Appeal and Applications under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Stephanie Redlick
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
Order Made By: Tassia Poynter, Member
For the Appellant: Mikesh Patel, Counsel (Not in attendance)
For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Counsel
Heard by Videoconference: May 29 and May 30, 2025
BACKGROUND
1Stephanie Redlick (the Appellant) owns sixteen horses that were removed by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (the Respondent) on February 20, 2025, and which have been kept in its care since that time.
2On March 12, 2025, the Appellant, through her counsel, gave written notice of her intention to commence appeal(s) and applications concerning her horses pursuant to the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act) via a letter to the Animal Care Review Board (Board).
3On March 17 and 20, 2025, a Case Management Officer (CMO) of the Board sent email correspondence to the Appellant’s counsel and identified two appeals and two applications brought under the PAWS Act based on their review of the March 12, 2025 letter as follows:
a. An appeal of a notice of removal issued by Animal Welfare Services (AWS) on February 20, 2025;
b. An appeal of a Statement of Account (SOA) dated February 26, 2025;
c. An application for revocation of order; and
d. An application for return of animals.
4The CMO emailed the Appellant’s counsel to advise that while the Board had received the appeals and applications listed above, they were incomplete and requested that the following be completed/provided: the Board’s notice of appeal/application forms; copies of the document/instrument under appeal; and a declaration of representative form.
5On April 1, 2025, the CMO sent further email correspondence to the Appellant’s counsel and advised that the appeal of the notice of removal issued on February 20, 2025 had been filed beyond the prescribed period of 10 business days and that the Board cannot process the appeal.
6Accordingly, only three of the Appellant’s matters are before the Board:
a. An appeal of a SOA dated February 26, 2025;
b. An application for revocation of order; and
c. An application for return of animals.
7On April 8, 2025, the Board issued a Motion Order granting the Respondent’s motion to combine the SOA appeal and two applications under section 9.1(1)(a) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (SPPA). The matters were ordered to proceed under one Board file number (16843/ACRB).
8On April 11, 2025, the parties participated in a case conference relating to the three matters listed above. The Case Conference Report and Order (CCRO) dated April 22, 2025 required, among other things, that:
a. On or before April 15, 2025, the Appellant was to provide clarification to the Respondent and the Board as to the grounds of appeal for the SOA appeal. The Respondent did not consent to this order at the case conference;
b. On or before April 21, 2025, the parties were to commence any preliminary/procedural motions;
c. On or before April 25, 2025, the parties were to exchange disclosure, including witness statements of the anticipated evidence at the hearing (i.e., will-say statements);
d. On or before April 29, 2025, the parties were to exchange any responding disclosure; and
e. On or before April 30, 2025, the parties were to exchange and file with the Board the documents they intended to rely upon at the hearing in addition to a witness list.
9On April 24, 2025, the parties were provided with a Notice of Videoconference Hearing which provided the date, time, and details for joining the hearing of the appeal and applications via Zoom. The hearing was later rescheduled to proceed on May 29 and 30, 2025, commencing at 9:30 a.m., based on the Respondent’s request, which the Board granted.
RESPONDENT’S MOTION
10On April 26, 2025, the Respondent filed a Notice of Motion seeking the following relief:
Appeal of the Statement of Account (SOA):
a. An Order dismissing the appeal of the SOA on the basis that it was filed outside of the prescribed period and lacks articulated grounds of appeal as required by the PAWS Act; or,
b. In the alternative, an Order restricting the grounds of appeal to the sole issue of whether the costs included in the SOA reflect the actual costs of the care provided for the removed animals.
Application for Revocation of Order(s):
a. An Order dismissing the application for revocation of order(s) as it is unclear which order is being sought to be revoked and the February 5, 2025 order [issued under section 30(1) of the PAWS Act] has already been revoked by AWS;
b. An Order dismissing the application for revocation of order(s) as the grounds for the application as set out in the notice of application are merely a collateral attack on the order(s) and/or the circumstances of removal of the animals, and do not address how the animals have ceased to be in distress, as required by section 38(3) of the PAWS Act; or,
c. In the alternative, an Order directing the Appellant to identify which order(s) is/are the subject of the application for revocation and to articulate the grounds for the application that address how the animals have ceased to be in distress.
