Date: 2026-02-05

Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Natalie Malcolm

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Ashley Deathe, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Natalie Malcolm, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Konstantina Chantzis, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference: November 18-19, 2025 and December 1, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Natalie Malcolm (Appellant) appeals two decisions made by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) related to her dog named “Louie,” who is a male American Bulldog-type dog, approximately 6 months old. Specifically, the Appellant appeals the Respondent’s decision to keep Louie in its care and the costs associated with Louie’s care.

2Louie first came to the attention of the Respondent after a treating veterinarian called Animal Welfare Services (AWS) raising concerns about Louie’s welfare. On September 22, 2025, AWS issued a Notice of Removal to the appellant pursuant to section 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c.13 (the PAWS Act). The Notice of Removal was not appealed.

3On October 8, 2025, the Respondent issued a Decision to Keep Louie in care, pursuant to s.31(6) of the PAWS Act (Decision to Keep). The PAWS Act authorizes the Respondent to keep an animal in care where it has reasonable grounds to believe that the animal may be placed in distress or trained to fight another animal if returned to its owner. The Appellant appealed the Decision to Keep to the Animal Care Review Board (the Board). That appeal is dated October 16, 2025.

4In addition, the Respondent issued a Statement of Account to the Appellant for costs incurred in relation to Louie’s medical care and boarding from September 22, 2025 – October 8, 2025. That Statement of Account totals $10,008.57 and is dated October 15, 2025. The Appellant also appealed the Statement of Account to the Board. That appeal is dated October 16, 2025.

5Both appeals proceeded to a video hearing on November 18-19 and December 1, 2025.

ISSUES

6The issues are as follows:

Decision to Keep

(a) Whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that Louie may be placed in distress if he was returned to the Appellant such that the decision to keep the animal in care made under s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act was valid?

Statement of Account

(b) Should the statement of account dated October 15, 2025, in the amount of $10,008.57 be confirmed, varied, or revoked?​

RESULT

7For the reasons that follow, I order the return of Louie to the Appellant and I vary the Statement of Account to $9,567.87.

ANALYSIS

Issue 1: Decision to Keep in Care

8The appellant brought Louie to Kahu Medical Centre (“Kahu”) for veterinary care on September 21, 2025, where he was assessed by Dr. Mark Dilworth, a licensed veterinarian. Dr. Dilworth testimony included his assessment of Louie’s injuries, his opinion about the likely cause of those injuries, the treatment he provided to Louie, and the costs of both the care and boarding of Louie.

9Dr. Dilworth observed that Louie had multiple deep cuts on his body. He recalled that the Appellant had told him the injuries were caused by Louie’s biting and scratching. However, that explanation did not match Dr. Dilworth’s observations of the straight line (linear) look of the injuries. The injuries, according to Dr. Dilworth, appeared to be the result of the dog being tied. He notified AWS about the possible maltreatment and shared photos of Louie’s injuries with AWS.

10AWS Inspector Tamara Welch discussed Louie’s condition with Dr. Dilworth, she also received photographs taken by Dr. Dilworth of Louie’s injuries. On September 22, 2025, she issued a Notice of Removal, relying on Dr. Dilworth’s opinion that removing Louie was necessary to relieve his distress, and served it on the Appellant. The Certificate of Veterinarian was signed on September 22, 2025. That Notice of Removal was not appealed. Dr. Dilworth proceeded to treat Louie’s injuries, which he testified had required surgery, wound care, and antibiotics.

11Inspector Welch met with the Appellant on September 23, 2025, the day after the Notice of Removal was issued, and interviewed her about Louie’s injuries.

12Inspector Welch testified that she learned during that interview that the appellant had provided a number of at-home treatments to Louie. Later that day she attended Kahu and observed Louie and took photographs of his injuries, after his surgery.

13Regional Supervisor Brandon James issued the Decision to Keep on October 8, 2025, as the Delegate of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (the Delegate). He testified as to the grounds he relied on to come to that decision acknowledging that he did not speak with the Appellant directly, but that he relied on the summary of the information provided to him from Inspector Welch, the photos taken by the veterinarian and Inspector Welch, and the veterinary records.

14Section 31(6) of the PAWS Act provides that the Respondent may decide to keep an animal that was removed in its care for several reasons. At issue in this matter is whether there are reasonable grounds to believe that the animal may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant: s. 31(6)(b)(i), PAWS Act.

15Distress is defined at section 1 of the PAWS Act as the state of being,

(a) In need of proper care, water, food or shelter;

(b) Injured, sick, in pain or suffering; or

(c) Abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.

16The Delegate testified the following factors contributed to his belief that Louie may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant:

(a) The severity of Louie’s injuries and likelihood that the Appellant caused those injuries;

(b) The Appellant’s treatment decisions which included a 12 day delay from the time of the accident until the date she first took Louie to a veterinarian hospital for assessment;

(c) The Appellant’s lack of financial resources and its impact on her treatment decisions.;

(d) The Appellant’s poor judgment in identifying her dog’s need for medical care and in treating him; and

(e) Other factors relating to the home environment.

17I have considered all of the testimony and documentary evidence before me and I find that it in all of the circumstances, there was insufficient evidence that Louie may be returned to a state of distress if returned to the Appellant’s care at the time the Decision to Keep was made.

(a) The severity and cause of Louie’s injuries

18Dr. Dilworth, Inspector Welch, and the Delegate testified that Louie’s injuries were severe and that they were not likely self-inflicted as a result of biting, scratching or licking.

19Dr. Dilworth testified that he recalled that when he first met Louie, he observed a mildly reactive, very sweet dog who had wounds on the thorax (neck) and lumbar (back) areas that looked like dermatitis, which is a generic term to refer to irritation of the skin. He testified that the Appellant informed him Louie had hot water spilled on him and that he was “going after himself.” The Appellant’s concern, as understood by Dr. Dilworth on September 21, 2025, was that Louie was very itchy. He recalled that she had also reported to him that she had been bandaging him.

20He testified that he raised concerns about the type of wounds with the Appellant and she indicated it was because Louie was chewing at himself. This information appeared inconsistent with the linear look of the injuries which prompted Dr. Dilworth to ask the Appellant whether there was anyone else in the house who could have done this to Louie. The Appellant confirmed that only she and her son lived with Louie.

21Dr. Dilworth testified that he conferred with colleagues as to the likely cause of the lacerations and was concerned about possible abuse and neglect.

22The next day, Dr. Dilworth examined Louie under sedation. He testified that the further examination required Louie to be more comfortable. He observed and photographed wounds that appeared as lacerations on the underside of Louie’s body. He made notes of this examination.

23Dr. Dilworth explained that the term “laceration” referred to any cut that went through all layers of “derma,” in other words cut through the full thickness of the skin.

24Dr. Dilworth testified that the more serious wounds were linear, around the muzzle and also following an x-shape across the underside of the dog (the abdomen), and which included a “deep wound” forward of the penis, and “deep wounds” around the neck and wounds around the muzzle. Relatedly, there were also wounds on the tongue and gingiva. In addition to the more serious wounds, there were other skin lesions on the side of the abdomen that were more superficial, meaning they did not cut through the entire layer of skin.

25Prior to taking photos of the injuries, Louie was shaved and the areas were cleaned as documented in Dr. Dilworth’s notes. In total, 13 photographs were entered as evidence from Dr. Dilworth as to the state of Louie’s injuries prior to treatment.

26Based on his experience as a veterinarian and his examination of Louie, Dr. Dilworth opined that these wounds could not have been self-inflicted, in other words they were not made as a result of scratching, biting, or chewing. When asked if these wounds could have been caused by bandages, Dr. Dilworth stated that he had never seen injuries “like this” related to bandages. In his medical notes, he refers to the “superficial wound on [Louie’s] muzzle consistent with something being tied around it for a prolonged period of time.”

27Inspector Welch testified that the Appellant admitted to her that she was wrapping Louie in bandages and also described how she wrapped the bandages, in a figure-eight style, around Louie’s abdomen.

28The Appellant disagrees with Dr. Dilworth’s testimony as to the state of Louie’s injuries at the time Louie was admitted to Kahu. She says that she never observed the lacerations that are shown in the September 22, 2025, photographs. Her position was that those wounds appeared while Louie was in the care of the veterinarian. In support of her position, she referred to the photograph taken from security camera footage at Kahu showing her, her son, and Louie, which she says does not show the same injuries as the photographs from September 22, 2025. This photograph, however, does not depict Louie’s belly or underside where the wounds were most severe. I find that there are marks on Louie’s muzzle and back that are visible in the photo.

29The Appellant testified that she removed the bandages from time to time for Louie to eat and drink. This is consistent with Dr. Dilworth’s assessment that at the time of his initial examination, Louie was not dehydrated and in adequate body condition.

30I accept Dr. Dilworth’s evidence of the description of Louie’s injuries at the time Louie was presented to Kahu because I find his testimony supported by photographs and notes. I accept that the photographs taken by Dr. Dilworth on September 22, 2025, are an accurate depiction of the severity of Louie’s injuries. I note that Dr. Dilworth’s photographs were taken prior to surgery but after shaving. I find that the lacerations would not have been as clearly visible to the Appellant on September 21, 2025, as they appear to me in the photographs.

31I also accept that the lacerations were caused by the appellant’s application of bandages. Either the bandages were left on too long, tied too tightly, or a combination of both factors. While Dr. Dilworth had not seen injuries from bandages like this before, the injuries follow the figure-eight pattern the Appellant described as her bandaging method.

32The Appellant testified that on September 9, 2025, hot water was spilled on Louie but she did not seek medical care that day, explaining that she did not notice any open wounds on Louie. She did not take Louie to a veterinarian for assessment or treatment until September 21, 2025, choosing instead to treat him at home.

33The Delegate testified that in his opinion this delay was “blatant neglect.” Dr. Dilworth opined that Louie was likely in pain from his injuries and therefore suffering for some time as a result of the delay.

34The Appellant explained her delay in seeking treatment as a result of her honest and sincere belief that Louie was not in distress or otherwise requiring medical care. She added that as a first-time dog owner who had grown up in Jamaica where emergency veterinary care is not widely available, she did think to seek out emergency veterinary services. Her belief that Louie was not in need of immediate medical care is because his injuries did not appear to be severe until September 21, 2025.

35The Appellant testified in detail as to her decision-making throughout the 12-days.

36Sometime after September 9 when the hot water fell on Louie, the Appellant noticed a missing patch of hair on Louie’s back and some discolouration on the top of his head. It is unclear whether she noticed this on day one or within the first few days.

37What is clear is that she became concerned that Louie would attempt to lick or bite at the injury he had on his back, so she wrapped him in bandages. But he was still “going after himself.” As he would do this, she also noticed he was able to expose the wounds. She then treated Louie by restricting his ability to use his mouth, wrapped his muzzle, and attempted to protect the wounds from infection or scratching by wrapping them.

38To wrap his muzzle and elsewhere on his body, she purchased bandages labelled “Self-Adhesive Bandage” and “Flexible & Breathable” which was labelled as containing 5% spandex.

39Initially, the Appellant applied the bandage to the top of Louie’s head and wrapped it around his neck. Because Louie continued to attempt to lick, bite or scratch himself, the Appellant decided to secure the bandage on Louie’s back by wrapping a figure-eight wrap around this body such that is crossed under this belly, traversed over each of his hind legs and covered the wound on his back.

40The Appellant explained that she wrapped Louie in this way because of her overriding concern that without sufficient protection from himself, Louie would infect his back wound or otherwise make it worse.

41Throughout her testimony, the Appellant stressed that she released Louie’s muzzle to allow him to eat and drink and when he went outside to exercise. Her friend, Mr. Julius Swaby, testified that he saw Louie outside sometime after September 9, 2025, while the figure-eight bandage was in place, and Louie did not have his muzzle tied. Dr. Dilworth also testified that Louie appeared to him as having good body condition and was not dehydrated. I accept the Appellant’s evidence that she released the bandages from Louie’s muzzle daily to allow him to eat and drink and exercise at intervals, as she described. I note that while this allowed him to eat and drink at specific times of the day, this did not allow him to pant at will, nor did this allow him to drink or eat at will. The Delegate and the Inspector testified that they are trained to muzzle a dog on an exceptional basis and that to restrict a dog’s ability to use its mouth causes an animal distress.

42The Appellant acknowledged in her testimony that a cone would have been more humane than wrapping Louie’s muzzle and achieve the same purpose. She emphasized that she attempted to source one and in the interim, she wrapped his muzzle to stop his biting and licking. In particular, she testified that she called a couple of stores and took Louie with her to size him, but none of the cones available at that store were the proper fit for Louie.

43The Appellant testified that a few days after the incident, she noticed that Louie’s throat was swelling. She described the size of the swelling as enlarging to the approximate size of a golf ball. She removed his neck bandages and noticed some oozing, but the swelling started to go down. The Appellant entered into evidence a photo that she also shared with Inspector Welch of Louie’s neck swelling. The photo depicts Louie wearing a sweater or jacket which the Appellant testified was another means of attempting to prevent him from going after the skin on his back.

44There is no oozing from his neck in the photograph and the figure-eight bandage is not visible, I accept the Appellant’s testimony that there was some liquid present where the neck bandage had been and it is likely Louie’s skin was cut under his neck.

45The Appellant’s evidence of how long she left the figure-eight bandages in place was imprecise and at times confusing. At one point, she testified that Louie’s bandages were left on for approximately 5-6 days and then removed for a number of days prior to seeking medical treatment.

46She also stated that even when the bandages were in place, they were removed for daily baths. She agreed under cross-examination that Louie would sometimes bark when she tried to bathe him.

47In addition to bathing Louie, the Appellant also used a spray labelled “Betadine Antiseptic, 5% povidone-iodine” which was described on its label as something that “helps prevent infection in minor cuts, scrapes and burns.” She was not aware that it could sting if applied to skin, and while she noticed that Louie would become aggressive with her when she tried to use the spray, it did not occur to her that the act of spraying this solution was causing him pain.

48She would also spray him with deodorizer as she noticed he had a bad smell. She testified that he always smelled better after a bath and that until September 21, she assumed that any bad smell was related to dog maturation. Under cross-examination, the Appellant agreed that the bad smell started about seven or eight days after the accident. She thought he was maybe “just stinky.”

49It was not just the Appellant who noticed that Louie was smelling foul. It was during this shopping trip for the cone, the Appellant testified that a storekeeper commented on Louie’s smell and suggested she take him to the veterinarian. It is unclear the precise date of this shopping trip, but I find it occurred sometime after Louie began to smell (approximately seven or eight days after the accident).

50By September 15, 2025, the Appellant was thinking about veterinarian care because she called her regular animal clinic, the Animal Hospital of High Park (the “hospital”), to ask if they would accept a payment plan. The records of communications, made by an unidentified person at that hospital, indicate a call came in from the owner stating that Louie had been burned and kept scratching at the wound, that the wound is now open, and they wanted to know if the veterinarian would accept a payment plan. The hospital declined a payment plan and recommended the owner take the dog to an emergency clinic and advised the Appellant to wrap the wound so Louie does not cause more injury. And further: “advised, (that) waiting could cause Louie to get an infection and make things worse, and later would cost more.”

51The next day, September 16, 2025, there is another hospital note summarizing a second phone call about Louie’s condition. The hospital was informed that Louie had been wrapped up and there was a plan to bring him to the vet.

52I note that all the veterinarian records from that hospital refer to the Appellant’s son as Louie’s owner. Neither party disputes that the Appellant is Louie’s owner. The Appellant explained that it was her son who initiated the relationship with Louie’s regular veterinarian and suggests that they defaulted to referring to her son as the owner. From a review of the hospital’s records, alone, it is not obvious if the hospital was communicating with the Appellant or her son on September 15 or 16. The Appellant does not dispute that she knew that Louis’s regular veterinarian had cautioned that she should wrap Louie’s wound and take Louie to an emergency clinic as of September 15, 2025.

53The Appellant testified that it was her son who noticed a serious wound on Louie’s belly, in front of his penis, on September 21, 2025. While she had heard Louie “sucking” and “licking” something, she had not realized the state of the belly wound until her son pointed it out. It was this moment that she said she realized that Louie’s condition had deteriorated which caused the Appellant to act urgently to find a medical care clinic for Louie to be assessed.

54She also testified that throughout this period Louie’s demeanour did not suggest to her that he was in pain. The hospital note on September 16, 2025, referred to the owner’s impression of the dog’s wellbeing: “he is able to sleep, is active and eating well”.

55The Appellant stated that at the time she brought Louie to a veterinarian on September 21, 2025, she believed his injuries were only to the top of his head, his back, and the wound in front of his penis. She did not observe any other cuts or injuries and did not believe they were present on Louie as of September 21, 2025.

56From the time that hot water spilled on Louie until the moment she took him for medical care, she testified that she truly believed that she was doing the right thing for Louie. The Appellant expressed repeated remorse and was at times emotional when giving her testimony and submissions. With the benefit of hindsight, the Appellant concedes that she ought to have acted faster to take Louie to the veterinarian and that she acknowledges she made mistakes.

57I find that the delay in seeking medical care and the at-home treatment decisions contributed to Louie’s injuries: the decision to bandage Louie for too long and/or too tightly cut his skin and caused many of the injuries that Dr. Dilworth observed, the decision to bind Louie’s muzzle and delay veterinarian care cause additional pain and suffering to Louie. Causing Louie distress was unintentional and the result of the Appellant’s misguided belief the Louie’s injuries were not serious to warrant veterinary care and that at-home treatment was an appropriate alternative until it was not.

The Appellant’s lack of financial resources

58The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant delayed medical care because she did not have sufficient financial resources and that this would likely prevent her from seeking medical care in the future. Inspector Welch testified that the Appellant admitted to her that she did not have money for veterinary care.

59The Appellant acknowledged during her testimony that she was seeking a payment plan. This is also referenced in the hospital notes of September 15-16, 2025. The Appellant also testified that she had previously taken Louie to a veterinarian and was willing to pay for medical care. She testified that she paid $200 at the time she took Louie to Kahu and had been assured by Dr. Dilworth that she would be able to pay for Louie’s care at a discounted rate and on a payment plan. Her position is that she was not opposed to paying for medical care but that she needed a payment plan.

60In the written reasons for the Decision to Keep the Delegate also references her ability to pay for medical care required as of October 8, 2025:

At the time of this [Decision to Keep], the dog remains in need of ongoing medical care. As the owners admittedly do not have the money to provide care and failed to address appropriately initially, it is this authors decision that the (dog) must remain in the care of AWS to provide that care.

61However, I find that the evidence of the cost of the medical care required at the time of the Decision to Keep was minimal. At the time the sutures were removed, October 8, 2025, the veterinary records indicate that Louie required 7 days of oral medication at a frequency of 1 tablet a day. The October 15, 2025 invoice indicates that the cost of 7 Capsules of that medication was $4.83 CAD.

62There is also a reference in the veterinary notes to twice daily wound cleanings of one area, but there are no references to the wound cleaning being completed after the day the sutures were removed and Dr. Dilworth was not asked about the post-surgical care plan. Consequently, I have no information as to how many days the wound cleanings were required.

63While I accept the Delegate’s evidence that there was some treatment required at the time the Decision to Keep was issued, I do not infer the Appellant would have been unwilling to ensure that Louie consumed 1 tablet of medicine per day for 7 days or that she would be unable to pay the costs of that post-operative medicine which was less than $5.

64I find that Louie had substantially recovered from his injuries by the time the Decision to Keep was issued and the medical care as of that date was not outside of the Appellant’s capabilities nor beyond her financial resources.

The appellant’s judgment

65The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s lack of observation of Louie’s skin wounds and her treatment decisions, including the delay in seeking medical care after being recommended to do so, is sufficient evidence of poor judgment such that Louie may be placed in distress if returned to her care.

66The issue for me to consider is if medical care may be required in the future, would the Appellant be unable or unwilling to provide proper care such that Louie would suffer from abuse, neglect or privation.

67I have found that the Appellant’s treatment decisions caused and contributed to Louie’s injuries and that financial considerations played some part in the Appellant’s decision to delay medical care in the context of the Appellant’s belief that the injuries were not severe. I also place weight on the Appellant’s the ultimate decision to seek medical care and her repeated and early acknowledgment that she was mistaken in how she handled the situation. I understand the Appellant’s care decisions in the context of accidental skin injuries that were – at first -- not obviously severe.

68The Appellant appears to have taken comfort in Louie’s willingness to eat, sleep, and drink and dismissed any other behavioural signs that he was suffering. She also appears to have not looked in any careful way at the area she was bandaging and dismissed other’s suggestions that she seek medical attention sooner. In hindsight, she wholly misjudged the severity of Louie’s wounds and did not contemplate that her actions could be causing additional injuries to Louie. She acknowledged her error and communicated this early on to Inspector Welch.

69As Dr. Dilworth testified as to the general nature of Bulldog type dogs as “very stoic” and gave the example of a similar type of dog may even wave its tail despite have been recently stabbed several times.

70Considering the circumstances as a whole, I find her poor judgment in this one incident is insufficient evidence of her willingness or ability to seek veterinarian care or follow advice in the future in the event that Louie required medical care again.

71In closing arguments, the Respondent referred to cases where the Board accepted an owner’s past failure to seek medical care or refusal of medical care as sufficient evidence that the animal may be placed in distress if returned.

72I distinguish this case from the situation where an owner disregards multiple Orders issued under s.30 of the PAWS Act (for example, LaPointe v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 148 and White v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 47). In those cases, the owner’s historical pattern of care for the animal – documented by failure to comply with orders issued by the Respondent – was found to be reasonable grounds for a Decision to Keep. In other words, evidence of an appellant refusing or failing to comply with an order from the government agency responsible for animal welfare in this province may be sufficient evidence of the appellant’s willingness to seek out medical care in the future.

73The Respondent also relied on the Board’s decision in Spafford v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 64 where the Board was unpersuaded by an owner’s promises to seek medical care in the future. The Board held that there was “no evidence before it that the appellant was able or willing to care for [the animal].” In contrast, there is evidence from the Appellant that she was concerned about Louie’s health. In any event, I am not bound to follow Spafford or any other decision issued by the Board.

74The Appellant’s poor judgment in this case is not similarly representative of a pattern of refusal to provide medical care as the cases cited to me. The Appellant failed to identify the severity or potential severity of Louie’s injuries which worsened over time and did not act any a shopkeeper’s instinct or the over-the-phone advice of the hospital to get Louie assessed. Her evidence shows that when she realized Louis’s injuries were severe – when she became aware of a serious wound on his belly, forward of his penis -- she took Louie to the veterinarian.

Other factors

75During his testimony, the Delegate also referred to a video that involved Louie being kicked. In response to my question, the Respondent confirmed the video was not part of the evidentiary record. From his testimony, it was unclear whether the Delegate had viewed the video.

76I also note that the Decision to Keep references the video twice, those references appear as follows:

“On September 23, 2025, the attending veterinarian advised the clinic checked video footage and saw the owner son kick the dog in the exam room "not terribly" but a few times when he tried to scratch.

[…] one of the owner [sic] has been seen kicking the dog for doing the very thing the mouth wrap was intended to stop, licking.

77During his testimony, the Delegate did not explain why “not terribly” is in quotations in the Decision to Keep or whose opinion that is intended to capture.

78Subsection 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c.S.22 provides me with a wide discretion to admit into evidence anything (including testimony) that is “relevant to the subject matter of the proceeding.”

79I accept the Delegate’s testimony about the video is evidence of part what the Delegate relied on in his Decision to Keep. I also note that it is hearsay evidence of the truth of the video contents because the video was not entered into evidence and it appears that the Delegate is relying on someone else’s description of what was in the video rather than his own assessment.

80I place little weight on the Delegate’s testimony about the video as evidence from which I can infer that Louie may be kicked, or otherwise be the subject to abuse, if he is returned to the Appellant.

81In sum:

(a) There is no evidence that the Appellant has seen this video;

(b) There is no evidence as to whether the Appellant was in the video, whether she believes that kicking a dog is appropriate or whether she would allow another person to kick Louie; and

(c) There is no evidence that the Delegate saw the video.

82For these reasons, I put little weight on the testimony regarding the video and do not find that it is sufficient basis to infer that Louie may be placed back into a state of distress if returned to the Appellant

Conclusion

83Overall, I find this was a case of an owner attempting to care for her animal following an accidental injury, as misguided and as unreasonable as her care turned out to be. Moreover, I do not find that the appellant’s poor judgment in how to treat Louie’s worsening injuries represents a pattern such that Louie is at risk of abuse, neglect or privation upon return to her care. I am also not persuaded that the medical care or costs, required as of October 8, 2025, was beyond the capabilities or resources of the Appellant.

