Tribunals ontario Animal Care Review Board
TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux
Appeal and Application under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Robert Coad
Appellant/Applicant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant/Applicant: Robert Coad, Self-represented For the Respondent: Yun (Alice) Liu, Counsel
Heard: August 1, 12, September 3, 12, October 1 and 2, 2025; last submissions received January 16, 2026
INTRODUCTION
1Robert Coad (Appellant) appealed to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) a decision of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) to keep seven of his animals in care. He also brought an application seeking the return of the animals.
2The matters relate to one adult cat that was removed from the Appellant’s care in June 2025, and six kittens that were born in the Respondent’s care to a cat that was removed in April 2025. The Appellant was in custody awaiting trial during the removals (for reasons unrelated to these matters) and remained in custody at the time of this hearing.
3After the hearing into these matters was completed and the Board’s decision was pending, the Respondent informed the Board that the Appellant had been released from custody and the animals that were the subject of this appeal and application were returned to him.
4Given this new information, and because the return of the animals was the only remedy available in the appeal and application, I sought submissions from the parties on whether the appeal and application were moot, and if so, whether the Board should exercise its discretion to decide them.
5The Respondent provided submissions on February 16, 2026. It took the position that the appeal and application are moot, and the Board should not exercise its discretion to decide the matters. The Appellant did not provide any submissions.
RESULT
6As the return of the animals is the only remedy the Board can grant in an appeal of a decision to keep animals in care and in an application for return, the matters are moot because the animals have already been returned to the Appellant.
7The Board declines to decide the moot appeal and application.
APPEAL AND APPLICATION ARE MOOT
8The leading case on mootness is the Supreme Court’s decision in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 SCR 342, 1989 CanLII 123 (Borowski). Borowski sets out a two-step analysis for mootness:
- Is the dispute between the parties moot?
- If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the appeal?
9In the first stage of the Borowski test, the Board must decide whether the matter is moot – that is, whether there is still a live controversy between the parties. The controversy here was that the Appellant believed that his animals should be returned, and the Respondent disagreed. For the reasons that follow, I find that there is no live controversy between the parties because the Respondent returned the animals to the Appellant and the matters are therefore moot.
10On June 19, 2025, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector issued a decision to keep seven of the Appellant’s animals in its care pursuant to s. 31(6) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act). According to that decision, the Respondent kept the animals in care because it determined that a) doing so was necessary to relieve the animals’ distress, and b) it had reasonable grounds to believe that the animals may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant. Part of the reasoning for this decision was that the Appellant remained in custody and had not identified a suitable caregiver.
11The Appellant appealed this decision to the Board. His position was that he provides appropriate care for the animals and that the concerns that arose about their condition were the result of hired caregivers not providing proper care while he was in custody.
12As mentioned previously, the Appellant also filed an application seeking the return of the animals because he expected to either care for them personally once he was released from custody or place them with caregivers in a new location.
13The available remedy on an appeal of a decision to keep animals in care and in an application for return is for the Board to order the return of the animals to their owner. In January 2026, while the decision in these matters was pending, the Respondent advised the Board that the Appellant had been released from custody and that the Respondent had returned the animals to him. In its submissions, the Respondent further indicates that the Appellant was released in October 2025 and the animals were returned to him on October 24, 2025.
14Given these developments, I find there is no live controversy between the parties in these matters. The animals have already been returned to the Appellant and the remedy requested by him is no longer necessary. I agree with the Respondent that any decision of the Board in these cases would not have a practical effect on the rights of the parties.
15As the return of the animals was the only remedy the Board could grant in the appeal and application, the issues raised in both proceedings became moot when the Respondent returned the animals to the Appellant.
BOARD DECLINES TO DECIDE MOOT APPEAL AND APPLICATION
16While there is no live controversy remaining, rendering the matter moot, the Board may exercise its discretion to decide the merits of the moot matter based on the Borowski framework.
17Borowski outlines three factors to consider in determining whether to exercise discretion to decide the merits of a moot appeal:
i. The existence of a truly adversarial context; ii. The presence of particular circumstances that would justify the expenditure of limited tribunal resources to resolve moot cases; and iii. The need for the tribunal to be sensitive to its adjudicative role and not intrude into the role of the legislature.
18The burden is on the party seeking to have the moot issue decided on its merits to demonstrate why the Board should depart from the general rule of not deciding moot appeals (Payne v Wilson, 2002 CanLII 45002 (ON CA) at para. 18).
19The Appellant made no submissions on whether the Board should exercise its discretion to decide the moot appeal and application now that the remedy he requested has already been granted.
20In declining to decide the moot proceedings, I accepted the Respondent’s submission that there is no adversarial context. The Respondent indicates that it issued its final statement of account for these animals on December 19, 2025. The 10-business-day appeal period for that statement of account has now passed. In early January 2026, the Board also released its decision on an earlier appeal of a statement of account that covered certain costs related to these animals. While further litigation could result from that appeal, and the Board is aware of a pending reconsideration request in that matter, there is nothing before me to indicate that deciding these moot matters on their merits would impact the outcome of that proceeding or have any collateral consequences for the parties or others.
21Second, I agree with the Respondent’s submission that it would not be an economic use of the Board’s resources to decide the moot matters. Even though the oral hearing was already completed in 2025 and the continued use of Board resources will be considerably less than that in matters where the hearing has not been held, it would not be a worthwhile use of scarce Board resources to decide the matters in a case where there is no uncertainty in the law.
22On the third factor, I must be sensitive to the Board’s adjudicative role and the risk that “[p]ronouncing judgments in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties may be viewed as intruding into the role of the legislative branch” (Borowski, at page 362). This factor is especially significant where the matter requires an abstract interpretation of the legislation. Neither party made substantive submissions on this point or suggested that deciding the matters would require me to provide an abstract interpretation of the PAWS Act. In any event, I do not find this factor determinative given my finding that there is no adversarial context remaining between the parties and that deciding on the merits would be an inefficient use of the Board’s resources.
23For all these reasons, I decline to determine the merits of the appeal and application.
ORDER
24The appeal and application are dismissed.
Released: February 27, 2026
____________________________
Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair