Mayen Ajak-Mayan v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 214

Date: 02/26/2026

Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Mayen Ajak-Mayan

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair

For the Appellant: Mayen Ajak-Mayan, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Hoursa Yazdi, Counsel Joshua Matson, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services

Heard by Videoconference: January 5, 2026

Written Submissions: February 9, 2026

OVERVIEW

1Mayan Ajak-Mayan (Appellant) appeals to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) the removal of his dog, Blizzard. Animal Welfare Services (AWS) removed the dog from the Appellant’s residence on November 7, 2025, under section 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act). Under that section, removal occurs after a veterinarian has advised an inspector in writing that removal is necessary to relieve the animal’s distress.

2A Notice of Removal (NOR) was served on the Appellant in person, also on November 7, 2025. The NOR stated that there was evidence of the dog being physically abused.

3The Appellant’s position is that Blizzard should be returned to him as his behaviour towards the dog on November 7, 2025, was uncharacteristic of him and of short duration. He is addressing the issue by actively seeking the help of dog trainers to assist him with Blizzard’s behaviour, and he has sought the help of mental health practitioners regarding his own behaviour.

4The Respondent, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, takes the position that the Appellant physically abused Blizzard, and the removal of Blizzard to relieve the dog’s distress was justified.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

5The issues to be decided are:

1. Was the dog in distress at the time of its removal?
2. If so, was it necessary for AWS to remove the dog to alleviate its distress?

RESULT

6The appeal of the removal of the dog is dismissed because it is moot. The Board has no jurisdiction to return the dog, as it has been forfeited to the Crown.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

Disclosure and Hearing materials

7On December 16, 2025, the Appellant filed a motion seeking an extension of time to file disclosure, from December 16, 2025, to December 23, 2025, because he had a medical incident on December 12, 2025, that interfered with his hearing preparations. He also requested an adjournment of the hearing to a later unspecified date.

8The Board granted the Appellant an extension to December 23, 2025, for disclosure, and responding documents to December 30, 2025. It did not order an adjournment of the hearing because the Appellant provided no justification for the adjournment (such as a medical note stating that he could not participate), or suggest alternate dates.

9On January 2, 2026, the Board issued an amended order extending the filing date for the Appellant’s evidence (Book of Documents) to January 5, 2026, at 12:00 p.m.

10At the beginning of the hearing the Respondent advised me that it had not received any disclosure.

11The Appellant advised that he filed disclosure with the Board on December 24, 2025, not understanding he was supposed to have sent it to the Respondent. He also filed submissions on January 5, 2026, before the hearing. These did not include will says of the Appellant’s witnesses.

12The Respondent did not oppose me accepting the submissions or the late disclosure, provided it be granted a short recess to review the Appellant’s disclosure and submissions. I granted a 1-hr recess on this basis.

Forfeiture

13Following the recess at the beginning of the hearing, the Respondent advised that it had just learned that Blizzard was forfeited to the Crown. The Respondent submitted that the Board has no jurisdiction to return Blizzard to the Appellant because he is no longer the owner, and that this information was being provided to the Board to speak to the remedy available to the Board.

14This was new information. The Respondent did not submit this as a motion, and I therefore had no materials providing context. The Respondent did not make submissions regarding mootness, advising me only that I could not order the return of Blizzard because of this.

15The Respondent provided the following information: A Statement of Account was emailed to the Appellant on November 20, 2025, in the amount of $269.25, and on December 24, 2025, a letter was emailed to him explaining the impact of not paying the SOA, which was forfeiture.

16The Appellant said he wrote and phoned the Board on December 24, 2025, asking for advice regarding the letter, but never received a response.

17While I agreed with the Respondent that it may not be possible to return Blizzard if he has been forfeited, I could not make this finding during the hearing as I had insufficient submissions regarding this. The hearing proceeded on this basis.

18Following the hearing, on January 26, 2026, I issued an Order for submissions from the parties on the following questions:

1. Is the appeal of the decision to remove the Appellant’s dog moot due to forfeiture?
2. If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to decide the moot appeal?

19The Appellant’s position is that forfeiture of Blizzard should not prevent the Board from deciding his appeal under s. 38 of the PAWS Act. The Appellant further submitted that the appeal process becomes ineffective if forfeiture can occur while an appeal is underway.

20The Respondent’s position is that the appeal of the removal is moot and should be dismissed as there is no remedy available to the Board. The Board lacks jurisdiction to order the return of Blizzard to the Appellant.

ANALYSIS

21I find that the appeal of Blizzard’s removal is moot, and I decline to exercise my discretion to decide on the merits of the appeal. I dismiss the appeal for the reasons that follow.

A Statement of Account was served on the Appellant on November 20, 2025; Blizzard was forfeited to the Crown on December 12, 2025

22During the hearing, Inspector Sheri Horan testified that she served a Statement of Account (SOA) on the Appellant on November 20, 2025, by email.

23Section 35(4) of the PAWS Act states that an animal is forfeited to the Crown if the owner or custodian does not:

1. Appeal the SOA within 10 business days after it was served; or
2. Pay the SOA within 15 business days following service.

24The Respondent submitted that the Appellant neither appealed the SOA nor paid it within the prescribed time periods, and that Blizzard was forfeited to the Crown on December 12, 2025. The prescribed time periods are described in Ontario Regulation 447/19 Ministerial Prescriptions made under the PAWS Act.

25The Appellant submitted that at the time Blizzard was removed, on November 7, 2025, he advised Inspector Horan that he did not have a phone as it had been broken, and that he was experiencing difficulty accessing electronic communications for this reason. During the hearing he testified that he had requested Inspector Horan issue him the NOR as a paper document for this reason.

26The Appellant submitted that because of not having access to a phone, he was only able to submit his appeal of Blizzard’s removal on November 21, 2025, and had to take photographs of the documents written by hand in order to file them. On this basis the Appellant submitted that it would be unfair to treat forfeiture as automatically ending his appeal rights when he faced barriers to receiving, reviewing, and responding to the SOA issued on November 20, 2025, within the strict (prescribed) timelines.

27The Appellant further submitted that on December 12, 2025, he suffered a serious cut to his hand and required surgery. He submitted that it would be unfair and contrary to procedural fairness to dismiss his appeal based on missed timelines. I do not find this information to be relevant as the Appellant’s injury occurred fifteen days after the SOA was emailed to him. The Appellant didn’t argue that he wasn’t served the SOA, other than that he didn’t receive it on November 20, 2025.

28Despite the Appellant’s submissions, it is clear from his November 21, 2025, appeal of Blizzard’s removal, which was by email, that he had access to electronic communications that day. Further, he attended the case conference for his appeal of Blizzard’s removal by telephone on December 3, 2025, which further indicates that he had access to a telephone that day; further, he presumably received notice of the case conference following his appeal with details of the case conference date and how to call in.

29While the Appellant indicated at the case conference that his access to technology was limited and he might not have access to a computer during the hearing, he did not request that any documents be served on him personally or by mail. He also did not request Accommodations, even though accommodation information was provided to him by the Board when acknowledging his appeal of Blizzard’s removal.

30Section 68 of the PAWS Act, and s. 2 of Ontario Regulation 316/23 Service of Documents (the Regulation) addresses service. Service of a Statement of Account may be by registered mail, regular mail, courier, fax or electronic mail, and neither the PAWS Act nor the Regulation prescribe which method must be used.

31Pursuant to the Regulation, service of the SOA is deemed to have been on the day it was emailed to the Appellant, which was November 20, 2025.

32Despite the Regulation, deemed service is a rebuttable presumption. I accept that the Appellant’s telephone was broken on November 7, 2025, because he told Inspector Horan this and that is why she issued him a paper copy of the NOR. While the Appellant submitted that he was unable to access the SOA on November 20, 2025, he provided no evidence to support his claim. I find that service was on November 20, 2025.

33I do not accept the Appellant’s evidence that he faced barriers to receiving, reviewing, or responding to the SOA within the prescribed timeline of 10 business days, as he provided no documentary evidence to substantiate this claim. He could have filed his appeal of the SOA on November 21, 2025, when he had access to email, or at some point before the prescribed timeline for appealing, but he did not. There is no evidence that he ever filed an appeal of the SOA.

34The SOA form provides information regarding filing appeals with the Board and the consequences of forfeiting an animal when an owner/custodian does not appeal a SOA, or pay the SOA within the prescribed periods under s. 35(4). The SOA form also provides information that an owner/custodian may enter into a written agreement with the Respondent to extend the payment period or reduce the amount to be paid, or both under s. 35(5) of the PAWS Act. In this case, the parties did not enter into a written agreement.

35I find that Blizzard was forfeited to the Crown on December 12, 2025, to reflect my finding of when the Appellant received the SOA, as the Appellant neither appealed the SOA, nor paid it within the prescribed timelines.

The Appeal is Moot; the Board has no Jurisdiction to grant the remedy requested

36The leading case on mootness is Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 (“Borowski”)). As Borowski is a Supreme Court of Canada case, it is binding on me, and I will apply it in my analysis. The Supreme Court’s decision in Borowski sets out a two-step analysis used to consider mootness:

1. Is the dispute between the parties moot?
2. If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the appeal?

37In Borowski, the Supreme Court of Canada described the doctrine of mootness at p. 353 as follows:

The doctrine of mootness is an aspect of a general policy or practice that a court may decline to decide a case which raises merely a hypothetical or abstract question. The general principle applies when the decision of the court will not have the effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties. If the decision of the court will have no practical effect on such rights, the court will decline to decide the case. This essential ingredient must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commenced but at the time when then court is called upon to reach a decision. Accordingly, if, subsequent to the initiation of the action or proceeding, events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so that no present live controversy affects the rights of the parties, the case is said to be moot.

Step 1 – Is the Appeal of the removal of Blizzard moot?

38I find that the appeal of Blizzard’s removal is moot for the reasons that follow.

