Stephanie Redlick v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 203

Date: 12/30/2025

Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Stephanie Redlick

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Debra Backstein, Vice-Chair

For the Appellant: Stephanie Redlick, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Victoria Crocker, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services Erin MacGillivray, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference: November 5, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Stephanie Redlick (Appellant) appeals to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) a Statement of Account (SOA) in the amount of $118,831.19. The SOA was issued by Animal Welfare Services (AWS) on August 26, 2025.

2AWS removed sixteen horses from the Appellant’s rented property and issued a Notice of Removal (NOR) on February 20, 2025 pursuant to s. 31(1) (c) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c.13 (PAWS Act). The NOR identified non-compliance with Orders issued on February 12, 2025. The Appellant did not appeal the NOR.

3On February 24, 2025, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) issued a Notice of Decision to Keep the Animal(s) in Care (DTK) pursuant to s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act for the horses that were previously removed. The Appellant did not appeal the DTK.

4On February 26, 2025, the Respondent issued a Statement of Account (SOA #1) which was appealed to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) on March 12, 2025.

5On March 12, 2025, the Appellant also submitted two Applications to the Board seeking the return of the horses.

6On April 26, 2025, the Respondent filed a Notice of Motion seeking the dismissal of the two Applications and the appeal of SOA#1.

7On July 25, 2025, the Board released a Motion Decision and Order which granted the Respondent’s motion and dismissed the two Applications and the appeal of SOA#1.

8The horses were forfeited to the Crown on August 26, 2025, due to non-payment of SOA#1

9On August 26, 2025, AWS issued a second statement of account (SOA#2), to the Appellant pursuant to s. 35 of the PAWS Act, for transportation, boarding, veterinary care and animal care costs.

10The Appellant appealed the SOA to the Board and seeks to have it revoked because:

1. the removal was improper as the horses were not in distress at the time when they were removed and had been getting regular veterinary care while in her possession;
2. the removal of the horses was an illegal seizure;
3. any issues that the horses suffered from following their removal were caused by the custodian appointed by the Respondent; and
4. there were unnecessary charges on the SOA.

11The Respondent seeks to have the SOA confirmed, except for $2,602.07 in veterinary costs, which it asks the Board to deduct.

ISSUE IN DISPUTE

12Should the SOA dated August 26, 2025, in the amount of $118,831.19 be confirmed, revoked or varied?

RESULT

13SOA#2 dated August 26, 2025, as later amended by the Respondent to $116,229.12 during the hearing, is confirmed. The costs shall be paid to the Minister of Finance.

PRELIMINARY MATTERS

A. APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR EXCLUSION OF EVIDENCE

14The Appellant filed a motion with the Board seeking an order to exclude evidence contained in the Respondent’s Book of Documents on the basis that they were filed on October 14, 2025 at 11:22 pm as opposed to the October 14, 2025 5:00 pm deadline set out on in the Board’s Case Conference Report and Order dated September 29, 2025.

15The Respondent acknowledged that the documents were filed late but opposed the motion, submitting that the delay was due to a technical error which was rectified as soon as they became aware of the issue. The Respondent argued that the Appellant suffered no prejudice because of the delay. In addition, the Respondent noted that all the Appellant’s documents for the hearing were either served late or not at all.

Motion Decision

16I denied the Appellant’s motion, with written reasons to follow. These are my reasons.

17The Board has the authority to control its own process pursuant to section 25.0.1 of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act R.S.O., 1990, c. S.22 (SPPA), including extending procedural timelines where appropriate.

18In addition, s. 25.1 of the SPPA provides that a tribunal may exercise the powers necessary to carry out its functions, including managing proceedings in a manner that is fair, efficient and proportionate.

19Having considered the circumstances, I am not satisfied that the Appellant suffered any prejudice due to the six hour and 22 minute delay. The Appellant was unable to identify how the late service impaired her ability to prepare for or participate in the hearing. In addition, the Appellant rejected an offer for additional time to review the documents prior to the commencement of the hearing.

20I find that the delay in receiving the Respondent’s documents was brief and service occurred well in advance of the hearing, giving the Appellant a fair opportunity to review and respond to them.

21I find that excluding the Respondent’s materials would not advance a fair determination of the issues before the Board and would undermine the Board’s ability to determine the appeal on its merits.

22The Appellant’s motion to exclude the Respondent’s documents was dismissed.

B. APPELLANT’S MOTIONS FOR RECUSAL OF HEARING ADJUDICATOR

23During the hearing, the Appellant brought multiple motions, both orally and in writing, alleging bias and seeking my recusal.

Factual Context

24The first recusal motion was raised at the outset of the hearing, before any evidence was heard. Further recusal requests were made during the hearing, including during witness testimony.

25The Appellant advised prior to the commencement of the hearing that she was unwilling to turn on her camera and would appear by telephone only.

26Although this was ultimately allowed, I noted that no accommodation request had been made in advance of the hearing to indicate why the Appellant was seeking to participate in a different format than the videoconference hearing format that was agreed to by the parties.

27When I asked the Appellant to explain her reasoning for not turning on her camera, she alleged that the act of questioning her was an indication of abuse and bias.

28Furthermore, the Appellant alleged bias when I asked her to abide by the rules of the hearing and to refrain from interrupting me, the Respondent’s counsel and testifying witnesses.

29In addition, the Appellant purposely disconnected from the videoconference on multiple occasions including immediately after procedural rulings that she disagreed with. On each occasion, the hearing was paused, the Board’s case management officer attempted to re-establish contact, and the Appellant was allowed additional time to rejoin the hearing. Multiple breaks were taken to allow the Appellant to regain her composure, consider how she wished to proceed and return to the hearing prepared to participate respectfully.

30After multiple deliberate disconnections, the Appellant was explicitly advised that if she continued to delay and interrupt the hearing with her actions, the hearing would continue in her absence. Despite this warning, the Appellant disconnected again and but then alleged bias upon her return to the hearing.

31The Appellant also alleged bias when asked to refrain from making personal attacks on my character that were unrelated to the merits or procedure of the hearing.

Respondent’s Objection to Motions

32The Respondent opposed the recusal motions on the basis that there was no indication of adjudicator bias.

Motion Decisions

33The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias is well-established. The Supreme Court of Canada set out the test in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. Canada 1976 CanLII 2 (SCC), [1978] 1 SCR 369. In that case, the court stated:

“The apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and right-minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon the required information. In the words of the Court of Appeal, that test is “what would an informed person, viewing the matter realistically and practically-and having through the matter though-conclude. Would he think that it is more likely than not that the [decision-maker], whether consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly.”

34In Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada 2003 SCC 45, [2003] 2 SCR 259 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed the existence and importance of a strong presumption of judicial or quasi-judicial impartiality. In order to overcome this presumption, a party alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias must establish the presence of substantial grounds:

Viewed in this light, “[i]mpartiality is the fundamental qualification of a judge and the core attribute of the judiciary” It is the key to our judicial process and must be presumed. As was noted by L’Heureux-Dube J. and McLachlin J. (as she then was ) in S. (R.D.), supra, at para. 32, the presumption of impartiality carries considerable weight, and the law should not carelessly evoke the possibility of bias in a judge, whose authority depends upon that presumption. Thus, while the requirement of judicial impartiality is a stringent one, the burden is on the party arguing for disqualification to establish that the circumstances justify a finding that the judge must be disqualified.

35The threshold is therefore high as the party alleging bias must overcome a presumption of impartiality with substantial grounds of a reasonable apprehension of bias.

36The Appellant’s recusal motions are not supported by objective evidence or sworn materials. Her allegations lie in her disagreement with procedural rulings and objections to following tribunal rules. As such, I do not accept that an informed, reasonable person viewing the matter would conclude that there was a reasonable apprehension of bias.

37The enforcement of hearing decorum, declining to allow interruptions and disorderly conduct and making adverse findings do not establish a reasonable apprehension of bias. Furthermore, repeated recusal motions with no new grounds do not strengthen the Appellant’s allegations of bias.

38The Appellant has not provided substantial grounds to overcome a presumption of impartiality and as such the Appellant’s recusal motions are dismissed.

SOA APPEAL – EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

39According to section 35(1) of the PAWS Act, the Respondent may serve on an animal owner or custodian a statement of account in circumstances where:

1. An inspector has taken steps to relieve the animal’s distress by providing it with necessaries;
2. An inspector has removed the animal under s. 31(1) or (2); or
3. The Respondent has kept the animal in its care under s. 31(6) or taken the animal into care under s. 44(8).

40Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act states that costs may include, among other things:

1. Costs incurred to relieve the animal’s distress;
2. Costs incurred in removing the animal or taking it into care;
3. Costs of providing care for an animal that has been removed;
4. Costs of providing care for an animal that has been kept or taken into care; and
5. Costs of taking any prescribed action in relation to an animal.

41Section 35(3) of the PAWS Act states that an animal’s owner or custodian is liable for the amount set out in a statement of account subject to an order of the Board pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act.

42The Respondent has an initial burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the charges reflected in the statement of account reflect the actual costs incurred and that the costs are reasonable. If the Respondent meets this burden, the onus shifts to the appellant to show that a statement of account should be revoked or varied (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct) at para 41.

The Horses Were Removed in Accordance with the [PAWS Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-13/latest/so-2019-c-13.html).

43The Appellant’s bases for the appeal of SOA#2 are as follows:

1. The horses should never have been removed as they were properly cared for at the time of removal;
2. The removal by AWS was illegal and unjustified;
3. The property manager of the rented property where the horses were living caused any health issues that the horses were suffering from;
4. AWS should not have assumed care of the horses.

44Senior Investigator Alison Green gave brief contextual evidence regarding the circumstances that led to the removal, including the issuance of compliance orders, the Appellant’s non-compliance with those orders, and the removal. This evidence was admitted to explain how the costs reflected in the SOA arose, and not to determine whether or not the removal was proper.

SOA#2 Reflects Actual Transportation, Boarding and Veterinary Costs Incurred and Those Costs Are Reasonable

Transportation

45The SOA included transportation costs totaling $12,110.50, related to the removal and transport of horses.

46AWS Senior Investigator Alison Green (S.I. Green) testified that on February 20, 2025, transportation costs related to three of the horses that were removed had not been captured in an earlier statement of account that was issued to the Appellant.

47S.I. Green also testified that the transportation costs included a subsequent and separate transport of a pregnant mare to an alternate facility for foaling while in the Respondent’s care.

48S.I. Green said AWS retained approved equine transport vendors to safely move the horses from the property and to relocate them to multiple boarding facilities.

49She also verified the supporting invoices and explained that the transportation costs were charged per transport event rather than per horse and that this reflected standard equine transportation practices.

50Based upon the evidence of Senior S.I. Green and the supporting invoices, I am satisfied that these transportation costs were actually incurred for services related to the care of the horses and were reasonable. I am also satisfied that the costs were charged in accordance with standard equine transportation practices.

Boarding

51The SOA contained $83,648.92 in boarding costs and covered the period from removal on February 20, 2025 to August 26, 2025. The horses were forfeited to the Crown on August 26, 2025 after the Appellant did not pay an earlier statement of account that was issued to her. Since the Appellant did not have any ownership rights over the horses after the date of forfeiture, the SOA did not pass on any boarding costs to the Appellant after the forfeiture date.

52The Respondent filed into evidence invoices that outlined the dates, the number of horses, and the total charges incurred for boarding costs. S.I. Green testified that the horses were boarded at three separate equine boarding facilities that were selected by AWS because they had previous experience with these facilities and believed that they were capable of meeting the various needs of the horses.

53S.I. Green testified that the boarding costs for the 16 horses, as reflected in the invoices, included the following:

1. Daily housing of the horses in three different boarding facilities;
2. Food, water, shelter and supervision;
3. Separation of horses based on their medical needs;
4. Boarding of the mare and foal at a specialized facility following birth; and
5. Ongoing care for the horses for the approximately six months that they were in the boarding facilities following their removal until the date of forfeiture.

54It was the evidence of S.I. Green that boarding rates charged were consistent with market rates for equine boarding and that AWS was not involved in determining vendor pricing. She also noted that AWS absorbed charges for halters, blankets and fly masks as well as some other costs at the boarding facilities and that these charges were not passed on to the Appellant.

55I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the boarding costs were actually incurred. While the boarding invoices were not itemized on a per-horse, per-day basis, the evidence establishes that the costs of boarding 16 horses for nearly six months result in approximately $28.00 to $30.00 per horse per day, which is consistent with standard boarding rates according to S.I. Green.

56I recognize that the boarding costs were the largest charge on SOA#2 but the evidence established that they were properly incurred and reasonable given that they reflect continuous daily care, housing, feed, water, shelter and supervision provided by equine facilities over a period of nearly six months.

Veterinary Costs/Animal Care Costs

57SOA#2 includes charges for both veterinary services and animal care provided to the horses while in the Respondent’s care. The veterinary component of SOA#2 totaled $28,994.25. An additional $4,977.52 related to non-veterinary but necessary care including farrier services, bandage care and assistance provided in support of veterinary treatment.

58The costs related to veterinary services delivered during the relevant period included:

1. Veterinary examinations;
2. Diagnostic assessments;
3. Dental procedures;
4. Sedation;
5. Medication; and
6. Ongoing monitoring of the horses’ health.

59The witness testimony as well as the invoices, established that the veterinary care was provided both in response to the horses’ conditions at the time of removal as well as part of continued management of the horses’ health while boarded under the Respondent’s supervision.

