Tribunals Ontario

Animal Care Review Board

TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2025-01-13

Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Bradley Hill Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent

DECISION AND ORDER

Adjudicators: Anxhela (Angela) Peco, Vice-Chair

Appearances:

For the Appellant: Bradley Hill, self-represented For the Respondent: Joanna Chan, Counsel

Heard by videoconference: November 21, 2024

OVERVIEW

1In October 2024, Animal Welfare Services (AWS) issued a Statement of Account (SOA) to Bradley Hill, requiring him to pay $1,536.80 in animal care costs related to one of his horses. AWS attended a property where the appellant’s horses were being kept and, with the assistance of an external service provider, removed a broken halter and lead rope from one of the appellant’s horses, which they deemed to be in distress.

2The appellant appealed the SOA to the Animal Care Review Board (Board) and seeks to have the SOA revoked or reduced. He argues that the horse was not in distress and that there was no urgency to the situation requiring AWS to intervene and incur these fees. He also argues that the costs are excessive and that, in any event, the SOA should be revoked or reduced because he does not have the ability to pay it.

3For the reasons set out below, I find that the SOA reflects the actual costs of services provided, and I find that these costs were reasonable in the circumstances. I am not persuaded that the appellant has limited ability to pay, and I therefore confirm the SOA in the amount of $1,536.80.

ISSUE

4Should the SOA dated October 8, 2024, be confirmed, revoked, or varied?

RESULT

5Pursuant to its powers in s. 38(9) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 13 (PAWS Act), the Board confirms the SOA and orders the appellant to pay $1,536.80 to the Minister of Finance.

PRELIMINARY ISSUE

Appellant’s adjournment request denied

6The appellant requested an adjournment at the start of the hearing. He stated that he needed time to hire a lawyer to assist him with preparing his evidence. He also needed time to obtain access to body camera footage that would have recorded the AWS inspectors’ actions and his discussions with them on the relevant dates. Finally, the appellant needed additional time to summons as a witness the vendor whom AWS had hired to assist with removing the horse’s broken halter.

7The respondent opposed the request and indicated that a) none of the AWS inspectors had worn body cameras, and therefore the footage did not exist; and b) the appellant was informed about the process for summonsing witnesses and associated deadlines at the case conference in this matter.

8For the reasons that follow, I denied the appellant’s request for an adjournment.

9Late adjournments cause delay and disruption to both the tribunal and to hearing parties and their witnesses, who have set aside time to participate in a hearing. For that reason, an oral request for an adjournment at the start of a hearing may only be made in exceptional circumstances and with the consent of the tribunal (Rule 16.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, Fire Safety Commission Common Rules of Practice & Procedure). While I permitted the appellant to bring his request, recognizing that he was self-represented, I found there were no exceptional circumstances that warranted this late request and nothing that would have prevented the appellant from bringing the request sooner. In addition, I was not persuaded that the appellant would be prejudiced if the Board refused the adjournment.

10Although the appellant raised concerns about the limited time he had to prepare for this hearing, the procedural steps and deadlines related to this proceeding were consented to by both parties at the case conference of October 29, 2024. At that case conference, the parties were also given until November 8, 2004 to bring any preliminary motions, and motions could have been brought after that date with the Board’s permission. No motions were received. There was also no evidence that the appellant sought additional guidance from the Board on the process for summonsing witnesses.

11I was also not persuaded by the appellant’s argument that he especially needed a lawyer now that he learned from the respondent’s counsel that the body camera footage, which he expected would be a key piece of evidence to support his position, did not exist. The appellant did not establish how he would be prejudiced by this. The appellant was present on the relevant dates and could provide his own evidence about his interactions with AWS staff, and he could cross-examine the respondent’s witness on her observations.

12Overall, I was not persuaded that the appellant could not have brought this motion sooner or that the appellant would be prejudiced by the Board refusing the adjournment.

EVIDENCE AND ANALYSIS

13Section 35(1) of the PAWS Act makes an animal owner liable for costs incurred by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector in relation to an animal in circumstances where an inspector has taken steps to relieve the animal’s distress by providing it with necessaries.

14Section 35(2) of the PAWS Act lists various costs that are recoverable, including costs incurred to relieve an animal’s distress.

15In the present case, AWS hired a vendor to assist with removing a broken halter and lead rope that they believed was causing the appellant’s horse distress. The vendor charged AWS $1,536.80 for his services and the respondent now argues that those costs should be borne by the appellant.

16While the burden of proof on this appeal is on the appellant to show that the SOA should be revoked or varied, the respondent has an initial evidentiary burden to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs were reasonable and reflect necessary actions to relieve distress.

17To that end, Inspector Lori Lamb testified for the respondent. She recounted the events that led to AWS’s involvement in this case and how the need for the vendor’s services arose.

18Inspector Lamb first attended the property where the appellant’s horses were kept on August 17, 2024. A colleague had requested that she attend the property to confirm the appellant’s compliance with a previous order AWS had issued to him for this group of horses. During this visit, she observed that one of the horses had a broken halter around its neck and that it was dragging a long lead rope. She also observed rope rash in the horse’s chest area and legs, which she believed was caused by friction with the rope. Photographs taken by Inspector Lamb confirmed these injuries.

19Inspector Lamb spoke to the appellant that same day. She learned that he had recently acquired this horse, and that the horse was semi-feral and not comfortable being handled. The appellant confirmed this in his evidence, stating that the horse’s seller had left the halter on during transport and that the appellant had been unable to remove the halter when they arrived at the property. The halter had later broken around the nose area and was hanging around the horse’s neck. The appellant had tried several times to remove the halter, without success.

20Inspector Lamb issued an order to the appellant requiring him to have the halter removed by 10:00 a.m. the following day, Sunday, August 18, 2024.

21Inspector Lamb returned to the property at 10:47 a.m. on August 18, 2024, and did not find the appellant on site. She observed that the horse still had the broken halter around its neck. She phoned veterinarian clinics in the area but was unable to find someone who could sedate the horse and help remove the halter. At the recommendation of an AWS staff veterinarian, she contacted a vendor who had extensive experience in handling horses, including feral horses, and confirmed his availability for later that day.

22She returned to the property in late afternoon and found that the appellant had been attempting to remove the halter with the assistance of family members and friends but again, had been unsuccessful. The appellant confirmed this in his evidence.

23According to Inspector Lamb, the vendor arrived on site with an assistant and devised a plan for how to have the halter removed. The vendor brought 12-15 fencing panels, placed them in such a way that the horse with the broken halter could be isolated from the group and led down a chute and into the vendor’s trailer. There, the appellant removed the broken halter and lead rope from the horse, and cleaned and treated the rope burn.

Charges on the SOA were for necessary care and were reasonable

24For the reasons set out below, I find that the respondent has established that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries and that these costs were reasonable.

25The respondent filed into evidence an invoice supporting the amount passed on to the appellant in the SOA. The vendor’s invoice set out various service fees, which totaled $1,536.80 and supported a finding that the SOA reflects the actual costs of necessaries. These fees included:

1. Emergency call fee - $250.00
2. 4 hours truck/trailer/self at $130.00/hour - $520.00
3. 4 hours helper at $60/hour - $240.00
4. Moveable corral - $350.00.

26In terms of the emergency call fee, I considered Inspector Lamb’s testimony that an emergency fee was typical for services provided by vendors at short notice. The vendor in this case had accommodated a same-day request for services after AWS had already ruled out the availability of other vendors.

27Fees for four hours of service were also reasonable. I relied on Inspector Lamb’s testimony that the vendor’s travel time to and from the horse’s location was two hours. The vendor had spent additional time sanitizing the panels and the trailer, and as corroborated by the appellant, the vendor had spent approximately one hour on-site assisting with the halter removal.

28I also had no reason to question the $240 fee for the vendor’s assistant. Despite the appellant’s contention that he and others were already on-site and ready to help, and did in fact help the vendor, neither the appellant nor his father, who testified at the hearing, denied that the vendor’s assistant also provided services. I therefore see no basis to remove these costs.

29I find the charges for the moveable corral were also reasonable. Based on Inspector Lamb’s testimony, AWS did not have available to it fencing panels that it could have provided to help manage costs, and thus the vendor had to provide them.

30I did consider the appellant’s evidence and submissions that some of his own panels were used that day and that he could have acquired more, the suggestion being that he should not have to pay the cost of the panels.

31These arguments did not persuade me that the appellant should not be responsible for the cost of the moveable corral. While this was a joint effort and I do recognize the appellant and his father’s contributions in the process of removing the halter from the horse, I accepted Inspector Lamb’s testimony that the additional panels were needed to isolate the one horse from the herd, and to create the chute they used to lead the horse onto the trailer without injury to the horse or anyone else. In Inspector Lamb’s view, the panels were critical to executing the plan they put in place.

32The appellant also had opportunities, prior to the vendor’s arrival at the property, to bring additional panels on-site, but he had not done so. Even if I accept the appellant’s argument that the 10:00 a.m. deadline for compliance with the Order was very short and he did not have sufficient time to make arrangements, he had not made any more progress or brought the panels to the property by 4:30 p.m., when the vendor arrived on August 18. As such, I find that these fees were justified.

AWS’s actions to relieve the horse’s distress were not premature or unnecessary

33The appellant argued that AWS’ intervention in this case was unnecessary and premature, and that he could perform the same tasks the vendor had performed.

34The respondent readily conceded, and I accept, that the appellant had made good faith efforts to remove the broken halter from the horse. However, despite those efforts and multiple days of trying, he had been unsuccessful. As a result, I find it more likely than not that the appellant would have continued to have difficulty with the horse had it not been for AWS’ involvement and the vendor’s assistance.

35The appellant also denied that the halter posed a risk of injury to the horse. Both the appellant and his father stated that the disposable halter was made of cheap material that would have broken had the horse become entangled on the property. In the appellant’s view, there was therefore no need for AWS to act with the sense of urgency that it had.

36I found the appellant’s argument on this point to be at odds with his evidence about his own extensive efforts to remove the halter, which suggested that he appreciated that there was risk of injury to the horse if the broken halter remained around his neck. In cross-examination, the appellant also acknowledged that it is never good practice to leave a halter on a horse.

37I was also mindful of Inspector Lamb’s evidence about the urgency of the situation because of the risk of injury that it presented to the horse. I accepted her testimony that the horse was at a significant risk of strangling itself if the halter and/or lead rope became caught, or of breaking a leg if it fell due to tripping on the rope or due to another horse stepping on the rope. She said the horse would suffer for a long time before it succumbed to these painful injuries.

38The fact that there hadn’t been a life-threatening injury during the few days that the horse had had the broken halter and rope around its neck does not, in my view, establish that there wasn’t significant risk. There was also photographic evidence of injuries to the horse’s chest area and legs, which again indicated to me that AWS’ intervention was appropriate to relieve the horse’s distress. The appellant’s argument that the rope marks on the chest were caused by the buckle of the rope (as opposed to the horse stepping on the rope) did not explain the horse’s leg injuries, and regardless of which part of the rope was causing them, the injuries were documented, and the rope continued to pose a risk.

39For these reasons, I find that AWS’ intervention was reasonable, as were the resulting costs.

The SOA should not be revoked or varied based on limited ability of pay

40For the reasons set out below, I find that the appellant did not provide reliable evidence to establish that he had limited ability to pay.

41The appellant argued that the SOA should be revoked or varied because of his financial circumstances. He stated that he has had health issues that have limited his ability to earn a living and caused financial stress.

42The appellant filed into evidence a “Tax Summary” containing information he had reported to the individual who prepared his 2023 tax return. This document indicated an income of $2,628.98 in 2023. The appellant said that he had taken temporary medical leave and had been forced to go on government assistance while awaiting a diagnosis for his health issues. He said he sold some of his belongings to raise money to support himself, and that he had children to support, in addition to paying rent and other monthly expenses.

43The appellant also provided a confirmation email for a medical appointment with a specialist. He said he would be discussing surgery options with the specialist although he was not sure what type of surgery he would have or what the recovery time would be.

44Even if I were to accept the information on the Tax Summary document, which was not issued by Canada Revenue Agency but was rather a form reflecting information that the appellant would have provided to the individual preparing his 2023 tax returns, that document contained dated information about the appellant’s 2023 income. In addition, the information regarding the medical appointment was vague and there was no evidence establishing what the appellant’s condition was or how it impacted his ability to work.

45More importantly, the appellant testified that he had returned to work part-time in August 2024. Although I considered the appellant’s evidence that his work hours vary depending on his health condition, there was some evidence that the appellant was earning an income at the time of this hearing and had been for a few months. He also indicated that he received government credits and child tax credits.

46Oftentimes, the appellant’s evidence about his extremely difficult financial circumstances was at odds with the financial commitments that he indicated he could deliver on. For example, he stated that he cared for 15 horses, six of them on lease, two on a lifelong lease, and two horses that another owner paid him to board. He owned the remaining horses. He purchased the horse with the broken halter for $1,000 in August 2024 and had paid $2,000 for a seasonal lease of the property where the 15 horses were being kept from April to November 2024. He listed other ancillary costs that he covered, including hay and feed.

47When asked whether he paid to lease the horses, he said he did not and that he was able to breed the mares to generate revenue and use the horses for riding lessons when he started a horse training business. Despite evidence that he intended to use the horses as an income source, when asked whether he generated revenue from his work breeding or riding the horses, the appellant said he had not and that he kept the 15 horses for “personal pleasure.” It is not plausible that the appellant would shoulder the financial cost of caring for 15 horses for personal pleasure while at the same time experiencing the financial difficulties that he described. It is more likely than not that the horses were either an additional source of income or the appellant had additional resources available to him to cover these expenses.

48For the above-noted reasons, the appellant has not satisfied me that he has limited ability to pay the SOA and that the SOA should be revoked or reduced on that basis.

49Overall, I find that the SOA reflected the actual costs of necessaries provided to the horse, and that those costs were reasonable. I also find no basis to revoke or vary the SOA due to inability to pay.

ORDER

50Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38(9) of the PAWS Act, I confirm the SOA and order that the appellant pay costs of $1,536.80 to the Minister of Finance.