39In the first stage of the Borowski test, the Board must decide whether the appeal is moot – that is, whether a live controversy between the parties has ended. The controversy here was that the Appellant believes Blizzard should be returned, and the Respondent disagrees. For the following reasons, I find that the Board cannot return Blizzard, as Blizzard was forfeited to the Crown, and so there is no live controversy and the matter is moot.

40I am persuaded by the Respondent’s submissions, which include the following:

1. Forfeiture occurs by automatic operation of the PAWS Act, and is not subject to any action taken by the Crown or the CAWI to initiate or finalize the forfeiture process. This interpretation is supported by Guillaume v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 5782 (para. 9), to support the Respondent’s position that following forfeiture to the Crown, an animal becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals;
2. Section 63(1) of the PAWS Act provides that the Respondent is then authorized by the Crown to deal with the animals as if the CAWI were the owner;
3. The powers of the Board on an appeal of an animal’s removal are set out in s. 38(9)2 of the PAWS Act. The only remedy on such an appeal is the return of the removed animal to the owner or custodian; and
4. As a result of the above, the Board has no authority to return the forfeited animal to an Appellant when they are no longer the animal’s owner or custodian.

41The finality of forfeiture has been confirmed in the Ontario Court of Appeal case of Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Ontario (Animal Care Review Board), 2024 ONCA 89, where the states “it is not possible to make an order unwinding this development”.

42In conclusion, I find that the Board has no power to return Blizzard to the Appellant because Blizzard was forfeited to the Crown on December 12, 2025, by operation of law, and the Board cannot unwind this development. For this reason, I find the appeal of Blizzard’s removal to be moot.

Step 2 – Should the Board exercise discretion to decide on the merits of the appeal even though it is moot?

43For the reasons that follow, the Board will not exercise discretion to decide on the merits of the appeal.

The Borowski Framework

44While there is no live controversy remaining, rendering the appeal moot, the Board may exercise its discretion to decide on the merits of a moot appeal based on the Borowski framework.

45Borowski outlines three factors to consider in determining whether to exercise discretion to decide on the merits of a moot appeal:

1. The requirement of an adversarial context;
2. The concern for judicial economy; and
3. The need for courts and tribunals to demonstrate a measure of awareness for their proper law-making function.

46For the reasons that follow, I have considered these factors and choose not to exercise my discretion to decide on the merits of the moot appeal.

Adversarial context

47I have considered whether deciding this issue may have collateral consequences for the parties if any remaining issues exist. I agree with the Respondent that the adversarial context disappeared because Blizzard is now forfeited and there are no outstanding issues.

48While the Appellant submitted that I should hear the merits of his appeal because forfeiture should not operate to eliminate his statutory appeal right or deprive the Board of jurisdiction, I disagree. To make a decision would be merely an academic exercise, given that the Board has no authority to order the return of an animal once it has been forfeited.

49I disagree with the Appellant that the appeal process becomes ineffective if forfeiture can occur while his appeal of the removal is underway. Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act states that the CAWI may from time to time serve a SOA on the owner or custodian of an animal for any costs incurred in relation to the animal. Section 35(4) addresses the consequences of not appealing or paying the SOA within the prescribed period. This information is on the back of the SOA. The Appellant could have appealed the SOA to avoid forfeiture, but did not do so.

50For these reasons, I find that no adversarial context remains.

The need for judicial economy

51The question the Board needs to answer here is whether deciding this issue would be an appropriate use of adjudicative resources. Neither party made submissions regarding the Board’s resources.

52In the absence of submissions on this factor, I find that it would be an inefficient use of the Board’s resources to decide on the merits of the moot appeal, given that there is no adversarial context remaining.

The Board’s awareness of its role as an adjudicative body

53The third factor of the mootness framework under Borowski requires the Board to consider its proper law-making function to avoid intruding into the role of the legislative branch by pronouncing judgments in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties. This factor is especially significant where the matter in dispute requires an abstract interpretation of the legislation.

54Although I am not convinced that the appeal before me would require me to provide an abstract interpretation of the PAWS Act, given my findings that there is no adversarial context remaining between the parties and that deciding on the merits of the moot appeal would be an inefficient use of the Board’s resources, I do not find the third Borowski factor determinative. In my view, the purpose of this factor is to provide a check on adjudicative law-making where a decision maker is otherwise inclined to hear a moot matter. In this case, I am not inclined to decide on the merits of this appeal based on my findings regarding the first two Borowski factors. Accordingly, since there is no risk of intruding into the role of the legislative branch, an in-depth analysis of the third Borowski factor is not required.

55To conclude, I decline to exercise my discretion to decide on the merits of the appeal.

CONCLUSIONS

56I find that the appeal of the removal of Blizzard is moot given that the Board lacks jurisdiction to return him, as he was forfeited to the Crown.

57After considering the Borowski framework, I decline to exercise my discretion to decide on the merits of the appeal.

ORDER

58The appeal of the removal of Blizzard is dismissed.