Lionel Howse v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 200

Tribunals ontario Animal Care Review Board

TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2025-12-19

Appeals and Application under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13

Between:

Lionel Howse Appellant/Applicant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Alisa Chaplick, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant/Applicant: Lionel Howse, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Jessica Holroyd, Counsel

Observer: Connor Howie, Member, Animal Care Review Board (November 4, 2025)

Heard by videoconference: November 4 and 19, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Lionel Howse (the “Appellant”) owns a female labrador dog named Peaches, who was removed from his care by Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) on September 9, 2025. The removal occurred at the border in Windsor, Canada, when the Appellant was returning from a road trip with Peaches. A Notice of Removal of Animal(s) (“NOR”), dated September 12, 2025, was then issued pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c.13 (PAWS Act). As discussed below, the NOR was appealed to the Animal Care Review Board (“Board”) by a Notice of Appeal received by the Board on September 24, 2025 (File No. 17769).

2On September 25, 2025, the Appellant was served with a Decision to Keep the Animal in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care (“DTK”) which was is not the subject of this hearing.

3On October 3, 2025, the Appellant was served with a Statement of Account (“SOA”) under s. 35 of the PAWS Act in the amount of $1,133.04 for costs incurred by AWS to care for the dog. The Appellant appealed the SOA to the Board on October 13, 2025 (File No. 17863).

4Furthermore, the Appellant filed an Application for Return of an Animal (“Application for Return”) dated October 16, 2025, regarding Peaches, under s. 38 of the PAWS Act (File No. 17867). The Appellant stated in the Application for Return that he was making the Application for Return under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act on the basis that the conditions that caused the animal to be kept in the Respondent’s care have ceased to exist.

5The parties participated in a case conference on October 21, 2025, during which the Board ordered the following proceedings to be combined, on consent of the parties, pursuant to section 9.1(1)(a) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (“SPPA”):

1. Board File No. 17769, pertaining to the Appeal of the NOR;
2. Board File No. 17863, pertaining to the Appeal of the SOA; and
3. Board File No. 17867, pertaining to the Application for Return.

6The matter proceeded to a videoconference hearing.

PROCEDURAL ISSUE – ADJOURNMENT OF APPELLANT’S CASE TO A SECOND HEARING DATE GRANTED

7While the hearing was underway, the Appellant requested an adjournment and a resumption of the hearing at a later date. This is because the Appellant advised that his witness, Jennifer Forlizzo, who he stated is an animal shelter owner who observed the Appellant with his dog in the United States, was unavailable on the scheduled hearing date of November 4, 2025, due to a medical emergency.

8The Respondent objected to an adjournment. They stated that the Appellant did not provide any disclosure, including will say statements for himself, regarding his testimony on his own behalf or for Ms. Forlizzo, by the deadlines agreed to at the case conference and set out in the Case Conference Report and Order. Since no will says were provided, the Respondent submitted that neither Ms. Forlizzo nor the Appellant should be permitted to testify. The Appellant, on the other hand, stated that he did not understand what a will say was at the time of the case conference.

9I ordered the hearing adjourned on November 4, 2025. The reasons for ordering the adjournment were to give the Appellant, a self-represented party, a chance to prepare will says for himself and Ms. Forlizzo and to give the Appellant another chance to arrange for Ms. Forlizzo to testify.

10The parties confirmed their availability for a hearing resumption date of November 19, 2025, subject to confirmation that Ms. Forlizzo would be available. However, the Appellant was not able to reach Ms. Forlizzo during the hearing on November 4, 2025, with respect to her alternate availability. I asked the Appellant to email the Board and the Respondent with Ms. Forlizzo’s alternate availability; however, the Appellant did not contact the Board by the deadline I provided.

11A hearing resumption date was set for November 19, 2025, with will says for both the Appellant and Ms. Forlizzo due by November 13, 2025.

12On the hearing resumption date of November 19, 2025, the Appellant advised that Ms. Forlizzo would be hospitalized for an extended period of time due to an illness and was therefore unable to testify. The Appellant did, however, provide his own will say by the specified deadline. I allowed the Appellant to testify regarding the contents included in his will say and the contents of the Appeal of the NOR, the Appeal of the SOA and the Application for Return.

ISSUES

13The issues to be decided are:

1. Was the Appellant’s dog in distress at the time of removal, and if so, was it necessary for AWS to remove the dog to alleviate its distress?
2. Should the SOA served on the Appellant on October 3, 2025 be confirmed, varied, or revoked?
3. Have the conditions that caused the dog to be kept in the Respondent’s care ceased to exist such that the dog should be returned to the Appellant?

RESULT

14For the reasons that follow, I find that the dog was in distress at the time of removal, and it was necessary for AWS to remove the dog to alleviate its distress. In addition, I confirm the SOA in the amount of $1,133.04. Finally, I find that the conditions that caused the dog to be kept in the Respondent’s care have not ceased to exist such that the dog should not be returned to the Appellant.

BACKGROUND

15AWS Inspector Patrick Wise testified and stated the following: On August 16, 2025, AWS received a report regarding a concern for a dog, stating that the Appellant posted a link online showing him hitting his dog, Peaches, and whispering in her ear that he was going to kill her.

16On the same day, Inspector Wise received an email from the complainant with a streaming website identified as “Kick.com/ideally”. Inspector Wise stated that he was also able to find videos on YouTube of the Appellant and the dog. Two of the videos were marked as exhibits in this hearing. The first is “dangerous streamer “lildealy” abusing his dog on livestream” and the second is “lil dealy vs peaches”.

17On August 17, 2025, Inspector Wise reviewed a livestream showing the dog owner identified as the Appellant, located in Texas, USA. Based on the livestream, the Appellant appeared to be in a hotel room with the dog and another male. In addition, on August 17, 2025, Inspector Wise (and another inspector) attended the Appellant’s last known address in Toronto. They received no answer when they knocked on the door and left a notice on the door to notify the occupants of their attendance.

18In addition, Dr. Nicola Jackson, a veterinarian with AWS, signed a Certificate of a Veterinarian Advising the Removal of Animal(s) (“Certificate of Veterinarian”) dated August 20, 2025, advising that alleviating the distress of Peaches necessitated her removal, pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act. In the Certificate of Veterinarian, Dr. Jackson identified Peaches as a, “Female Yellow Lab X type large breed dog from provided videos”, evidencing that she had watched video evidence before signing the Certificate of Veterinarian. Dr. Jackson also prepared an Expert Report in this matter dated October 20, 2025. In the Expert Report, she stated that while she had not been directly involved in Peaches’ care, she was asked to watch video footage to determine if Peaches was in distress in the footage and whether there were grounds for her removal.

19On August 20, 2025, Inspector Wise spoke with Detective Mitch Maetzger of the Toronto Police Service (“TPS”). Detective Maetzger confirmed that the TPS was also investigating the Appellant’s alleged animal abuse and was planning to charge the Appellant with a number of offences under the Criminal Code and the Provincial Offences Act.

20On August 21, 2025, Inspector Wise (and another inspector) returned to the Appellant’s last known address and left another notice on the door to notify the occupants of their attendance.

21On September 9, 2025, Inspector Wise spoke with Detective Maetzger who advised that the Appellant was arrested by the Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”) at the Windsor border. Detective Maetzger confirmed to Inspector Wise that the dog was in the custody of the CBSA. Inspector Wise asked Detective Maetzger to contact the CBSA and ask them to contact the Windsor Humane Society (“Humane Society”) to request that the dog be picked up at the border crossing. Also on that day, an Animal Control Officer from the Humane Society picked up the dog and transported her to a shelter where she was held until retrieved by an AWS inspector.

22On September 12, 2025, TPS advised Inspector Wise that the Appellant had been released on bail on September 10, 2025, with conditions. On September 25, 2025, Inspector Wise emailed the DTK, noted above, to the Appellant. In addition, on October 3, 2025, the SOA, noted above, was served on the Appellant.

NOTICE OF REMOVAL – EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

The Appellant’s dog was in distress at the time of removal and it was necessary for AWS to remove the dog to alleviate its distress

23I find that Peaches was in distress at the time of removal. The NOR states that Peaches was removed pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act, in which a veterinarian has advised the inspector in writing that removal is necessary to relieve the animal’s distress. The NOR then notes that videos were provided and states that there was alleged animal abuse.

24Distress is defined in s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act as “the state of being (a) in need of proper care, water, food or shelter, (b) injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or (c) abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.”

25In support of the finding that Peaches was in distress at the time the NOR was issued, I rely on Inspector Wise’s evidence regarding the videos that the Appellant posted online which demonstrated behaviours including the Appellant hitting his dog and whispering in her ear that he was going to kill her. I also rely on the testimony of Dr. Jackson regarding the video evidence, which the Respondent played during the hearing.

26As noted, Dr. Jackson signed a Certificate of Veterinarian regarding this matter dated August 20, 2025. In addition, after the removal of the dog, Dr. Jackson prepared an Expert Report regarding this matter dated October 20, 2025. During the hearing, the Respondent paused the video evidence at various points so Dr. Jackson could provide her expert opinion regarding the events taking place.

27Dr. Jackson’s stated the following regarding the video evidence:

A. The Appellant says to Peaches, “I will fucing kill you in front of everyone right here…”, “I fucing hate this dog bro. I’m literally going to snap her neck.” and, “Fuc* that dog…I hope she fuc*ing wants to commit suicide, that dumb bitch…”

B. On one video clip, Peaches is in bed with the Appellant and he smacks her across the top of her head with his left hand twice. She flinches both times and her ears go back and down;

C. In one video clip, the Appellant appears to smack the dog on her back end six times before grabbing the dog’s tail. The Appellant pulls Peaches onto his lap and is restraining her body with his left hand and grasping her muzzle, holding it closed with his right hand while saying, “…Shut the fu*k up…”;

D. Peaches shows numerous signs of anxiety and fear including crouching, lowered body posture with ears down and back and cowering. Dr. Jackson states that these are all indicators of negative feelings experienced during either a perceived or anticipated threat to her safety and reflect psychological distress;

E. Even though the Appellant contends he was playing a character during the video evidence, this is irrelevant because the physical and psychological abuse was still occurring; and

F. Dr. Jackson was unaware of whether the Appellant had the intention of following through with what he was saying to Peaches in his outbursts, but he displays a concerning pattern of behaviour towards Peaches.

28Dr. Jackson stated that the Appellant’s actions were abusive and caused Peaches to experience pain. In addition, according to Dr. Jackson, Peaches was subjected to undue physical and psychological hardship.

29Dr. Jackson stated that she observed several aversive handling techniques in the video evidence, including kicking Peaches’ crate, grabbing her and pulling her forcefully and smacking her after she barked. Dr. Jackson noted that the American Veterinarian Society for Animal Behavior (“AVSAB”) has a Position Statement on Humane Dog Training (“Position Statement”). This Position Statement was included in the Respondent’s Book of Documents as Tab “A” of Dr. Jackson’s Expert Report. In her Expert Report, Dr. Jackson quotes from the Position Statement as follows, “The application of aversive methods – which, by definition, rely on application of force, pain, or emotional or physical discomfort – should not be used in canine training for the treatment of behavioral disorders”.¹ Dr. Jackson states that the use of force, pain and emotional and physical discomfort are observed in the video evidence in relation to Peaches.

30Dr. Jackson also states that, based on the video evidence, Peaches was in distress as per the definition of “distress” in the PAWS Act, noted above. Dr. Jackson states that the Appellant’s actions observed in the video evidence were abusive and caused Peaches to experience pain. In addition, Dr. Jackson concluded that as per the definition of distress, Peaches was subjected to undue physical and psychological hardship.

31The Appellant, on the other hand, stated that Peaches was not in distress in his care but rather, he believes she is in distress now because she has been removed from him and he was her primary caregiver. The Appellant also stated that he has learned from this experience and that if he did cause Peaches to be in distress, he would never do so again. In addition, the Appellant stated that he is worried that now that Peaches is not in his care, she may be depressed and not eat. The Appellant also stated that he was trying to teach the dog when she had done something wrong, but he has learned that there are better ways to train a dog. During the hearing, he showed a video of positive interactions between himself and Peaches which he stated shows their love and companionship, and shows that Peaches was happy and well cared for with him. In addition, the Appellant stated that he was playing a character in the video evidence and would never intentionally cause Peaches’ distress.

32The Appellant also originally argued that Peaches should not have been removed. However, later in the hearing he conceded that Peaches was in distress and that the removal was appropriate. The Appellant stated that at the time of Peaches’ removal, he was in the process of relocating to Newfoundland to live with his parents, where she would have received appropriate and stable care. He stated that Peaches was taken at the border during this move, at a time when her care and safety were being responsibly managed. He also stated that if the Board finds that Peaches cannot be returned to him, Peaches should be returned to his family in Newfoundland.

33In addition, the Appellant stated that Peaches has been a well-cared for and loved companion for many years. He stated that while there may have been isolated moments of frustration in the past, they were brief and human lapses, no different from what any caregiver may experience. In addition, the Appellant stated that these moments do not represent a pattern of abuse or neglect, nor do they reflect his capacity to provide for the dogs’ needs.

34The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that the Board does not have jurisdiction to return a dog to a family member, as the Board’s jurisdiction allows the return of an animal to an owner or custodian and not to a different household. I agree with this based on a plain reading of s. 38(9)2 of the PAWS Act which states,

(9) After a hearing, the Board may do one or more of the following:

2. Order that an animal removed under subsection 31 (1) or (2), or that was taken into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care under subsection 31 (6) or 44 (8), be returned to the owner or custodian. (emphasis added)

35The Respondent also argued that returning Peaches to a family member could lead to conditions of distress as Peaches would likely still have to interact with the Appellant. I agree with this and note that the Appellant himself stated that he would be in Newfoundland with Peaches at certain times. Furthermore, I note that the Board does not have jurisdiction in Newfoundland where the Appellant stated that his family resides.

36For clarity, I find that the Board cannot direct that Peaches be returned to the Appellant’s family as requested by the Appellant. As noted in s. 38(9)2 of the PAWS Act, the Board can order Peaches’ return to her owner or custodian. The Appellant is Peaches’ owner and he presented no evidence that any of his family members were Peaches’ custodian, such that I could order Peaches’ return to his family.

37I find, based on the evidence presented, that Peaches was in distress at the time of removal and note that the Appellant conceded this as well. In particular, I find that as per s. 1(1)(c) of the definition of distress noted above, Peaches was in a state of being, “abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect” and was therefore in distress when she was removed from the Appellant’s care.

38I also find that, as per the Respondent’s argument, even if the Appellant’s treatment of the dog shown in the video evidence presented by the Respondent were part of an online persona, for the dog, the distress was real. The Respondent also argued, and I agree, that even though the Appellant’s video evidence showed positive interactions between the Appellant and Peaches, it does not change the evidence of abuse and distress in the interactions observed in the Respondent’s video evidence.

39In addition, I agree with Dr. Jackson that the use of force was clear in the video evidence, and that Peaches was in pain and discomfort. I also accept the AVSAB Position Statement quoted, in part, by Dr. Jackson, which states that aversive methods should not be used in canine training for the treatment of behavioural disorders.

40Furthermore, I find that it was necessary to remove Peaches to alleviate her distress. Based on the video evidence of abuse which AWS stated spanned over 7 months that it is aware of, I find that there was a pattern of abuse that would have likely continued if Peaches was not removed from the Appellant’s care. In addition, while the Appellant argued that the behaviour displayed in the video evidence was part of his online persona, I note that the Appellant repeatedly threatened to kill Peaches. I find these repeated threats to be further evidence that it was necessary to remove Peaches to relieve her distress.

41For these reasons, I find that Peaches was in distress at the time of removal and that removal was necessary to alleviate her distress.

STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT – EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

(i) The Respondent met the initial evidentiary burden to prove that the SOA reflects the actual cost of necessaries and these costs were reasonable

42With respect to the appeal of the SOA, pursuant to s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act, an animal owner is liable for costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector in relation to the animal in circumstances where:

1. an inspector has taken steps to relieve the animal’s distress, which may include by providing it with necessaries under s. 33;
2. an inspector has removed the animal under s. 31(1) or (2); or
3. the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector has kept the animal in care or taken the animal into care.

43Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act explains that costs may include, among other things:

1. costs incurred to relieve the animal’s distress;
2. costs incurred in removing the animal or taking it into care;
3. costs of providing care for an animal that has been removed;
4. costs of providing care for an animal that has been kept or taken into care.

44While the burden of proof in this appeal is on the Appellant to show that the SOA should be revoked or varied, the Respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs were reasonable.²

45I find that the Respondent met the initial evidentiary burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA reflects the actual cost of necessaries, and these costs were reasonable. In support of this finding, I note that Inspector Wise testified regarding the SOA on behalf of the Respondent. He recounted the events that led to the removal of Peaches and how the need for transportation, boarding and food for Peaches arose. I accepted that it was necessary to transport Peaches from the Humane Society to the boarding facility, to board her at the boarding facility and to provide to provide food for her while at the boarding facility.

46As noted, the SOA in the amount of $1,133.04 consisted of $45.20 for transportation of Peaches from the Humane Society to a boarding facility. It also consisted of boarding costs in the amount of $1,017.00 for the boarding facility to board Peaches from September 10, 2025 – September 30, 2025. In addition, it consisted of the cost of food for Peaches in the amount of $70.84.

47The Respondent submitted redacted invoices to the Board which accompanied the SOA. The Respondent stated that the redacted invoices were also provided to the Appellant. In addition to the charges for transportation and food noted above, the redacted invoices showed that the boarding costs for Peaches were $45.00 per night plus HST. Inspector Wise’s evidence was the boarding costs were determined by both the boarding facility where Peaches was boarded and by AWS. In addition, Inspector Wise’s evidence was that the costs charged for boarding Peaches were consistent with the boarding costs that facilities typically charge for boarding similar animals. The Appellant did not dispute the reasonableness of the costs included in the SOA.

48The Respondent argued that the charges on the SOA were for necessaries to relieve distress. I agree with the Respondent and accept that the costs included on the SOA were reasonable and necessary to relieve Peaches’ distress.

49For clarity, I accept the Respondent’s evidence regarding the SOA and find that the $1,133.04 in costs set out in the SOA are reasonable. This conclusion was supported by the invoices attached to the SOA. I also find that the costs incurred were necessary to keep Peaches healthy and safe and the expenses related to that care fell within s. 35(2) of the PAWS Act including, “[c]osts of providing care for an animal that has been removed” pursuant to s. 35(2)3 of the PAWS Act. For the above reasons, I find that the Respondent met its initial evidentiary burden of proving, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs were reasonable

(ii) the Appellant did not meet the burden of proving that the SOA should be revoked or varied

50Having found that the Respondent met the initial evidentiary burden, the onus then shifts to the Appellant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be revoked or varied.

51The Respondent argued that the Appellant did not meet this onus and stated that the Appellant did not present any arguments or evidence that the costs in the SOA were unreasonable.

52The Appellant, on the other hand, sought to have the SOA revoked, stating that at the time Peaches was seized, he was in the process of relocating Peaches to Newfoundland where Peaches would have received appropriate care. The Appellant stated that Peaches was taken at the border at a time when her care and safety were being responsibly managed. The Appellant argued that the removal was therefore premature and unnecessary, as there was no risk to Peaches’ welfare when the removal occurred. The Appellant stated that, as a result, the costs on the SOA totaling $1,133.04 should be waived. The Appellant stated that these expenses place an undue burden on him, and that his actions regarding Peaches were reasonable and made in good faith.

53I find that the Appellant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be revoked. While the Appellant argued that Peaches was seized while in the process of relocation to Newfoundland where her care would be responsibly managed, that argument is speculative. There was no concrete evidence provided to the Board to support the Appellant’s contention that Peaches’ removal was premature and unnecessary, or that there was no risk to Peaches’ welfare at the time she was seized. On the contrary, as I have already found, above, and as conceded by the Appellant, Peaches’ removal was necessary.

54While the Appellant argues that the costs in the SOA place an undue burden on him, he did not make any specific arguments at the hearing regarding financial hardship or inability to pay the SOA, nor did he provide the Board with any documentation regarding his financial position. The Board finds that the costs in the SOA were reasonably incurred in caring for Peaches when removed from the Appellant and that the government or taxpayers should not have to bear these reasonable costs, which are the Appellant’s responsibility as Peaches’ owner. The Board finds that the Appellant has not proven, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be varied or revoked. Accordingly, the Board finds that the Appellant must pay the amount of the SOA, being $1,133.04, to the Minister of Finance.

APPLICATION FOR RETURN – EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS

The conditions that caused the dog to be kept in the Respondent’s care have not ceased to exist such that the dog should not be returned to the Appellant

55As noted above, on October 16, 2025, the Appellant filed an Application for Return regarding Peaches, under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act. The Appellant stated, on the Application for Return, that he was making the Application for Return under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act on the basis that the conditions that caused Peaches to be kept in the Respondent’s care have ceased to exist. The onus is on the Appellant to show that the conditions which caused the dog to be kept in the Respondent’s care have ceased to exist.³

56In support of the Application for Return, the Appellant stated that his sister is prepared to take full responsibility for Peaches’ care if the Board does not believe that Peaches should be returned to his care. The Appellant stated that his sister lives in Newfoundland with her three children in a stable home with a fully fenced backyard. He also stated that his sister is open to any oversight that may be required by the Board and/or AWS including regular check-ins regarding Peaches’ well-being.

57In the Appellant’s appeal of the SOA, he stated that he has now settled in Newfoundland, where he lives with his parents and maintains steady employment. Conversely, at the hearing, the Appellant advised that he would be attending school in Toronto and would only occasionally see Peaches when visiting his family in Newfoundland. The Appellant stated that Peaches is deeply loved by his entire family. He also stated that since the video evidence at issue introduced by the Respondent in this matter, he has taken significant steps to educate himself on positive dog training methods. He said that he has spoken with professional dog trainers and shelter staff to learn more compassionate ways to correct behaviour without frustration and is committed to continuing this learning.

58The Respondent, on the other hand, stated that for an Application for Return to be successful, the Appellant must acknowledge that the animal was in distress at the time of removal, or acknowledge that the DTK was reasonable at the time it was put in place. The Respondent stated that there was insufficient evidence that the Appellant adequately acknowledged either of these things. The Respondent also stated that there was a lack of evidence on the part of the Appellant to demonstrate that the circumstances shown in the Respondent’s video evidence no longer exist. In addition, the Respondent argued that was unclear whether the Appellant fully appreciated that his actions of using physical force when interacting with Peaches caused Peaches’ distress. The Respondent therefore stated that the Appellant failed to meet his onus in this matter.

59In response, the Appellant stated that he was aware that Peaches was in distress at the time of removal (as noted, the Appellant conceded this in his position regarding the SOA). In addition, the Appellant stated that he is educating himself to ensure that he does not repeat his past behaviour if Peaches is returned.

60I find that the Appellant failed to meet his onus in this matter. There was no viable plan for Peaches’ care if returned. The plan appeared to be for Peaches to be relocated to Newfoundland. Although the Appellant stated that his family in Newfoundland would be open to check-ins regarding Peaches’ well-being, neither the Board nor AWS have jurisdiction to order such check-ins in Newfoundland. Furthermore, as discussed above, the Board only has jurisdiction to return Peaches to its owner or custodian. Accordingly, if I were to allow the Application for Return, Peaches would be returned to the Appellant, which could cause Peaches to be subjected to further distress, as discussed above. As a result, the Application for Return is dismissed.

ORDER

61For the reasons noted above, I find the Appellant’s dog was in distress at the time of removal and it was necessary for AWS to remove the dog to alleviate its distress.

62In addition, I confirm the SOA and order that the Appellant pay $1,133.04 to the Minister of Finance.

63Furthermore, I find that the conditions that caused the dog to be kept in the Respondent’s care have not ceased to exist such that the dog should not be returned to the Appellant. The Application for Return is dismissed.

Released: December 19, 2025

____________________________

Alisa Chaplick, Vice-Chair

Footnotes

1. 1AVSAB Position Statement at pg. 1.
2. 2Windrift Adventures Inc. v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONSC 272.
3. 3Ishankova v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 36.