Application for Return of Animals:
a. An Order dismissing the application for return of animals as the grounds for the application as set out in the notice of application are merely a collateral attack on the circumstances of removal of the animals, and do not address how conditions that caused the animals to be kept in the care of the Respondent have ceased to exist, as required by section 38(4) of the PAWS Act; or,
b. In the alternative, an Order directing the Appellant to articulate the grounds for the application that address how conditions that caused the animals to be kept in the Respondent’s care have ceased to exist.
11The motion was scheduled to be heard orally at the start of the videoconference hearing of the appeal and applications.
12The Appellant and her counsel made no submissions, either in writing before the hearing or orally at the hearing, on the substance of the motion.
RESULT
13The Respondent’s motion is granted. The Appellant’s SOA appeal under section 38(1) of the PAWS Act, application for revocation of order under section 38(3) of the PAWS Act, and application for return of animals under section 38(4) of the PAWS Act are all dismissed.
FACTS
A. Appellant’s grounds of appeal and application
14The Appellant’s March 12, 2025 letter which sought to commence the present appeal and applications included a subject line which read: “RE: APPEAL UNDER SECTION 38(1)(b), APPLICATION FOR REVOCATION OF ORDER UNDER SECTION 38(3), AND APPLICATION FOR RETURN OF ANIMALS UNDER SECTION 38(4).” An appeal under section 38(1)2 – not 38(1)(b) as there is no such provision – relates to a decision by an animal welfare inspector to remove an animal from a place (i.e., a notice of removal).
i. SOA appeal
15The March 12, 2025 letter contained several headings, including specific headings for the appeal of the notice of removal, and for each application. It did not contain a heading or a reference to the relevant section of the PAWS Act for a SOA appeal.
16The only references to the SOA in the March 12, 2025 letter are as follows:
a. “This appeal is filed in response to the Statement of Account served on February 26, 2025, and is submitted within the statutory deadline of March 12, 2025”; and,
b. “5. Remedies sought […] Nullify all costs imposed on [the Appellant], including those outlined in the Statement of Account served on February 26, 2025”.
17The Appellant’s counsel did not complete or file the Board’s notice of appeal form, nor did he provide a copy of the February 26, 2025 SOA at the time he filed the March 12, 2025 letter.
ii. Application for revocation of order
18In the March 12, 2025 letter, the Appellant’s counsel stated that the Appellant was applying for revocation of an order issued by AWS dated February 5, 2025, and provided the following grounds of application:
a. The cited conditions of “distress” have ceased to exist, or were never present;
b. Veterinary records confirm that all required medical treatment had been provided at the time of the removal;
c. The AWS inspector’s allegations regarding “non-compliance” (December 30, 2024) are demonstrably false and contradicted by veterinary records and invoices;
d. A Notice of Revocation issued on January 13, 2025 explicitly stated that prior concerns had been addressed, further confirming that the AWS’ intervention was unnecessary; and
e. The Appellant has documentation proving that she purchases and rehabilitates rescue horses, with purchase records from Ontario Livestock Exchange Inc. and David Carson Farms & Auction Services Ltd. demonstrating her commitment to equine welfare.
19Elsewhere in the March 12, 2025 letter, the Appellant’s counsel states: “The removal order, based on alleged ‘distress,’ is categorically denied and contradicted by substantial veterinary and testimonial evidence proving the horses were in proper care at all times” and, “The horses were receiving regular veterinary care and were NOT in distress”.
iii. Application for return of animals
20In the March 12, 2025 letter, the Appellant’s counsel demanded the immediate return of the Appellant’s horses. The grounds of application are that the removal was:
a. Carried out under misleading and false pretenses/the decision to remove them was based on misrepresented facts;
b. Executed despite ongoing veterinary treatment and proper care being in place/the Appellant provided proper care for her horses; and
c. Influenced by defamatory falsehoods propagated by competitors with vested interests in harming the Appellant’s reputation and livelihood.
21The Appellant’s counsel also noted that on February 10, 2025, the Appellant relocated her equine operation to a larger facility at a different location in Ontario to improve the horses’ welfare.
iv. Appellant’s subsequent correspondence and filing with the Board
22As set out above, a CMO of the Board contacted the Appellant’s counsel to advise that the notice of appeal for the SOA appeal was incomplete. The CMO provided a deadline of March 24, 2025 to submit the documents requested, failing which the Board may decide not to process the appeal.
23On March 25, 2025, the Appellant’s counsel contacted the Board via email and provided a completed Notice of Appeal form. The Board’s Notice of Appeal form contains various sections including section 3, “Reasons for Appeal” and section 4, “Remedy”. Under both sections, the Appellant’s counsel stated, “please find attached letter” and reattached the March 12, 2025 letter. No further information was provided in either section.
24On April 11, 2025, the parties participated in the case conference in relation to the three matters before the Board.
25The CCRO stated at paragraph 11 that “the Appellant’s grounds of appeal for the SOA set out above in paragraph [6] were not fully understood, and the Appellant has committed to providing clarification of the grounds to the Respondent and the Board by April 15, 2025”.
26The Appellant did not provide any clarification to the Board or the Respondent regarding the grounds of appeal for the SOA by April 15, 2025, or at any point prior to the hearing.
v. Appellant made no submissions on the substance of the motion and did not file documents or a witness list prior to the hearing
27The Appellant did not file any written submissions on the Respondent’s motion prior to the hearing despite the Board inviting her to do so.
28The Appellant also did not do any of the following by the deadlines set out in the CCRO, or at any time prior to the hearing in relation to any of the three matters before the Board:
a. provide any disclosure (including will-say statements) to the Respondent;
b. file with the Board and exchange with the Respondent the documents she intended to rely upon at the hearing; or
c. file with the Board and exchange with the Respondent a witness list.
29At the hearing, the Appellant advised that her counsel had sent documents to the Board, without copying the Respondent, on March 12, 2025, the same date that her counsel filed her notice with the Board. These documents included:
a. An invoice from the Ontario Veterinary College dated January 7, 2025, for care provided to a horse named “Midnight Train”;
b. An invoice from McKee Pownall Veterinary Professional Corporation dated February 7, 2025, for care provided to a horse named “Jojo”;
c. Medical records documentation of Drs. Russell and Garza dated February 1-3, 2025, regarding the examination of a filly and mare;
d. An invoice from the Ontario Veterinary College dated February 27, 2025, for care provided on December 27, 2024 to a horse named “Baby”; and
e. Various invoices from Central Ontario Veterinary Services for care provided in 2022-2024 to various horses, including the following: Chaya (Pandora); Mini, Tinkerbelle; and Natural Energy (Nemo). The invoices note that the Appellant is no longer a client as of August 2024.
30The Board provided the Respondent an opportunity to review the documents above at the hearing and heard submissions on their relevance, if any, to the Respondent’s motion. The Respondent’s position remained unchanged.
vi. Appellant made no submissions on the substance of the motion at the hearing
31The Appellant’s counsel did not attend either day of the scheduled hearing that took place on May 29 and 30, 2025. He did not contact the Board on either day to inform it that he would be absent and has not provided any explanation to the Board for his absence since.
32The Appellant attended both days of hearing. Initially, she stated that notwithstanding her counsel’s absence, she was prepared to proceed with the hearing, including the motion, without representation. The Board recessed to permit the Appellant time to review the motion record and then invited her to make submissions on the motion. The Appellant provided submissions that were unrelated to the issues on the motion. When the Board sought clarification on her position on the motion, the Appellant stated that she felt she could not continue to participate in the hearing without first consulting with her counsel. The Board adjourned the hearing until May 30, 2025 at 9:30 a.m.
vii. Appellant’s counsel’s correspondence seeking to file an amended notice for the SOA appeal on day two of the hearing
33On May 30, 2025, at 9:10 a.m., the Appellant’s counsel emailed a letter to the Board and the Respondent. The cover email stated, “Please find attached an Amended Notice of Appeal for the Statement of Account on behalf of Ms. Stephanie Redlick”.
34The May 30, 2025 letter contained four sections: (1) Detailed Grounds of Appeal; (2) Supporting Evidence; (3) Relief Sought; and (4) Request for Oral Hearing.
35The Appellant’s proposed grounds of appeal for the SOA appeal are:
The veterinary costs ($1,771.33) were unnecessarily incurred as comprehensive veterinary care was actively and routinely provided by the Appellants [sic]. The Appellants [sic] possess detailed veterinary records demonstrating timely and adequate care for all animals involved. These records directly contradict the Inspector's claims of distress.
The transportation costs ($2,938.00) were improperly imposed because the seizure and transportation of animals were unjustified. No immediate threat or harm necessitated the removal of these animals, and the decision to remove was based on misrepresented and incorrect assessments of the animals' condition.
The Appellants [sic] assert procedural unfairness, as they were denied the opportunity to present immediate evidence at the time of the inspection and removal of the animals. The inspector’s refusal to engage substantively with evidence provided by the Appellants [sic] constitutes procedural impropriety affecting the validity of the incurred costs.
The Appellants [sic] further argue that the inspection and subsequent removal of animals were influenced by biased and inaccurate reports from third parties, resulting in prejudicial and flawed decision-making.
36The May 30, 2025 letter requested an oral hearing, despite the fact that the hearing was scheduled to resume that same day. It also requested various relief including overturning the SOA and the return of the Appellant’s horses.
37The May 30, 2025 letter did not address the following, among other things:
a. the issues on the Respondent’s motion;
b. why the Board should accept an amended notice of appeal at this time after not providing this information by the April 15, 2025 deadline to do so as set out in the CCRO; or
c. why the Appellant provided no disclosure or witness statements to the Respondent, nor why she did not exchange with the Respondent and file documents or a witness list with the Board in relation to her appeal and applications by the deadlines set out in the CCRO.
38On May 30, 2025 at 9:30 a.m., the hearing resumed and I provided the Appellant with one final opportunity to submit written submissions that respond to the Respondent’s motion, to be filed on or before June 6, 2025.
viii. No submissions on the substance of the motion made by June 6, 2025
39On June 6, 2025, the Appellant’s counsel sent email correspondence to the Board that attached: (a) the May 30, 2025 letter; (b) an affidavit sworn by the Appellant on June 6, 2025; and (c) various invoices and records that were previously sent by the Appellant’s counsel to the Board.
40The Appellant’s affidavit outlined her position on the SOA as articulated in the proposed amended notice of appeal and requested that the Board dismiss the Respondent’s motion.
41Neither the body of the email correspondence, or any of the attachments to it, addressed the issues on the Respondent’s motion, aside from a bald request to dismiss it.
42Having reviewed the materials provided by the Appellant, the Respondent advised that it had no reply submissions.
ANALYSIS
SOA Appeal
A. Respondent’s submissions
43The Respondent argues that the Appellant did not express an intention to appeal the SOA in the March 12, 2025 letter.
44The Respondent further argues that even if the Board were to infer an intention to appeal the SOA from the March 12, 2025 letter, because the Appellant did not provide any grounds for the appeal, the Board ought not to have processed the SOA appeal in the first place as it did not meet the requirements of section 38(5) of the PAWS Act which provides, “A notice to the Board must set out the remedy or action sought and the grounds for the appeal or application”.
45It is the Respondent’s position that the notice requirements under section 38(5) of the PAWS Act are mandatory and must be met by the prescribed period under section 38(2) of the PAWS Act, and that the Board does not have jurisdiction to allow a party to amend a notice to meet the notice requirements under section 38(5) of the PAWS Act after the prescribed period for commencing an appeal has elapsed.
46In support of its position, the Respondent cited Kerr v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 69 (Kerr). In that case, the appellant brought a motion to “modify the grounds for appeal” for a statement of account appeal. The Board dismissed the motion and held at paragraph 19 that, “Despite the appellant’s submissions to the contrary, I find that the Board does not have the legislative authority to allow an appellant to expand the stated grounds of appeal after the prescribed period of time to appeal has elapsed […]”.
47The Respondent’s position is that the two sentences that reference the SOA in the March 12, 2025 letter do not meet the notice requirements of section 38(5) of the PAWS Act because:
a. The March 12, 2025 letter clearly articulates an intention to bring three different matters to the Board: an appeal of the notice of removal, an application for revocation of order(s), and an application for return of animals. In doing so, the Appellant specifically chose to not state that she was bringing an appeal of the SOA; and
b. Nowhere in the March 12, 2025 letter does the Appellant describe the grounds of appeal for the SOA. The Board would have to infer that the grounds of appeal for the SOA are the improper removal of the horses, but to do so would run contrary to what the legislature intended under section 38(5) of the PAWS Act when it specified that a notice must set out both the remedy sought and the grounds of appeal.
48The Respondent took no issue with the form of the notice being a letter from the Appellant’s counsel and submitted that the Board’s notice of appeal forms are an administrative rather than a statutory requirement and, therefore, did not need to be completed and filed with the Board by the prescribed period.
B. Statutory interpretation of [section 38(5)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-13/latest/so-2019-c-13.html) of the [PAWS Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-13/latest/so-2019-c-13.html)
49As outlined above, section 38(5) of the PAWS Act reads “A notice to the Board must set out the remedy or action sought and the grounds for the appeal or application”.
50I accept the Respondent’s submission that a notice to the Board must include the two components set out in the legislation: the remedy/action sought and the grounds of appeal/application. I find that the Board does not have jurisdiction to depart from these requirements because the language of section 38(5) of the PAWS Act is clear, unambiguous, and mandatory.
51I disagree, however, with the Respondent’s submission that the Board does not have jurisdiction to allow a party to amend their grounds of appeal in a notice to the Board beyond the prescribed period to commence an appeal under section 38(2) of the PAWS Act, so long as the written notice was received by the Board within the prescribed period.
52Regarding the Kerr decision, I respectfully disagree with the conclusion reached by the Board regarding its jurisdiction for the reasons set out below. I also note that in that case, many of the amendments sought by the appellant related to issues concerning previous appeals before the Board that the parties had settled (see Kerr at paras. 17-18). I am also not bound by the Kerr decision.
53In my view, section 38(2) of the PAWS Act - which requires that a notice be in writing and made within the prescribed period - and section 38(5) of the PAWS Act - which requires that the notice set out the remedy or action sought and the grounds for the appeal or application - are to be read separately for the following reasons.
54The PAWS Act is silent on the question of whether the Board has jurisdiction to allow a party to amend a notice to the Board once the prescribed period has elapsed.
55As a result, I considered the purpose of the PAWS Act and various contextual factors in interpreting section 38(5) of the PAWS Act as it relates to amending a notice of appeal to the Board.
56As set out in section 64 of the Legislation Act, 2006, S.O. 2006, c. 21, Sch. F, “An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects”.
57The PAWS Act sets out the responsibilities of custodians/owners of animals, as well as their right to appeal orders and decisions of the Respondent, subject to the requirements of the PAWS Act and its regulations. The protection of animals is the overarching purpose of the PAWS Act.
58The SPPA and the Common Rules of Practice & Procedure for the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission, Version I (October 2, 2017), as amended (the Rules) also provide context for interpreting section 38(5) of the PAWS Act. I find that the permissive and discretionary language of both the SPPA and the Rules as they relate to processing an appeal support a more flexible interpretation of section 38(5) of the PAWS Act which could, in certain circumstances, permit a party to cure defects and/or amend a notice in writing to the Board, beyond the prescribed time to commence an appeal under section 38(2) of the PAWS Act.
59On the issue of processing the commencement of a proceeding (i.e., an appeal or application), section 4.5 of the SPPA contemplates that a tribunal or its administrative staff may decide not to process the documents relating to the commencement of the proceeding if:
a. the documents are incomplete;
b. the documents are received after the time required for commencing the proceeding has elapsed;
c. the fee required for commencing the proceeding is not paid; or
d. there is some other technical defect in the commencement of the proceeding.
60That section of the SPPA further provides that a tribunal or its administrative staff must have rules respecting their decision to not process documents relating to the commencement of the proceeding. Those rules must set out the grounds upon which the tribunal or its administrative staff may decide not to process the documents relating to the commencement of a proceeding, and the requirements for the processing of the documents to be resumed.
61The Rules contemplate a complete file prior to the Board processing an appeal and set out the criteria for dismissing an appeal without a hearing.
62Rule 3.3 of the Rules provides that the Board may decline to process an appeal unless all the following conditions are met:
a. All required [Board] documents are complete;
b. All required processing fees are paid; and
c. Documents are received before the expiry of the time period required, in accordance with any applicable legislation or the Rules.
63Rule 3.3 of the Rules further provides that “the Board will notify the party who filed the appeal if any of the above requirements are not met and shall give the party such time as the Board determines appropriate in the circumstances to comply with the requirements before declining to process an appeal under this Rule”.
64Rule 3.4 of the Rules permits the Board to dismiss an appeal without a hearing if “[…] c. the statutory requirements for bringing the appeal have not been met”, subject to the notice requirements set out in Rule 3.5 of the Rules.
65In my view, the Respondent’s position encourages the Board to adopt an overly rigid approach that would have the effect of curtailing the remedial nature of the PAWS Act. By contrast, I find that a flexible interpretation and application of section 38(5) of the PAWS Act is appropriate because it promotes the remedial purpose of the legislation.
66In reaching this conclusion, I also considered the audience of section 38(5) of the PAWS Act, that is, appellants and prospective appellants before the Board. In this case, the Appellant was represented by counsel, but it is not uncommon for appellants to be self-represented. I find that the rigid interpretation proposed by the Respondent places too high an onus on appellants to file a notice within a short period of time and without any option to amend the notice to cure any defects.
C. Test for granting an amendment to a notice
67Whether the Board should permit an amendment to a notice depends on the facts of the specific case. The Board’s decision-making in this regard must be grounded in procedural fairness and include an inquiry into:
a. whether the other party/parties would suffer prejudice because of the amendment; and
b. whether granting the amendment would result in undue delay, having regard to the Board’s statutory mandate under section 38(7) of the PAWS Act to deal with matters before it on an expedited basis.
D. Application of section 38(5) of the [PAWS Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-13/latest/so-2019-c-13.html) to the present SOA appeal
68In my view, while it is not entirely clear that the Appellant intended to appeal the SOA based on the content of the March 12, 2025 letter, I nevertheless find that she clearly articulated a remedy in respect of an SOA appeal when she requested under the heading “remedies sought” that the Board, “Nullify all costs imposed on [the Appellant], including those outlined in the Statement of Account served on February 26, 2025”.
69As described above, the Appellant was given multiple opportunities to cure the defect in her notice of appeal by providing the grounds of appeal and failed to do so until the hearing was already underway.
70The first opportunity to cure the defect was on March 20, 2025 when a CMO of the Board permitted the Appellant an extension of four days to submit a completed Board notice of appeal form that contains sections for remedy and grounds of appeal. The Appellant’s counsel completed the form, but relied on the defective March 12, 2025 letter.
71The second opportunity to cure the defect was at the April 11, 2025 case conference. Based on the information in the CCRO, the Appellant did not articulate grounds of appeal at the case conference and was given a deadline of April 15, 2025 to provide clarification to the Board and the Respondent regarding her grounds of appeal.
72The third opportunity to cure the defect was by April 15, 2025, the deadline provided to the Appellant by the Board in the CCRO. Again, the Appellant did not provide any clarification by that date.
73It was not until May 30, 2025, the second day of the scheduled hearing, that the Appellant’s counsel submitted a letter with the proposed grounds of appeal for the SOA appeal, without any explanation for why the Board should accept the amendment at this late stage in the proceeding.
74I find that permitting the amendment would be prejudicial to the Respondent and I decline to do so.
75I also find that permitting the amendment to the notice at this stage of the proceeding would unduly delay the Board’s disposition of these matters which involve sixteen horses that, at the time of the hearing, had already been in the Respondent’s care for more than three months. To do so would involve setting new disclosure and filing deadlines and setting down hearing continuation dates because the Appellant chose not to follow the Board’s various orders in the CCRO.
76Accordingly, even though I find that it is possible for the Board to permit the Appellant to amend her written notice of appeal to set out the grounds of appeal as required by section 38(5) of the PAWS Act, I decline to do so in the circumstances of this case because:
a. it would be prejudicial to the Respondent to grant the amendment at this late stage of the proceeding; and
b. the prejudice cannot be remedied without further delaying the Board’s processes which would be contrary to section 38(7) of the PAWS Act which requires that matters be dealt with on an expedited basis.
77As a result, the Appellant’s SOA appeal under section 38(1) of the PAWS Act is dismissed.
Applications
78For the following reasons, both applications are dismissed.
A. Application for revocation of order
79Section 38(3) of the PAWS Act provides that, “An owner or custodian of an animal who receives an order from an animal welfare inspector may apply to the Board by notice in writing to have the order revoked if the animal has ceased to be in distress”.
80The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s application for revocation does not meet the statutory requirements of the PAWS Act because the grounds of application do not address how the horses have ceased to be in distress.
81It is also the Respondent’s position that it is unclear which order or orders the Appellant is seeking to revoke because the February 5, 2025 order has already been revoked. There were two further orders issued to the Appellant by AWS on February 12, 2025, but the March 12, 2025 letter does not reference them.
