Edward (Andrew) Crayford-Brown v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 157

Animal Care Review Board

Date: 06/25/2025

Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Edward (Andrew) Crayford-Brown

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

ADJUDICATOR: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair

For the Appellant: Edward (Andrew) Crayford-Brown, Self-Represented

For the Respondent: Carly Atrooshi, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services Jason Kirsh, Counsel

Heard by Videoconference: May 7, 2025

OVERVIEW

1Edward (Andrew) Crayford-Brown, the Appellant, appeals a decision of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI), the Respondent, to keep his dog Rex in the Respondent’s care, to the Animal Care Review Board (Board).

2On March 27, 2025, Rex was removed from the Appellant’s residence by Inspector Alexandra Bray pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019 (PAWS Act). The Notice of Removal issued on that date stated that the removal was because a veterinarian had advised the inspector in writing that removal was necessary to relieve the animal’s distress, which was due to an eye injury.

3On April 2, 2025, the Respondent emailed a “Notice of Decision to Keep Animal(s) in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s Care” (DTK), signed by Regional Supervisor Carly Atrooshi, CAWI Delegate, and dated April 1, 2025, to the Appellant. In the same email the Respondent issued a Statement of Account (SOA), dated April 2, 2025, in the amount of $4,795.24 for veterinary costs for Rex’s treatment.

4The Appellant did not appeal the removal of Rex, or the SOA.

5On April 28, 2025, the Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal of the DTK on the grounds that Rex had been forfeited to the Crown pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act, and as a result the Board had no jurisdiction to return Rex to the Appellant.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

The Respondent’s Pre-hearing Motion to Dismiss the Appeal

6On April 28, 2025, the Respondent filed a motion seeking an Order to dismiss the appeal of the DTK on the ground that the appeal is moot. The basis for this was that Rex had been forfeited to the Crown on April 26, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act because the Appellant did not:

1. Appeal the Statement of Account (SOA) issued to him on April 2, 2025, within the prescribed time period of 10 business days; and/or

2. Pay the SOA within the prescribed time period of 15 business days pursuant to s. 35(4) of the PAWS Act.

7The Board scheduled the Respondent’s motion to be heard on May 7, 2025 at the start of the merits hearing. The Appellant was advised of the motion by the Board in a Notice of Motion emailed to him on May 2, 2025.

The Respondent’s position

8The Respondent’s position is that the motion should be granted because the Board cannot grant the remedy of returning Rex to the Appellant because the Appellant is no longer his owner.

9The Respondent’s written submissions supporting the motion include the following:

1. Factual background, supported by a sworn affidavit of Inspector Alexandra Bray;

2. Submissions regarding statutory forfeiture under the PAWS Act resulting in Rex becoming the property of the Crown:

i. Rex was forfeited to the Crown on April 26, 2025, pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act, given that the Appellant didn’t appeal the Statement of Account (SOA) served on him on April 2, 2025, nor pay it within the prescribed time periods of 10 business days and fifteen business days, respectively.

ii. Forfeiture occurs by statutory action and is not subject to any action taken by the Crown or the CAWI to initiate or finalize the forfeiture process. Once an animal has been forfeited to the Crown, it becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals. Section 63(1) of the PAWS Act provides that the CAWI is then authorized by the Crown to “deal with the animals as if the CAWI were the owner.” The CAWI can then transfer ownership of animals or sell the animals to another owner who then assumes responsibility for the care of the animals.

iii. The dispute over the return of the animal disappeared on forfeiture, and the Board has no jurisdiction to order the return of an animal once it has been forfeited.

3. Case law, including Guillaume v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONSC 5782, to support the Respondent’s position that following forfeiture to the Crown, an animal becomes the property of the Crown, and the previous owner/custodian ceases to have any rights of ownership or possession over the animals (para. 9); and

4. Previous Board dismissals of appeals of removal decisions and keep in care decisions involving forfeited animals and the issue of mootness.

10In response to my question regarding whether the Respondent had considered the test for mootness set out in Borowski v. Canada (Attorney General), 1989 CanLII 123 (SCC), [1989] 1 SCR 342 (“Borowski”), the Respondent submitted the following:

1. An appeal can be dismissed if the dispute is moot.

2. Discretion to hear an appeal can be by considering three factors:

i. Adversarial context;

ii. Judicial economy; and

iii. The Board’s awareness of its proper lawmaking function.

3. There is no adversarial context in this appeal – while the Appellant attended the hearing, he did not provide disclosure to the Respondent, nor file a Book of Documents with the Board, similarly he did not file any witness statements. As a result of this, the Appellant has no evidence to rely upon at the hearing.

4. Judicial economy does not support hearing this matter – case law is clear that there is no remedy when an animal has been forfeited to the Crown. The Board has had a significant increase in workload in recent years, requiring dealing with appeals efficiently and fairly. It advised that the Board should not be spending time dealing with moot appeals.

5. Lawmaking function – dismissal of a moot appeal is in accordance with the Board’s lawmaking function. No further explanation was provided.

11In response to my question regarding the Statement of Account dated April 2, 2025, which reflected in several places that a final Statement of Account was still to be issued, the Respondent advised that there will be no further Statement of Account issued to the Appellant.

12In response to my question regarding whether the Appellant was served the entire SOA by email, including the “back pages” which includes information about forfeiture and appeals, the Respondent submitted that the entire SOA was emailed to the Appellant, and directed me to paragraphs 6 and 8 of Inspector Bray’s sworn affidavit, which confirmed this information.

The Appellant’s position

13The Appellant submitted the following:

1. He was unaware of the Motion, but acknowledged that he may have received the email, but didn’t read everything he received;

2. He did not receive the SOA, but did receive an invoice from the veterinarian who provided services for his dog;

3. He did not appeal the SOA or pay it, but believed that his appeal of the DTK included an appeal of the SOA;

4. He has a learning disability and can’t read; and

5. He would not pay the SOA because he believes his dog was stolen by AWS

14The Appellant maintained that he attended the hearing for his appeal of the DTK and wanted his dog returned to him.

ANALYSIS

15I find that the appeal is moot and dismiss the appeal for the reasons that follow.

16The leading case on mootness is Borowski. As Borowski is binding on me, I will apply it in my analysis. The Supreme Court’s decision in Borowski sets out a two-step analysis used to consider mootness:

1. Is the dispute between the parties’ moot?

2. If so, should the Board exercise its discretion to hear the appeal?

17In Borowski, the Supreme Court of Canada described the doctrine of mootness at p. 353 as follows:

An aspect of a general policy or practice that a court may decline to decide a case which merely raises a hypothetical or abstract question. The general principle applies when the decision of the court will not have the effect of resolving some controversy which affects or may affect the rights of the parties. If the decision of the court will have no practical effect on such rights, the court will decline to decide the case. This essential ingredient must be present not only when the action or proceeding is commenced but at the time when then court is called upon to reach a decision. Accordingly, if, subsequent to the initiation of the action or proceeding, events occur which affect the relationship of the parties so that no present live controversy affects the rights of the parties, the case is said to be moot.

Step 1 – Is the appeal moot?

18I accept the Respondent’s evidence that Rex was forfeited pursuant to s35(4) of the PAWS Act on April 26, 2025, due to the Appellant’s failure to appeal the SOA or pay it within the statutory timelines.

19Furthermore, I accept the Respondent’s evidence that the Appellant received the SOA in its entirety on April 2, 2025, by email. The SOA included his appeal rights and the appeal process. It also provided information that his dog could be forfeited if he did not exercise his rights either to appeal the SOA or to pay it within the prescribed time periods. This information was included in Inspector Bray’s sworn affidavit.

20I note that the Inspector’s affidavit includes an email to the Appellant on April 2, 2025, with both the DTK and SOA (Exhibit C). The Appellant appealed the DTK on April 8, 2025, but did not appeal the SOA.

21The Appellant submitted that he received only the veterinarian’s redacted invoice, but not the SOA. While the invoice was not included in the Inspector’s affidavit, I accept that the Appellant received it based on his description. I do not accept his submission that he did not receive the SOA, preferring the evidence of the Respondent.

22I find that the Appellant should have been aware that he could either appeal the SOA or pay it, and that by doing neither, his dog would be forfeited pursuant to s. 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act because the information was provided to him on the SOA form. It was ultimately the Appellant’s responsibility to read the entirety of each document. Furthermore, in light of the Appellant’s appeal of the DTK, I do not accept that he was not aware of his right of appeal under s.38 of the PAWS Act.

23While the Appellant also submitted that he thought the DTK appeal also included the SOA appeal, it did not. Page 4 of the SOA form is clear in its description that an appeal may be made for any of the following: an Order, a decision to remove an animal, a decision to keep an animal, and/or a SOA. The Notice of Appeal form, available on the Board’s website, is clear in its requirement to provide information about each instrument being appealed (i.e. date issued, date received, method of service, include a copy of instrument).

24The NOA described as a remedy that the Appellant wanted his dog returned immediately, the welfare officer and all the involved people to be properly dealt with for their participation in this incident and the vet fees withdrawn. While he included a copy of the DTK, he did not include a copy of the SOA, or any of the information required on the NOA form. The case conference report and order provides only the Appellant’s grounds for appealing the DTK. There was no indication that he raised grounds for appealing the SOA.

25I acknowledge that the Appellant has indicated that he has a learning disability and can’t read, but that he enlisted the aid of friends in appealing the DTK. He could also have enlisted their aid to appeal the SOA but didn’t. Further, in the case conference on April 16, 2025, the Adjudicator asked the parties if an accommodation was required and in paragraph [11] of the case conference report and order (CCRO) issued on April 22, 2025, indicates that neither party required any accommodations when prompted.

26In conclusion, even though the Appellant did not intend to pay the SOA, he did not exercise his appeal rights either. By statutory provision (s. 35(4)(a)¹ of the PAWS Act), the dog was forfeited on April 26, 2025. I accept the Respondent’s submissions that the Board has no power to return Rex to the Appellant because the dog was forfeited, and he is no longer the owner.

27As the Board has no jurisdiction to return the Appellant’s dog to him, which is the only remedy available in an appeal of a DTK, I find that the appeal is moot.

Step 2 – Should the Board exercise discretion to hear the appeal, even though it is moot?

28While there is no live controversy remaining, the Board may exercise its discretion and hear a moot appeal based on the BorowskI framework.

29Borowski outlines three factors to consider in determining whether to exercise discretion to hear a moot case:

1. The requirement of an adversarial context;

2. The concern for judicial economy; and

3. The need for courts and tribunals to demonstrate a measure of awareness for their proper law-making function.

30For the reasons that follow, I have considered these factors and choose not to exercise my discretion to hear the moot appeal.

Adversarial context

31I disagree with the Respondent that adversarial context disappears because the Appellant failed to file his submissions with the Board. While the live controversy no longer exists as the Board lacks jurisdiction to render a decision to return the animal, an adversarial context may still exist if the Appellant has a direct interest in the remaining issues to be decided as described in the CCRO:

1. Was it necessary to keep Rex in the care of the Respondent to relieve his distress?

2. Did the Respondent have reasonable grounds to believe that Rex may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant?

32Collateral consequences to findings on the issues may still exist. The Respondent issued the SOA on April 2, 2025, and the dog was forfeited on April 26, 2025. Pursuant to s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act, the Appellant is still liable for costs incurred during the interval between these two dates. The outcome of any findings on the issues could have a bearing on the quantum of SOAs yet to be issued.

33However, when I questioned the Respondent if a second SOA would be issued, given that there was mention of one on the SOA issued on April 2, 2025, it confirmed that one would not be issued.

34On this basis, no adversarial context remains. The issues described above (in paragraph [31]) would only have been relevant had there been a possibility of a future SOA issued. On appeal, these questions could have determined the quantum of the SOA. As the Respondent has confirmed that a subsequent SOA will not be issued to the Appellant, an examination of the issues would only be hypothetical and therefore moot.

The Board’s resources

35I agree with the Respondent that it would be an inefficient use of the Board’s resources to hear the appeal, given that it is moot and there is no adversarial context remaining.

The Board’s awareness of its limited role, as an adjudicative body

36The third factor of the mootness framework under Borowski requires the Board to consider its proper law-making function to avoid intruding into the role of the legislative branch by pronouncing judgments in the absence of a dispute affecting the rights of the parties. This factor is especially significant where the matter in dispute requires an abstract interpretation of the legislation. Although I am not convinced that the appeal before me would require me to provide an abstract interpretation of the PAWS Act, given my findings that there is no adversarial context between the parties and that hearing this appeal would not be an efficient use of the Board’s resources, I do not find the third Borowski factor determinative. In my view, the purpose of this factor is to provide a check on adjudicative law making where a decision maker is otherwise inclined to hear a moot matter. In this case, I am not inclined to do so based on my findings regarding the first two Borowski factors. Accordingly, since there is no risk of intruding into the role of the legislative branch, an in-depth analysis of the third Borowski factor is not required.

Conclusion

37I find that the appeal is moot given that the Board lacks jurisdiction to return Rex to the Appellant, as he was forfeited to the Crown. After considering Borowski’s framework, I decline to exercise my discretion to hear the appeal.

ISSUES

38The issues in dispute are:

1. Was it necessary to keep Rex in the care of the Respondent to relieve his distress?

2. Did the Respondent have reasonable grounds to believe that Rex may be placed in distress if returned to the Appellant?

3. Should Rex be returned to the Appellant?

RESULT

39The appeal of the DTK is dismissed because it is moot. The Board has no jurisdiction to return Rex to the Appellant.

ORDER

40The Respondent’s motion to dismiss the appeal is granted.

41The appeal of the DTK is dismissed.

Released: June 25, 2025

_________________________

Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair

Footnotes

1. 1Ontario Regulation 447/19 Ministerial Prescriptions, states in paragraph 1(2) that for the purposes of clause 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act, 15 business days is the prescribed period of time within which the owner or custodian must pay the stated amount (of the SOA) if not appealing the SOA. Section 35(4)(a) of the PAWS Act states that an animal is forfeited to the Crown if the SOA is not paid within the prescribed period after being served the SOA.