Animal Care Review Board
Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Victory Esievo Appellants
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Ziba Heydarian, Vice-Chair
Appearances
For the Appellant: Victory Esievo, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Adrien Iafrate, Counsel Isabella DiMenna, Articling Student
Heard by videoconference: July 31, 2025
OVERVIEW
1The Appellant, Victory Esievo, owned an eight-week-old golden retriever puppy who was removed from his care by Animal Welfare Services (AWS) on June 5, 2025, under s. 31 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act). The day prior on June 4, 2025, the Appellant took the puppy to the Niagara Veterinary Emergency Clinic (Clinic) for heat stroke. After he informed the Clinic that he could not afford the treatment, AWS became involved.
2On June 5, 2025, AWS served the Appellant with a statement of account for $1,320.46, issued under s. 35 of the PAWS Act, requiring him to pay for the costs of care for the puppy. However, AWS later revoked this statement of account and issued a new one that removed the costs of treatment incurred before AWS removed the puppy. The revised statement of account (SOA) was served on the Appellant on June 24, 2025, in the amount of $509.63.
3On June 24, 2025, the Appellant appealed the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) and on July 31, 2025, the parties participated in a videoconference hearing of the appeal.
ISSUE IN DISPUTE
4Should the SOA dated June 24, 2025 in the amount of $509.63 be confirmed, revoked, or varied?
RESULT
5The Board confirms the SOA and orders the Appellant to pay $509.63 to the Minister of Finance.
ANALYSIS
Did the charges on the SOA reflect the actual costs of necessaries provided, and were they reasonable?
6Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act states that the Respondent, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, may serve an animal owner or custodian with a statement of account respecting costs incurred to relieve distress and provide necessaries.
7Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act provides a list of costs that may be recovered, including costs incurred to relieve an animal’s distress, an animal which has been removed pursuant to subsection 31(1) or (2), or an animal kept in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care pursuant to subsection 31(6).
8The Board places an initial evidentiary burden on the Respondent to show that the SOA reflects actual costs of care incurred in relation to the circumstances prescribed under subsection 35(1), and that the costs incurred were reasonable. The overall burden rests on the Appellant, who must prove on a balance of probabilities that there are reasons that justify varying or revoking the statement of account.
9The Respondent called evidence from Inspectors Karmel Smith and Alysha Miller, who both testified regarding the circumstances around the removal, as well as the costs included in the SOA.
10Inspector Smith testified that on June 4, 2025, she received a call from Dr. Lawton, who was the Clinic veterinarian who had signed off on a certificate advising AWS that removal of the dog was necessary to relieve its distress. Dr. Lawton informed her that the Appellant had brought in the puppy for heat stress and stated that he had left the puppy on the balcony for around thirty minutes while he had gone shopping. The puppy's symptoms included vomiting, weakness, panting, and overall lethargy. As the puppy was still quite young, Dr. Lawton recommended prompt removal for critical distress, as it would have a good chance at survival if they acted quickly to administer treatment, which the Appellant had declined because he could not afford it. Inspector Smith testified that the treatment was not successful and Dr. Lawton made the decision to euthanize the puppy.
11Inspector Miller became involved with this case on June 5, 2025 and was assigned to a dispatch call from the Clinic reporting that the puppy was minimally responsive and required prompt attention. When she emailed the Clinic, she was informed that the puppy’s condition had declined rapidly during treatment (vomiting, diarrhea, and gasping for air) and she was advised of Dr. Lawton’s decision to euthanize the puppy.
12Following this, Inspector Miller testified that she attended the Appellant’s property to ask what had taken place. The Appellant informed her that he had left the puppy in a crate outside on the balcony of his apartment for around 30 minutes, but when he brought the puppy back inside it was not very responsive. Inspector Miller asked whether the puppy had access to water outside and the Appellant said it did not. Inspector Miller also testified that the temperature on June 4, 2025, was very hot at around thirty degrees, which would have been closer to thirty-five degrees with the humidex. While the puppy was taken to the vet clinic the same day and subsequently removed, the treatment could not save him.
13Inspector Miller testified that she issued an initial statement of account to the Appellant, which included the costs of examination, bloodwork, monitoring, IV, euthanasia, and cremation. However, on June 10, 2025, Inspector Miller emailed the Appellant to advise that this statement of account had been revoked and the updated SOA was being issued, which would only include the fees for monitoring and care, IV, and euthanasia, which were incurred after AWS removed the dog. Inspector Miller testified that on June 24, 2025, the veterinary clinic sent her a revised invoice for $509.63, inclusive of tax, and that she served the updated SOA on the Appellant the same day.
14Inspector Miller reviewed the veterinary records and the revised invoice, and testified that the fees charged were both necessary and reasonable based on her experience working at AWS. The charges on the updated invoice were reduced to exclude any examination costs before removal, and the only fees included were the following:
i. Monitoring & Care - $132.70 + tax ii. IV Surgery - $153.30 + tax iii. Euthanasia - $165.00 + tax.
15Inspector Miller went line by line over the Clinic’s invoice, and I find that the fees covered under the SOA were reasonable, as they included the actual costs of treatment and euthanasia and did not include costs incurred prior to the removal of the puppy.
16The Appellant did not dispute the costs incurred under the SOA, which were supported by the Clinic’s updated invoice. The Appellant focused on the circumstances of removal and stated that the Clinic rushed him out after AWS became involved. He also testified that the Clinic asked him to sign two forms regarding treatment, but he never signed them to authorize treatment. The Appellant testified that the quote for services provided by the Clinic was too high, and when he informed them that he could not afford it, AWS got involved. While I appreciate the Appellant’s position that he wanted to be consulted regarding the puppy’s care, the Respondent argued that following removal, AWS and the veterinarian(s) involved are responsible for making care decisions for the puppy. I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the animal was in distress, a condition that the Appellant did not dispute, and find that the costs included in the SOA were necessary given that the veterinarian confirmed the puppy was in critical distress and required urgent treatment.
17The Appellant also claimed that he thought he was surrendering his animal, but there was no evidence to support this. Lastly, he argued that he never told the inspector he went grocery shopping, but rather he put the puppy outside while he was cleaning his apartment so that he would not be harmed by the cleaning products. Whether the Appellant went shopping or was cleaning his apartment, it is undisputed that the puppy was left outside for around thirty minutes during extremely hot conditions, and this ultimately led to the heat stroke. Furthermore, the focus of the present appeal is on the validity of the SOA rather than how the removal took place. The Appellant admitted that he told the veterinarian he could not afford treatment and wished to take his puppy home. As a result, Dr. Lawton signed the certificate recommending removal of the puppy.
18The Appellant provided no evidence or testimony to challenge the charges covered in the revised invoice and I was persuaded by the Respondent’s uncontradicted evidence that the fees charged under the SOA were both reasonable and necessary.
The Appellant’s Ability to Pay the SOA
19Having found that the Respondent met the initial evidentiary burden, the burden then shifts to the Appellant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be revoked or varied.
20Most of the Appellant’s testimony focused on his argument that he should not be financially responsible to pay for the SOA given that he did not authorize the treatment, but he also submitted that he could not afford treatment. However, the Appellant did not provide any documentary evidence to support his position that he had a limited ability to pay for the puppy’s costs of care.
21The Respondent cross-examined the Appellant on a statement he provided in his evidence regarding his state of mind and lack of consent regarding treatment. The last sentence of this statement said “this was done without my informed consent and against my expressed rights as the legal owner of the dog.” Based on this, the Respondent argued that the Appellant assumed responsibility for the puppy and had not surrendered it before the care was being provided. Furthermore, the Respondent argued that AWS does not require consent or any specific paperwork to be signed to remove the animal. I accept the Respondent’s argument that the statement filed by the Appellant showed that he understood he was the legal owner of the puppy and assumed responsibility for it.
22The Respondent argued that the Appellant had not offered any evidence that would warrant the Board exercising its discretion to vary or revoke the SOA, and I would agree. There were no bank statements, pay stubs, government issued documents, such as notice(s) of assessments, or any other proof to show that he faced financial hardship. As a result, I decline to vary or revoke the SOA as I am not convinced that the Appellant cannot pay the SOA.
ORDER
23Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9)3.1 of the PAWS Act, I confirm the SOA dated June 24, 2025, and order the Appellant to pay $509.63 to the Minister of Finance.
Released: August 22, 2025
Ziba Heydarian, Vice Chair