82The Respondent argues that an application for revocation of order serves a distinct purpose and differs from an appeal under section 38(1) of the PAWS Act. It is the Respondent’s position that section 38(3) of the PAWS Act should be interpreted as providing an opportunity to an animal owner/custodian to identify to the Board and the Respondent, “how it is that they have fixed the problem” identified in the order issued under the PAWS Act, and that an application is not the appropriate forum for an applicant to disagree with some or all aspects of an order issued under section 30(1) of the PAWS Act.
83In the Respondent’s view, there is nothing in the Appellant’s grounds of application that addresses how she has fixed the problems identified by AWS, nor does she acknowledge that the horses were in distress; rather, the Appellant makes a bald assertion that the conditions of distress have ceased to exist, or were never present, and that the removal of the horses was improper. The Respondent’s position is that those issues should be dealt with by the Board on an appeal of a notice of removal, which, in this case, is not before the Board because it was filed after the prescribed period to do so.
84I find that because the February 5, 2025 order was revoked by the Respondent, and because the Appellant did not identify any other order issued by AWS under section 30(1) of the PAWS Act that she seeks to revoke, the application is now moot and I dismiss it for that reason.
85I make no finding on the Respondent’s submissions regarding its interpretation of the purpose of section 38(3) of the PAWS Act in this case as I do not find it necessary to do so because the application for revocation of order is dismissed due to mootness.
B. Application for return of animals
86Section 38(4) of the PAWS Act provides that, “An owner or custodian of an animal that has been kept in or taken into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care may apply to the Board by notice in writing to have the animal returned if the conditions that caused the animal to be kept in or taken into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care have ceased to exist”.
87The Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s application for return of animals does not meet the statutory requirements of the PAWS Act because the grounds of application do not address how the conditions that caused the horses to be kept in or taken into the Respondent’s care have ceased to exist.
88Notwithstanding the Appellant’s position in her grounds of application that she relocated her horses to a new property on February 10, 2025 to improve the horses’ welfare, the two orders issued by AWS to the Appellant on February 12, 2025 relate to the horses’ shelter, among other issues, at that new location. Those two orders also relate to non-shelter issues, such as the horses’ body condition, feeding plans, and exercise, none of which are addressed in the grounds of application.
89I dismiss the application for return of animals because the grounds of application do not address how the conditions that caused the horses to be kept in or taken into the Respondent’s care have ceased to exist, as required by section 38(4) of the PAWS Act.
C. Collateral attack
90The Respondent further argues that the grounds of application for both applications are a collateral attack on the underlying decisions of AWS to issue order(s) and/or to remove and keep the Appellant’s horses in its care under the PAWS Act.
91The Respondent relied on its arguments that were accepted by the Board in Biswas v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2024 ONACRB 106, at paragraph 18: “The PAWS Act does not permit late appeals to be argued and revived as part of different appeals [or applications] and an attempt to do so is ‘an impermissible collateral attack’. This was established in the Supreme Court of Canada case, R. v. Consolidated Mayburn Mines Ltd., 1998 CanLII 820 (SCC). This case states that a person who has failed to avail themselves of the appeal mechanisms provided by the Act in relation to an instrument, cannot later collaterally attack the validity of that instrument in a different proceeding”.
92I agree with the Respondent’s reasoning regarding why the applications in this case are a collateral attack on the underlying decisions of AWS to issue order(s) and/or to remove and keep the Appellant’s horses in its care under the PAWS Act.
93It is clear from reading the March 12, 2025 letter that the Appellant sought to challenge the underlying orders and decision to remove the horses. Given that the Appellant did not commence an appeal under section 38(1) of the PAWS Act in relation to either the orders issued under section 30(1) of the PAWS Act, or the notice of removal within the prescribed period, it would be inappropriate for the Board to permit the Appellant to now advance arguments on an application regarding the validity of the orders that were issued, or whether the horses were in distress at the time of their removal.
94Finally, I do not find it necessary to determine if the notices of application should be amended because, notwithstanding the outcome in this case, the Appellant may bring new applications under sections 38(3) and/or 38(4) of the PAWS Act for either revocation of order or return of animals at any time.
ORDER
95The Board grants the Respondent’s motion and dismisses the Appellant’s SOA appeal, application for revocation of order, and application for return of animals. Accordingly, the Board’s file for all three matters is closed.
Released: July 25, 2025
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Tassia Poynter, Member