:
a) it determines it is necessary to relieve its distress, or
b) it has reasonable grounds to believe that the animal may be placed in distress if returned to its owner, or custodian.
14Distress is defined in s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act, as the state of being:
a) In need of proper care, water, food, or shelter,
b) Injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or
c) Abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation, or neglect.
Board’s Findings
Were the animals in distress and was it necessary to keep them in care to alleviate that distress (s. 31 (6) (a) PAWS ACT)?
15Based on the evidence of AWS Regional Manager Braun (“RM Braun”), Dr. Pauline Delnatte (“Dr. Delnatte”) and Inspector Maryanne Pryer (“Inspector Pryer”) the Board finds that at the time of issuing the DTK, the animals were in distress, and it was necessary to keep them to relieve the animals’ distress. The Board rejects the appellant’s argument that the presence of masked humans could have been a significant contributor to the observed stress in the animals covered in the DTK. In any event, these arguments related to the Notice of Removal (“NOR”) of August 21, 2025, and not the DTK of October 2, 2025. The Board issued a Decision on October 16, 2025, confirming the NOR, save for one animal.
16RM Braun testified that he issued the DTK on October 2, 2025, following the receipt of a Keep in Care request form from Inspector Pryer on September 5, 2025.
17RM Braun reviewed the documentation served on the appellant and the supporting documents provided by the inspector, with a focus on medical health concerns and the suitability of the environment for the animals. The documents included the following:
a) Notice of Removal dated August 21, 2025. It listed the animals removed. Not all the animals listed were covered by the DTK as the other animals (eight) were surrendered by the appellant, save one otter that died;
b) Certificate of Veterinarian dated August 21, 2025, signed by Dr. Pauline Delnatte;
c) Photos taken on site by Investigator Young;
d) Will say statement of Inspector Pryer;
e) Emails from the appellant of September 3 and 11, 2025; and
f) Expert report from Dr. Delnatte of September 15, 2025.
18Dr. Delnatte testified that between August 22 and 26, 2025, she performed a clinical assessment of all the removed animals, except for the capuchin, who was observed by Dr. Hirji, who specializes in primates and who worked with Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary. Dr. Delnatte’s observations can be summarized as follows:
a) All but three of the animals removed were in suboptimal body condition.
b) Twelve of the animals removed suffered from identified medical issues, some having been in these conditions for several weeks or likely months prior to their removal.
c) Four animals suffered from dental disease.
d) Most animals displayed behavioral abnormalities, including repetitive behaviors that can’t be stopped, such as hand biting, erratic pacing, etc.
e) The social grouping was inadequate for most animals, with some highly social species housed in solitary.
f) Juvenile primates (the capuchin and juvenile macaque) were being raised without their mother or contact with the same species.
19At the time of writing the report of September 15, 2025, Dr. Delnatte provided RM Braun with her observation for each animal listed in Appendix B of the DTK. The animals in question are listed in the table below:
| Number | Species |
|---|---|
| 3 | Japanese Macaque |
| 1 | Capuchin |
| 2 | Common Genet |
| 1 | Fennec Fox |
20While most animals saw their condition improve from the time they were removed on August 21, 2025, the common assessment for each one was that they remained in distress and more time was required to relieve their distress.
21Her other observations for each animal included the following:
a) Fennec fox (female): still in poor body condition, was still anxious and displaying food aggression. In the facilities where it was removed, for social reasons, she was placed with another Fennec fox (male) that was removed from the premises on August 21, 20025 and surrendered by the appellant.
b) Common genets (1 male and female): both were in acceptable body condition but shedding excessively. Male had cracked ankle.
c) Japanese macaques (2 females): high need for enrichment was missing and some of the worse environmental conditions caused continued psychological stress that were still obvious as well as behavioral concerns. Of note, at the time of removal, one of the macaques was identified as a male, but subsequent observation confirmed she was a female.
d) Juvenile macaque; seemed small for her purported age of 12 to 15 months; also, difficulty manipulating objects and should have been with mother.
e) White faced capuchin: very young to be independent and still not weaned. Concerned with very high psychological distress.
22After three weeks of observations, Dr. Delnatte’s conclusions were that while the animals’ respective conditions had improved, they needed more time in a controlled environment to be relieved from their distress.
23The appellant argued that the animals’ distress observed on August 21, 2025, was due to the presence of masked humans and could have been equally impactful on the animals as any other source of stress.
24Dr. Delnatte’s evidence was clear that most animals displayed behavioural abnormalities, including stereotypical behaviours, such as hand biting, erratic pacing, and food food-guarding that are symptoms of the stress she observed in the animals on August 21, 2025. These are long lasting and were continuing at the time the DTK was issued. She testified that they were not behaviours associated with the animals seeing a masked human. Furthermore, these behaviours continued to be observed, with diminishing intensity, following their removal from the appellant’s premises and at the time the DTK was issued.
25The Board is satisfied that based on the evidence of the respondent, the DTK of October 2, 2025, was justified and was necessary to relieve that animals’ distress.
26The Board notes that if the requirements of s. 31(6)(a) of the PAWS Act are justified by the respondent, then there is no need to consider the requirements of s. 31(6)(b)(i) of the PAWS Act. However, having heard evidence on the later requirements, the Board will determine if the requirements of s. 31(6)(b)(i) of PAWS Act were met by the respondent.
Did the respondent have reasonable grounds to believe that the animals may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant (s. 36 (6)(b)(i)?
27Much of the appellant’s evidence focused on this issue.
28The Board finds that the respondent had reasonable grounds to believe that the animals would be in distress if they were returned to the appellant. The appellant did not demonstrate she had met the requirements necessary for the return of the animals.
29RM Braun testified that he needed to be satisfied that if the animals were to be returned to the appellant, they would not be in a situation of distress. He therefore requested an expert opinion from Dr. Delnatte. Her report of September 15, 2025, was included in the DTK as Appendix B.
30Dr Delnatte testified that there were no indications at the time of the report that the animals could be returned in an environment free of distress. The key points of Dr. Delnatte’s report included a lack of veterinary care, lack of concrete husbandry care plans, and the need for improved lighting and ventilation.
31For the animals to be returned to the appellant, RM Braun testified that the conditions to be met were identified in the DTK and included the following:
a) provide a detailed daily care plan, species by species which includes socialization and enrichment.
b) Ensure appropriate environmental cleanliness and ammonia remediation.
c) provide a confirmed established relationship veterinarian that can provide adequate care for the varying diverse species, along with detailed veterinary care regime/plan.
d) provide a detailed dietary plan, species by species including supplier(s) of the varying sustenance.
e) improve/construct adequate enclosures.
f) consent to an AWS inspection and verification of the conditions.
g) consent to scheduled AWS follow up inspections.
32The appellant takes the position that she met the requirements identified in Dr. Delnatte’s in paragraph 29 above before the issuance of the DTK on October 2, 2025.
There was no Daily Care Plan in place
33The Board finds that the appellant did not have a daily care plan in place at the time the DTK was issued on October 2, 2025.
34The appellant relies on a Daily Care Plan that she states was sent to Inspector Pryer and approved by her on or about September 5, 2025. But the Daily Care Plan she submitted in evidence at the Hearing, appears to be a “cut and paste” from another document. It is not dated, and it did not indicate who it came from and who was the intended recipient. There is no indication that it was sent to Inspector Pryor. The appellant’s oral testimony is that the Plan was sent to Inspector Pryor, but her own documentary evidence does not support that allegation. While Inspector Pryer confirmed she had seen the Daily Care Plan, she could not recall if she became aware of it before or after the DTK was issued. But she confirmed that between August 21, 2025, and October 2, 2025, there were no discussions with the appellant with respect to the animals being the object of the DTK. I find the Inspector Pryor’s evidence to be more reliable particularly given the evidence submitted as a whole by the respondent, when compared to the scare evidence of the appellant. I therefore find that on the balance of probabilities, the appellant did not have a Daily Care Plan as of the date the DTK was issued, or if she did, she did not share it with Inspector Pryer before October 2, 2025.
The Daily Care Plan for spider monkeys could not be used for the animals under the DTK
35The appellant also relied on a Daily Care Plan that was prepared for spider monkeys originally covered under the NOR of August 21, 2025, as evidence that she could use it to meet the requirements to comply with the DTK.
36On August 27, 2025, Inspector Pryor issued to the appellant a species-specific Order for 4 four spider monkeys. It provided requirements that the appellant needed to put in place to be able to keep the spider monkeys. It also specified there would compliance inspections on September 10 and 27, 2025.
37The appellant testified that she was advised by Inspector Pryer that the spider monkey Daily Care Plan could be used for the animals in the DTK. However, this was not supported by any evidence, such as an email or phone record to Inspector Pryer.
38Inspector Pryor testified that the Daily Care Plan makes specific reference to the spider monkeys, not to the animals covered by the DTK. This is clear on the face of the document itself, at Appendix A, where the animal description refers to 4 spider monkeys. There is no reference to the animals under the DTK. Inspector Pryer confirmed that the August 27, 2025, order was for the spider monkeys only. No information was shared that the compliance requirements could also be used for the animals covered by the DTK.
39For these reasons, I find the appellant’s evidence on the Daily Care Plan to be unreliable and cannot conclude that the Inspector Pryer saw it before the DTK was issued, or she did see it, it was specifically for the spider monkeys, and not for the animals identified in the DTK.
There was no confirmed established relationship with a veterinarian that could care for the animals if they were returned to the appellant
40For the reasons below, the Board finds that the appellant did not have an established relationship with a veterinarian at the time the DTK was issued.
a. Dr Germain Nappert’s lack of veterinary license in Ontario was a factor to consider in the DTK
41The appellant testified Dr. Germain Nappert was the veterinary in charge of the animals and that even if he was not licensed to practice in Ontario, he was in the process of becoming licensed.
42Dr. Delnatte reached out to Dr. Nappert to confirm if he was the veterinary of record. In a letter dated September 4, 2025, Dr. Nappert indicated he had administered Tuberculosis vaccines for about a year but was not currently providing care for the animals and that he was not licensed to provide veterinary services in Ontario. He confirmed that he was applying for a license to practice as a veterinary in Ontario.
43During the Hearing, Dr. Delnatte was shown a letter dated November 14, 2025, submitted in evidence by the appellant (one of the 8 documents described in paragraph 11, above, from Dr. Nappert in which he indicates he has been the appellant’s veterinary for several years, and not just one year. He also indicates that he provided veterinarian consultations, guidance and medical oversight to the appellant’s animals. Dr. Delnatte testified that there was a clear contradiction between the September 4 and November 14, 2025, letters with respect to Dr. Nappert’s role in taking care of the appellant’s animals. He seems to be limiting the scope of his work in the September 4 letter and then in his November 14 letter he confirms how extensively he was involved in the care of the appellant’s animals for several years. And if he was taking care of the animals to the extent he says he did in the November 14 letter, Dr Delnatte testified that he would have been practicing in Ontario as a veterinary without a proper license.
44In cross-examination, the appellant confirmed she sent several emails to the Board and to the respondent in which she underlined how she was displeased with AWS’ attempts to confirm that Dr. Nappert was licensed by the College of Veterinarians of Ontario. All these letters were sent after October 2, 2025, the day the DTK was issued, which means that at the time the DTK was issued, Dr. Nappert was not properly licensed to practice as a veterinary in Ontario, and Dr. Delnatte was justified in raising this as a factor to consider in her September 14, 2025, report to RM Braun.
b. Dr Glen Collard was not veterinary of record at the time the DTK was issued
45The appellant testified that if Dr. Nappert was not her veterinary of record for her animals, she was also a client of Dr. Glen Collard but provided no evidence to support her allegation. At the Hearing, she was presented with an exchange of text messages on December 11, 2025, between Dr. Collard and Inspector Pryer where Dr. Collard indicates he had not been the appellant’s veterinary of record since 2024, when he tested animals for Tuberculosis. Dr. Collard confirmed that Dr. Nappert appeared to be the appellant’s veterinarian of record. The only evidence the Board has is that Dr. Collard was not her veterinary of record, and that is not contradicted.
46I find that at the time the DTK was issued, the appellant did not provide a confirmed established relationship with veterinarian that could provide adequate care for the varying diverse species, along with detailed veterinary care regime/plan.
47I therefore find that it was appropriate for Dr. Delnatte to include in her report that the appellant did not have a licenced veterinary, which left the animals without adequate and appropriate veterinary care at the time the DTK was issued.
No adequate enclosures for the animals in the DTK
48For the reasons below, the Board finds that there were no adequate enclosures in place at the time the DTK was issued, and that the enclosures were not for the animals covered under the DTK.
49The appellant alleges that a new building was installed and was set up to receive the animals before the DTK was issued on October 2, 2025. In an email dated September 3, 2025, sent to Inspector Pryer and RM Braun, the appellant included enclosure plans. RM Brown considered those plans but noted that they were just plans, with no concrete evidence that the enclosures had been completed at the time he made his decision to keep the animals in care.
50As noted above, there was an order dated August 27, 2025, issued to the appellant which related to 4 spider monkeys. It included an Appendix A that listed a series of conditions to be met by the appellant. The first series of conditions was to be met by September 10, 2025, and the other series to be met by September 25, 2025. An inspection was to take place on each of these milestones.
51In her email to Inspector Prior on September 11, 2025, the appellant indicates that she purchased the building “to house the animals currently at my facility”. Based on this language, it is evident that the building was not meant for the animals covered by the DTK which were no longer on her premises.
52Inspector Pryer confirmed that the purpose of the inspection of September 28, 2025, was to determine if the appellant had complied with the requirements of the August 27, 2025, order, which was for the spider monkeys only.
53The respondent submitted in evidence a video taken September 26, 2025, by one of the AWS inspectors. It shows that many of the enclosures the appellant states were for the animals subject to the DTK would not have been ready to receive them. But the video does show the spider monkeys in two completed enclosures, the 16 feet by 10 feet, and the 10 feet by 10 feet enclosures.
54Dr. Delnatte was shown the appellant’s proposed enclosure plans for the new building as well as pictures of the interior of the building and asked to comment on their adequacy. Her evidence is that none of the enclosures would have been adequate to accommodate the animals subject to the DTK. She also confirmed that the existing shed (10 feet x 20 feet) from which the animals were removed is not sufficient in size for any species of the animals subject to the DTK.
55RM Braun also confirmed he did not see any of the pictures or videos of the new structure installed by the appellant prior to October 2, 2025, and that the results of the September 26, 2025, inspection did not make their way in his DTK. Inspector Pryer confirmed that this is because the inspections were for the compliance with the Order issued on August 27, 2025, for the spider monkeys. They had nothing to do with the DTK.
56Contrary to what the appellant argues, the Board finds that the building was never meant for the animals covered by the October 2, 2025, DTK. The evidence is that the inspections of September 26 and November 28, 2025, were for the compliance of the August 27, 2025, order involving the spider monkeys only
57On November 24, 2025, the appellant sent an email to Inspector Pryer to confirm another inspection for November 26, 2025. The sole purpose of that inspection was to verify the electrical installation, and that she was not consenting to any additional inspection other than to confirm her compliance with an order issued to her involving the spider monkeys. During cross-examination, the appellant stated she felt the inspection of November 28, 2025, had a broader scope than what she meant in her email, and included the inspection of the new building.
58If an inspection was required on November 28, 2025, then by deduction, the building was still not compliant before that for the spider monkeys and by deduction, not ready for the animals covered by the DTK at the time it was issued on October 2, 2025.
59Therefore, I find that the new building was not meant to receive the animals covered by the DTK and was not ready for that purpose at the time the DTK was issued on October 2, 2025.
Conflating Notice of Removal and the DTK
60The appellant spent a considerable amount of time cross-examining Inspector Pryer and Dr. Delnatte on the events surrounding the removal of the animals on August 21, 2025. This included questions on the distress of the animals, conditions they were found in, the food they were given by appellant compared to what they received in the animals shelters, the cost the appellant would have expended versus those of the animal shelters, whether the appellant prevented from handling the animals, whether another person on the premises was prevented form cleaning the facilities, the events surrounding the death of an otter, and the wearing of Personal Protective Equipment by Inspector Pryer, Dr. Delnatte and other AWS Inspectors.
61The Board underlines this because those issues are not addressed in this Decision. They are not relevant to the issue at hand being the DTK. Rather, and the appellant agreed with this, that they are issues related the NOR of August 21, 2025, which was appealed by the appellant and disposed of in a Board Decision (file 17539/ACRB) dated December 10, 2025.
Board’s Conclusion on DTK
62For all the above reasons, the appellant’s appeal of the DTK issued October 2, 2025, is denied.
Statement of Account
Applicable sections of the PAWS Act
63Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act states that the CAWI may from time to time serve a statement of account on an animal owner or custodian where it has taken steps to relieve an animal in distress, removed an animal, or take an animal in its care.
64Section 38(9) of the PAWS Act states that the Board may confirm, revoke or vary statements of account.
65The respondent also bears the initial evidentiary burden to show that the charges on the SOAs are reasonable and reflect the actual cost of necessaries provided to alleviate the distress of the animals removed. Then the appellant bears the onus with respect to whether the SOA should be revoked or varied (see Windrift Adventures Inc v. CAWI, 2023 ONSC 4501.
Preliminary Issues
66On the first day of hearing, the respondent’s counsel advised the Board that the amount of the SOA should be revised down to $12,908.94. It covers the same time-period as the original SOA but was amended to remove the charges for eight animals that were surrendered by the appellant following their removal on August 21, 2025.
67On the last day of hearing, the respondent’s counsel advised the Board that the amount of the SOA should be further varied to $11,709.69. It also covered the same time-period as the previous SOAs, but it reflected the fact that a juvenile macaque was ordered returned to the appellant on December 16, 2025.Therefroe the charges for that animal were removed.
68As a result, the outstanding amount of the SOA is $11,709.69
Board’s Finding
69For the reasons below, the Board confirms the SOA in the amount of $11,709.69
70The appellant submits that she should not have pay the SOA since the animals should have been returned to her.
71She also argued she does not have the financial ability to pay the Statement of Account, particularly because of the $40,000 improvements she had to make for the installation of the new building.
72For the SOA, the respondent filed detailed invoices issued by Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary (“Story Book”), Little Ray’s Reptile Zoo Inc. (“Little Ray’s”) and Safari Niagara.
Story Book
73There were two invoices from Primate Sanctuary, one for the period of August 21, to August 31, 2025, totaling $765.00, and another for the period of September 1 to September 15, 2025, totaling $1,350.00. Both were for the feeding and boarding of a capuchin and a Japanese macaque.
74As a result of this Board’s Oder of October 16, 2025, to return a juvenile Japanese macaque, the first invoice of $765.00 was reduced to $495.00, and the second invoice of $1350.00 was reduced to $675.00, for a total of $1,170.00 for Story Book.
Little Ray’s
75There were two invoices from Little Ray’s. One was for the period of August 22 to August 31, 2025, totaling $8,428.44, for the care of animals, staffing costs and mileage for 14 animals. There was a second invoice for the period of September 1 to September 15, 2025, totaling $1,975.00, for the care of 9 animals (5 had been surrendered by the appellant. Both invoices totaled $10,493.44.
76The first invoice was adjusted down to $7,722.19 to reflect the surrender of animals by the applicant, for a new total of $9,697.19 for both invoices.
77As a result of this Board’s Oder of October 16, 2025, to return a juvenile Japanese macaque, the second invoice of $1975.00 was reduced to $254.25. The new total for Little Ray’s is $9,442.94.
Safari Niagara
78There was one invoice from Safari Niagara covering the period of August 27 to September 2, 2025, totaling $840.00 for set-up fees, boarding and feeding.
The Invoices submitted under the SOA are reasonable
79The Board finds that the invoices submitted (and amended as described above) are reasonable.
80Inspector Pryer testified that based on her experience, the costs charged by Story Book Farm Primate Sanctuary, Little Ray’s Reptile Zoo Inc. and Safari Niagara for the initial set-up fees, boarding and feeding are similar to previous invoices issued by them in other matters and are aligned with fees charged by other facilities. These facilities also had a specialty in handling primates. I accept Inspector Pryor’s evidence over that of the appellant, who while objecting to the amounts, did not provide evidence from other animal providers to show how inappropriate they were.
81The appellant argued that it was inappropriate for the respondent to submit an invoice from Story Book with no HST included, and that somehow, the invoice was not valid or legal. Other than arguing it was improper to submit such invoices, no evidence or legal argument in support was offered to explain why this was an issue. The respondent offered as an explanation that this provider is a registered charity as shown on the invoices, and therefore not required to pay HST. I accept this explanation.
82The appellant also submitted that the set-up fees charged by the animal facilities were excessive but offered no evidence to support her position. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the Board accepts that the set-up fees charged were reasonable and sees no reason to remove or vary them.
83The appellant submits that she should not have to pay the SOA since the animals should have been returned to her. The Board rejects that argument. As the respondent correctly pointed out, all the costs incurred and subject of the SOA were up to September 15, 2025, and therefore pre-date the DTK. And the removal of the animals under the NOR was upheld in the Board Decision of October 16, 2025. Therefore, the SOA should not be nullified even if the DTK appeal was granted.
84I find that the charges on the modified SOA are reasonable and reflect the actual cost of services provided to the animals.
Financial Hardship
85The appellant provided no evidence as to her current financial circumstances and how payment of the SOA would result in financial hardship. She testified that she spent approximately $40,000 for the new building but provided no documentary evidence to support this.
86I also find that the appellant has not met the onus to vary or revoke the modified SOA. The Board sees no reason to vary or revoke the SOA and confirms that the appellant owes the revised amount of $11, 709.69.
ORDER
87The appellant’s appeal of the Decision to Keep dated October 2, 2025, is denied.
88The appellant’s appeal of the Statement of Account of October 2, 2025, is denied and the Board orders the Appellant to pay $11,709.69.
Released: April 2, 2026
_________________________
François Henrie
Member