William Gibson and Janice Hollett v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 199

Tribunals Ontario

Animal Care Review Board

TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO

Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2025-12-17

Appeal and application under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

William Gibson and Janice Hollett Appellants/Applicants

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellants/Applicants: William Gibson and Janice Hollett, Self-represented

For the Respondent: Erin MacGillivray, Counsel

Heard by videoconference: October 17 and 24, 2025

INTRODUCTION

1In late August 2025, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) removed 71 animals from William Gibson and Janice Hollett’s (Appellants) residence. The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) then issued a Statement of Account (SOA) requiring the Appellants to pay $29,694.95 for removal, boarding, and veterinary costs related to the animals.

2The Appellants appealed the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) and seek to have it revoked or varied on the basis that:

1. Some of the services provided were unnecessary;
2. The charges were unreasonable; and/or
3. There were fabricated financial records.

3The Respondent’s position is that the SOA reflects actual and reasonable costs incurred for the removed animals and asks that the SOA be confirmed, except for $8,325.00 in boarding fees, which it asks the Board to deduct from the SOA.

4The Appellants have also brought an application seeking the return of the 66 surviving animals that remain in the Respondent’s care. They argue the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care have been addressed because they have moved to a different property that meets the animals’ needs. The Respondent opposes the application citing, among other things, a concern over the lack of detail about the conditions the animals would be returned to.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

5The issues in dispute are:

1. Should the SOA be confirmed, revoked, or varied?
2. Have the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care cease to exist such that the animals should be returned to the Appellants?

RESULT

6The SOA is varied to $21,369.95 and the Appellants are ordered to pay this amount to the Minister of Finance.

7The application is dismissed, and I decline to order the return of the animals to the Appellants.

PRELIMINARY ISSUES

8The Respondent brought two motions that were scheduled to be heard at the start of the merits hearing of the appeal and application. The motions sought the following relief:

1. For 17723/ACRB (SOA appeal) – an order striking the grounds of the appeal as they were a collateral attack on underlying AWS orders and notices and were outside the Board’s jurisdiction.

Alternatively, the Respondent sought an order restricting the grounds of the SOA appeal to whether the costs included in the SOA reflect the actual costs of care provided for the removed animals and that the care was reasonable.

2. For 17724/ACRB (Application for return) – an order dismissing the application because the grounds for the application are a collateral attack on underlying AWS orders and notices and outside the Board’s jurisdiction.

9I granted the Respondent’s first motion in part and dismissed the second motion for the following reasons.

a) 17723/ACRB – SOA appeal

10The Respondent’s motion is granted in part.

11The Respondent submitted that the Appellants’ Notice of Appeal did not satisfy the statutory requirements outlined in s. 38(5) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13. (PAWS Act). Specifically, the Respondent’s position was that the Notice of Appeal did not outline valid grounds or remedies and, instead, relied on grounds that were a collateral attack on other AWS decisions. As a result, the Respondent argued that the Board did not have jurisdiction to hear the SOA appeal.

12I agreed with the Respondent that the Appellants’ Notice of Appeal and supporting documents signaled their intention to challenge underlying AWS orders and notices in the context of their SOA appeal. In documents filed with the Board, Mr. Gibson voiced his dissatisfaction with the inspection, disputed that removal of the animals was necessary, and alleged that complaints about his care for the animals were fabricated.

13This Board has previously held, and I agree, that the validity of underlying AWS decisions for removing or keeping an animal in care cannot form part of the basis of the grounds on an SOA appeal when an appellant has not appealed those underlying decisions (Biswas v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 106). If a party has not availed themselves of the appeal mechanisms provided in the PAWS Act in relation to the removal or the decision to keep the animals in care, it cannot later collaterally attack the validity of those instruments in a different proceeding (R v Consolidated Maybrun Mines Ltd., 1998 CanLII 820 SCC)).

14As a resulted, I granted the Respondent’s motion and:

1. Struck the following ground of appeal found in paragraph 14(b) of the October 2, 2025 Case Conference Report and Order (CCRO):

i. “The Applicants dispute that the animals were in distress at the time of their removal. The Applicants argue that any alleged failure to meet the standards of care for the Animals found by AWS was due to the deliberate actions by another person who was not authorized to be on the Property or near the Animals;” and

2. Restricted the appeal grounds to whether the SOA reflected actual costs incurred and whether those costs were reasonable. This order was in line with the ground of appeal listed in paragraph 14(a) of the CCRO, which stated that the Appellants sought to have the SOA revoked or varied because the costs were not reasonable or warranted.

The fact that this ground of appeal did not elaborate on why the Appellants believed the costs were unreasonable did not mean that the sole reason they were challenging them was because the costs flowed from a removal they did not agree with, as suggested by the Respondent. An allegation that costs are unreasonable can be sufficient in itself to signal an appellant’s intention to have the Respondent prove their costs which, in any event, is their initial evidentiary burden on an SOA appeal.

b) 17724/ACRB – Application for return

15The Respondent’s motion to dismiss the application is denied.

16The issue on an application for return is whether the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in or taken into care have ceased to exist: s. 38(4), PAWS Act. Animal owners who apply to have their animals returned must file that notice in writing and set out the remedy or action sought and the grounds for the application: s. 38(5), PAWS Act.

17The Respondent submitted that the Appellants’ application for return was not statutorily compliant because it did not address the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care and, instead, listed grounds that signaled the Appellants’ intention to challenge earlier AWS orders and decisions to remove the animals. The Respondent submitted that the Appellants have not appealed the earlier AWS orders and decisions and, therefore, cannot challenge those decisions indirectly through this application as that would amount to a collateral attack.

18I denied the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the application for the following reasons:

1. I agree with the Respondent that the Appellants cannot challenge the validity of underlying AWS orders, the removal, or the keep in case decision in a later proceeding, such as this application, and that attempting to do so would be an impermissible collateral attack;

2. Nevertheless, I was not persuaded that the Appellants had not articulated valid grounds for the application. The CCRO reflects the parties’ agreements on the issues in dispute and reflects the Appellants’ corresponding grounds. Those grounds include a statement that directly addresses the issue on an application. Specifically, paragraph 14(c) of the CCRO states that the Appellants dispute that the animals will be placed in distress if returned to them as they have another property in which to locate the animals. It is apparent from this statement that the Appellants intend to seek the return of their animals by arguing that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care no longer exist;

3. I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that this statement in paragraph 14(c) of the CCRO was listed in a section titled “Grounds of Appeal” and that, as a result, it should not be considered as a ground for the application. The fact that the CCRO section heading did not explicitly say “grounds for the application” was likely an oversight by the adjudicator who drafted the CCRO and not a deliberate drafting choice, as suggested by the Respondent. In any event, the focus should be on the substance of the grounds and not the headings. In this case, it was clear that the statement had no relevance to the SOA appeal and was instead intended to respond to the very question that is at issue on an application, namely whether the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care had ceased to exist; and

4. Finally, I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s argument that the application was deficient because on an application for return, an owner must acknowledge that the animals were in distress and the Appellants in this case continue to dispute that the animals were in distress.

The Respondent relied on White v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 47 at paragraph 10, in which the adjudicator makes a similar comment in the context of an appeal of a removal and a decision to keep animals in care. Aside from the statement that a s. 38(4) application would require an owner to acknowledge that animals were in distress, the decision contains no reasons for why the adjudicator reached that conclusion.

I am not bound by the decision in that case, and in the present case, I do not find the Appellants’ insistence that the animals were not in distress to be a barrier to them pursuing the application. It is entirely plausible that in some cases, an animal owner can make a good faith argument disputing that their animals were in distress and at the same time bring an application and show that the conditions have changed such that they comply with AWS’ expectations. While I may not consider those arguments relevant to a decision about whether to return the animals, there is nothing that precludes me from being able to hear the application simply because those arguments were also included.

1. STATEMENT OF ACCOUNT APPEAL

19For the reasons that follow, the SOA is varied to $21,369.95.

20An animal owner or custodian is responsible for costs incurred by the Respondent in cases where an inspector has taken steps to relieve an animal’s distress, removed an animal, or kept an animal in care: s. 35(1), PAWS Act. Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act lists various costs that are recoverable by the Respondent, including costs incurred in removing an animal and costs of providing care for an animal that has been removed.

21If an owner or custodian appeals a statement of account respecting these costs, the burden of proof is on the owner to show that the SOA should be revoked or varied. However, the Respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the SOA reflects the actual costs incurred and that these costs were reasonable (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 4501 (Div. Ct.)).

Events leading to the animals’ removal and subsequent care provided

22Inspector Lindsay Kirkwood testified about AWS’ involvement in this case and recounted how the need for removal and subsequent boarding and veterinary services arose.

23Inspector Kirkwood first attended the Appellants’ residence in July 2025 after receiving a report of a large number of animals of different species living in unsanitary conditions. She subsequently issued four orders to the Appellants under s. 30(1) of the PAWS Act, requiring them to take certain actions to relieve the animals’ distress. Some requirements were species-specific but in general, they addressed the animals’ environmental, shelter, food, and water needs.

24Inspector Kirkwood returned to the property in late August 2025 and first removed one bird and two rabbits under s. 31(1)(b) of the PAWS Act, citing the need to relieve critical distress. These animals were taken to a veterinary clinic shortly after removal. One bird and one of the rabbits were later euthanized.

25The next day, on August 29, 2025, AWS removed another 68 animals, citing non-compliance with the orders previously issued to the Appellants (s. 31(1)(c)). Removal was also based on a veterinarian’s certificate advising that removal was necessary to alleviate distress caused by a lack of food, potable water and appropriate shelter (s. 31(1)(a)). This second group of animals included three dogs that were taken to an emergency veterinary clinic and a frog that was taken to a facility that specializes in reptiles and amphibians. The rest of the animals were placed in a boarding facility where they were assessed by a veterinarian.

26On September 9, 2025, Inspector Kirkwood issued the SOA that is the subject of this appeal. The SOA covered the period of August 28 to September 9, 2025. It totaled $29,694.95 and consisted of:

a) $881.25 in transportation costs; b) $375.00 in animal care (removal) costs; c) $11,125.00 in boarding costs; and d) $17,313.70 in veterinary costs.

Most charges on the SOA reflected actual costs incurred and were reasonable

27With one exception relating to boarding costs, I find that the Respondent proved on a balance of probabilities that the SOA reflected actual costs incurred and that these costs were reasonable.

a) Transportation and animal care (removal) costs

28The SOA lists $881.25 in transportation costs and $375.00 in removal assistance costs. I confirm these amounts for the following reasons:

1. Based on Invoice 1699, filed in evidence by the Respondent, I find these amounts reflected the actual costs incurred for the use of a livestock trailer and van to transport the 68 animals that were removed on August 29, 2025 and for the services of three individuals who helped load the animals into the vehicles; and
2. Given the number of animals involved, I find that it was reasonable for AWS to use larger transport vehicles and to rely on the assistance of vendors who spent 5 hours on site loading the animals, and 3.75 hours travelling to and from the property.

b) Veterinary costs

29The SOA lists $17,313.70 in veterinary care costs. Most of these expenses relate to the treatment of a dog who tested positive for parvovirus.

30Having reviewed the following invoices from Kawartha Veterinary Emergency Clinic, I find the SOA reflected actual costs incurred for veterinary care:

a) Invoice 171055: $395.61 – examination and medication for one rabbit; b) Invoice 171056: $470.08 – examination, euthanasia, and cremation of one rabbit; c) Invoice 171068: $362.73 – consultation and euthanasia of one bird; d) Invoice 171134: $552.90 – examination, nail trim, medication, and parvovirus test for one dog; e) Invoice 171138: $1,082.74 – examination, nail trim, parvovirus test, and medication for one dog; and f) Invoice 171384: $14,449.64 – examination, parvovirus test, medications, and hospitalization for one dog, Zopa, who tested positive for parvovirus.

31In finding these costs reasonable, I accepted the evidence of Dr. Alina Gardiner, an expert in veterinary medicine, who was called by the Respondent to provide opinion evidence on whether the veterinary products and services invoiced were reasonably required and of market value. Having reviewed the medical records, Dr. Gardiner prepared a report and testified that the veterinary fees incurred were both necessary and reasonable based on the condition of the animals, the severity of their illnesses, and the emergencies encountered.

32I accepted Dr. Gardiner’s evidence as I found it to be thorough and reliable. Dr. Gardiner testified that she reviewed the medical records and itemized invoices and clearly explained how the diagnostic tests, procedures, and treatments administered by the veterinarians addressed clinical signs in the animals and aligned with standard veterinary medical practices. For example, she explained that canine parvovirus is a highly contagious and potentially fatal disease that requires urgent and intensive supportive care. I accepted her explanation that the SNAP Parvo Test performed on the dogs was an appropriate screening tool that offered quick and reliable results to guide treatment decisions.

33I also accepted her opinion that radiographs were necessary when placing a nasogastric feeding tube to ensure that the dog who had tested positive for parvovirus received nutrition. Further, I accepted her evidence that hospitalization and related costs were necessary because parvovirus positive dogs are usually kept in isolation due to the virus’ contagious characteristics.

34Dr. Gardiner compared the veterinary costs charged by the vendors to the 2025 Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Fee Guide. The Fee Guide is an annual publication of suggested fees for veterinary services in Ontario. Dr. Gardiner found that most costs fell within or below the recommended ranges in the Fee Guide. For example, blood collection, IV fluids set-up, ultrasound, and hospitalization fees were all below the suggested range. Medications, euthanasia, and physical exams were all within range. I placed weight on Dr. Gardiner’s evidence and find that these costs were of market value and, therefore, were reasonable.

35Dr. Gardiner identified a few charges that were higher than the Fee Guide’s recommended pricing. However, I found these charges to be reasonable. I accepted Dr. Gardiner’s evidence that the cost discrepancy for some procedures was likely the result of the veterinary clinic including the cost of supplies in the cost of the procedure, and that it is common practice for clinics to charge for these services as a “package deal.”

36Where there was no comparator available in the Fee Guide or exact costs could not be calculated, Dr. Gardiner opined on the reasonableness of the costs by relying on industry practices and her own clinical experience. For example, the cost of certain laboratory tests could not be calculated because the costs are determined by the laboratory, with an individual clinic markup for interpretation. Although the Fee Guide suggested a 1.6x markup for these tests, Dr. Gardiner did not have information on which laboratory the clinic used, how much they charged, and whether the clinic’s markup was within the suggested range. However, she compared the total invoiced amounts for a package of laboratory tests to what her own clinic charges and found them to be within the range. I accepted this evidence.

37I do not agree with the Appellants’ position that some veterinary costs were unnecessarily incurred.

38Initially, the Appellants indicated they were not contesting the charges related to the dogs’ treatment for parvovirus. However, in cross-examination, the Appellants challenged Dr. Gardiner’s opinion regarding the necessity of many veterinary services (including those related to the treatment of parvovirus) and, by extension, the corresponding costs.

39Specifically, the Appellants suggested in cross-examination that Dr. Gardiner could not provide an accurate expert opinion without seeing the animals to determine if the treatments matched their symptoms. This line of questioning did not undermine the reliability of Dr. Gardiner’s evidence. Dr. Gardiner was not purporting to have diagnosed or treated the animals without having seen them. Her opinion evidence was based on reviewing the treating veterinarians’ notes and medical records to answer the question of whether the treatments were appropriate for the clinical signs those veterinarians observed. The Appellants did not provide any evidence to show that the records on which Dr. Gardiner’s opinion was based were inaccurate nor any expert evidence contradicting Dr. Gardiner’s opinion.

40The Appellants suggested that the dewormer administered to some of the animals was not necessary or effective because the Appellants had already administered dewormer only days before. Dr. Gardiner testified that if those were the circumstances, giving the animals another dose of dewormer would not be counteractive, but it would also not be useful. However, she added that repeat treatment may be necessary depending on the type of worms it is treating and the type of dewormer previously used, since some are short-acting. There was no specific evidence from the Appellants on what dewormer they had previously used.

41The Appellants also questioned the necessity of euthanasia and related costs. Dr. Gardiner’s report indicated that some animals were euthanized due to untreatable conditions and poor prognoses. One of the euthanized animals included a severely emaciated chicken with no feet.

42The Appellants cross-examined Dr. Gardiner on whether euthanasia is a common practice for animals with a disability and whether it is possible for an animal who lost their feet due to frostbite to recover and adapt from that loss. Dr. Gardiner testified that it was possible for an animal to recover from frostbite but that in this case, euthanasia was appropriate due to poor prognosis and quality of life. The Appellants did not offer any persuasive evidence that challenged Dr. Gardiner’s opinion or the treating veterinarians’ conclusions that euthanasia was the most humane course of action for animals with severe malnutrition, infections, chronic wounds, severe lameness, nerve damage and missing feet, severe dental disease, muscle wasting and anemia.

43The Appellants also cross-examined Dr. Gardiner on whether the dogs’ vomiting, diarrhea and loss of appetite could have been caused by a change in diet or extreme car sickness and stress. The suggestion appears to be that the dogs’ symptoms could have been caused by something other than parvovirus. I did not find this line of questioning undermined the reliability of Dr. Gardiner’s opinion. I accepted Dr. Gardiner’s evidence that:

1. The medical records showed two dogs had tested positive for parvovirus;
2. The parvovirus test used was a reliable screening tool;
3. Dogs infected with parvovirus exhibit clinical signs such as vomiting, diarrhea, and dehydration, some of which were noted on Zopa’s medical records; and
4. A change in diet does not commonly cause vomiting or diarrhea, and if it does, it would be short-term and not an ongoing issue. This evidence, together with Zopa’s medical records, which indicated that the dog had ongoing diarrhea five days after she was admitted to the hospital, made it likely that those symptoms were caused by parvovirus and not a change in diet, motion sickness or stress.

44I find that the dogs’ treatment for parvovirus was necessary, as were the other treatments and services addressed above. I also find that the corresponding costs were reasonable, and I confirm the veterinary costs included in the SOA.

c) Boarding costs

45The SOA listed $11,125.00 in boarding costs, covering the period from removal to September 9, 2025. For the first group of animals, the boarding costs started on August 28, 2025. For the second group of animals, boarding costs started on August 29, 2025.

Boarding costs from August 2025

46I find that the Respondent proved on a balance of probabilities that boarding costs of $2,000.00 were incurred as set out in Invoice 1699:

1. Aug 28-31, 2025 – 4 days at $25/day x 1 rabbit;
2. Aug 29-31, 2025 – 3 days at $75/day x 2 dogs (included isolation);
3. Aug 29-31, 2025 – 3 days at $18/day x 1 goat;
4. Aug 29-31, 2025 – 3 days at $9/day x 44 chickens;
5. Aug 29-31, 2025 – 3 days at $12/day x 4 turkeys;
6. Aug 29-31, 2025 – 3 days at $9/day x 7 ducks; and
7. Aug 29-31, 2025 – 3 days at $45/day x 5 pigs.

47I also accepted Inspector Kirkwood’s evidence that the boarding facility she selected was the only one in the area that could house the different species and had sufficient staff to care for them, and that the rates charged were standard market price.

48The Appellants’ only submission regarding these costs was that they were avoidable because there was a farm the animals could have been returned to. To consider this submission would have required me to conduct a review of the decision to keep the animals in care, which was not before me on this appeal.

Boarding costs from September 2025

49The SOA reflected an additional $8,325.00 in boarding costs which covered the period of September 1-9, 2025. For the reasons that follow, I find these costs were not actually incurred when the SOA was issued, and I vary the SOA by deducting $8,325.00.

50Inspector Kirkwood testified that when she issued the SOA on September 9, 2025, she had only received Invoice 1699, referenced above. That invoice reflected boarding costs up to August 31, 2025. She explained that she used the daily boarding rate set out in that invoice, which she confirmed with the facility, and calculated what boarding would have cost from September 1-9, 2025. This is how she arrived at the $8,325.00 figure. She included this amount in the SOA, reasoning that it would give the Appellants a fulsome picture of what they owed. She eventually received an invoice for those services from the vendor on October 1, 2025. That invoice reflected the same amount she had calculated on her own, which was $8,325.00.

51In closing submissions, the Respondent asked the Board to vary the SOA by deducting the $8,325.00 in boarding costs but added that its request was not an undertaking that boarding costs from September 1-9, 2025 would not be included on future potential SOAs. The Respondent provided no explanation for this request.

52The Appellants submitted that Inspector Kirkwood’s decision to project boarding costs and include them in the SOA before receiving the invoice amounted to fabrication and impacted negatively on her credibility. The Appellants characterized the Respondent’s request to have this amount deducted from the SOA as an attempt to conceal what had happened.

53I find Inspector Kirkwood’s practice of projecting boarding costs and including those in the SOA before the vendor invoiced the Respondent for those services does not amount to fabrication and does not detract from her credibility. The inspector was candid about how she calculated the amount, and I find that she was well-intentioned in including the amount in the SOA. Moreover, the invoice received from the vendor on October 1, 2025 ultimately validated her calculations.

54However, the practice of projecting costs and reflecting them in a statement of account that is issued to the animal owner before the Respondent has been invoiced for those services is contrary to the legislation and problematic for various reasons.

55Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act provides that the Respondent may serve a statement of account on an owner or custodian of an animal respecting “costs incurred.” When the SOA was served on the Appellants, the $8,325.00 had not yet been incurred and, therefore, did not comply with the requirements in s. 35(1).

56While the Respondent questioned Inspector Kirkwood on whether boarding costs were “incurred” between August 28 and September 9, 2025, and the inspector confirmed that they were, it does not establish that these specific costs were incurred by the time the SOA was issued to the Appellants on September 9, 2025.

57The issuance of a statement of account triggers a process whereby an animal owner can lose their animal if they fail to appeal or pay that statement of account by the legislated timelines: s. 35(4), PAWS Act. These are the automatic forfeiture provisions in the PAWS Act.

58In this case, the SOA containing these projected costs was issued to the Appellants on September 9, 2025. The Respondent was not invoiced until October 1, 2025. And yet, Inspector Kirkwood confirmed in response to my question that it was her expectation that the Appellants would pay the amount in full by the statutory deadline, which is 15 business days. In other words, the Appellants would have been required to pay the projected amount (or forfeit their animals for failure to pay the projected amount) by September 30, 2025, all before the Respondent was invoiced for those services on October 1, 2025.

59Throughout the hearing, the Respondent led evidence about these boarding costs and put forward a position that the costs should be confirmed. During closing submissions, the Respondent decided that it did not want to seek these costs and instead, it would potentially include them in a future statement of account. I wish to make clear that I reviewed these costs on the merits and for the reasons explained above, I found the Respondent did not have authority to seek these costs at the time the SOA was issued, the costs were not incurred or reasonable, and I varied the SOA based on this finding.

60For all the above-mentioned reasons, I find the SOA reflected actual costs incurred and that those costs were reasonable, except for the $8,325 in boarding costs. As a result, I vary the SOA to $21,369.95.

2. APPLICATION FOR RETURN

61I deny the Appellants’ application for the return of their animals because the Appellants have not proven on a balance of probabilities that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care have ceased to exist.

62The Appellants have filed an application under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act seeking the return of the 66 animals that remain in the Respondent’s care. In an application for the return of animals, the applicant has the burden of proving that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in or taken into the Respondent’s care are no longer present.

Respondent’s decision to keep the animals in care and Appellants’ evidence on the conditions to which the animals would be returned

63AWS carried out two removals of the animals in late August 2025, first removing 3 animals and then removing another 68. Five of the removed animals were euthanized. The remaining animals include 3 dogs, 1 rabbit, 5 pigs, 1 goat, 44 chickens, 4 turkeys, 7 ducks and 1 frog.

64On September 12, 2025, the Respondent issued a Decision to Keep the 66 surviving animals in its care after determining that:

a) Keeping the animals in care was necessary to relieve their distress; and b) It had reasonable grounds to believe that the animals may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellants.

65The Decision to Keep the animals in care is not under appeal and is being discussed here for the purpose of identifying the conditions the Appellants need to address to satisfy the Board that the animals can be returned to them.

66Regional Supervisor (RS) Victoria Crocker testified that the following factors informed her decision to keep the animals in care:

a) The animals were living in an unsanitary and unsafe environment; b) There was inadequate food, water, bedding, and shelter, including no nesting boxes for the chickens or heat/humidity controls for the frog; c) Many animals required medical attention. For example: i. Dogs were diagnosed with and treated for parvovirus. One of the dogs had a fishing lure stuck in its tail; ii. Five animals required humane euthanasia due to their poor condition and the remaining rabbit was in thin body condition; iii. The pigs were receiving treatment for mange; and iv. The chickens required ongoing treatments for lice and mites. Both the chickens and ducks were in thin body condition.

67The Notice of the Decision to Keep the animals in care reviewed the history of the file and noted that the Appellants were unable to provide adequate and appropriate care to their animals despite having had a significant amount of time to comply with the previous orders issued to them. It also noted that they were unable to improve the living conditions, which it said worsened over time.

68In support of the application for return, Mr. Gibson testified that since the events in question, the Appellants have relocated and the animals would be housed in a different property if returned to them. He said he was unable to take photographs of the new rental property because the property owner would not agree to it. Both Mr. Gibson and Ms. Hollett said the new farm property is set up to receive the animals and was deemed safe for their cows and horses by another AWS agent.

69Given the burden of proof is on the Appellants, it is unnecessary for me to review at length the evidence of the Respondent’s other witnesses, other than to say that Inspector Kirkwood and Senior Investigator Josh Vettor, both of whom had been involved with this file, were consistent in saying that neither had been invited to inspect the new property nor received any detailed information from the Appellants about the conditions at the new property as it related to this group of animals.

The Appellants have not satisfied the Board that the conditions that caused the animals to be in distress are no longer present

70I find the Appellants’ evidence in relation to the new property to be vague and unsupported by any documentation.

71The Appellants relied in large part on the availability of the new rental farm as a reason to have the animals returned to them. I did not place weight on the Appellants’ testimony as they only provided general statements that the property is set up for the animals to be there safely. Without photographic or other evidence of the conditions at the new farm, the mere fact that animals will be relocated does not on its own persuade me that the new property meets the standards of care as it relates to shelter, bedding, and a sanitary living environment for the 66 animals that are the subject of this application. Although the Appellants explained the lack of photographic evidence was due to the property owner not permitting them to take photographs, it was unclear why they had not invited AWS to inspect the property prior to this hearing as an alternative means of confirming that the conditions were suitable for this specific group of animals.

72I also considered the Appellants’ submissions that the new property has been deemed safe by another AWS agent for their other animals and that fact should support their application for return. This submission was not persuasive because it is unclear how meeting the standards of care for cows and horses proves that the property is well-suited for other species (e.g. that it contains nesting boxes for the chickens), and no evidence from the other AWS agent was before me.

73In addition, the Appellants did not provide a specific care plan for the animals that had medical conditions. For example, Ms. Hollett mentioned that the rabbit would be returned to the house and kept inside a cage for the winter, which addressed the shelter needs, but there was no evidence on how the Appellants planned to manage his thin body condition outside of a general statement that they have a veterinarian.

74Overall, I find the Appellants did not prove on a balance of probabilities that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in care have ceased to exist such that the application should be granted.

ORDER

75Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, I:

1. Vary the SOA and order the Appellants to pay $21,369.95 to the Minister of Finance; and
2. Deny the Appellant’s application for the return of the animals.