Robin Trumbley v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 177

Date: 09/09/2025

Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Robin Trumbley

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair

For the Appellant: Robin Trumbley, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Carly Atrooshi, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services Adrien Iafrate, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference: August 6, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Robin Trumbley, the Appellant, appeals the removal of her dog, Cerberus, to the Animal Care Review Board (Board).

2On June 8, 2025, Cerberus was removed from the Appellant’s residence by Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector Joshua McKeen pursuant to s. 31(1)(b) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019 (PAWS Act). The Notice of Removal (NOR) issued on that date stated that the removal was because the dog was injured in an altercation with another dog and showed the following injuries: non-weight bearing on right front leg, deep bleeding lacerations, dull and lethargic. The NOR further stated that the Appellant had no means to obtain urgent medical care.

3On June 10, 2025, the Respondent, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI), served the Appellant with a Statement of Account (SOA) issued pursuant to s. 35 of the PAWS Act. The amount of the SOA was $3,174.31, which was the total for veterinary care provided to Cerberus. The Respondent also served a Keep in Care Decision (KIC) pursuant to s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act on the same date.

4The Appellant did not appeal the SOA or the KIC to the Board.

5On July 11, 2025, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the removal on the grounds that Cerberus had been forfeited to the Crown on July 3, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act. As a result of the forfeiture, the Respondent submitted that the appeal of the NOR is moot as the Board no longer has jurisdiction to return Cerberus to the Appellant.

6The Board scheduled the Respondent’s motion to be heard on August 6, 2025, at the start of the merits hearing. The Appellant was advised of the motion by the Board in a Notice of Motion emailed to her on July 16, 2025.

ISSUES IN DISPUTE

7The only issue before the Board on this appeal is whether Cerberus can be returned to the Appellant. This issue can be determined by considering the following questions identified by the parties at the July 7, 2025, pre-hearing case conference:

1. Was Cerberus in distress at the time of his removal on June 8, 2025?

2. If so, was it necessary for AWS to remove Cerberus to alleviate his distress?

RESULT

8The appeal of the NOR is dismissed because it is moot. The Board has no jurisdiction to return Cerberus to the Appellant, as he has been forfeited to the Crown.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

The Respondent’s Pre-hearing Motion to Dismiss the Appeal

9On July 11, 2025, the Respondent filed a motion seeking an order to dismiss the appeal of the removal on the ground that the appeal is moot. As noted above, this motion was scheduled for the start of the hearing day on August 6, 2025. The basis for the Respondent’s motion was that Cerberus had been forfeited to the Crown on July 3, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act because the Appellant did not:

1. Appeal the SOA issued to her on June 10, 2025, within the prescribed time period of 10 business days; and/or

2. Pay the SOA within the prescribed time period of 15 business days.

10Pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act, Cerberus was forfeited to the Crown because the Appellant had neither appealed the SOA nor paid it within the legislated timelines.

ANALYSIS

11I find that the appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal for the reasons that follow.

12The leading case on mootness is Borowski (Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 (“Borowski”)). As Borowski is binding on me, I will apply it in my analysis. The Supreme Court’s decision in Borowski sets out a two-step analysis used to consider mootness:

1. Is the dispute between the parties’ moot?

2. If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the appeal?

13In Borowski, the Supreme Court of Canada described the doctrine of mootness at p. 353 as follows:

An aspect of a general policy or practice that a court may decline to decide a case which merely raises a hypothetical or abstract question. The general principle applies when the decision of the court will not have the effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties. If the decision of the court will have no practical effect on such rights, the court will decline to decide the case. This essential ingredient must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commenced but at the time when then court is called upon to reach a decision. Accordingly, if, subsequent to the initiation of the action or proceeding, events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so that no present live controversy affects the rights of the parties, the case is said to be moot.

Step 1 – Is the appeal moot?

14I find that Cerberus was forfeited pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act on July 3, 2025, due to the Appellant’s failure to appeal the SOA issued on June 10, 2025, or to pay it within the prescribed timelines, for the reasons that follow.

15I am persuaded by the Respondent’s submissions, which included the following:

1. Forfeiture occurs by statutory action and is not subject to any action taken by the Crown or the CAWI to initiate or finalize the forfeiture process. Once an animal has been forfeited to the Crown, it becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals. Section 63(1) of the PAWS Act provides that the CAWI is then authorized by the Crown to “deal with the animals as if the CAWI were the owner.”

2. The dispute over the return of the animal disappeared on forfeiture, and the Board has no jurisdiction to order the return of an animal once it has been forfeited.

3. There is available case law, including Guillaume v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 5782 (para. 9), to support the Respondent’s position that following forfeiture to the Crown, an animal becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals.

16I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the Appellant received the SOA, having been served it by email.

17The SOA form provides information regarding filing appeals with the Board and the consequence of forfeiting an animal when an owner/custodian does not appeal a SOA or pay the SOA within the prescribed periods under s. 35(4). The SOA form also provides information that an owner/custodian may enter into a written agreement with the CAWI to extend the payment period or reduce the amount to be paid, or both under s. 35(5) of the PAWS Act.

18I am not persuaded by the Appellant’s submissions regarding the SOA, which included that:

1. She had asked the Inspector and the Humane Society, and left messages (unknown to whom) about where to pay the SOA.

2. She is on disability support, and would be interested in a payment plan.

3. She read the various documents issued to her, including the SOA, but did not understand them. She forwarded these to her daughter, but her daughter is busy.

19The Appellant acknowledged that she did not appeal the SOA or pay it, or enter into a written agreement with the CAWI regarding a payment plan. Having not exercised her rights under the PAWS Act, I agree with the Respondent that Cerberus was forfeited to the Crown.

20In the case conference, the Adjudicator asked the parties if an accommodation was required and in the case conference report and order (paragraph [9]) issued on July 10, 2025, it indicates that neither party required any accommodations when prompted.

21In conclusion, by statutory provision (s. 35(4)(a)¹ of the PAWS Act), the dog was forfeited on July 3, 2025. I accept the Respondent’s submissions that the Board has no power to return Cerberus to the Appellant because the dog was forfeited, and the Appellant is no longer the owner.

22As the Board has no jurisdiction to return the Appellant’s dog to her, which is the only remedy available in an appeal of a NOR, I find that the appeal is moot.

Step 2 – Should the Board exercise discretion to hear the appeal, even though it is moot?

23While there is no live controversy remaining, the Board may exercise its discretion and hear a moot appeal based on the Borowski framework.

24Borowski outlines three factors to consider in determining whether to exercise discretion to hear a moot case:

1. The requirement of an adversarial context;

2. The concern for judicial economy; and

3. The need for courts and tribunals to demonstrate a measure of awareness for their proper law-making function.

25For the reasons that follow, I have considered these factors and choose not to exercise my discretion to hear the moot appeal.

Adversarial context

26I disagree with the Respondent that an adversarial context disappears solely because Cerberus was forfeited. While the live controversy no longer exists, as the Board lacks jurisdiction to render a decision to return the animal and the ownership dissolves on forfeiture, an adversarial context may still exist if the Appellant has a direct interest in any remaining issues to be decided (as described above in paragraph [7]).

27Collateral consequences to findings on the issues may still exist. The Respondent issued the first SOA on June 10, 2025, and Cerberus was forfeited on July 3, 2025. Pursuant to s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act, the Appellant is still liable for costs incurred during the interval between these two dates. The outcome of any findings on the issues could have a bearing on the quantum of SOAs yet to be issued.

28However, the Respondent submitted that a second SOA was issued on July 8, 2025, which was neither appealed nor paid within the statutory timelines. The Respondent confirmed that it would not issue any further SOAs.

29Given that the Appellant did not appeal any SOA or other order of the AWS to this Board, no adversarial context between the parties remains. The issues described in paragraph [7] would only have been relevant had there been a possibility of an outstanding appeal of future SOAs. On appeal, the Board’s decision on issues relevant to the removal could have determined the quantum of the SOA. As the Respondent has confirmed that a subsequent SOA will not be issued to the Appellant, an examination of the issues would only be hypothetical and would have no bearing on the rights of the parties, as the Board would not have the ability to make any remedial orders.

The Board’s resources

30I agree with the Respondent that it would be an inefficient use of the Board’s resources to hear the appeal, given that it is moot and there is no adversarial context remaining.

The Board’s awareness of its limited role, as an adjudicative body

31The third factor of the mootness framework under Borowski requires the Board to consider its proper law-making function to avoid intruding into the role of the legislative branch by pronouncing judgments in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties. This factor is especially significant where the matter in dispute requires an abstract interpretation of the legislation.

32Although I am not convinced that the appeal before me would require me to provide an abstract interpretation of the PAWS Act, given my findings that there is no adversarial context between the parties and that hearing this appeal would not be an efficient use of the Board’s resources, I do not find the third Borowski factor determinative. In my view, the purpose of this factor is to provide a check on adjudicative law-making where a decision maker is otherwise inclined to hear a moot matter. In this case, I am not inclined to do so based on my findings regarding the first two Borowski factors. Accordingly, since there is no risk of intruding into the role of the legislative branch, an in-depth analysis of the third Borowski factor is not required.

Conclusion

33I find that the appeal is moot given that the Board lacks jurisdiction to return Cerberus to the Appellant, as he was forfeited to the Crown. After considering the Borowski framework, I decline to exercise my discretion to hear the moot appeal.

ORDER

34The Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

35The appeal of the NOR is dismissed.

Footnotes

1. 1Ontario Regulation 447/19 Ministerial Prescriptions, states in paragraph 1(2) that for the purposes of clause 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act, 15 business days is the prescribed period of time within which the owner or custodian must pay the stated amount (of the SOA) if not appealing the SOA. Section 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act states that an animal is forfeited to the Crown if the SOA is not paid within the prescribed period after being served the SOA.