60The Respondent relied on expert evidence provided by Dr. Kyle Goldie, a licensed veterinarian with experience in equine medicine. Dr. Goldie was qualified as an expert in veterinary care for horses. He was not one of the treating veterinarians but was retained to provide an expert report and to review the veterinary invoices and medical records associated with the horses while in the care of the Respondent.

61Dr. Goldie testified that he conducted a line-by-line review of the veterinary invoices and cross-referenced the invoices with the corresponding medical records. He testified that in assessing the veterinary costs, he referred to the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association (OVMA) Fee Guide as an objective reference point. Dr. Goldie explained that the OVMA Fee Guide is often used as a benchmark within the veterinary profession to determine if fees fall within a reasonable range. He testified that he compared the fees charged in this case to the OVMA Fee Guide for procedures including professional fees, sedation, dental work and prescription medication and found the charges to generally be within range.

62Dr. Goldie identified certain veterinarian charges that exceeded the OVMA Fee Guide, including the prescription medication mark-ups and professional fees. Based on this review, he recommended a reduction to SOA#2 in the amount of $2,470.14, which accounted for the variation in SOA#2 that the Respondent was seeking.

63Based upon the evidence provided, I am satisfied that the veterinary costs in SOA#2 were incurred and were reasonable, subject to the reductions identified by Dr. Goldie and sought by the Respondent.

64I therefore find that the Respondent met its onus and demonstrated that the veterinary and animal care costs reflected in SOA#2 were actually incurred and were reasonable, subject to the variations identified above.

Board finds no basis to vary or revoke the SOA

65Having found that the Respondent established on a balance of probabilities that the costs reflected in SOA#2 were actually incurred and were reasonable, the onus then shifts to the Appellant to demonstrate that the statement of account should be varied or revoked.

66I find that the Appellant did not meet this onus.

67Throughout the hearing, the Appellant’s submissions focused largely on issues relating to the removal of the horses and the conduct of AWS. It became clear that the Appellant was attempting to litigate the removal of the horses, which she had not appealed to the Board and was not an issue that was before me.

68The Appellant did not provide any evidence to challenge the transportation costs in SOA#2. In particular, she did not provide arguments that the transportation services were not incurred, were outside the standard costs, and she did not produce evidence of alternative or less expensive options. Instead, the Appellant’s submissions focused on her argument that the transportation of the horses should not have been incurred at all because the underlying removal was unlawful.

69The Appellant did not provide evidence to demonstrate that the boarding costs in SOA#2 were not incurred or were unreasonable. She did not challenge the boarding rates or provide testimony or evidence regarding lower rates or alternative boarding facilities. Instead, she again focused on her view of that the removal of the horses should not have occurred.

70Similarly, the Appellant provided no evidence that the veterinary or animal care costs found in SOA#2 were not incurred or were unreasonable. She did nothing to dispute the necessity of the treatments nor to provide lower cost treatment options. She continued to assert that the removal was improper and therefore the veterinary and animal care should not have been incurred.

71The Board heard very limited evidence from the Appellant’s father, Sammy Redlick, who spoke to why the horses should not have been removed. I did not find this evidence to be relevant to the issue of the charges or reasonableness of charges in SOA#2.

72I note that the Appellant did not challenge the Respondent’s witnesses in cross-examination on issues related to SOA#2. She also did not to make any direct submissions on the costs themselves, whether they were incurred and whether they were reasonable.

73Accordingly, I find that the Appellant has not demonstrated on a balance of probabilities that SOA#2 should be revoked or further varied.

74Having considered all the Appellant’s evidence and submissions, I find that the Appellant has not met her onus of demonstrating that any category of costs found in SOA#2 were not incurred or were unreasonable.

Conclusions

75I find that there was sufficient evidence to support the incurred costs for transportation, boarding, veterinary care and animal care and that these costs were reasonable.

76I find that the costs reflected in SOA#2 were incurred by the Respondent for the care of the horses from February 20, 2025 to August 26, 2025 (starting on the day of their removal and ending on the day of forfeiture). I find that the costs reflected in SOA#2, including costs of transportation of the three horses and pregnant mare not captured in the first statement of account, boarding and veterinary care, reflect the actual and necessary costs incurred and that these amounts were reasonable.

77I find that the costs incurred and reflected in SOA#2, are recoverable under s.35(2)3 of the PAWS Act because they were incurred for providing care for horses that were removed.

ORDER

78The SOA dated August 26, 2025 is varied to $116,229.12. The costs shall be paid to the Minister of Finance.