Tribunals Ontario

Animal Care Review Board

TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2025-05-23

Appeals under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Joshua LaPointe Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Joshua LaPointe, self-represented

For the Respondent: Jason Tam, Counsel

Hybrid hearing held: January 7, 10, 30, February 18, March 13, 2025; last submissions received March 24, 2025

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, Joshua LaPointe, is the owner of 35 dogs that were removed from his residence and kept in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care. These appeals relate to one of those dogs, Patch.

2In November 2024, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) removed Patch from the appellant’s residence over concerns about a bulging eye that inspectors believed had worsened since their last visit in October 2024. A veterinarian was consulted, and he advised that removal was necessary to relieve the dog’s distress.

3Later that month, the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (respondent) decided to keep the dog in care, noting that it had reasonable grounds to believe the dog may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant. The respondent cited concerns about the appellant’s history of non-compliance with orders, unsanitary living conditions, and a failure to meet other standards of care.

4The appellant appeals the removal and the decision to keep the dog in care to the Animal Care Review Board (Board). His position on these appeals can be reduced to three arguments: a) the dog was not in distress and his condition was a congenital defect and not the result of improper care; b) the dog’s removal was premature, and the appellant should have been afforded an opportunity to take the dog to the veterinarian himself; and c) because the dog was removed under “false pretenses,” the subsequent decision to keep him in care was also invalid.

5The matters proceeded to a hearing. On consent of the parties, the appeals were heard at the same time pursuant to s. 9.1(1)(b) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22.

ISSUES

6Notice of Removal (ACRB File No. 16430):

1. Was Patch in distress at the time of his removal? If so, was it necessary for AWS to remove Patch to alleviate his distress?

7Decision to Keep (ACRB File No. 16507):

1. Did the respondent have reasonable grounds to believe Patch may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant?
2. Should Patch be returned to the appellant?

RESULT

8For the reasons that follow, I find that the dog was in distress, given his eye condition, and removal was necessary to relieve him of his distress. I also find that the subsequent decision to keep the dog in care was justified, as it was reasonable for the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector to conclude that the dog may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant.

9Pursuant to its powers in s. 38(9)2 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act), the Board dismisses both appeals and declines to order the return of the dog to the appellant.

PROCEDURAL MATTERS

Technology issues

10The hearing was to proceed via videoconference, with a preliminary motion scheduled on January 6, 2025. The videoconference hearing on the merits started on January 7. When it resumed for its second day on January 10, the appellant did not have a working camera and asked to participate by audio only.

11After attempts to resolve the issue were unsuccessful, and in an effort to move the hearing forward without delay, I permitted the appellant to participate by audio only. I considered that this issue arose after the completion of the appellant’s case and that the appellant had already testified and been cross-examined via videoconference. Nevertheless, I instructed the appellant to resolve the technical issue before the next hearing date and invited him to contact the Board if he needed further assistance. The appellant did not seek assistance from the Board nor ask to attend at a public access terminal, and he did not have a working camera for the remainder of the hearing.

Videoconference proceeding converted to a hybrid hearing

12At the resumption of the hearing on January 30, 2025, the appellant advised that his computer had crashed, he was being hacked, and his documents were being deleted or compromised. The appellant would not respond to my offers for assistance with Zoom technology and repeatedly spoke over me. I had to place the appellant on mute several times to be able to hear submissions and give directions.

13It became apparent that the appellant was not able to comply with the Board’s directions about avoiding interruptions and allowing myself and the respondent’s counsel to speak. The appellant was not responsive to the questions I asked. At times he was also unable to unmute. As a result of this, and because he continued to participate by audio only, it became difficult to determine if the appellant remained on the line or was attempting to speak. Given these difficulties and my concerns over whether the appellant could meaningfully participate in the hearing, I determined that it was in the best interests of this proceeding to adjourn the hearing and reconvene on a different date.

14The difficulties continued when the hearing reconvened on February 18, 2025. Despite several directions from the Board about the need to avoid interruptions during witness testimony and reassurances that the appellant would have the opportunity to cross-examine the respondent’s witness, the appellant continuously spoke over me, the testifying witness, and counsel for the respondent. The Board took a recess, but the appellant did not rejoin at the scheduled return time, later citing technical difficulties in an email sent to the Board after the hearing was adjourned.

15In light of the appellant exiting or being unable to continue with the videoconference hearing and concerns about ongoing disruptive behaviour, I converted the proceeding to a hybrid hearing to avoid delay. I ordered the respondent to submit the evidence of its remaining two witnesses via affidavit and scheduled a half-day hearing for cross-examination and any reply evidence by the appellant, which were completed on March 13, 2025. I then set filing deadlines for written closing submissions. The appellant did not file any closing submissions.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

Notice of Removal: Was Patch in distress at the time of his removal? If so, was it necessary for AWS to remove Patch to alleviate his distress?

16For the reasons set out below, I accepted the respondent’s evidence and find that Patch was in distress at the time of his removal given his eye condition. The appellant’s insistence that the condition was a congenital defect and his refusal to have the dog examined sooner than his next scheduled appointment, which was for November 7, 2024, supported a conclusion that removal was warranted to alleviate the dog’s distress and enable him to be seen by a veterinarian without delay.

Definition of distress and removal powers under the [PAWS Act](https://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2019-c-13/latest/so-2019-c-13.html)

17An inspector has the authority to remove an animal and issue a Notice of Removal under s. 31 of the PAWS Act for the purpose of relieving an animal’s distress.

18Distress is defined in s. 1(1) of the PAWS Act as the state of being:

a. in need of proper care, water, food or shelter,

b. injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or

c. abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.

The respondent’s evidence

19Four witnesses testified for the respondent regarding the events that led up to the dog’s removal, their observations of the dog’s condition, and the clinical findings after the dog’s removal.

The inspectors’ evidence

20Inspector Christina Haaima testified that she first attended the appellant’s property in August 2024 after receiving a complaint about the conditions inside the residence. She made multiple unsuccessful attempts to schedule an inspection with the appellant and eventually executed a warrant and entered the property on October 10, 2024.

21Following the October 10 inspection, Inspector Haaima issued an Order pursuant to section 30(1) of the PAWS Act requiring, among other things, that the appellant have four to six Boston Terrier-type dogs examined by a veterinarian for protruding eyes. Patch was one of those dogs. A photograph of a dog identified by the inspector to be Patch, taken during the inspection, showed a black and white Boston Terrier dog inside a kennel with a bulging right eye.

22While not critical in nature, Inspector Haaima believed the ocular issue needed to be addressed and she set a compliance deadline of October 22, 2024 for the veterinary examination. The Order also set out other requirements related to the environment and access to clean water.

23In email correspondence with Inspector Haaima on October 16, the appellant indicated that he had scheduled two veterinary appointments on November 7 and 19 and requested an extension of the October 22 compliance date. Inspector Haaima granted this extension by way of a Revocation and Replacement of an Order, issued October 17, and set a new deadline of November 28 for the veterinary orders related to the same group of dogs. The compliance date for one of the environmental orders remained unchanged and so a compliance check for that item was ultimately scheduled for November 4.

24Inspector Haaima testified that during the November 4 re-inspection, she noticed that Patch’s eye looked worse than it did on her last visit on October 10. She described the eye as three quarters of the way out of its socket, ruptured, crusted over and scabbed, with red conjunctiva.

25Inspector Haaima told the appellant that the dog needed urgent medical care and that waiting until the November 7 appointment would not be appropriate because the condition was likely very painful. She testified that she then contacted AWS Regional Veterinarian Dr. Bruce Robertson to ask for an assessment. She gave Dr. Robertson a video and photograph of Patch’s eye and told him what she’d observed. Having reviewed that information, Dr. Robertson issued a certificate that same day advising that removal of the dog was necessary to alleviate his distress.

26Inspector Haaima testified that following her phone call with Dr. Robertson, police had arrived at the residence and the appellant denied the inspectors re-entry. She returned with a warrant the next day and observed Patch to be in the same condition. Senior Investigator Joshua Matson testified that he made similar observations with respect to Patch’s eye on November 5. A photograph and video taken by AWS inspectors that day corroborated the inspectors’ observations that Patch’s right eye was bulging significantly.

27On November 5, Inspector Haaima removed the dog and issued a Notice of Removal under s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act, which permits an animal welfare inspector to remove an animal if a veterinarian has advised them in writing that relieving the animal’s distress necessitates their removal.

The veterinarians’ evidence

28Dr. Robertson was qualified as an expert in veterinary medicine and testified about why he issued a certificate advising removal. He said he compared photographs of Patch from October 10 and November 4 and believed his condition had worsened. He was concerned about the dog being unable to blink, which left his eye at risk of drying out and ulcerating. He suspected an injury, a mass behind the eyeball or fluid pressure, and believed the dog needed same-day veterinary care to prevent further damage and relieve discomfort.

29Dr. Geoffrey Hart was the veterinarian who examined Patch on November 5, the day he was removed. He was qualified as an expert in veterinary medicine and provided his opinion regarding the condition of the dog. He noted the following with respect to the dog’s right eye:

a. The architecture of the eye was completely obliterated and internal structures were not visible.

b. The dog had no vision in the eye and a large, thick crust had formed on its surface, indicative of a long-term and chronic condition.

c. After some testing and pain medication, the eye was surgically removed on November 8 because it would never heal and would be a constant source of discomfort and infection. Bloodwork revealed elevated inflammatory proteins and white blood cells, likely from the condition of the eye.

30With respect to the left eye, Dr. Hart said it had corneal scarring and inflammation. As of November 18, the inflammation was still present, causing the eye to have a cloudy appearance. The eye had not responded to treatment and may also need to be removed in the future.

The appellant’s evidence

31The appellant gave general evidence about the dog’s health and about his interactions with AWS inspectors in October and November 2024.

32The appellant testified that Patch ate and drank normally and was not in pain. He was not hiding or isolating nor was he pawing at his eye. There was no change in the dog to indicate he had been injured. With respect to the eye condition, the appellant testified that Patch was born like that.

33The appellant gave evidence about his conversation with Inspector Haaima on November 4. He said Inspector Haaima advised him that the dog looked worse and he told her that he did not notice a difference but that he would book a veterinary appointment as a precaution. The appellant testified that he did not refuse to take the dog to a veterinarian, but that the earliest appointment was on November 7. He also said he did not withdraw consent for the inspectors to be in his home on November 4 and that they “left of their own free will.”

34The appellant’s father testified about the appellant’s care of the dogs and his own observations of Patch. He said generally the appellant took good care of the dogs and the only thing he could see being a problem was the number of dogs on the property and some environmental issues. Regarding Patch’s eye, he said Patch had eye issues since he was born and clarified that this was the case for a couple of years.

Finding of distress and necessity of removing Patch to alleviate distress

Unrefuted evidence of an injured or unhealthy eye

35On an appeal of a Notice of Removal issued under s. 31, the burden of proof is on the appellant to prove that the animal was not in distress and/or that removal was not necessary to alleviate the animal’s distress.

36I was not persuaded by the appellant’s evidence that the dog was healthy and that there was no basis for a finding of distress. On the issue of the dog’s condition, I found the evidence of the respondent’s witnesses more persuasive because it was supported by photographs and videos clearly showing the dog’s eye bulging out of its socket, reddened and with brown scabbing on top. The inspectors’ evidence was also corroborated by Dr. Hart’s findings when he examined Patch the day he was removed, and by the fact that eye removal surgery followed shortly thereafter.

37The fact that the eye removal surgery did not occur until a few days after the dog was removed did not prove that the issue was not time-sensitive, as the appellant suggested. On this issue, I accepted Dr. Hart’s explanation that the reason the surgery did not occur immediately was because the dog was undergoing tests to ensure he was safe for surgery. He received antibiotics and pain medication while waiting for the procedure.

38Finally, there was no evidence to support the appellant’s bald assertion that the dog’s injury occurred while in AWS’ care. This argument was not supported by any evidence and contradicted Dr. Hart’s evidence that what he noticed on November 5 was the result of a long-standing condition that had gone untreated.

Dog’s behaviour did not prove lack of distress

39The appellant testified that the dog was behaving normally, and this suggested that he was in good health. Even if I were to accept the appellant’s evidence that the dog was behaving normally, that observation is not at odds with Dr. Hart’s evidence that if the eye condition was caused by an injury, the most painful part for the dog would have been when the injury first happened. In addition, Dr. Hart testified that the condition was painful but noted that over time the dog may have been downregulating the pain response and may not have exhibited signs of pain. When considered in light of all of the other evidence, the argument that the dog was not acting hurt did not persuade me that the dog was not in distress.

Congenital defect not the cause of a bulging eye

40The appellant stated that the dog had a congenital defect and that the breed is genetically predisposed to eye conditions. While there was some evidence that Patch’s condition was chronic and long-standing, I relied on Dr. Hart’s unchallenged expert opinion that a genetic eye disorder does not cause the eye to come out of its socket and would not have been the reason for what happened to the dog’s right eye. Although I accept the appellant’s evidence that this dog breed is predisposed to eye conditions, as confirmed by Dr. Robertson and Dr. Hart, it does not explain the severity of the condition in the right eye or prove that the dog was not in distress.

41There was also evidence from the appellant’s father that the appellant administered eye drops to the dogs from time to time. The appellant did not provide any reliable evidence to explain what these eye drops were and why they were an effective remedy, and I was persuaded by Dr. Hart’s testimony that topical remedies would have been inappropriate and ineffective treatment for a proptosed eye.

The veterinarian’s certificate was valid and supported removal

42The extent of Dr. Robertson’s involvement in reviewing the dog’s condition and issuing a certificate advising removal was a live issue in this hearing.

43While the appellant often had difficulty distinguishing between evidence and argument in his examination in chief and did not file any closing submissions, I will briefly address some comments made by the appellant throughout the hearing as it related to his challenge of the removal and Dr. Robertson’s involvement.

44The appellant stated repeatedly that the respondent did not have a legal basis to remove the dog because it did not have a veterinarian on-site to diagnose the dog, determine distress and authorize removal. I was not persuaded by this argument. The appellant made vague references to a law requiring a veterinarian to be on-site but did not cite any provisions to show that this is a requirement. Nor does the language in section 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act, which authorizes an animal’s removal based on a veterinarian’s advice, require an in-person veterinary assessment.

45I find it appropriate that Dr. Robertson relied on the inspector’s observations of the dog’s condition as well as photographs and video of the dog when forming his opinion that the dog was in distress and needed to be evaluated immediately. I also accept the respondent’s submission that Dr. Robertson did not diagnose or offer treatment options; instead, he issued a veterinary certificate so that the animal could be examined by a veterinarian who would then make a diagnosis and formulate a treatment plan.

46I therefore find that the removal was authorized under s. 31(1)(a) of the PAWS Act and that the veterinarian’s certificate was valid. Dr. Robertson’s evidence that eye issues can deteriorate quickly and that there was risk of further damage because Patch could not blink persuaded me that Patch was in need of proper care, was injured, in pain or suffering. Therefore, his condition met the definition of distress and required removal to alleviate that distress.

Removal was not premature

47The appellant argued that the removal was premature because he scheduled a veterinary appointment for November 7 and should have been given the opportunity to take the dog to the veterinarian.

48I did not find this argument persuasive for two reasons. First, the evidence about the dog’s condition pointed to the need for immediate evaluation and Dr. Robertson testified that he would have issued the veterinary certificate even with the knowledge of an upcoming appointment. Secondly, the appellant’s evidence on his efforts to schedule a veterinary appointment in response to Inspector Haaima’s concerns on November 4 was unreliable, as outlined below.

49The decision to remove the dog was made in the context of a conversation between Inspector Haaima and the appellant on November 4. According to Inspector Haaima, the appellant denied that the dog’s condition had worsened or that it was painful and continued to state to the inspector that the dog was born with that condition. Her evidence was that she would have removed the dog that same day, but the appellant revoked consent for the inspectors to re-enter the property and they had to return with a warrant the next day.

50The appellant’s evidence about this conversation with Inspector Haaima was that he told her he would book an appointment for Patch as a precaution and that the AWS team left his home “of their own free will.” On cross-examination, he said he did book the appointment, but the earliest availability was November 7.

51I find that this evidence was an attempt on the part of the appellant to recast his actions on November 4 to make the removal appear arbitrary and premature. In reaching this conclusion, I considered the following factors:

1. The appellant made contradictory statements about the efforts he made to address Inspector Haaima’s concerns about the dog’s worsening condition. He testified that he scheduled the November 7 appointment after speaking with Inspector Haaima on November 4.

2. However, in cross-examination, the appellant was shown the emails he sent to Inspector Haaima on October 16 where he asked for an extension of the compliance date for the veterinary order. His emails indicated that he had booked veterinary appointments on two dates, including November 7, and that that was the reason he was seeking the extension.

3. When shown these emails, the appellant suggested without proof that the emails were fake or contained typos. The appellant also stated that a possible explanation for these October emails was that he had scheduled that appointment for another dog, Lincoln. However, Lincoln had already been removed from his care on October 10, before those emails were sent.

4. The emails clearly show that the appellant had booked the November 7 appointment not in response to Inspector Haaima’s concerns about Patch’s worsening eye condition, but rather in response to her October order that he seek veterinary care for his dogs.

52I therefore rejected the appellant’s version of events and accepted Inspector Haaima’s evidence that the appellant continued to deny there was anything wrong with the dog and that she would have removed the dog on November 4 pursuant to the veterinarian’s certificate had the appellant not revoked consent for her to re-enter the property.

53Finally, regardless of how the November 7 appointment came to be scheduled, there is little merit to the appellant’s argument that removal was inappropriate because he should have had the opportunity to take the dog to the veterinarian himself. The appellant did have an opportunity to take the dog to urgent care during the time the inspectors left his home on November 4 and their return on November 5, but did not do so.

54For all of the reasons set out above, I find that Patch was in distress and removal was required to alleviate his distress.

Decision to Keep the Dog in Care: Did the respondent have reasonable grounds to believe Patch may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant?

55The appellant stated that he provides proper care for his dogs and that he complied with AWS’ orders. He also stated that because the removal of the dog was illegal, the decision to keep him in care was also invalid because it flowed from an illegal act. The appellant sought the return of his dog.

56The respondent submitted that there were reasonable grounds to keep Patch in care and that the appellant had not provided any credible evidence that Patch could be returned to his care without placing him back in distress.

57The respondent also submitted that if the Board overturns the decision to keep, it should nevertheless be convinced that Patch would be placed back into a state of distress if returned to the appellant based on his history of non-compliance, the unsanitary conditions from the last inspection on November 26, and the veterinary findings about the remaining dogs, which were also removed from the appellant’s care in late November.

58For the reasons set out below, I find that based on the information available to the respondent at the time, the respondent had reasonable grounds to believe Patch may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant and I uphold the decision to keep the dog in care.

The respondent’s evidence

59Senior Manager Micheal Lycett issued the decision to keep the dog in care on November 20, 2024 in his previous capacity as Regional Supervisor, under s. 31(6) of the PAWS Act. In Appendix B of that decision, he stated that he had reasonable grounds to believe that the appellant was either unwilling or unable to provide proper care and to keep Patch out of distress. He listed the following reasons for reaching that conclusion:

a. Based on the inspector’s follow-up visits on November 4 and 5, there are poor sanitary conditions and the premises do not meet the basic requirements of the standards of care.

b. Multiple animals were observed to be in distress.

c. The appellant continues to state there is nothing wrong with the care he is providing and the conditions are unlikely to change.

60Both Inspector Haaima and Regional Supervisor Matson testified about the condition of the home during their visits in October and November 2024. They recalled a strong smell of ammonia and soiled floors and bedding. Photographs taken during those inspections showed extremely unsanitary living conditions. On November 13, 2024, Inspector Haaima also issued a Notice of Non-Compliance with Orders (Notice) to the appellant, which formed part of the records Senior Manager Lycett reviewed in issuing the decision to keep the dog in care.

The appellant’s evidence

61The appellant denied that the conditions in his home were unsanitary and stated that he had complied with everything set out in the inspector’s Order. He said he purchased enrichment toys for the dogs and installed vents to improve air quality.

62The appellant’s father stated that as far as he knew, the appellant had complied with the orders. However, in cross-examination, he stated he did not know exactly what the orders were and what his son had to do. He also testified that he had accompanied his son to the veterinarian a few times and had seen his son cleaning floors and working on improving air circulation in the home.

Likely that Patch would be placed back in distress if returned to the appellant

63I find that Senior Manager Lycett had reasonable grounds to believe the dog may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant, based on the information he had available to him at the time, which included the inspectors’ duty notes, photographs and videos taken during the inspections, and some medical records.

64The appellant’s comments that there was nothing wrong with the care he was providing or with the health of the dog, along with the medical records showing a chronic and untreated condition in Patch’s right eye, supported a conclusion that the appellant was unable or unwilling to provide proper care and may be unable to recognize the dog’s future medical needs. In cross-examination, when asked whether he had ever taken Patch to a veterinarian, the appellant stated that Patch has never needed to go and has never been in distress. The appellant’s response shows a misguided approach to caring for his dog and supports a conclusion that the appellant is unable or unwilling to seek care and was unable to understand the severity of the dog’s condition.

65In terms of the environment, while there was some evidence from the inspectors that air quality in the home had improved on November 4, ammonia levels were still high and had gotten worse by the time they returned on November 5. The appellant’s father confirmed that the installation of ventilation fans was a work in progress and poor ventilation had been an ongoing issue. The appellant provided no supporting evidence to show whether the current state of the home would meet the basic standards of care such that the dog would not be placed in distress if returned to him.

66For the reasons set out above, I find that that respondent had reasonable grounds to believe that Patch may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant, and I uphold the decision to keep the dog in care on that basis.

ORDER

67I dismiss the appeals of the Notice of Removal and the Decision to Keep Patch in Care and decline to order the return of the dog to the appellant.