84Given my findings above, I find am not persuaded that there was sufficient evidence at the time the Decision to Keep was made, that Louie may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant. I order Louie returned to the Appellant.

Issue 2: Statement of Account

85For the following reasons, I am satisfied that the costs of the medical care associated with Louie’s care are reasonable and necessary. Based on Dr. Dilworth’s evidence that Louie did not need to be in a veterinary facility once he had recovered from his original surgery, I find that the Boarding Costs incurred between October 2 -October 8, 2025, are unnecessary and reduce the Statement of Account by $440.70 which is 6 days of boarding costs at $73.45 per day. I have considered the Appellant’s ability to pay and I decline to vary the costs on that basis.

86As a starting principle, an owner or custodian of an animal is responsible for costs incurred by the Respondent in cases where an inspector has taken steps to relieve an animal’s distress, removed an animal, or kept an animal in care: Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act. The legislation identifies various costs that are recoverable by the Respondent, including transportation, veterinary services, boarding and other reasonable animal care cost expenses: Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act.

87An owner or custodian of an animal may appeal a Statement of Account to the Board: s. 38(1)4., PAWS Act. After a hearing, the Board may confirm, revoke, or vary an SOA and order that the costs be paid, as confirmed or varied, to the Minister of Finance: s. 38(9), paragraphs 3 and 3.1, PAWS Act.

88Once the Respondent meets this initial evidentiary burden to prove that the charges in the SOA reflect the actual costs of necessaries provided and that the care provided was reasonable, the onus shifts to the Appellants to show, on a balance of probabilities, that the Statement of Account should be varied or revoked: Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.) at para. 41 and s. 35(1), PAWS Act.

Whether costs incurred were reasonable and necessary

89The Statement of Account served on the Appellant states total costs are for “costs incurred up to October 8^th 2025” and lists a total of $10,008.57. A 3-page invoice dated October 15, 2025, was attached to the Statement of Account which lists 39 charges. There are no subtotals provided that breakdown total medical or boarding costs.

90Inspector Welch confirmed that while the total amount due on the invoice is $10,957.70, she removed costs incurred after October 8, 2025, the date the Decision to Keep was signed. Therefore, the total amount invoiced to the Appellant was $10,008.57. The invoices included with the Statement of Account are dated October 15, 2025, and are labelled “pending” and specify “Amount Paid: 0.00 CAD. Even though the costs had not been paid by the Respondent at the time of the Statement of Account, I find that the obligation to pay those costs had arisen and therefore incurred.

91Dr. Dilworth testified about the treatment he provided to Louie:

(a) He proactively treated for mites, as he had been told by the Appellant that Louie was very itchy;

(b) He investigated possible causes of the itching symptoms such as parasites, fungal infection, bacteria, or immune mediated disease;

(c) He biopsied some of the skin to determine if there was evidence of burn (I note that this charge occurred after the Decision to Keep was issued and is not included on the Statement of Account); and

(d) To heal the wounds, Dr. Dilworth proceeded to surgically close the wounds, putting sutures into the skin.

92He explained that the treatment for mites was appropriate given the information provided to him by the Appellant on September 21, 2025. If Louie was itchy, he wanted to rule out mites because testing for parasites (and therefore mites) can yield false negatives.

93While Dr. Dilworth acknowledged that the wounds may have healed without surgical intervention, he also testified that it was possible that Louie would have deteriorated further without surgery. In Dr. Dilworth’s opinion, it would be inappropriate to permit an animal’s continued suffering because it was possible the wounds might heal on their own.

94The appellant did not challenge Dr. Dilworth’s treatment decisions. Based on uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Dilworth, I find the medical care reasonable and necessary.

95Dr. Dilworth testified that his fees for medical treatment are comparable to other emergency veterinary hospitals, and he accepted the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Guide as the industry recognized guide that reflects the annual summary of fees charged throughout the province.

96The Appellant asserts that the costs of medical care ought to be reduced to $2500 because that is the discount that Dr. Dilworth had offered to her. While there is no written agreement on this point, Dr. Dilworth confirmed in his testimony that he was generally willing to discount his fees or otherwise work with the Appellant’s financial resources at the time. I find that the willingness of Dr. Dilworth to reduce his fees was not because the fees he charged were unreasonable but because of what he understood to be the Appellant’s limited financial resources at the time. The evidence supports a finding that the medical care costs were reasonable and necessary.

97Dr. Dilworth testified that Louie recovered from surgery approximately 10 days after sutures were put in place. Upon recovery, Louie was no longer trying to bite or scratch at himself. Based on this evidence, I find that Louie healed from his initial surgery at the earliest on or about October 2, 2025. Dr. Dilworth added that Louie’s overall skin improvement took longer, but that he did not need to be in a vet facility for that recovery to take place. This appears to be consistent with the billing charges. According to the invoices included with the Statement of Account, as of September 29, 2025, Louie was no longer billed as a “hospitalization,” fee but as a “boarding” fee. Fees for “Hospitalization and Professional Care” per 12-hour shift are charged until September 28, 2025, at a rate of $168.37. As of September 29, 2025, there is a “Boarding – Dog” fee of $73.45 charged.

98Based on all of the evidence, and in particular Dr. Dilworth’s testimony as to when Louie would have recovered from his surgery, I am not satisfied that Louie was required to be boarded in a veterinarian run facility after October 2, 2025. At the time the Decision to Keep was issued, the evidence is Louie required daily medication, 1 tablet per day.

99Further, there is a clinical examination note on October 7, 2025, that indicates, “wounds have healed with the exception of one small area which is healing by second intention.”

100On October 8, 2025, Louie’s sutures were removed and a 7-day course of oral medicine (Fluoxetine) was prescribed for Louie. There is also reference to a wound site that was to be cleaned twice daily but it is unclear for how long these needed to be done. In his testimony, Dr. Dilworth did not describe a post-operative plan for Louie and the veterinarian notes after October 8, 2025, do not refer to wound cleaning, only to oral medication.

101Therefore, I am not satisfied that boarding costs were necessary after October 2, 2025, and before Louie’s sutures were removed on October 8, 2025. Any at home care required of Louie in those intervening 6 days was not outside the capabilities of the Appellant such that Louie needed to be boarded. I find the boarding fees after October 2, 2025, were unnecessary. I calculate those fees of “Boarding Dog” as $73.45 (referenced as the daily rate on the invoice) x 6 days which amounts to $440.70 and reduce the Statement of Account accordingly.

102Considering all the evidence, I find that the Respondent has met its onus that the medical care costs incurred and the boarding costs until October 2, 2025, are reasonable and necessary.

Ability to pay

103The Divisional Court in Ishankova v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONSC 1231(Div. Ct.) (Ishankova), confirmed that ability to pay is a relevant factor in the Board’s discretionary analysis, provided that it is weighed in a manner consistent with the PAWS Act’s purpose of owner accountability and avoiding routine cost-shifting to the public.

104I have considered the Appellant’s position that I should reduce the Statement of Account based on her ability to pay. She asserts she is unable to pay the full cost of the Statement of Account and she points to her:

(a) Her repeated attempts to find a veterinarian who would consider a payment plan; and

(b) Her testimony that she had savings but that these would not cover the full amount of the Statement of Account.

105The Appellant works as a grocery store clerk whose hours are variable. She testified that she has some savings that can be used to pay for Louie’s medical costs.

106The Appellant also testified that she has typical monthly expense including rent, car payments, debt repayments, and utilities, and confirmed that her son contributes to those expenses. Her testimony on her overall income and expenses was somewhat vague.

107She testified to having savings that could be drawn from to pay some of the Statement of Account and that she has been able to save significant additional funds since Louie was taken into care on September 22, 2025.

108Taking into consideration the Appellant’s testimony that she has been able to save considerably since Louie was taken into care on September 22, 2025, that her monthly expenses are partially paid for by her son, and that she has savings to draw on for this Statement of Account, I am not persuaded to vary the Statement of Account on the basis of the ability of pay.

109A reduction in the Statement of Account would be counter to the purpose of the PAWS Act to promote owner accountability in these circumstances where I have found that the Appellant’s actions caused much of Louie’s injuries.

ORDER

110Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s.38(9), I order Louie be returned to the Appellant.

111I vary the Statement of Account to $9,567.87.