Tribunals Ontario
Animal Care Review Board
TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux
Date: 2025-12-01
Appeals and application under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Danielle Cadotte Appellant/Applicant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair
Appearances:
For the Appellant/Applicant: Danielle Cadotte, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Jason Kirsh, Counsel
Heard by videoconference: October 20, 2025
INTRODUCTION
1The Appellant, Danielle Cadotte, is the owner of a dog named Lexi. In September 2025, a veterinary clinic reported concerns about Lexi to Animal Welfare Services (AWS) after Lexi was diagnosed with a serious uterine infection and the Appellant had taken her home. The next day, AWS removed Lexi from the Appellant’s care, citing a need to relieve critical distress.
2While in AWS’ care, Lexi was examined by a veterinarian and underwent surgery. Shortly after, AWS issued the Appellant a Statement of Account (SOA) requiring her to pay $4,064.28 for Lexi’s boarding and veterinary care costs.
3The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) also decided to keep Lexi in care, stating that it was necessary to do so to relieve Lexi’s distress while she recovered from surgery. The Respondent also stated it had reasonable grounds to believe that Lexi may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant.
4The Appellant appealed the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) based on inability to pay. She also appealed the Respondent’s decision to keep Lexi in care on the basis that it was speculative and brought an application seeking Lexi’s return.
5The Respondent argues that the SOA reflects actual and reasonable costs incurred and seeks to have the SOA confirmed, except for a duplicate charge that it asks the Board to deduct from the amount owed. The Respondent also opposes the Appellant’s application for Lexi’s return, citing a lack of information about the proposed care plan.
6On consent of the parties, the two appeals and the application were combined pursuant to s. 9.1(1)(a) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 and proceeded together to a videoconference hearing.
ISSUES
7The issues in dispute are as follows:
Decision to Keep in Care (17668/ACRB)
a) Was it necessary for the Respondent to keep Lexi in care to alleviate its distress?
b) Did the Respondent have reasonable grounds to believe that Lexi may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant?
Statement of Account (17675/ACRB)
c) Should the SOA, dated September 11, 2025, be confirmed, varied or revoked?
Application for Return (17825/ACRB)
d) Have the conditions that caused Lexi to be kept in care ceased to exist such that Lexi should be returned to the Appellant?
RESULT
8I find that it was not necessary for the Respondent to keep Lexi in care to alleviate her distress, nor were there reasonable grounds to believe Lexi may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant. I order Lexi to be returned to the Appellant.
9Given my findings on the Decision to Keep in Care appeal, it is not necessary for me to determine the application.
10The SOA is varied, and the Appellant is ordered to pay $3,305.01 to the Minister of Finance.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
The Respondent’s motion to dismiss the application is denied
11At the start of the hearing, the Respondent indicated they had not received any disclosure from the Appellant by the deadlines set out in the Board’s Case Conference Reports and Orders (CCROs). On that basis, the Respondent asked that the application for the return of Lexi be dismissed given that the onus on an application is entirely on an applicant and, in this matter, the Appellant had filed no evidence in support of her application.
12The Respondent conceded that the Appellant’s lack of disclosure was less of an issue on the appeals of the Decision to Keep in Care and the SOA. The Respondent submitted that those matters could move forward because:
a) part of the evidentiary burden on those appeals was on the Respondent; and
b) the Appellant could participate and arguably succeed on those appeals by testing the Respondent’s evidence through cross-examination.
13In the alternative, the Respondent submitted that if the Appellant was permitted to testify, it would be appropriate for the Appellant to adopt the contents of her notice of appeal and application as her testimony.
14The Appellant submitted that she had never prepared disclosure before, most of the evidence rested with the Respondent, and she did not have any evidence to present other than what she had previously told the Respondent and the Board. She added that two of her anticipated witnesses were no longer available and stated that she would have to be her own witness.
15I denied the Respondent’s motion to dismiss the application. Instead, I permitted Ms. Cadotte to testify on all three matters but ordered that she confine her testimony to information contained in her Notice of Appeal and Application for Return forms. I made this order for the following reasons:
a) The approach struck a balance between providing some procedural latitude to a self-represented party and avoiding any significant prejudice to the Respondent, who would have had notice of the Appellant’s appeal and application grounds from the information contained on the forms;
b) I was not persuaded by the Respondent’s submission that the Appellant should not be allowed to present evidence because there were two case conferences held in this matter where the process and the nature of will say statements were explained. The Respondent’s position that when an appellant is reminded twice of document deadlines and still fails to comply, they should not be allowed to present evidence is untenable;
c) While I agree that compliance with procedural orders ensures hearings proceed smoothly, strict enforcement of procedural orders may result in rigid processes that do not allow for alternative ways of achieving the intended purpose of an order or a rule. Here, the only witness to testify for the Appellant was the Appellant herself. If I granted the Respondent’s motion, she would effectively be left not being able to participate in the hearing of the application, which is procedurally unfair;
d) If the purpose of disclosure and will says was to provide the Respondent with an opportunity to know the Appellant’s version of events and prepare its case, the Respondent had notice through the Notice of Appeal and other documents filed by the Appellant and would not be taken by surprise if the Appellant’s testimony was confined to her earlier statements; and
e) It was also apparent from the Appellant’s submissions that she was neither clear on what constituted evidence nor familiar with how to present evidence to the Board, which supported affording the Appellant some procedural leeway. For example, stating that she did not have any evidence to present while at the same time stating that she intended to testify suggested to me that she may have understood evidence to be documentary in nature and therefore did not have anything to file in that regard. I ultimately clarified with the Appellant that previous statements were not in evidence and that the hearing was her opportunity to provide her version of events to the Board.
EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS
Decision to Keep in Care (17668/ACRB)
16I find the Respondent has not established that it was necessary to keep Lexi in care to alleviate her distress. I also find that the Respondent did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Lexi may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant. I therefore order that Lexi be returned to the Appellant.
17On a review of a decision to keep an animal in care, the Board must assess whether the decision was properly issued under one of the grounds set out in s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act.
18The remedy on a successful appeal of a decision to keep an animal in care is the return of the animal to the owner: s. 38(9)2 of the PAWS Act.
Grounds for Keeping Lexi in Care
19On September 5, 2025, the Respondent issued a Notice of Decision to Keep an Animal in Care (DTK) to the Appellant on the basis that:
a) Keeping Lexi in care was necessary to relieve her distress (s. 31(6)(a) of the PAWS Act); and
b) It had reasonable grounds to believe that Lexi may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant (s. 31(6)((b)(i) of the PAWS Act).
20The DTK listed the following reasons for keeping Lexi in care:
a) It was necessary to keep Lexi in care because she required ongoing veterinary care and medication as she recovered from surgery; and
b) Lexi may be placed back into distress if returned to her owner because Ms. Cadotte had shown she was either unwilling or unable to provide adequate and appropriate medical care, as demonstrated by her leaving the hospital with Lexi despite being advised that Lexi was in critical distress and required immediate surgery.
21Regional Supervisor (RS) Carly Atrooshi was the Respondent’s delegate who made the decision to keep Lexi in care. RS Atrooshi did not have direct involvement with the Appellant. Her testimony regarding the events that led to Lexi’s removal was based on information relayed to her by AWS Inspector Brynne Howell. Inspector Howell was the lead investigator who removed Lexi from the Appellant’s residence and initiated a written request to keep Lexi in care.
22The Appellant took Lexi to the Thames Valley Animal Hospital on September 3, 2025. After the hospital informed the Appellant of Lexi’s diagnosis, the Appellant told hospital staff that she had to leave to get money and would return for the surgery. She said the hospital phoned the Appellant, but the Appellant did not return their calls.
23The next day, hospital staff contacted AWS to report their concerns for Lexi. Inspector Howell attended Ms. Cadotte’s residence the morning of September 4, where she observed Lexi to be dull and lethargic, and leaking pink-tinged purulent discharge from her vulva. The Appellant was not home at the time.
24During that visit, Inspector Howell removed Lexi from the Appellant’s home, citing the need to relieve critical distress (s. 31(1)(b) of the PAWS Act). Lexi underwent surgery that same day.
25RS Atrooshi testified that she decided to keep Lexi in care for the following two reasons:
a) She believed it was necessary to keep Lexi in care to relieve her distress as she required the care of a veterinarian and medication and hospitalization that the Appellant could not provide; and
b) While distress related to the pyometra had been alleviated, she was concerned that if Lexi was returned to the Appellant and anything further were to go wrong that would require veterinary care, the Appellant would be unable to provide it. According to RS Atrooshi, this would place Lexi back in distress. She added that this concern was also based on an incident in May 2025 with the Appellant involving another dog.
26RS Atrooshi testified that in May 2025, AWS received a call from a different veterinary clinic informing them that the Appellant had brought in a different dog who was sick and lethargic. She said that after the clinic advised the Appellant that euthanasia was the most humane course of action, the Appellant “left and abandoned the dog” and told the clinic that she was going to obtain money and would return. She testified that the Appellant did not return for the dog. AWS was called and the dog was ultimately euthanized. RS Atrooshi clarified that the Appellant had eventually consented to euthanasia. In relation to this incident, AWS issued a notice of offence letter to the Appellant in June 2025 for permitting the dog to be in distress.
Analysis
27I begin with a brief discussion of the definition of distress, since it is referenced in both statutory grounds for keeping Lexi in care. Distress is defined in s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act as the state of being,
In need of proper care, water, food or shelter,
Injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or
Abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.
28I find it more likely than not that following her emergency surgery on September 4, 2025, Lexi was in distress on September 5 by reason of being “in need of proper care” or “injured, sick, in pain or suffering,” while she recovered from surgery.
29However, I find that the Respondent has not proven on a balance of probabilities that it was necessary to keep Lexi in care to alleviate that distress.
30While RS Atrooshi referenced Lexi’s need for veterinary care and medications, it was unclear why the Appellant would be unable to care for the dog during her recovery. The Respondent did not provide specific and persuasive evidence of the type and intensity of care Lexi needed following surgery. There was no evidence on whether the medication needed to be administered by a veterinarian at the hospital or whether Lexi could be brought to and from the hospital to receive that care.
31It was also known to the Respondent that the Appellant had left the clinic on September 3, 2025 because she did not have money to pay for the surgery. Given that Lexi had already undergone surgery by September 5, 2025, the Respondent conceded that Lexi’s distress related to pyometra was alleviated, and surgery was the primary driver of the veterinary costs, the Respondent’s evidence does not establish why the Appellant would be unable to care for Lexi during its recovery when associated veterinary costs would be considerably lower.
32For similar reasons, I am not persuaded that the Respondent had reasonable grounds to believe that Lexi may be placed in distressed if returned to the Appellant due to an unwillingness or inability to provide care.
33I accept the Appellant’s unchallenged testimony that she took Lexi to the hospital on September 3,2025 just before closing because she was worried about Lexi’s eye. She further testified that she could not afford the $4,000 she was quoted for surgery and knew she could not get financing. I also accept that she was diligently trying to find subsidized veterinary care for Lexi after she left the hospital. The Appellant stated that she phoned different places in Windsor and London to try to find subsidized veterinary care for low-income individuals. She said she would have taken Lexi to Windsor the next day around noon, and she expected a friend to drive her there, but AWS removed Lexi around 10:30 a.m.
34The Appellant stated that because of AWS’ early visit to her home on September 4, 2025, she was not given an opportunity to demonstrate her intent to provide care for Lexi or present a care plan for a dog she had had in her care for eight years.
35I find that the Respondent knew that it was the Appellant herself who had brought Lexi to the veterinarian on September 3, 2025. This fact does not support the Respondent’s position that the Appellant was unwilling to provide care to Lexi. Rather, she testified, and I accept, that she had an inability to afford a large lump sum payment, and it was accompanied by efforts to find subsidized veterinary care.
36Further, if the Appellant’s ability to cover medication and veterinary costs was an ongoing concern, there was no evidence that the Respondent had any communication with the Appellant regarding what post-surgical care consisted of, what it would cost, and whether the Appellant could commit to covering it.
37The Respondent also argued that it formed reasonable grounds to believe that Lexi may be placed in distress based on the situation in this case and also based on the earlier incident from May 2025, The Respondent argued that these situations showed a pattern of behaviour from an Appellant and an unwillingness or inability to provide necessary care.
38I am also not persuaded by this submission. With respect to the Appellant’s history with AWS, the May 2025 incident was known to RS Atrooshi at the time she issued the DTK. However, RS Atrooshi never referenced the incident in the written reasons for issuing the DTK. While the DTK generally refers to an “unwillingness or inability to provide adequate and appropriate medical care,” the only example it goes on to provide is the Appellant’s conduct on September 3, 2025. There is no mention of the earlier incident, and I place little to no weight on the evidence related to the Appellant’s conduct in May 2025 in making my determination.
39The lack of any reference to Ms. Cadotte’s history with AWS is also significant because the DTK is expected to provide notice to an animal owner or custodian of the reasons for the decision to keep an animal in care. The grounds and the reasons set out in that document can form the basis for an appeal or inform the scope of an application for return. It is improper for the Respondent to provide additional reasons for why it formed reasonable grounds that were not originally listed in the DTK, and to do so at a later date once the DTK is challenged.
40For all of these reasons, I find that the Respondent has not proven on a balance of probabilities that the DTK was made in accordance with the grounds in s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act. As a result, I order the Respondent to return Lexi to the Appellant immediately pursuant to s. 38(9)2.
Statement of Account (17675/ACRB)
41For the reasons that follow, I vary the SOA to $3,305.01.
42Under section 35(1) of the PAWS Act, the respondent may, from time to time, serve on the owner or custodian of an animal an SOA reflecting costs incurred in relieving an animal’s distress, removing an animal or keeping an animal in care.
43An owner may appeal an SOA to the Board: s. 38(2)4, PAWS Act. After a hearing, the Board may confirm, revoke or vary the SOA and order that the costs be paid, as confirmed or varied, to the Minister of Finance: s. 38(9)3.1, PAWS Act.
44The burden of proof is on the owner to show that the SOA should be revoked or varied. However, the Respondent has an initial burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the SOA reflects actual costs incurred and that the costs were reasonable.
45On September 11, 2025, AWS issued the Appellant an SOA, requiring her to pay $4,064.28 in boarding and veterinary costs for Lexi.
46The Appellant’s only submission in response to the SOA was a request to pay the SOA via a payment plan or receive an extension of time to pay due to her financial circumstances.
47Given the Respondent’s initial evidentiary burden, I will first assess whether the SOA reflects actual costs incurred and if those costs were reasonable. However, the Board does not have the ability to order a payment plan or extend the time for payment, as requested by the Appellant, and my analysis is therefore limited to whether the SOA should be confirmed, revoked or varied.
Analysis
48I find the Respondent has proved, on a balance of probabilities, that most of the charges in the SOA reflect actual costs incurred for Lexi and that those costs were reasonable.
49The Respondent filed into evidence an itemized invoice1 from Thames Valley Animal Hospital totaling $4,064.28. The invoice lists boarding and veterinary services provided to Lexi between September 4 and September 9, 2025, and proves that the costs reflected in the SOA were actually incurred.
50I also accept the evidence of Dr. Robertson, an expert in veterinary medicine, who was called by the Respondent to provide opinion evidence on whether the veterinary products and services invoiced were reasonably required and of market value. Having reviewed the medical records, Dr. Robertson opined that based on Lexi’s clinical condition, the products and services provided were reasonably required to relieve Lexi of distress and the fees charged were generally at or below market value.
51Dr. Robertson compared the veterinary invoice to the 2025 Ontario Veterinary Medical Association Fee Guide (Fee Guide). The Fee Guide is an annual publication of suggested fees for veterinary services in Ontario. I accepted his evidence that the fees charged were generally within or below the fees suggested by the Fee Guide and, therefore, were reasonable.
52For example, the hospital charged $1,820.00 for Lexi’s surgery, as compared to the Fee Guide’s suggested amount of $2,230.60. The veterinary examination had cost $72.00, compared to the $189.50 suggested in the Fee Guide. Blood testing, urinalysis, blood glucose testing, and hospitalization were all below the suggested Fee Guide pricing.
53Based on Dr. Robertson’s expert report, boarding was the only service that cost more than the suggested Fee Guide pricing, at $189.00 for six days of boarding, as compared to $167.20 that would have been charged had the clinic followed the Fee Guide suggestion. Despite being higher than the suggested Fee Guide pricing, I find that the daily boarding fee of approximately $32.00 was reasonable. The difference in the daily rate between the suggested and the actual amount was less than $4.00, which is not excessive.
54Dr. Robertson also identified a billing error in the invoice. He noted that based on his review of Lexi’s medical records, an injection of Baytril ($48.78) was charged twice but only given once. As a result, and at the request of the Respondent, I deducted this cost from the SOA.
55Dr. Robertson’s report indicates that he did not analyze the medication costs because the Fee Guide classes the sale of drugs and medications as at the discretion of the individual veterinarian.
56Although I accepted Dr. Robertson’s expert opinion that the services and products, including medications, were reasonably required to relieve Lexi of distress, I have no evidence from the Respondent on whether the cost of the medications, which Dr. Robertson did not analyze, fell within a reasonable range of what veterinarians generally charge, taking into account factors like the location of the practice, the fact that this was a hospital clinic and not a general practice, etc.
57I therefore find the Respondent did not provide sufficient evidence to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the medication costs were reasonable. As a result, the SOA is further reduced by deducting the following amounts charged for the medications, totaling $461.03:
a) September 4, 2025 – Cerenia – $70.25;
b) September 4, 2025 – Baytril injection – $48.78;
c) September 4, 2025 – Duplocillin – $34.65;
d) September 5, 2025 – Caninsulin – $78.17;
e) September 6, 2025 - Buprenorphine injection – $115.78; and
f) September 7, 2025 – Buprenorphine injection – $113.40.
58Having previously found that keeping Lexi in care after her surgery was not necessary, the following costs incurred after September 5, 2025 (and not previously deducted under the medication deductions) are also subtracted from the SOA. These total $249.46 and include:
a) September 6, 2025 –IDEXX VetLab Cortisol – $56.07;
b) September 8, 2025 – I/D Canine Canned w/ Turkey – $67.39; and
c) September 6-9, 2025 – Boarding Daily Rate (Canine) x 4 days – $126.
59Therefore, the varied amount of the SOA following the deduction of the cost of one Baytril injection, the cost of the medications, and the costs incurred after September 5, 2025 is $3,305.01.
The Board does not have the authority to order a payment plan or extend time to pay
60The Appellant’s sole request regarding the SOA was that she be permitted to pay the amount in installments over a longer period of time because of her financial circumstances. She submitted that she was not expecting the amount to “disappear” because it is money that she owes, but that she cannot make a large lump sum payment.
61The Appellant testified that she receives social assistance and works on occasion. She stated that she has no family to help support her financially.
62The Respondent submitted, and I agree, that there is no authority in the legislation that allows me to extend the time to pay or order payment by installments. Once the decision in this matter is issued, section 1(2) of Ministerial Prescriptions, O Reg 447/19 requires the Appellant to make any required payments within 15 business days.
63The legislation, however, does give the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector discretion to enter into a written agreement with the Appellant to reduce the amount or extend the time for payment before the 15-business day deadline has passed (see s. 35(5) of the PAWS Act). It is therefore open to the parties to negotiate a payment plan given that the Appellant has taken a reasonable position and expressed a willingness to pay.
64For all the above-noted reasons, I vary the SOA to $3,305.01 and order the Appellant to pay the amount to the Minister of Finance.
Application for Return (17825/ACRB)
65The Appellant filed an application seeking the return of Lexi under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act. Having ordered Lexi’s return as the remedy on the Decision to Keep appeal, it is not necessary for me to consider the application as it is now moot.
ORDER
66Pursuant to its power in s. 38(9)2 of the PAWS Act, the Board orders Lexi to be returned to the Appellant immediately as it was not necessary for the Respondent to keep Lexi in its care to alleviate her distress, nor were there reasonable grounds to believe Lexi may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant.
67Given my findings on the Decision to Keep appeal, it is not necessary for me to determine the application.
68Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9)3.1 of the PAWS Act, the SOA is varied and the Appellant shall pay $3,305.01 to the Minister of Finance.
Released: December 1, 2025
Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair