Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Brittany (Violi) Ferguson and Warren Sider
Appellants
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
ADJUDICATOR: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair
For the Appellant: Brittany (Violi) Ferguson, Self-Represented; Warren Sider, Self-represented
For the Respondent: Bailey Wintermute, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services; Yun (Alice) Liu, Counsel
Heard by Videoconference: April 30 and May 1, 2025
OVERVIEW
1Brittany (Violi) Ferguson and Warren Sider, the Appellants, appeal an Order to the Animal Care Review Board (the Board). The Order was issued by Animal Welfare Services (AWS) on February 24, 2025, under s. 30(1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act) in relation to 11 dogs (three adult dogs and eight puppies).
2At the time the Order was issued, the Appellants were unhoused and resided in their vehicle, a Grand Jeep Cherokee, with their 11 dogs. While travelling with their 11 dogs, the Appellants’ vehicle broke down in the parking lot of a Tim Hortons (the property). They were stranded in the parking lot for three days waiting for a replacement part for their vehicle.
3On February 24, 2025, AWS received a complaint regarding the Appellants and their dogs at the property. AWS Inspectors Chelsea Der Nederlanden and Alicia Miller attended to conduct an inspection and assess whether the animals were in distress. Inspector Der Nederlanden issued the Order on February 24, 2025, requiring the Appellants to take certain actions to relieve the dogs of distress.
4The Appellants testified that their vehicle was repaired and that they have moved on from the property. In response to the Order, the Appellants testified that they complied with the Order by the compliance deadlines. In short, the situation that the Inspector based her Order on changed within a few days of the Order being issued.
5The Appellants appealed the Order on February 28, 2025, asking that the Board revoke it as the compliance deadlines provided in the Order did not allow enough time for compliance. They requested an extension of time to comply with the Order. They have also asked to have the Minister of the Solicitor General (the Minister) pay them the costs of complying with the Order.
6The Respondent requests that the Order be confirmed, maintaining that the dogs were in distress and the Order was issued to relieve their distress. The Respondent asks that the Board dismiss the request for the Minister to pay the Appellants their expenses to comply with the Order, as the Appellants provided no persuasive evidence to support their request.
7The hearing proceeded before the Board as a videoconference format hearing.
ISSUES
8The issues in dispute are:
Should the Order dated February 24, 2025, be confirmed, revoked, or modified?
Should the Board order that the Minister pay the Appellants the cost of complying with the Order dated February 24, 2025?
RESULT
9For the reasons that follow:
Item 1 of the Order, related to providing space for the animals to move naturally, is revoked.
Item 2 of the Order, related to providing adequate resting and sleeping space for the dogs, is revoked.
Item 3 of the Order, related to feeding, is modified as follows:
i. Provide all dogs with food appropriate to their age and in sufficient quantity based on their weight, following instructions on commercially purchased food or in written veterinarian instructions.
ii. Dogs should each be fed in separate bowls, and fed separately if food aggression is evident.
The date of compliance is extended to one week following the release of this decision.
Item 4 of the Order, related to isolating an aggressive dog, is modified to extend its compliance date to one day following the release of this decision.
Item 5 of the Order, relating to taking the dog Livia to a veterinarian and following the recommended treatment, is modified to extend its compliance date to one week following the release of this decision.
Item 6 of the Order, relating to taking the dog Atlas to a veterinarian and following the recommended treatment, is modified to extend its compliance date to one week following the release of this decision.
The further requirement in Items 5 and 6 of the Order to provide the animal welfare inspector with documentation from the veterinarian, and a statement from the Appellants regarding at home treatments provided in accordance with the Veterinarian’s recommendations, is modified only to add a compliance date of 10 days following the release of this decision; and
The Appellants’ request for an order requiring the Minister to pay all or part of the costs for complying with items 5 and 6 of the Order is dismissed.
PRELIMINARY ISSUES
Motions
10The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (Respondent) brought three motions at the outset of the hearing seeking the following relief:
The Respondent wished to call Senior Investigator Kedra Servos as a witness, even though she wasn’t identified as a witness in the case conference report and order (CCRO) issued on March 21, 2025;
The Respondent asked for a ruling regarding the late disclosure of evidence by the Appellants, filed after the April 4, 2025, deadline described in the CCRO; and
The Respondent objected to the Appellants relying on a number of recordings at the hearing because they were not disclosed to the Respondent or submitted the Board within the timelines ordered in the CCRO.
11After hearing submissions regarding the Respondent calling Senior Investigator Kedra Servos as a witness, I allowed her to be called. The Respondent included the witness’ name in the final witness list filed with the Board on April 11, 2025, as ordered in the CCRO, and her witness statement was included in the Respondent’s Book of Documents. The Appellant, therefore had notice that Senior Investigator Servos would be called as a witness for the hearting and, in fact, did not object to the Respondent’s request. I also found there was no prejudice to the Appellant in having Senior Investigator Servos testify.
12After hearing submissions regarding the Appellants’ late filing of their disclosure, I allowed the documents into the hearing evidence. Disclosure was ordered in the CCRO by April 4, 2025, but was not submitted by the Appellants until April 7, 2025 (62-page document), and April 17, 2025 (129-page document). The hearing started on April 30, 2025, which still gave the Respondent almost two weeks to review the documents. In addition, the Respondent said there was no prejudice as a result of the late disclosure.
13After hearing submissions regarding admitting various recordings, I granted the Respondent’s motion to exclude the recordings from the hearing evidence and did not allow them to be played. The recordings were not filed with the Board and, while the Respondent was aware of the recordings because they were referred to in the Appellant’s disclosure, the Respondent never received the recordings. To allow the recording into the hearing evidence would be prejudicial to the Respondent because it had no time to review the recordings in advance of the hearing and prepare for cross-examination.
The Appellants’ legal surname
14Brittany Ferguson confirmed that “Ferguson” is her legal last name, but that she prefers to be addressed as Brittany Violi.
ANALYSIS
Should the Order dated February 24, 2025, be confirmed, revoked, or modified?
15For the reasons that follow, I modify the Order as a whole. My findings on the individual items in the Order follow.
16Inspector Der Nederlanden issued an Order to the Appellants pursuant to s. 30 of the PAWS Act, requiring the Appellants to do the following:
Provide all dogs with adequate and appropriate space to enable them to move naturally and to exercise.
Provide all dogs with an adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area.
Provide all dogs with an adequate and appropriate quantity and quality of food served in separate feedings to prevent aggression.
Ensure the enclosed structure the dogs are contained to does not contain one or more other animals that may pose a danger.
And, have the animal(s)1 examined by a veterinarian with special attention to:
Livia – low body condition score (BCS), appearance of rib and hip bones and overall health and wellness.
Cane Corso/Bernes Mountain Dog type puppy, approximately 5/6 months old – red mass in corner of left eye and overall health and wellness.
And further,
Provide the animal welfare inspector with documentation from the veterinarian outlining the examination findings (for items 5 and 6), and the treatments recommended and undertaken by the veterinarian, as well as a statement of treatments you have carried out at home according to the veterinarian’s recommendations (e.g. specific medication provided daily).
17A completion date of February 24, 2025, at 4:00 p.m. was ordered for items 1, 2, 3, and 4. Items 5 and 6 were ordered a completion date of March 4, 2025, at 10:00 a.m.
18Section 30(1) of the PAWS Act states:
An animal welfare inspector who has reasonable grounds to believe that an animal is in distress and who is able to promptly find the owner or custodian of the animal may order the owner or custodian to take such action as may, in the opinion of the inspector, be necessary to relieve the animal of its distress, which may include, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, having the animal examined and treated by a veterinarian at the expense of the owner or custodian.
19Distress is defined in s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act as:
The state of being
a) in need of proper care, water, food, or shelter,
b) injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or
c) abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation, or neglect.
20Section 3 of the Ontario Regulation 444/19 (O.Reg. 444/19) provides basic standards of care for all animals, including the following subsections:
Every animal must be provided with adequate and appropriate food and water.
Every animal must be provided with adequate and appropriate medical attention.
Every animal must be provided with an adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area.
(a) Every animal must be provided with adequate and appropriate space to enable the animal to move naturally and to exercise.
(c) If an animal is confined to a pen or other enclosed structure or area, it must not contain one or more other animals that may pose a danger to the animal.
21In Pryde v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONSC 6632, the Divisional Court agreed with the Board’s decision that if the standards of care as set out in the Regulation are not met, then such care is not proper for the purposes of the PAWS Act and, as a result, such improper care amounts to distress (para 52).
22In an appeal of an Order, the Respondent has the initial evidentiary burden to show that the animals were in distress, and that the ordered items were necessary to relieve them of that distress. Once this initial evidentiary burden has been satisfied, then the onus shifts to the Appellants to satisfy me that the Order should be revoked or modified.
Were the dogs in distress? Were the ordered items necessary to relieve them of distress?
Item 1 – were the dogs provided with adequate and appropriate space to move naturally and to exercise? ([s. 3(6)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html)(a) of [O.Reg. 444/19](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html))
23I do not find the dogs were in distress related to providing adequate and appropriate space to move around naturally and to exercise.
24As described in paragraph [21], if the dogs lacked adequate and appropriate space to move naturally and to exercise, they would be found to be in distress. For the reasons below, I do not find that the dogs were in distress, based on my finding that the Respondent provided insufficient evidence to support Item 1 of the Order which was intended to relieve distress.
25As I do not find that the dogs were in distress, I revoke item 1 of the Order.
26While the language of Item 1 in the Order is consistent with s. 3(6)(a) of O.Reg. 444/19, it does not provide the Appellants with clear direction as to what would constitute compliance. For example, the Order could have expanded on what “adequate and appropriate space” was required for the dogs, but it did not.
27Neither party provided any evidence to guide me in my decision on this item. The Respondent provided no metrics or expert opinion on adequate space needed in an enclosed area for a number of dogs of this size and age to stand, to sit, to lie down, to turn around, or to otherwise move naturally and to exercise. The only evidence provided was Inspector Der Nederlanden’s testimony that she did not believe the vehicle provided adequate and appropriate space for the dogs to move naturally and to exercise as required by O.Reg. 444/19.
28Further, Inspector Der Nederlanden’s testified that she had no evidence regarding the inside space or even had a clear view of the dogs on the date of the inspection. Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that she could not see the dogs in the back of the vehicle because the windows were tinted dark, and that the Appellants would not open the doors. She did describe seeing multiple puppies crawling throughout the car, and one large dog in the front seat. She testified that she had never seen the dogs let out for exercise on her visits on February 24 and on February 25, 2025.
29The Appellants testified that they couldn’t provide access to the inside of the vehicle on the date of the inspection because the dogs were reacting to what the Appellants described as the “hostile” environment created by the numerous police officers and AWS Inspectors. This testimony along with Inspector Der Nederlanden’s admission that she did not view the inside of the car or the dogs, supports my finding that the Order was not based on evidence.
30The Appellants testified that staying at the property was temporary and they did not live there. They have numerous rural properties that they use during the day, including one of their own that was involved in a legal ownership dispute, and various ones that Mr. Sider visits as part of his employment. In all of these locations, the Appellants testified that the dogs are allowed to run freely for exercise.
31The Appellants testified that while their car was waiting for repairs, the space in the vehicle was adequate for the dogs to move around naturally. They testified that during this time, the dogs were taken outside to exercise every two hours.
32The Appellants, however, did not provide any documentary evidence to support that the space was adequate for the number of dogs to provide for natural movement in an enclosed space while the dogs were confined. They provided five photographs – one showing a dog sitting in the front seat of a vehicle, and another showing a dog lying in the “cargo” area of a vehicle. The third photo shows two dogs lying down on a bench seat (head-to-head), and the fourth photo shows a dog’s head against a vehicle “moonroof”. The fifth photo shows two puppies snuggled together on a blanket. In all cases the photos were focused on the dogs, and there is no sense of the overall space available.
33The Appellants testified that on being issued the Order, they immediately rehomed a number of their dogs, indicating that they were now in compliance with item 1 of the Order, having created less competition for space within the vehicle.
34The Respondent objected to the Appellants’ attempts to testify regarding the status of their compliance with the Order on the grounds that the matter before me was limited to an appeal of the Order and the basis for issuing it on February 24, 2025. The Respondent submitted that presenting information regarding compliance was useful only where an Application for revoking an order was in place (pursuant to s. 38(3) of the PAWS Act), and that the Appellants had not made such an application.
35I agree with the Respondent that, given the limitations of what is before me, I may not revoke the Order on the basis of compliance resulting in the dogs no longer being in distress. However, my analysis has considered the Appellant’s testimony regarding their efforts to comply with the Order, as they did not appear to dispute what was ordered. Their dispute largely related to the compliance deadlines.
36While I accept the Appellants’ testimony that they rehomed a number of dogs, and now have two adult dogs and one puppy in their vehicle, freeing up space, I still have no evidence regarding what adequate and appropriate space is to allow the dogs to move freely within a vehicle, either at the time to Order was issued, or now with the reduced number of dogs.
37I revoke Item 1 because the Respondent has not met its initial evidentiary burden to prove that the dogs were in distress by defining what constitutes adequate and appropriate space for dogs to move naturally in an enclosed space for an extended period of time, or what appropriate exercise is for dogs of this size and age. The Order lacked specific details of how compliance could be achieved. I make no finding on the compliance deadline.
Item 2 – Were the dogs provided with an adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area? ([s. 3(5)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html) of [O.Reg. 444/19](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html))
38I do not find the dogs were in distress related to the provision of an adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area.
39As described in paragraph [21], if the dogs lacked an adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area, they would be found to be in distress. I do not find that the dogs were in distress, based on my finding that the Respondent provided insufficient evidence to support Item 2 of the Order which was intended to relieve distress.
40As I do not find that the dogs were in distress, I revoke item 2 of the Order.
41While the language of Item 2 in the Order is consistent with s. 3(5) of O.Reg. 444/19, it does not provide the Appellants with clear direction as to what would constitute compliance. For example, the Order could have expanded on what “adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area” was required for the dogs, but it did not.
42Neither party provided any evidence to guide me in my decision on this item. Inspector Der Nederlanden expressed concern that the vehicle did not provide sufficient space for the dogs to rest naturally. She testified that adequate space for the dogs for resting and sleeping requires between 70 cm – 1 m for adult dogs, and 50 cm for the puppies because they were half the size of the adults, and that the space had to be large enough for natural behaviours of the dogs. She provided no supporting evidence for these metrics. Nor did she provide metrics of the available space inside the vehicle.
43The Appellants testified that the dogs sleep as a pack and have sufficient space for this as the vehicle interior is large. While the Appellants provided some photographs (see paragraph [32]), these were focused on the dogs and did not provide any context that the dogs had sufficient space. They provided no other evidence to support their position.
44While the language in the Order is consistent with O.Reg. 444/19, it does not provide clear definition of what an “adequate and appropriate resting and sleeping area” is for three adult dogs and eight puppies. Inspector Der Nederlanden provided no reference for her suggestion on what adequate space should be.
45Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that she couldn’t see into the back of the vehicle because the windows were tinted dark, and that the Appellants wouldn’t open the doors. This is contrary to her earlier evidence that she could see the puppies moving around inside the vehicle. Regardless, the Inspector’s testimony only supports that the Order was not based on evidence.
46The Appellants testified that in response to the Order, they rehomed one adult dog and seven puppies, and now have only two adult dogs and a puppy, saying that they are now in compliance.
47Despite the Appellants’ testimony about the current situation, I have no guidance to determine whether the interior of the Appellant’s vehicle now provides adequate space for the remaining dogs to rest and sleep as I was not provided with any proven metrics or expert opinion from either party.
48I revoke Item 2 because the Respondent has not met its initial evidentiary burden regarding what adequate and appropriate space is for dogs to rest and sleep in an enclosed space for an extended period of time. The Order lacked specific details of how compliance could be achieved. I make no finding on the compliance deadline.
Item 3 – Were the dogs provided with an adequate and appropriate quantity and quality of food served in separate feedings to prevent aggression? ([s. 3(1)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html) of [O.Reg. 444/19](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html))
49I find that the dogs were not provided with an adequate and appropriate quantity and quality of food, and for this reason find that they were in distress.
50I modify item 3 of the Order, making it more specific because Item 3 of the Order lacked clear direction as to what would constitute compliance. I further modify the compliance date for the reasons that follow.
51Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that she had two concerns regarding the food provided to the dogs: first, the puppies were being fed adult food, which was inappropriate nutrition for their age of only six months; and second, that the adult female dog Livia had a low body condition score (BCS), possibly because she had insufficient food due to food aggression. She testified that the Appellants acknowledged that she was “skinny,” having not bounced back after giving birth to the puppies about six months earlier.
52The Inspector acknowledged that she was only able to assess Livia because she could see her sitting in the front seat, and because she was short haired, it was evident that she had a low BCS. The other dogs could not be assessed because they were in the back seat of the vehicle and because they had long hair, obscuring their body condition.
53Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that Mr. Sider told her that he didn’t give the puppies puppy food because it makes the dogs skinny, and that he fed Livia whatever the bag recommended.
54Senior Investigator Servos testified that the Appellants were unable to respond to her questions about how much food each dog was given. She said that generally a puppy requires puppy food until it is 12 months old.
55The Appellants testified that the food given was “Pedigree feed” because they were transitioning the puppies to adult food because they were a large breed dog. They did this because the dogs were not thriving on puppy food. They testified that their veterinarian was not concerned, advising that if the puppies’ weight dropped, they should switch the diet.
56I place greater weight on the evidence of the Respondents regarding the need for puppies to have food created specifically for their dietary needs, and the need for all the dogs to be fed daily amounts related to their age and size While the Appellants said their veterinarian said it was acceptable to move the puppies to adult food, they did not call the veterinarian as a witness.
57Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that feeding the dogs all at once leads to aggression, and that she had verbally recommended taking the dogs out of the car to feed them in turns, and that Mr. Sider had agreed to do that.
58The Appellants testified that the dog’s food was placed in troughs; the large dogs were fed outside, and the puppies were fed inside the vehicle.
59The Appellants testified that Livia’s condition was not due to food aggression but to an infection which was diagnosed when they took her to the veterinarian. They testified that Livia has now been treated, and she is gaining weight.
60While the Appellants said that Livia’s low BCS was related to a diagnosed infection, it is also possible that food aggression was a contributing factor. While the Appellants testified regarding how the dogs were fed, it is my understanding this method was a response to the direction provided by Inspector Der Nederlanden. I also note that the diagnosis (which was not provided as documentary evidence) occurred after the Order was issued, to satisfy Item 5 of the Order.
61For all the reasons set out above, I modify item 3 of the Order, making it more specific and clearer regarding what compliance is required, as follows:
Provide all dogs with food appropriate to their age and in sufficient quantity based on their weight, following instructions on commercially purchased food or in written veterinarian instructions; and
Dogs should each be fed in separate bowls, and fed separately if food aggression is evident.
62The Appellants testified that the compliance deadline of February 24, 2025, at 4:00 p.m. for items 1 through 4 was too short when the Order was issued to them at 12:42 p.m. that day. They submitted that being given three hours to comply was insufficient.
63The Respondent did not make submissions on the necessity of the compliance deadline.
64I agree that the compliance timeline for this item was too short, and more time was needed to comply.
65I find that the compliance date should be extended by one week from the release of this decision, to allow sufficient time for the puppies to be gradually transitioned to a food appropriate to puppies of their age.
Item 4 – Did the vehicle in which the dogs were housed contain animals that could pose a danger to other dogs housed there? ([s. 3(7)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html)(c) of [O.Reg. 444/19](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html))
66I find that the dogs were in distress because Livia exhibited aggressive behaviour and posed a danger to the other dogs.
67For the reasons that follow, I modify the compliance date for item 4 of the Order.
68Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that she had concerns that the dogs were living in the vehicle and fighting. She expressed concern that the fighting presented a danger to the dogs, explaining that she was concerned the fighting could escalate and cause long-term harm. She expressed concern for the puppies, who lived in close proximity to the fighting dogs.
69The Appellants acknowledged the aggression but explained that it was limited to Livia being aggressive towards the two male dogs when they were trying to mate with her. Inspector Der Nederlanden testified that the short compliance deadline was given because of the aggression and that the issues had existed for three days.
70I find that Livia has been known to act aggressively, as confirmed by the Appellants and I agree with Inspector Der Nederlanden’s concern for the puppies’ safety.
71The Appellants submitted that they intended to rehome some of the dogs, but the compliance deadline was too short to do so. Inspector Der Nederlanden orally extended the compliance date to noon on February 25, 2025 (the next day) to give the Appellants more time to rehome the dogs. The Appellants testified that they were able to rehome one of the adult males and 7 of the eight puppies. They testified they intended to keep Livia because she was Ms. Ferguson’s support dog. They testified that they had difficulty rehoming the puppy Atlas because of his eye condition. They did not explain why they still had one of the adult male dogs.
72The Appellants testified that Livia’s aggression only occurs when the male dogs try to mate with her. While there are now fewer dogs to be harmed, Livia still lives in close proximity to another male dog (Hercules) and one puppy (Atlas). The risk of injury still exists.
73I find that isolating Livia is supported by the evidence, because her aggression could harm any male dogs, and any puppies who might be in the way.
74I find that the compliance date should be extended by one day from the release of this decision to allow sufficient time for the Appellants to isolate Livia from adult male dogs. While rehoming is an option, there are other ways that isolation could be accomplished, and I am aware that the Order was issued over 3 months ago.
Items 5 and 6 – Was it necessary to have Livia and Atlas examined by a veterinarian, provide documentation, and follow recommended treatments to relieve distress? ([s. 3(2)](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html) of [O.Reg. 444/19](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/regu/o-reg-444-19/latest/o-reg-444-19.html))
75I find that Livia and Atlas were in distress because they needed medical attention, and it was not being provided to them by the Appellants.
76I find that it was necessary for Livia and Atlas to be examined by a veterinarian to relieve distress, and for the Appellants to comply with the various related requirements in Items 5 and 6 of the Order. However, I modify the compliance date for the reasons that follow.
77The Appellants did not challenge items 5 and 6 of the Order which required them to have Livia and Atlas seen by a veterinarian for their conditions. The Appellants testified that they had held off having Livia seen, to coincide with availability of a veterinarian who worked with the Farley Foundation, which supports low-income families seeking veterinarian care for their pets, and Ms. Ferguson’s Ontario Disability Support Program (ODSP) payments. They testified that they had held off having Atlas seen by a veterinarian, waiting to see if the red mass in his eye resolved with time.
78I find that Livia and Atlas were in distress and required veterinarian attention because their conditions needed medical care, and because the Appellants acknowledged this.
79The compliance deadline for items 5 and 6, to have Livia and Atlas seen by a veterinarian, was March 4, 2025, at 10:00 a.m. This provided the Appellants two weeks to comply with these items.
80The Appellants testified that they had asked to have the Order amended to March 11, 2025, because that is when they were able to secure an appointment, at Heartland Animal Hospital (Heartland). They testified Inspector Der Nederlanden would not amend the compliance date.
81The Appellants further testified that Ms. Ferguson received a monthly ODSP allowance (Ontario Disability Support Program), and that Heartland worked with the Farley Foundation, providing funding assistance for veterinarian bills. Ms. Ferguson submitted that not all veterinarians would participate in the Farley Foundation.
82As a result of the compliance date not being extended, the Appellants testified that they were forced to take their dogs to Fallsview Veterinary Clinic (Fallsview), which was more expensive for them because it did not accept a payment plan. They testified that the veterinarian bill, totalling $541.50 for both dogs, had to be paid out of the monthly ODSP allowance of $1,300.00. The effect of this was that the Appellants had no money left over for food for two weeks. The Appellants testified that they told Inspector Der Nederlanden that this was the reason they were requesting an extension to the compliance deadline. The Respondent disagreed.
83At the hearing, the Appellants testified that Livia and Atlas were seen by a veterinarian on March 4, 2025, and they now complied with Items 5 and 6 of the Order. I accept that the dogs were seen by the veterinarian and were given further instructions and medication based on the information on the invoice from Fallsview that they submitted.
84The Appellants did not provide any evidence to show that they now comply with the other requirements in Items 5 and 6 of the Order, which was to do the following:
Submit documentation to the Inspector outlining the examination findings, the treatments recommended and undertaken by the veterinarians, and
Submit a statement of treatments carried out at home based on the veterinarian’s recommendations.
85I amend the compliance date to fully comply with items 5 and 6, to one week from the date of the release of this decision. My reason for this is that there is nothing in Inspector Der Nederlanden’s testimony to support why she chose the compliance date of March 4, 2025, and nothing to show that either Livia’s BCS or Atlas’ eye condition (cherry eye) required urgent attention. The Appellants were given 2 weeks to comply and asked for a one-week extension because that is when they were able to book a veterinarian appointment. They showed Inspector Der Nederlanden confirmation of the appointment. It seems reasonable to have amended the compliance date.
2) Should the Board order that the Minister pay the Appellants the cost of complying with the Order dated February 24, 2025?
86Section 38(9)4 of the PAWS Act states that the Board can order that the whole or any part of the cost to the owner or custodian of an animal of complying with an order made under s. 30 be paid by the Minister to the owner or custodian.
87The Appellants submitted that the costs for complying with items 5 and 6 of the Order, totalling $541.50 for both dogs, should be paid by the Minister to them. The Respondent took the position that the dogs were in distress, that the Order was to relieve their distress, and that the March 4, 2025, date was reasonable and would have given the Appellants sufficient time to have the dogs seen by a veterinarian.
88For the reasons that follow, I dismiss the Appellant’s request.
89The Appellants’ only submission regarding the basis for this request is that had Inspector Der Nederlanden extended the compliance date to have the dogs seen by a veterinarian, the dogs would have been examined by a veterinarian who participated with the Farley Foundation, and who offered a payment plan. Being required to comply with the ordered compliance date meant that they did not have financial assistance from the Farley Foundation, or the ability to pay using a payment plan which would have reduced the up-front cost.
90While I appreciate the impact on the Appellants of having to pay the veterinary bill at the time service was provided, I did not find the Appellants’ evidence persuasive regarding what the amount of the veterinarian bill might have been had they been given an extension on the compliance date for items 5 and 6 of the Order.
91The total cost on the invoice was $541.50 for both dogs and included examinations for both dogs and medications. No evidence was submitted to show if any of these costs were eligible for subsidy by the Farley Foundation, or if the Appellants were eligible for financial assistance. There was also no evidence provided to show which veterinary clinics participated with the Farley Foundation and/or provided payment plans.
92I agree with the Respondent’s position that the Appellants did not make persuasive arguments for the expenses to be paid by the Minister to the Appellants. The Respondent also drew attention to the Appellants’ evidence that they had contacted a veterinarian in late January 2025 regarding Atlas’ eye and were told that he could be seen in 3-4 weeks as the clinic was fully booked until then, submitting that the Appellants could have had their dogs seen by a veterinarian at their own discretion by late February.
93For these reasons, I dismiss the Appellants’ request for an Order for the Minister to pay the whole or any part of the veterinary costs for complying with items 5 and 6 of the Order, on the basis that they did not provide persuasive arguments to support their request.
ORDER
94Item 1 of the Order, related to providing space for the animals to move naturally and to exercise, is revoked.
95Item 2 of the Order, related to providing adequate resting and sleeping space for the dogs, is revoked.
96Item 3 of the Order, related to feeding, is modified as follows:
i. Provide all dogs with food appropriate to their age and in sufficient quantity based on their weight, following instructions on commercially purchased food or in written veterinarian instructions.
ii. Dogs should each be fed in separate bowls, and fed separately if food aggression is evident.
Compliance is extended to one week following the release of this decision.
97Item 4 of the Order, related to isolating an aggressive dog, is modified to extend its compliance date to one day following the release of this decision.
98Item 5 of the Order, relating to taking the dog Livia to a veterinarian and following the recommended treatment and providing documentation to the Inspector, is modified to extend its compliance date to one week following the release of this decision.
99Item 6 of the Order, relating to taking the dog Atlas to a veterinarian and following the recommended treatment and providing documentation to the Inspector, is modified to extend its compliance date to one week following the release of this decision.
100The Appellants’ request for an order requiring the Minister to pay all or part of their veterinary costs for complying with items 5 and 6 of the Order is dismissed.
Released: June 23, 2025
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Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair