Latonya Griffiths v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Application under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Latonya Griffiths Applicant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent
MOTION DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair
For the Applicant: Latonya Griffiths (Did not Attend)
For the Respondent: Christopher Chew, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services; Erin MacGillivray, Counsel
Heard by Videoconference: June 10, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Latonya Griffiths, the Applicant, is the owner of two dogs, Gucci, a male Yorkshire Terrier type dog, and Hazel, a female miniature poodle (the animals). The animals lived with the Applicant in Kitchener, Ontario.
2On March 5, 2025, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector Brandon Wilson removed the animals pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (the PAWS Act) on the basis that a veterinarian had advised AWS in writing that removal was necessary to relieve the animal’s distress due to suspected injuries.
3On April 22, 2025, The Applicant filed an Application for Return of an Animal (Application) under s. 38(4) of the PAWS Act, on the basis that the conditions that caused the animals to be kept in the Respondent’s care had ceased to exist.
4On May 21, 2025, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI) filed a motion to dismiss the Applicant’s Application on the grounds that the animals had been forfeited to the Crown on April 8, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act and, as a result, the Board no longer had jurisdiction to return the animals to the Applicant because she was no longer the owner.
5The Board scheduled the Respondent’s motion to be heard at the start of the hearing of the Application scheduled for June 10, 2025.
PRELIMINARY ISSUE
The Motion to Dismiss was heard in the Applicant’s absence (the Applicant did not attend the scheduled hearing)
6The hearing was scheduled to start at 9:30 a.m. on June 10, 2025. However, the Applicant was not in attendance.
7The Board’s Case Management Officer (CMO) tried contacting the Applicant by phone and by email. She did not answer her phone, despite repeated attempts by the CMO. Her phone did not have voice mail. The CMO sent an email advising that the hearing had started but the Applicant did not respond.
8On May 23, 2025, the Board emailed both parties the Notice of Hearing (NOH), stating that the hearing was scheduled for June 10, 2025, at 9:30 a.m. The NOH made note that if a party fails to attend the hearing, the Board may proceed in the absence of the party and make a decision without further notice to the party.
9On May 26, 2025, the Board emailed a Notice of Motion Hearing (NOMH) to the parties related to the CAWI’s motion to dismiss filed on May 21, 2025, stating that it would be heard at the start of the merits hearing on June 10, 2025. It also advised that the motion hearing may proceed if a party failed to attend it.
10The Applicant did not submit an adjournment request and did not respond to the CMO’s email messages on June 10, 2025. I was satisfied that the Applicant had received notice of the videoconference hearing and, as a result, I ordered the hearing to proceed at 10:00 am pursuant to s. 7(3) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22 (SPPA). At no time did the Applicant communicate with the Board or the CAWI on the day of the hearing before it concluded.
11I am mindful of the potential prejudice to the Applicant by proceeding in her absence, as she did not have an opportunity to make oral submissions. However, the Applicant attended a case conference on May 8, 2025, and consented to the hearing date. Proceeding with the hearing in a timely matter is an important component of procedural fairness.
12In making my decision to proceed with the hearing in the Applicant’s absence, I based it on the Applicant’s failure to attend the hearing on June 10, 2025, despite two Notices, and her lack of response to the CMO on the day of the scheduled hearing. Furthermore, the Applicant chose not to file documents for the hearing or to file a response to the Respondent’s motion.
ISSUE: MOTION TO DISMISS
13The issue on this motion is whether the Board has jurisdiction to consider the Applicant’s s.38(4) Application, given that the animals were forfeited to the Crown on April 8, 2025.
RESULT
14The Applicant’s Application for the return of her animals is dismissed, as the animals were forfeited to the Crown on April 8, 2025, and the Board has no jurisdiction to grant the requested relief.
