Ronald Greene v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 185

Date: 10/21/2025

Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, RSO 2019, c 13.

Between:

Ronald Greene Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

MOTION DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicators: Peter Simmons, Vice Chair

For the Appellant: Jane Scharf, Paralegal

For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Counsel

Heard in Writing: August 22, 2025

OVERVIEW

1On April 29, 2025, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) conducted an inspection of Ronald Greene’s (the Appellant’s) property believing there were several cattle in distress on the property.

2On May 2, 2025, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal (NOA) with the Animal Care Review Board (Board) stating that he had not received a copy of “the order” and he was “only informed verbally” of the AWS’s potential removal of the cattle.

3On May 9, 2025, the Board issued a Notice of Intention to s (NOID) on the basis that the Board may not have jurisdiction in this matter under s.38 (1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act). On May 21, 2025, the Board issued an Order in which it stated it had jurisdiction and would not dismiss the matter without a hearing.¹

4On May 14, 2025, and prior to the Board’s Order of May 21, 2025, AWS sent the Appellant a letter containing the details of the inspection results of April 29, 2025, while also advising the Appellant they had decided that removal of the cattle was necessary in the short term and that they were underway with planning the removal.

5Also on May 14, 2025, the Appellant advised AWS that he had sold the cattle to another person despite filing his NOA on May 2, 2025, and provided AWS with a copy of a Bill of Sale for the cattle dated May 1, 2025.

6On May 23, 2025, AWS removed forty-six cattle from the Appellant’s property.

7This appeal was scheduled to proceed to a videoconference hearing starting on July 30, 2025.

THE RESPONDENT’S MOTION

8On June 27, 2025, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI or Respondent) filed a motion to dismiss the Appellant’s appeal because it was the Respondent’s position that the appeal is moot for the following reasons:

a) The Appellant no longer owns the cattle;

b) The cattle are no longer in the care of AWS or the CAWI;

c) The Appellant is not seeking the return of the cattle; and

d) There is no remedy available to the Board pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act.

9The Appellant made no submissions on the issue of mootness.

10The motion was scheduled to proceed at the start of the videoconference hearing on July 30, 2025. Initial oral submissions on the motion were made by both parties on that date and, on consent, the motion was scheduled to continue by way of written submissions.²

11On September 15, 2025, the Board sought further submissions from the parties concerning the status of the Appellant as owner/custodian of the cattle at the time he submitted the NOA, and the jurisdiction of the Board in relation to that status. The Board received written submissions from both parties on September 22, 2025, in accordance with the Board’s request.

RESULT

12The Respondent’s motion for an Order dismissing the appeal as moot is granted. The appeal is dismissed and will not proceed to a hearing on the merits.

ANALYSIS

13For the reasons that follow, I find that the appeal is moot. I also decline to exercise my discretion to hear the appeal on its merits.

The Appellant was not an owner, but a custodian of the cattle when he filed the NOA

14Section 38(1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act) provides that an owner or custodian of an animal may appeal any of the following to the Board:

a. An order from an animal welfare inspector;

b. A decision by an animal welfare inspector to remove an animal from a place;

c. A decision to keep an animal in or take an animal into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care; and/or

d. A statement of account.

15Therefore, the Appellant must have been an owner or custodian of the cattle on May 2, 2025, to have standing to file his appeal of the NOR.

16I agree with the Respondent that the Appellant was not the owner of the cattle as of May 1, 2025, which is the date the Appellant sold the cattle. Further, neither party disputes that the Appellant was not the owner of the cattle on May 2, 2025, when he filed the NOA. This also means the Appellant was also not the owner on May 23, 2025, the date AWS removed forty-six cattle from the Appellant’s property.

17I find however, that while the Appellant was not owner of the cattle on May 2, 2025, he was custodian and only ceased to be custodian when the cattle were removed from his property on May 23, 2025. I acknowledge the Respondent’s submission that custodianship may have been “unclear” but what is clear is the forty-six cattle remained on the Appellant’s property until they were removed. No submissions were made from either party to indicate the Appellant abdicated his responsibility for care of the cattle or maintenance and security of the property on which the cattle grazed for approximately three weeks following the sale.

The appeal is moot

18Mootness is a two-step analysis where step one is to determine if the tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared and therefore renders determination of the issues in dispute academic.³

19The Appellant’s principal ground for the appeal of the NOR, which he states in the NOA, is that he was not served a “hard copy” of an order, and that he was advised of a “future removal of cattle.” The Appellant made no submissions about wishing the return of any cattle and there is no indication that it was ever of interest to the Appellant. The Appellant also made no submissions on the issue of mootness in response to the motion.

20I find that the Board has no jurisdiction to return the cattle to the Appellant because he ceased to be owner of the cattle as of May 1, 2025. Therefore, there is no remedy available to Appellant through this appeal process. Accordingly, as there is no tangible dispute, and the matter is no longer live, I find that the appeal is moot.

The May 21, 2025, Order

21In its motion, the Respondent also submitted that the Board had no jurisdiction to hear the matter because it erred in finding that it had jurisdiction the May 21, 2025, Order.⁴ As I have granted the Respondent’s motion on the basis of mootness, I do not need to consider the Respondent’s submissions regarding the Board’s May 21, 2025, Order.

I decline to exercise my discretion to hear the moot appeal

22With no tangible or concrete dispute, the three considerations in the second step of mootness analysis assists in determining whether to exercise discretion to hear the appeal. In this matter,

a. There is no adversarial context as there are no remaining issues.

b. Given the appeal is moot, and there is no adversarial context, the use of scarce Board resources to hear the appeal is inefficient and judicial economy weighs in favour of not exercising discretion to hear the appeal.

c. Respect of the Board’s adjudicative role further weighs in favour of not exercising discretion to hear the matter.

23I am also persuaded by the Respondent’s submissions that the Board should not exercise its discretion to hear the moot appeal as the Appellant is no longer the owner of the cattle, there are no cattle to return as they are the property of another owner, and the Board has no powers to order the return of the cattle.

24This motion and the proceedings that led to it were grounded in an appeal of a decision to remove forty-six cattle. By the time the appeal was heard at the case conference on June 2, 2025, the cattle had been sold and removed from the Appellant’s property.

25This matter proceeded as an appeal of an order despite the Appellant stating in the NOA he had not been issued an order, and the Respondent confirming to the Board on June 9, 2025, which I note was after the case conference, that the Appellant had not been served any orders.

26The introduction of the motion highlighted the respective interests and concentrations of the parties; the Appellant’s wish for a merits hearing concerning a non-existent order, and the Respondent focused on a moot appeal stemming from a change of ownership.

27The appeal from May 2, 2025, is moot not because there was no order, but because the Board has no jurisdiction to return the cattle to the Appellant as he is no longer the owner, and the Board has no remedy available to it pursuant to s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act.

ORDER

28The Respondent’s motion for an Order dismissing the appeal as moot is granted. I decline to exercise my discretion to consider the moot appeal on its merits. The Board’s file is now closed.

Released: October 21, 2025

__________________________

Peter Simmons, Vice-Chair

Footnotes

1. 1Board Order - May 21, 2025 para 11.
2. 2The Board acknowledges that late submissions were filed by both parties.
3. 3Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1898 CanLII 123 (SCC),[1989] 1 S.C.R. 342
4. 4In reference to a Board Order from May 21, 2025.