Hiebert v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2025 ONACRB 137

Tribunals Ontario

Animal Care Review Board

Date: 2025-03-25

Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Dyllan Hiebert Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicator: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair

Appearances: For the Appellant: Daryl Miller, Counsel For the Respondent: Aisha Amode, Counsel

Heard by videoconference: February 24, 2025

OVERVIEW

1In January 2025, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) issued a Statement of Account (SOA) to the appellant, Dyllan Hiebert, requiring him to pay $2,490.41 in boarding and veterinary costs related to the care of his two animals.

2The appellant’s dogs were removed from his residence after he failed to comply with an order requiring him to have the dogs examined by a veterinarian. The dogs were later kept in the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care over concerns that the appellant would not provide medical attention or sanitary living conditions.

3The appellant appealed the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) and seeks to have the SOA revoked because he does not have the financial means to pay it. In the alternative, he seeks a reduction of the SOA and a payment plan.

4The Chief Animal Welfare Inspector (respondent) argues that the SOA reflects actual and reasonable costs incurred to provide necessaries to the dogs and it seeks to have the SOA confirmed.

5For the reasons set out below, I find that the SOA reflects the actual costs of services provided, and I find these costs to have been reasonable in the circumstances. However, I am persuaded that the appellant has limited ability to pay, and on that basis, I vary the SOA to $1,245.20.

ISSUE

6Should the SOA, dated January 6, 2025, be confirmed, revoked, or varied?

RESULT

7Pursuant to its powers in s. 38(9)3.1 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act), the Board varies the SOA and orders the appellant to pay $1,245.20 to the Minister of Finance.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

8Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act makes an animal owner responsible for costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector in cases where an inspector has removed or taken an animal into care or has provided necessaries to relieve an animal’s distress.

9If an owner appeals a statement of account respecting these costs, the burden of proof is on the owner to show that the SOA should be revoked or varied. However, the respondent has an initial burden to prove on a balance of probabilities that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs were reasonable.

10To that end, Inspector Kristen Bidulka testified for the respondent. She recounted the events that led to AWS’s involvement in this case and explained how the need for veterinary care and boarding services arose. This evidence is outlined below.

Events leading to the animals’ removal and the decision to keep them in care

11Inspector Bidulka attended the appellant’s residence for an inspection on November 13, 2024 after AWS received a report about three underweight dogs living in unsanitary conditions. She recalled making the following observations during that visit:

1. The bedroom where the appellant’s three dogs were housed was covered in garbage, feces and debris. The crate that was being used by one of the dogs was filled with garbage and the dog was unable to stand upright due to the small size of the crate and the volume of refuse inside it. The same conditions extended out into the hallway and kitchen, where the floors were similarly covered in garbage, feces and other debris.
2. Both Zeus, an 8-month-old dog, and Buddy, a 7-month-old dog, appeared to be in poor body condition, with their ribs, spine and hip points visible. The inspector said she felt minimal to no muscle mass or fat over these areas.
3. A third dog, Rookie, appeared to be in good body condition.

12A series of photographs taken by the AWS team on November 13, 2024 confirmed these observations. The photographs showed extremely unsanitary conditions in the home and two extremely thin dogs.

13As a result of her inspection, Inspector Bidulka issued an order requiring the appellant to:

1. Have the two underweight dogs, Zeus and Buddy, examined by a veterinarian by November 14, 2024; and
2. Provide a sanitary living environment to all dogs by November 19, 2024.

14A compliance check on November 14, 2024 confirmed that the appellant had not taken the animals to a veterinarian. As a result, AWS removed the two dogs that required veterinary care from the appellant’s residence pursuant to s. 31(1)(c) of the PAWS Act, citing non-compliance with the order issued on November 13.

15A few days later, the respondent decided to keep the dogs in care, determining that this was necessary to relieve the dogs’ distress and because they had reasonable grounds to believe that the dogs may be placed in distress if returned to the appellant (s. 31(6)(a) and (b)(i) of the PAWS Act).

16During their time in care, the dogs were placed in a boarding facility and received veterinary examinations and treatments. Some of the costs related to this care were reflected in the SOA that is now the subject of this appeal.

17In deciding whether to confirm, revoke or vary the SOA, I will first outline the costs that were passed on to the appellant and then review the appellant’s evidence regarding his financial circumstances.

Charges on the SOA were reasonable and related to necessary care

18I find that the respondent has established that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs were reasonable. The appellant did not contest the accuracy of the costs of boarding and veterinary services, but I will briefly review the evidence related to these costs given the respondent’s initial burden of proof.

Boarding costs

19The SOA listed $2,260 in boarding costs. The respondent filed into evidence two invoices from the boarding facility:

1. The first invoice in the amount of $1,084.80 covered boarding from November 19 to 30, 2024.
2. The second invoice in the amount of $1,175.20 covered boarding from December 1 to 13, 2024.

20I am satisfied that the amount passed on to the appellant is the actual cost of 25 days of boarding at $40/dog/day plus HST, totaling $2,260.

21Turning next to consider whether the boarding costs were necessary and reasonable, I relied on Inspector Bidulka’s evidence that boarding was essential to the dogs’ care and consisted of food, water, daily exercise, administering medicine and kennel cleaning. The medical records confirmed the dogs’ thin body condition, and it was important that the facility be able to monitor the dogs’ food intake while also providing other basic services. Accepting the respondent’s evidence, I found that the boarding costs were therefore necessary to relieve the dogs’ distress and provide for them while in care.

22I also found that the amount charged for boarding was reasonable. The facility charged $40/dog/day, and I accepted Inspector Bidulka’s uncontroverted evidence that this amount fell well below the suggested fees set out in the Ontario Veterinary Medical Association fee guide.

Appellant’s contention that boarding costs grew unnecessarily

23The appellant argued that boarding costs would not have “ballooned” if AWS inspectors had been clearer with the appellant about the outstanding requirement to provide sanitary living conditions and had scheduled a follow-up inspection to assess the condition of the home.

24Inspector Bidulka was cross-examined on this issue and explained that AWS had not returned to the home after the two dogs had been removed because the appellant had since relocated the third dog that remained in his care. While I make no finding about the conduct of the inspectors, I note that even if there was merit to the appellant’s argument, the decision to keep the animals in care was not based solely on the appellant failing to provide sanitary living conditions. Appendix A of that decision indicated that the dogs required ongoing medical care and noted a concern that the appellant could not provide adequate and appropriate medical attention. For these reasons, I was not persuaded that boarding costs would have been lower had the inspectors returned for another inspection.

Veterinary care costs

25In addition to boarding costs, the SOA listed $230.41 in veterinary care costs for medication, parasite prevention and deworming treatment.

26Invoices from the Hamilton/Burlington SPCA animal hospital supported these charges. The first invoice, issued on November 19, 2024, included a charge of $63.28 for Interceptor Plus, a medication that treats intestinal parasites. The second invoice, issued on December 31, 2024, included a charge of $167.13 for NexGard Purple, a parasite prevention medication, and for Canine Fortiflora, a probiotic. The dogs’ medical records supported the need for these treatments, noting that the dogs likely had intestinal and skin parasitism and diarrhea.

The SOA did not reflect costs incurred after forfeiture on December 14, 2024

27It is important to note that the appellant was issued an earlier statement of account in relation to the care of these dogs, which he did not pay by the statutory deadline. His failure to pay this earlier statement of account resulted in the dogs being forfeited to the Crown. Forfeiture occurred on December 14, 2024. The forfeiture date is important because the appellant would not be responsible for costs incurred in relation to the animals after that date because he was no longer the animals’ owner.

28I find that none of the costs passed on to the appellant in the SOA at issue in this appeal relate to care provided to the dogs on or after December 14, 2024. The latest date for boarding costs was December 13, 2024, and the medications were administered on November 20, December 3, and December 10, 2024. A charge of $67.80 for vaccine boosters listed on the December 31, 2024 invoice from the animal hospital was appropriately omitted from the SOA because those boosters were provided on December 17, 2024, after the dogs had been forfeited.

29In sum, I find that the costs of the SOA were well-supported by the documentary evidence and were reasonable in the circumstances.

