Application under s. 38 of Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between
Ashley MacDuff
Applicant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Alisa Chaplick, Vice-Chair
For the Applicant: Ashley MacDuff, Self-Represented
For the Respondent: Adrien Iafrate, Counsel Victoria Crocker, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Kathleen MacDonald, Inspector, AWS
Heard by Videoconference: September 10, 2025
BACKGROUND
1Ashley MacDuff (the “Applicant”) owned a Boston Terrier dog (“Odin” or the “dog”). On July 3, 2025, Animal Welfare Services (“AWS”) received a complaint that the Applicant abandoned Odin at a veterinarian clinic with a broken limb after he had been hit by a car. The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (“Respondent” or “CAWI”) provided an affidavit sworn by AWS Inspector Kathleen MacDonald on August 22, 2025 which stated that on July 3, 2025 at 13:38 hours, Inspector MacDonald issued an Order to the Applicant, pursuant to s. 30(1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c.13 (PAWS Act). The Order required the Applicant to contact the veterinarian caring for Odin, to make a decision regarding Odin’s care based on the veterinarian’s recommendations. The completion date of the Order was July 3, 2025, by 15:30 hours. Inspector MacDonald’s affidavit stated that the Order was not complied with.
2A Notice of Removal of Animal(s) (“NOR”) dated July 3, 2025, was issued to the Applicant pursuant to s. 31(1)(c) of the PAWS Act. The NOR stated that an Order was issued by an inspector with respect to Odin, on July 3, 2025, at 13:38 hours which was due on July 3, 2025 at 15:30 hours, and was not complied with.
3A Notice of Decision to Keep Animal(s) in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care was made on July 8, 2025, regarding Odin, pursuant to s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act.
4On July 11, 2025, a Statement of Account (“SOA”) was issued to the Applicant pursuant to s. 35 of the PAWS Act, in the amount of $19,948.37. The SOA stated that it was for a tibial fracture repair, an exploratory laparotomy and eye enucleation for Odin. The SOA was not appealed or paid within the required timeframes as described below; therefore, the Respondent stated that Odin was forfeited to the Crown on August 1, 2025.
5The Applicant submitted an Application for Revocation of an Order or Return of an Animal (“Application”) to the Animal Care Review Board (“Board”) dated August 11, 2025, seeking the return of Odin.
6The Respondent brought a motion dated August 22, 2025, asking the Board to dismiss the Application because the dog was forfeited to the Crown. Due to the forfeiture, the Respondent submitted that the Application is moot as there is no remedy available to the Board.
7The motion hearing proceeded on the same day as the scheduled merits hearing, prior to the merits hearing. If the motion was unsuccessful, the merits hearing was scheduled to proceed immediately thereafter. After hearing submissions from both parties on the motion, I made an oral decision stating that the Respondent’s motion was successful and that written reasons would follow. These are the written reasons. As noted in my oral decision, because the motion was granted, the hearing on the merits was cancelled.
DECISION
8The Board grants the Respondent’s motion. The Applicant is no longer Odin’s owner, due to the forfeiture that occurred on August 1, 2025. Accordingly, the Board does not have the power to order the return of Odin to the Applicant. As a result of this Motion Decision and Order, the Application is dismissed, and the matter will not proceed to a merits hearing.
FORFEITURE OF THE DOG
9The timelines for appealing or paying a statement of account are set out in s. 35 and s. 38 of the PAWS Act and s. 1(1) and s. 3 of Ontario Regulation 447/19 (the “Regulation”), made under the PAWS Act. In particular, there is a 10-business day deadline to appeal a statement of account and a 15-business day deadline to pay a statement of account.
10Subsection 35(4) of the PAWS Act states that if an owner or custodian does not appeal or pay the SOA within those time periods, the animal is forfeited to the Crown as follows:
(4) Subject to any agreement made under subsection (5), the animal is forfeited to the Crown if,
(a) the owner or custodian does not appeal the statement of account in accordance with section 38 and fails to pay the stated amount within a prescribed period of time after being served the statement of account; or
(b) the owner or custodian appealed the statement of account in accordance with section 38 but failed to pay the confirmed or varied amount within a prescribed period of time after the Board provided notice of its decision.
11Furthermore, s. 35(5) of the PAWS Act, states the following:
(5) Before the expiry of the relevant time period set out in clause (4) (a) or (b), [Forfeiture on failure to pay account] the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector may enter into a written agreement with the owner or custodian to extend the time for payment or reduce the amount that is to be paid, or both.
12In this matter, the SOA was served on the Applicant on July 11, 2025. The 10-business day deadline to appeal the SOA lapsed on July 25, 2025 and the 15-business day deadline to pay the SOA lapsed on August 1, 2025. There was also no evidence of an agreement to extend the time for payment or reduce the amount of the SOA, or both, as per s. 35(5) of the PAWS Act.
13Because the Applicant neither appealed nor paid the SOA by the above deadlines, Odin was automatically forfeited to the Crown by operation of statute under s. 35(4) on August 1, 2025. Accordingly, the Applicant’s Application for the return of Odin is moot.
14The legal implication of forfeiture is stated in the Divisional Court’s decision in Guillaume v Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 5782, where the court explained the following at paragraph 9 regarding forfeiture and the PAWS Act:
…Once animals are forfeited to the Crown, they become the property of the Crown and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over
the animals. Subsection 63(1) of the Act provides that the CAWI is authorized by the Crown to “deal with the animal as if the [CAWI] were the owner[.]”
15The Respondent stated that the purpose of the law which makes forfeiture automatic, when a statement of account is not paid or appealed within the timelines above, is to stop ongoing costs of care for the animal to the Crown when the owner or custodian does not pay these costs. This is achieved by allowing the CAWI to transfer ownership of the animal to another suitable owner who then assumes responsibility for its care.
16The Applicant in this matter made oral submissions during the motion hearing in which she stated that she could not afford the cost of the SOA in the amount of $19,948.37. The Applicant also stated that although she could not afford the SOA, she had been willing to set up a payment plan. In addition, the Applicant expressed how much her family loves Odin and how important Odin is to the family. Furthermore, the Applicant described ways in which the family would ensure Odin’s safety going forward.
17I accept the rationale regarding forfeiture explained by the Respondent with respect to stopping ongoing costs for the care of an animal to the Crown, when the owner or custodian does not pay these costs. In addition, while I am sympathetic to the Applicant’s position, I am unable to order the return of Odin to the Applicant, as the Board no longer has jurisdiction with respect to this matter. This is because, as noted above, Odin was forfeited to the Crown on August 1, 2025. Forfeiture means that the Board is left without a remedy in this matter.
MOOTNESS DOCTRINE
[18] As noted in my oral decision on the motion, I decline to order that this matter proceed to a hearing on the merits. This is due to the application of the doctrine of mootness which reflects the general policy that a decision-maker may decline to decide a case that presents no “live controversy” affecting the parties’ rights. In particular, I find that, as per the Respondent’s arguments, there is no live controversy affecting the parties’ rights that exists regarding this Application.1
19The Applicant did not make any arguments regarding whether the Board should hear the moot matter. The Respondent, on the other hand, argued that to determine whether the matter is a “live controversy,” or it is moot, a decision-maker should apply the two-step analysis set out by the Supreme Court of Canada:
Step 1: Determine whether the required tangible and concrete dispute has disappeared, rendering the issues academic.
Step 2: If Step 1 is answered affirmatively, decide if the court or Board should exercise its discretion to hear the case.2
20Typically, once a court or Board has determined that a matter is moot, it ought not to hear the matter.3 However, under certain circumstances a decision-maker may find that it is in the interest of justice to hear a moot matter.4 The Respondent argued that in assessing whether to exercise its discretion to hear a moot matter, a decision-maker must consider the following three rationales:
The presence of an adversarial context;
the concern for judicial economy; and
the need for the Court to be sensitive to its role as the adjudicative branch in our political framework.5
[21] I find that there is no “adversarial context” in this case that will or may impact the rights of the parties since the animal has been forfeited to the Crown and the remedy requested by the Applicant is no longer available. As noted, even if a hearing on the merits proceeded, the Board would not be able to return the dog to the Applicant because the Applicant is no longer the dog’s owner or custodian. With respect to the concern for judicial economy (or in the present case, the concern for Board resources), I find that the economic use of Board resources militates against hearing this moot matter, because the caselaw regarding this matter is well-settled. Furthermore, I am sensitive to the Board’s role as part of the adjudicative branch in our political framework and aware that I should not be encroaching on the role of the legislature, which has the power to make changes to the PAWS Act and the Regulation, if it chooses to do so.
Conclusion
22I find that the Application is moot given that the Board lacks jurisdiction to return the dog to the Applicant, as he was forfeited to the Crown. In addition, for the reasons provided herein, I decline to exercise my discretion to hear the moot Application.
ORDER
23The Respondent’s motion to dismiss the Application is granted. While I am sympathetic to the Applicant’s circumstances, the Application will not proceed to a hearing on the merits as the Board has no jurisdiction to order the return of the dog to the Applicant.
Released: September 29, 2025
______________________
Alisa Chaplick, Vice-Chair
Footnotes
- R v. Smith, 2004 SCC 14 at para. 32; Doucet-Boudreau v. Nova Scotia (Minister of Education), 2003 SCC 62 at para. 17 (“Doucet-Boudreau”); Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC) at 353 (“Borowski”).
- Borowski, at 353.
- Mapara v. Ferndale Institution, 2014 BCCA 49 at para. 16; Borowski, at 353.
- Doucet-Boudreau, at para. 17; Borowski, at 353.
- Doucet-Boudreau, at para. 18; Borowski, at 358-363.