Appeal under s. 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.
Between:
Akeel Wilson
Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector
Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Ziba Heydarian, Vice-Chair
Appearances
For the Appellant: Akeel Wilson, self-represented
For the Respondent: Eloise Jones, Regional Supervisor, Animal Welfare Services
Jessica Holroyd, Counsel
Heard by videoconference: April 30, 2025
OVERVIEW
1The Appellant, Akeel Wilson, is the owner of five miniature pinscher dogs, nine miniature pinscher puppies, one bully dog, and two bully puppies (collectively referred to as the Dogs), which he kept at his property in Mississauga, Ontario (Property).
2Between January 29 and February 26, 2025, the Appellant was held in custody at a correctional facility. On January 31, 2025, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) Inspector Ryan Withrow attended the Property in response to a dispatch call, removed the Dogs, and issued a Notice of Removal (NOR) under s. 31 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019 c. 13 (PAWS Act).
3On February 14, 2025, the Appellant was served with a Statement of Account (SOA) for veterinary care of the Dogs, under s. 35 of the PAWS Act, in the amount of $2,946.85. The Appellant has paid this SOA to AWS.
4On February 28, 2025, the Appellant was served with a second Statement of Account in the amount of $7,085.00, for boarding costs for the Dogs between January 31, 2025, to February 13, 2025.
5On March 4, 2025, the Appellant appealed the second, SOA to the Board based on financial hardship as he is under house arrest and cannot work.
THE ISSUES
6The issues in dispute in this matter are:
Do the charges included in the SOA dated February 28, 2025, in the amount of $7,085.00 reflect the actual costs of necessaries provided, and were these costs reasonable?
Should the SOA be confirmed, revoked, or modified?
RESULT
7For the reasons that follow:
I find that the charges on the SOA were reasonable and necessary.
I exercise my discretion under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act to vary the SOA based on the Appellant’s financial circumstances and limited ability to pay. I order the Appellant to pay $3,542.55 to the Minister of Finance.
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Issue 1: Did the charges on the SOA reflect the actual costs of necessaries provided and were they reasonable?
8Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act states that the Respondent, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (CAWI), may serve an animal owner or custodian with a statement of account respecting costs incurred to relieve distress and provide necessaries.
9Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act provides a list of costs that may be recovered including costs incurred to relieve the animal’s distress, remove and take the animal into care, provide care under a Decision to Keep (DTK), and costs to take any prescribed action in relation to the animal.
10The Respondent has the initial evidentiary burden to show that the SOA reflects costs that were reasonable and necessary.
11The Respondent called evidence from Inspector Ryan Withrow, who was the lead AWS inspector dealing with the removal and care of the Dogs.
12Inspector Withrow provided testimony regarding the basis for removal, stating that the Dogs required care after the Appellant was incarcerated on or around January 29, 2025. On January 30, 2025, Inspector Withrow contacted Regional Supervisor Eloise Jones and received approval for a critical distress entry of the Property. Upon entry, he found 17 dogs that appeared relatively healthy in multiple crates, but that were alone.
13Inspector Withrow further testified that after consulting with Regional Supervisor Jones, they decided it would be best to remove the Dogs the next day. The following morning, he travelled to the correctional facility where the Appellant was detained to obtain consent from the Appellant to remove his Dogs to relieve their distress as nobody was present to care for them.
14On January 31, 2025, after obtaining consent, Inspector Withrow attended the Property again and removed all 17 Dogs. They were initially taken to Oakpark Pet Hospital for examination, and later they were transferred to Oakville/Milton Humane Society for boarding.
15Inspector Withrow testified that on February 14, 2025, he served the first statement of account on the Appellant at the correctional facility. This related to the costs of initial assessment at Oakpark Pet Hospital for $2,946.85. He confirmed that the Dogs were returned to the Appellant on March 5, 2025, following inspection of the Property and payment of the first SOA as the Appellant was released from custody on February 26, 2025.
16Inspector Withrow further testified that on February 28, 2025, he served the second SOA to cover boarding fees between January 31 and February 13, 2025. Inspector Withrow stated that the invoices included in the second SOA showed two different rates for boarding, as there were several puppies born in care that were charged boarding at $20 per day, and the adult dogs that were removed were charged boarding at $45 per day. He testified that he was not involved in choosing the boarding facility, but the place chosen allowed for proper care for both the adult dogs and puppies.
17The Appellant did not challenge any of the boarding costs charged by the Oakville/Milton Humane Society. He expressed gratitude for the care his Dogs received and understood this was necessary while he was not present, but that it was just a matter of financial hardship.
18The Appellant confirmed that he was in custody between January 29 and February 26, 2025. He stated that he was grateful to AWS for caring for his Dogs while he was incarcerated and did not take issue with the reasonableness of the boarding fees, but he did state that the animals could have been returned sooner to a friend or family member of his.
19While I accept the Appellant’s testimony that he may have been able to find someone to care for his dogs, in closing submissions, he stated that he could have found someone if he had access to a phone while incarcerated, which he didn't. Therefore, I am not compelled by his argument that the animals could or should have been returned sooner without any substantiating evidence to prove this.
20Furthermore, the Appellant stated in his testimony that he was released from the correctional facility on February 26, 2025, and given that the Dogs were returned on March 5, 2025, this is only 5 business days after he returned home. Keeping in mind that AWS had to inspect the Property to ensure the animals would not be returned to a situation of distress, I find that 5 days is a reasonable amount of time to allow for an inspection and return of the Dogs.
21The Appellant also argued that he paid the first statement of account to get his Dogs home, but he disputed many of the charges including the cost of vaccinations because his animals were all healthy and up to date with their shots. He provided health records in support of this, and I accept his statements about the Dogs’ being healthy overall given that Inspector Withrow agreed in his testimony. However, I find that the Appellant cannot use an argument about the necessity of vaccines pertaining to the first SOA to dispute the second SOA, as this later SOA was for boarding fees only and did not include any veterinary care or vaccination costs.
22Based on the Respondent’s evidence, I find that the boarding fees charged of $20 daily for the puppies and $45 daily for the adult dogs were reasonable. Also, there was only one invoice included in the SOA for boarding costs between January 31 to February 13, 2025, which was in line with the Appellant’s testimony regarding the dates he was incarcerated at the correctional facility.
23Based on the evidence provided, I am persuaded that the care provided by AWS and the boarding fees charged under the second SOA were both reasonable and necessary in the circumstances.
Issue 2: Should the SOA be confirmed, revoked, or varied?
24Having found that the Respondent met the initial evidentiary burden, the overall onus then shifts to the Appellant to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA should be revoked or varied.
25The Appellant sought to have the SOA reduced based on inability to pay, and he testified about his financial circumstances following release from the correctional facility. He stated that he was also under house arrest since March 2024, had to wear an ankle bracelet, and due to his charges, he was unable to secure employment or earn any additional income.
26The Appellant testified that his only source of income was from social assistance, which varied between approximately $650-700 weekly, and that after his monthly expenses, including rent of $2,020, food, and contributions towards his children and Dogs’ care, this would leave him with almost nothing left at the end of each month. He also provided evidence by way of text messages to show that he owed his landlord over $6,000 in arrears given the difficult financial situation he was facing.
27The Respondent submitted that there was no supporting documentation for the Appellant’s financial situation, such as tax documents, and the Board should therefore decline to vary the SOA.
28Respectfully, I do not accept this submission. Although the Appellant did not submit supporting documentation in terms of Notices of Assessment for previous years, he did show his bank statement as well as proof of the debt owed to his landlord.
29I found the Appellant’s testimony as to his limited financial means to be reliable and accepted his argument that the circumstances of being under house arrest made it difficult for him to earn additional income and pay the full SOA. The expenses he reported were reasonable and expected in the circumstances and included things such as groceries, rent, childcare costs, and supplies to care for his Dogs.
30Notwithstanding the Appellant’s evidence that he would have very little income left over every month after paying his expenses, I find that there is still some ability to pay for the care of his Dogs. Therefore, I decline to revoke the SOA and instead reduce it by 50 percent to balance the need for the Respondent to recover some of the costs incurred in the SOA, while also taking into account the financial difficulties faced by the Appellant.
31During submissions, the Appellant requested to pay the SOA with a payment plan. The Board does not have the authority to order a payment plan, but the Appellant can discuss repayment options with the Respondent directly.
ORDER
32Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the Act, I vary SOA #2, dated February 28, 2025, and order that the costs of $3,542.55 be paid to the Minister of Finance.
Released: June 17, 2025
_________________________
Ziba Heydarian, Vice Chair