The appellant’s financial circumstances point to limited ability to pay

30Turning next to whether there is a basis to revoke or vary the SOA based on inability to pay, I considered the appellant’s evidence regarding his financial circumstances, which the respondent did not contest.

31The appellant testified that he receives monthly payments from the Ontario Disability Support Program. Part of those payments are sent directly to his landlord to cover rent, and another $568 are deposited into his account. A printout of the appellant’s bank statement confirmed this amount.

32The appellant said he had no additional sources of income; although he had worked in the past, he was not employed at the time of this hearing. The appellant also filed into evidence a Legal Aid Certificate (obtained for legal services in a different matter) to show that he is a client of modest means.

33In further evidence, the appellant testified that he accesses a community food bank on a fairly regular basis. This was supported by the testimony of the appellant’s social worker, who was aware of the appellant accessing a food bank on occasion. The social worker also testified about the appellant’s acquired disability and the support his organization provides to the appellant.

34I am satisfied on the evidence that the appellant has limited financial resources.

The Board varies the SOA based on limited ability to pay

35The appellant submits that if the Board accepts the evidence regarding his difficult financial circumstances, it should revoke the SOA based on inability to pay. Alternatively, the appellant asks the Board to reduce the SOA to approximately $1,000, paid by way of monthly installments of no more than $100.

36The respondent acknowledges that ability to pay is a factor when the Board reviews statements of account but urged the Board to weigh this factor against the need to hold owners accountable for costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector when providing necessaries to animals. The respondent took no position on the amount the SOA should be reduced to if the Board found it appropriate to vary the SOA based on ability of pay.

37It is well-established that the Board can consider ability to pay as a factor in deciding whether to confirm, revoke or vary a statement of account; see Ontario (Chief Animal Welfare Inspector) v. Ishankova, 2023 ONSC 1284 (Div. Ct.).

38Consistent with this and based on my earlier finding that the appellant has limited financial means, I reduce the SOA by 50 percent and require the appellant to pay $1,245.20. This outcome appropriately balances the legislative purpose of holding animal owners accountable with the appellant’s financial circumstances. In that sense, it is in line with the court’s holding in Ishankova that the “accountability objective [of the PAWS Act] is engaged by the statement of account provisions” but that “considering ability to pay is not necessarily inconsistent with promoting accountability” (para 56).

39A reduction of 50 percent is also appropriate because I find it more likely than not that the appellant has some ability to pay. The appellant’s own submission that he could pay a monthly amount if the Board varied the SOA supports this conclusion. The appellant’s evidence around his expenses and any leftover funds was also vague. For example, he stated he may have to pay for utilities but did not know the amount, and that he has to purchase food for his remaining dog, but the dog does not reside with him all the time and that family members help in this regard as well.

40The appellant’s argument that he was greatly impacted by the dogs’ removal and has already had to endure a significant penalty given the forfeiture of the dogs to the Crown had no bearing on my review of the SOA. The SOA is not a penalty, and neither is forfeiture, which occurred automatically when the appellant neither paid nor appealed the earlier statement of account.

41On the question of whether the Board can order a payment plan, as requested by the appellant, the respondent submitted, and I agree, that there is no authority in the legislation permitting the Board to grant extensions of time to pay or to require or permit payment pursuant to an installment schedule.

42Although the appellant gives a broad interpretation to the Board’s power to “vary” a statement of account in s. 38(9)3.1 of the PAWS Act, I read this power to be limited to varying the amount and not the statutory timeline for payment, which is prescribed in s. 1(2) of Ministerial Prescriptions, O Reg 447/19 and requires payment within 15 business days of the Board confirming or varying an amount following an appeal.

43While the legislation does contemplate extensions of time to pay, it gives the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector discretion to enter into a written agreement with the owner to reduce the amount or extend the time for payment before the 15-day timeframe has passed (s. 35(5) of the PAWS Act). It is therefore open to the parties to negotiate a payment plan if appropriate.

ORDER

44Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9)3.1 of the PAWS Act, the Board varies the SOA and orders the appellant to pay $1,245.20 to the Minister of Finance.