Elisha M. Jolly v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2026 ONACRB 205

Tribunals Ontario / Tribunaux décisionnels Ontario

Animal Care Review Board / Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2026-01-07

Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Elisha M. Jolly Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Debra Backstein, Vice-Chair

Appearances: For the Appellant: Elisha M. Jolly, Self-Represented For the Respondent: Jason Kirsh, Counsel

Heard by videoconference: November 7 and 10, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1Elisha M. Jolly, the Appellant, appeals a Statement of Account (SOA) to the Animal Care Review Board (Board). The SOA was issued to the Appellant on October 6, 2025 by Animal Welfare Services (AWS). The costs were for veterinary costs, including surgery and medical care, for a puppy that was in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s (Respondent) care.

2On September 21, 2025, the Appellant accepted what appeared to her to be a sick puppy from a person unknown to her, but whom she met while accompanying a friend to that person’s residence.

3On September 23, 2025, the Appellant took the puppy to King Animal Hospital (“KAH”). When the veterinarian at KAH advised her of the extent and potential severity of the puppy’s condition, as well as the treatment that was necessary, the Appellant advised that she intended to leave without the puppy having the medical care that it required.

4KAH contacted the Respondent and told them of the Appellant’s intention to leave without the puppy receiving medical care. The Respondent then attended at KAH, removed the puppy from the Appellant’s care, and arranged for the puppy to be treated. The removal was made pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act), which permits removal after a veterinarian has advised in writing that removal is necessary to relieve an animal’s distress.

5The Respondent issued the SOA pursuant to s. 35 of the PAWS Act, on October 6, 2025, requiring the Appellant to pay $23,420.25 in veterinary costs, including for surgery and medical care.

6The Appellant appealed the SOA to the Board and seeks to have it revoked or varied. The Appellant does not dispute that the Respondent incurred the costs. Rather, she argues that she was not the owner of the puppy, that she only had temporary custody while attempting to assist the animal, and that she was intending on surrendering it to KAH. Therefore, she argues that she should not be held responsible for the resulting costs. In addition, the Appellant submits that she cannot afford to pay the SOA.

7The Respondent seeks to have the SOA confirmed and submits that the Appellant had custody and control of the puppy at the relevant time, and that the costs reflected in the SOA were both incurred and reasonable.

ISSUE

8Should the SOA dated October 6, 2025 be confirmed, revoked, or varied?

RESULT

9The SOA is varied, and the Appellant is ordered to pay $5,855.06 to the Minister of Finance.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

10An animal owner is responsible for costs incurred by the Respondent in cases where an inspector has taken steps to relieve an animal’s distress, removed an animal, or kept an animal in care: s. 35(1), PAWS Act. Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act lists various costs that are recoverable by the Respondent, including costs incurred to relieve an animal’s distress and costs of providing care for an animal that has been removed or kept in care.

11If an owner appeals a statement of account respecting these costs, the burden of proof is on the owner to show that the statement of account should be revoked or varied. However, the Respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the statement of account reflects the actual costs incurred and that these costs were reasonable (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.)).

12For the reasons that follow, I find that the charges passed on to the Appellant were actually incurred and were reasonable.

Events leading to the Respondent taking custody of the puppy and the subsequent need for care

13AWS Investigator Kathleen MacDonald testified about her involvement in the file. She explained that she received a call from veterinarian Dr. Jaimee Gillis at KAH on September 23, 2025, at approximately 11:00 pm. Dr. Gillis informed her that there was a puppy in need of urgent medical care and that the Appellant was refusing care due to financial constraints. Instead, the Appellant planned on taking the puppy home against medical advice. Investigator MacDonald stated that Dr. Gillis informed her that the puppy was in critical condition and would likely die if taken home.

14Dr. Gillis signed a veterinary certificate in order to facilitate the removal of the puppy. Inspector MacDonald then issued a Notice of Removal on September 23, 2025 at 11:56 pm, under s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act, formally removing the puppy from the Appellant’s care to relieve its distress, citing “poor body condition, vomiting, electrolyte abnormalities.”

15Inspector MacDonald also testified that she had a telephone conversation wherein the Appellant advised that she had acquired the puppy approximately 48 hours earlier, when she had removed it from an unknown “friend of a friend’s house” because she had noticed that the puppy was in distress and needed medical care. The Appellant told her that she was unable to say from whom or from where she had taken possession of the puppy.

16Inspector MacDonald also advised that on September 24, 2025, she spoke with a veterinarian at KAH who stated that it had been determined that the puppy had a foreign body in his gastrointestinal tract that required immediate surgical intervention. She therefore authorized the surgery.

17Inspector MacDonald also testified that on October 2, 2025, the puppy was discharged from KAH and was sent to medical foster care. The puppy would receive any further and ongoing medical care needed from KAH.

18The Appellant gave evidence that she kept the puppy for 48 hours prior to taking it to KAH. During that time, she monitored his condition and tried to address the medical concerns on her own. She stated that when she realized the condition was not something she could handle, she contemplated taking the puppy to a shelter and it was the shelter that referred her to KAH.

Charges on the SOA reflected actual costs incurred and the costs are reasonable

19For the reasons that follow, I found that the Respondent demonstrated that the SOA reflected actual costs incurred in caring for the puppy and that those costs were reasonable.

20The Respondent filed into evidence two invoices, one dated October 6, 2025, for veterinary services in the amount of $19,262.50 (inclusive of tax) and another dated October 6, 2025 in the amount of $4,157.75 (inclusive of tax) for medical care for the puppy.

21The veterinary invoice includes charges for diagnostic testing, x-rays and ultrasound imaging, and for exploratory surgery. The medical care included post-operative medications and recovery rehabilitation under the care of a registered veterinary technician.

22In assessing the appropriateness of the veterinary services provided, I considered the evidence of Dr. Bruce Robertson, an expert in veterinary medicine. Dr. Robertson was called by the Respondent to provide an expert opinion on whether the veterinary care was necessary and whether the associated costs were reasonable.

23Following his review of the medical records of the treating veterinarians, Dr. Robertson prepared a written report and testified in support of the course of action taken in relation to the puppy, finding the treatments and prescribed medications to be appropriate.

24It was apparent from Dr. Robertson’s report and the medical records that the puppy presented to KAH with poor body condition and history of vomiting of unknown duration. X-rays and ultrasound imaging determined that the puppy had a foreign body in the intestinal tract, which required surgery. Exploratory surgery was performed, and a linear foreign body was found and removed from the digestive tract. It was also determined that the foreign body had perforated the wall of the intestines, causing an infection in the abdomen.

25Dr. Robertson then compared the veterinary costs charged in this case to the 2025 Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Fee Guide, which is an annual publication of suggested fees for veterinary services in Ontario.

26I accepted Dr. Robertson’s evidence that the costs charged were lower than the suggested fees for the services provided. He noted, however, that an analysis of the medications was not performed as the fee guide notes that those fees are at the discretion of the provider. He stated that he did not feel that the charges for medication were excessive and that they represented market value.

27Dr. Robertson opined that the products and services provided were reasonable to relieve the puppy of his medical distress due to the ingestion of a foreign body and concluded that the charges were “generally at or below market value and reasonably required for the dog in this case following removal from the owner by Animal Welfare Services.”

28I accepted Dr. Robertson’s unchallenged evidence that the costs of the veterinary and medical care were appropriate and of market value.

29The Appellant did not file any veterinary or expert evidence to challenge Dr. Robertson’s opinion or to demonstrate that the veterinary services or medications were not incurred, were unnecessary or that the costs were unreasonable.

30The Appellant took the position that she should not be responsible for the costs of the puppy’s veterinary and medical care because she was not the puppy’s owner. Her argument was that she came into possession of the puppy only temporarily and her involvement was motivated by a desire to assist an animal in need. She testified about the steps she took prior to bringing the puppy to KAH and emphasized that she was attempting to help the puppy rather than assume permanent responsibility for it. She did, however, state that had the puppy recovered while in her care, she likely would have kept it.

31The Appellant further submitted that it would be unfair to require her to pay the veterinary and animal cost incurred and that doing so would discourage others from helping animals in distress since they risked being penalized for “trying to do the right thing.”

32In seeking to have the costs confirmed, the Respondent submitted that the Board should not accept the Appellant’s argument that she was not the owner of the puppy. The PAWS Act defines “owner” broadly and includes a person who has possession of, or care and control over an animal. The Respondent argued that at the relevant times, the Appellant had physical possession of the puppy and was involved in decisions regarding the puppy’s care. They also pointed to the Appellant’s own evidence that had she been able to bring the puppy back to health on her own, she would have likely kept the puppy. The Respondent also questioned why the Appellant kept the puppy for 48 hours if her intention was merely to ensure that it got the medical care it required. They argued that if getting the puppy medical care were truly her intention, she would have found a way to get the puppy to a veterinarian much sooner and not attempted to care for it herself.

33I agree that the evidence provided by the Respondent is inconsistent with the Appellant’s assertion that her involvement in the puppy’s care was merely incidental or temporary.

34While I accept that the Appellant was motivated by good intentions, responsibility for an SOA under s. 35 of the PAWS Act turns on custody and control of an animal at the relevant time. There is no requirement that the person be the registered owner, have long-term custody, or intend to permanently keep the animal. An SOA is not a determination of fault or blame for the condition of an animal. The Board’s role is limited to applying the cost recovery framework as set out in the PAWS Act.

35I find that there is enough evidence before the Board, including Inspector MacDonald’s evidence, veterinary records and invoices, and the expert evidence provided by Dr. Robertson, to establish that the Respondent met its initial evidentiary burden to demonstrate that the costs in the SOA were incurred and that the care provided to the puppy was appropriate and reasonable given the dire health condition of the puppy.

36I am satisfied that the Appellant exercised sufficient custody and control of the puppy to support a finding that the SOA was properly issued to her. In addition, the Appellant did not establish that the costs set out in the SOA were not incurred or were unreasonable. As such, the Appellant has not met her onus to establish on a balance of probabilities that the SOA should be varied or revoked.

The Appellant’s financial circumstances and limited ability to pay

37The Appellant testified that she had limited financial means to pay the SOA, given that she is a new mother and is unemployed. While the Respondent did not contest the Appellant’s evidence regarding her financial circumstances, they noted that she did not provide any details or documentary evidence to support her position.

38Further, the Respondent stressed that the Board should weigh an inability to pay with the need to hold owners accountable for costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector when providing care to animals.

39It is well settled that the Board can consider ability to pay as a factor in deciding whether to confirm, revoke or vary a statement of account; see Ontario (Chief Animal Welfare Inspector) v. Ishankova, 2023 ONSC 1284 (Div. Ct.).

40Although the Appellant did not provide documentary evidence to substantiate her claim of inability to pay, I considered her sworn testimony regarding her current circumstances, including that she is a new mother and is not presently employed. I found her evidence on these points to be credible and consistent.

41In exercising the Board’s discretion under s.38(9) of the PAWS Act, I also considered that the Appellant did not dispute the veterinary and medical costs were incurred or reasonable, and that there was no evidence that she acted in bad faith or sought to evade responsibility.

42Balancing the statutory objective of cost recovery with the Appellant’s limited financial circumstances as described in her evidence, I find that a significant but partial reduction of the SOA is warranted. A reduction of 75 percent reflects a proportionate exercise of discretion that maintains accountability while recognizing the Appellant’s current inability to absorb the full financial burden of the SOA. I therefore reduce the SOA accordingly and require the Appellant to pay $5,855.06.

ORDER

43Pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, I vary the SOA and order the Appellant to pay $5,855.06 to the Minister of Finance.