ANALYSIS
The CAWI’s Motion to Dismiss or Preliminary Issue of Jurisdiction
15On May 21, 2025, the CAWI filed a motion seeking an Order to dismiss the Applicant’s Application on the ground that the Application is moot as there is no available remedy the Board can grant.
16The basis for the motion was that the animals were forfeited to the Crown on April 8, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act because the Applicant did not:
a) Appeal a Statement of Account (SOA) issued to her on March 17, 2025, within 10 business days; and/or
b) Pay the SOA within the prescribed time period of 15 business days pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act.
17The Board scheduled the CAWI’s motion to be heard at the start of the merits hearing on June 10, 2025. The Applicant was invited to file responding written submissions in advance by June 2, 2025, but she did not do so.
18At the hearing, I heard the CAWI’s motion and granted it orally, with written reasons to follow.
The CAWI’s motion
19The CAWI’s motion materials included an affidavit of Regional Supervisor Christopher Chew, sworn on May 21, 2025, which was not challenged by the Applicant (see paragraph [17]).
20I accept the CAWI’s evidence as set out in the affidavit as follows:
a) Factual background:
i. The Applicant was served with the SOA on March 17, 2025 (certificate of service provided).
ii. The Applicant did not appeal the SOA within the statutory 10-day period, which was March 31, 2025.
iii. The Applicant did not pay the SOA within the statutory 15-day period, which was April 7, 2025.
iv. The dogs were forfeited to the Crown on April 8, 2025.
v. The Applicant appealed the SOA on April 22, 2025, to the Board; the Board administratively dismissed her appeal on April 28, as it was filed beyond the statutory 10-day appeal period.
vi. The Applicant made an application to the Board on April 22, 2025, for the return of her dogs.
b) The Respondent’s submissions regarding statutory forfeiture under the PAWS Act resulting in the dog becoming the property of the Crown include:
i. The Applicant’s animals were forfeited to the Crown on April 8, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act, given that she did not appeal the Statement of Account (SOA) served on her on March 17, 2025, or pay it within the prescribed time periods of 10 business days and fifteen business days, respectively; and
ii. Forfeiture occurs by statutory action and is not subject to any action taken by the Crown or the Respondent to initiate or finalize the forfeiture process. Once an animal has been forfeited to the Crown, it becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals. Section 63(1) of the PAWS Act provides that the Respondent is then authorized by the Crown to “deal with the animals as if the CAWI were the owner.” The Respondent can then transfer ownership of animals or sell the animals to another owner who then assumes responsibility for the care of the animals.
iii. The dispute over the return of the animal disappeared on forfeiture, and the Board has no jurisdiction to order the return of an animal once it has been forfeited.
Conclusion
21I find that the Board no longer has the power to order the return of the animals to the Applicant because the animals are now property of the Crown. The legal implication of forfeiture is stated in the Divisional Court’s decision in Guillaume v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 5782 (para. 9), where the court explains that a person’s legal status as owner changes when the animals are forfeited to the Crown, and that under s. 63(1) of the PAWS Act, the CAWI is authorized to deal with the animals as if the CAWI were the owner.
22In addition, the Ontario Court of Appeal found that once an animal has been forfeited, “it is not possible to make an order unwinding this development” (Windrift Adventures Inc. v. Ontario (Animal Care Review Board, 2024 ONCA 89).
23In a matter where there was no appeal of the removal, or of the later decision of the CAWI to keep the animals, or of the SOA (within the legislated timeframe), and forfeiture occurred as a result of non-payment of a SOA, the Board does not have the power to order the return of the animals to a previous owner. Because the Applicant was not the owner at the time the s.38(4) application was filed, the Board does not have jurisdiction to consider the application.
24The CAWI’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted and consequently, this Board will not address the merits of the application.
ORDER
25The Respondent’s motion to dismiss is granted.
26The Application for the return of the Applicant’s two dogs is dismissed as the Board has no jurisdiction to order the return of the dogs to the Applicant.
Released: July 23, 2025
___________________________
Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair