David Romkes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2023 ONACRB 39

RECONSIDERATION DECISION - AMENDED

Before: Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair Edgar-André Montigny, Member

Date of Order: May 4, 2023 Tribunal File Number: 14406/ACRB

Case Name: David Romkes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Written Submissions by: For the Appellant: David Romkes, Self-represented For the Respondent: Danielle Meuleman, Counsel

OVERVIEW

1The appellant, David Romkes, filed a request for reconsideration of the December 28, 2022 decision¹ of the Animal Care Review Board (Board). The decision dealt with a Statement of Account (SOA) in the amount of $4,696.17 issued by Inspector Chew of Animal Welfare Services (AWS) on October 24, 2022 for necessaries provided to the appellant’s animals seized on September 9 and 13, 2022. In the decision, the Board confirmed the October 24, 2022 SOA in the amount of $4,696.17.

2The appellant is requesting that the reconsideration be granted, seeking the following remedies:

1. Cancel the decision;
2. Vary the decision to $378.00 to reflect necessities to end on September 12 and 13, 2022 which are the dates the animals the appellant claims he surrendered the animals; or
3. Order a rehearing of all or part of the matters.

3The appellant’s request for reconsideration is based on issues related to Rule 18.2 “Criteria for Granting Reconsideration” of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, Version I (October 2, 2017) as amended (Rules), including that the Board erred in its assessment of facts and law, that it heard false testimony, and that there is new evidence which was not available at the time of the hearing.

4The respondent opposed the appellant’s request for reconsideration and submitted that the Board should confirm the decision and dismiss the appellant’s request. It noted that the sole issue before the Board at the hearing was the quantum of the costs in the Statement of Account (SOA).

5The appellant provided Reply submissions, in which it re-iterated its claims regarding the need to vary the SOA.

RESULT

6The appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

ANALYSIS

7The grounds upon which a request for reconsideration can be granted are set out in Rule 18.2 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal, Animal Care Review Board, and Fire Safety Commission’s Common Rules of Practice and Procedure, Version I (October 2, 2017) as amended (“Rules”) which are:

a) The Tribunal acted outside its jurisdiction or violated the rules of procedural fairness;

b) The Tribunal made an error of law or fact such that the Tribunal would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made;

c) The Tribunal heard false evidence from a party or witness, which was discovered only after the hearing and likely affected the result; or

d) There is evidence that was not before the Tribunal when rendering its decision, could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it, and would likely have affected the result.

8For the reasons that follow, I find that the appellant failed to establish any of the grounds for the Board to reconsider its decision.

Rule 18.2(b) - Surrender of Animals and Mitigation

9The appellant submitted that the Board made an error of law and/or fact (Rule 18.2 (b)) pertaining to the surrender of the animals and the application of the Doctrine of Mitigation in the decision². The appellant submitted that the Board failed to determine a surrender date of the appellant’s animals. In doing so, it unilaterally considered and applied the Doctrine of Mitigation improperly and did not ensure consistency with governing legislation, regulations, and common law. It further failed to apply the facts correctly, citing Rules 3.1(c)³ and 18.2(b) of the Rules.

10In summary, the appellant submitted that had the Board failed to recognize that the appellant had surrendered his animals (by text in September 2022), and that AWS could have prevented the costs from rising.

11For the reasons that follow, I find that the Board did not make an error of law and/or fact in its decision regarding the disposition of the animals and mitigation, such that it would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. Therefore, a reconsideration of the decision under Rule 18.2(b) is not warranted.

Surrender

12The appellant’s position, both at the hearing, and in the Reconsideration request, was that he had surrendered his animals via three texts to Inspector Christopher Chew of Animal Welfare Services (Inspector Chew) on September 12, 13 and 15, 2022. On this basis, the appellant asked that the SOA be varied to reflect the dates of surrender.

13The appellant submitted that there is no process on how to surrender an animal on the Board’s website, in the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019⁴ (PAWS Act), or on the Notice of Removal Form. He also submitted that Inspector Chew never provided information to him on a formal surrender process.

14The appellant submitted that if Inspector Chew had advised how to formally surrender the animals, the costs could have been mitigated, and that the additional costs incurred following his surrender of the animals should not be recoverable.

15The appellant submitted that during the hearing the Board erred by not determining a date when the animals were surrendered.

16The respondent submitted that the issue of alleged “surrender” was fully canvased at the hearing. It further submitted that there is no statutory mechanism for the surrender of removed animals.

17The Board agrees with the respondent that the issue of the alleged “surrender” of the animals was fully canvassed at the hearing through evidence put forward by the appellant’s and Inspector Chew’s testimony. The appellant has not pointed to any errors, but rather disagrees with the Board’s findings, which is not the purpose of a reconsideration.

Mitigation

18The appellant disagrees with the Board’s acceptance of Inspector Chew’s testimony that AWS has no obligation to mitigate the rising costs pursuant to the PAWS Act. At the hearing, the appellant submitted that the respondent could have made efforts to mitigate the amount of the SOA by consulting with him on appropriate options, noting that he made efforts to surrender the animals. The appellant stated that the panel failed to apply Rule 3.1 to liberally interpret governing legislation and regulations to ensure consistency and should also have included consideration of common law.

19The appellant submitted that the Board erred in law in its interpretation of the Doctrine of Mitigation by applying only the PAWS Act. To support this position, he cited Janiak v. Ippolito⁵, where it was decided that the “plaintiff is bound to act not only in his interests, but the interests of the party who would have to pay damages, and keep down the damages, so far as it is reasonable and proper.” Further, the Supreme Court of Canada held that, “it is clear that the so-called ‘duty to mitigate’ derives from the general proposition that a plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant damages which he himself could have avoided by the taking of reasonable steps.”⁶

20The Janiak decision is a case where the plaintiff refused medical treatment which would have mitigated the damages he sought. Janiak has no application to this case.

21The respondent submitted that the appellant made no reference in his Reconsideration request to a statute or case law for the Doctrine of Mitigation principal, and that he may be referring to the common law “duty to mitigate” in a civil matter, which does not apply as this is not a civil proceeding. It adds that the PAWS Act is the statutory framework governing the actions of AWS and powers of appeal.

22The respondent submitted that there is no statutory mechanism for the surrender of removed animals, nor any duty on AWS to mitigate costs of care, and that s. 35 of the PAWS Act specifically provides that the owner/custodian is liable for the costs of animals in the care of the CAWI.

23In reply, the appellant submitted two additional cases where mitigation of costs was an issue. The Board cautions that the right of reply is a limited one. The purpose is for the party bearing the onus of the dispute to respond to any issues raised in the other party’s submissions which could not reasonably have been raised in its initial submissions. Parties are expected to make the entirety of their cases in their main submissions and new evidence as part of a reply is typically not permitted. The Board will not respond to the two cases submitted.

24The Board agrees with the respondent, that the appellant raised the same arguments that it did during the hearing, and a reconsideration is not intended for rehearing the same arguments because the appellant does not agree with the decision.

25For these reasons, the Board finds that it made no error in law and/or fact when it did not accept the appellant’s submission that it had surrendered the animals and vary the SOA accordingly, or that the respondent could have mitigated the costs. As such, the Board dismisses the request for reconsideration on the ground that it made an error in law and/or fact regarding surrender and mitigation.

Rule 18.2(b) - Notice of Decisions to Keep

26The appellant submitted that the Board made an error in law and/or fact (Rule 18.2 (b)) when it failed to correctly interpret and apply the “Notice of Decision of the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector to Keep an Animal in the Chief Animal Inspector’s Care” pursuant to Section 31(6) of the PAWS Act (“Decision to Keep in Care”), and s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act regarding the liability of an owner for expenses, for two reasons.

27First, the appellant submitted that he believed he no longer owned the animals as of September 12⁷, 2022 (for the rabbits), and September 14, 2022 (for the poultry and horses) as those were the dates the respondent issued the two Decisions to Keep in Care.

28Second, the appellant submitted that, as the respondent had made decisions to keep the animals in its care, this indicated to the appellant that his animals would not be returned to him. He submitted that s. 35(1) of the PAWS Act does not give AWS the authority to issue a SOA for animals it is keeping, as this section only permits a SOA to be served when an animal is taken into its care. The appellant submitted that the Board made an error in law as the SOA should have ceased to accrue once the Decisions to Keep in Care were issued.

29The Board finds that it did not make an error in law and/or fact regarding the ownership of the animals and the appellant’s liability to reimburse the CAWI for providing necessities to the animals while in its care for the reasons that follow.

30The ownership of the animals did not transfer to the CAWI simply because it issued a Decision to Keep in Care. The Board agrees with the respondent that these are appealable under s. 38(1) and 38(4) of the PAWS Act on the basis that the conditions causing the Decision to Keep in Care have ceased to exist. Indeed, one of the powers of the Board after a hearing is held where a Decision to Keep in Care is at issue, is to order the return of an animal to the owner/custodian. It is also clear that s. 35 of the PAWS Act clearly states that where the CAWI has taken an animal into its care, the CAWI may serve the owner/custodian with SOAs respecting the cost of necessaries.

31For this reason, the Board dismisses the appellant’s request for reconsideration as it did not make an error in law and/or fact when it did not reduce the SOA to reflect the dates of the Decisions to Keep in Care.

Rule 18.2(b), (c), and (d) - Perceived Conflict of Interest

32The appellant submitted that the Board erred in law and/or fact such that it would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made (Rule 18.2 (b)) as the Board:

1. Failed to identify a perceived conflict of interest pursuant to the College of Veterinarian Guide; and/or
2. Applied irrelevant case law to the issue of conflict of interest in its decision.⁸

33The appellant submitted two additional related grounds for reconsideration related to the perceived conflict of interest (Rules 18.2 (c), and (d)):

1. Dr. Zakrajsek gave false evidence in her testimony; and
2. There is new evidence regarding the conflict of interest allegation that was not before the Board when it rendered its decision, that could not have been obtained previously by the party now seeking to introduce it and would likely have affected the result.

34At the hearing the appellant raised the issue of conflict of interest as a preliminary issue on the first day, and in cross-examination of the respondent’s witness Dr. Zakrajsek. On the second day, the appellant raised the issue again indicating that he had obtained a copy of the College of Veterinarian’s of Ontario’s (CVO) Guideline. Since then, the appellant submitted that he has obtained confirmation from the University of Guelph where Dr. Zakrajsek graduated, that the CVO’s Jurisprudence Examination includes elements of conflict of interest in order to become licensed.

35For the reasons that follow, the Board dismisses the appellant’s request for a reconsideration on the basis of the issue of perceived conflict of interest. He did not meet his onus to establish his grounds under Rule 18.2.

Error of fact/law regarding the College of Veterinarians Guide (Rule 18.2(b))

36The appellant submitted that at the hearing, it testified that it had hired Dr. Zakrajsek, veterinarian, in 2020 to obtain an independent assessment of the same horses now before the Board. It referenced “the Guide” in the list of attachments⁹ appended to its submission. The appellant submitted that the Guide states that a conflict of interest can be perceived or real and sets out a test for veterinarians to use in determining one, and the procedures to be followed. He quoted the following:

A conflict of interest arises when a veterinarian’s duties and responsibilities may be influenced by some other interest that the veterinarian has, usually a personal or financial interest. The test for a conflict of interest is not only whether the veterinarian believes that such an interest may influence their professional judgement, but also whether the perception of a reasonable person aware of the circumstances as the whether the conflict may influence the professional judgement of the veterinarian.

37The appellant submitted that the Board referenced the Guide in its decision, but limited its review of the document and did not consider all of the relevant sections including the requirement to:

1. Inform both parties of a conflict of interest and circumstances giving rise to it;
2. Inform both parties that information gathered during the pre-purchase examinations will be shared with both parties; and
3. Obtain informed consent from both parties in writing that they have been informed of the above points and agree to the veterinarian conducting the exam on behalf of both of them.

38The appellant submitted that as a result of the Guide, the Board should have considered the evidence of Dr. Zakrajsek inadmissible and impeached her, given that she did not follow her own professional Guide by not declaring a conflict of interest in the matter.

39The respondent submitted that the issue of Dr. Zakrajsek’s alleged conflict of interest and her failure to disclose this was fully canvassed by the Board at the hearing and in submissions at the close of the hearing. It pointed to comprehensive reasons in paragraphs 15-22 of the Decision, where the Board demonstrated that it was alive to the issue and to the evidence raised in closing submissions. The respondent submitted that the Board fully considered the issue and dismissed it stating that Dr. Zakrajsek had not been shown to have any bias, that the involvement with the appellant was two years before, and that the appellant’s motion to have her disqualified had not been properly put before the Board.

40The Board agrees with the respondent that it was alive to the issue during the hearing, and a Reconsideration is not the time for re-arguing the matter. The Board finds the excerpt from the Guide pertains to the sale of animals from one party to another and has no bearing on this case.

41For these reasons, the Board finds that it is not persuaded that there was an error of fact and/or law such that it would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made. As such the Board dismisses the request for reconsideration on the ground of the alleged conflict of interest of a witness.

The Board did not apply irrelevant case law (Rule 18.2(b))

42The appellant submitted that the Board erred in its application of Westerhof v. Gee Estate¹⁰ as it only deals with the application of Rule 53.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure¹¹ on how an expert witness enters evidence versus a participatory witness, and that it does not speak to the issue of conflict of interest.

43The appellant submitted that the Board relied on Westerhof v. Gee Estate, in that Dr. Zakrajsek was a participatory witness and not bound by the conflict of interest provision in Rule 10.2.

44The respondent made no submissions on the issue.

45The Board rejects the appellant’s claim regarding Westerhof which was made by the respondent, not the Board. The Rules of Civil Procedure apply to the Court of Appeal and Superior Court of Justice proceedings, not to Tribunal proceedings and were not considered.

46The Board referenced Rule 10.4 in its Decision (paragraph 22) regarding the timeliness of the motion, stating that the issue should have been brought forward before the hearing as it should have been aware of the issue when Dr. Zakrajsek was named as a witness.

Perjury (Rule 18.2(a), (c) and (d))

47The appellant relied upon Rules 18.2(a), (c), and (d) regarding the alleged perjury of Dr. Zakrajsek.

48The appellant reminded the Board that he cross-examined Dr. Zakrajsek under oath if she was aware of any conflict of interest guidelines from the CVO, to which she responded that she was not aware of any. The appellant submitted that he researched and found several documents¹² pertaining to conflict of interest. These documents were submitted as new evidence (Rule 18.2(d)) in the conflict of interest allegation, and allegedly prove that the witness committed perjury.

49The appellant submitted that Dr. Zakrajsek is bound by her licensing requirements to know her guidelines and applicable laws, and as such committed perjury pursuant to the Criminal Code of Canada¹³ by intentionally misleading the Tribunal under oath in order that her evidence be accepted (Rule 18.2(c)).

50The appellant claimed the rules of procedural fairness were violated during the hearing (Rule 18.2(a)) given that he had no reasonable expectation that she would perjure herself on the first day of the hearing, and therefore had insufficient time to prepare an argument or provide evidence before the hearing ended.

51The appellant further submitted that the Board acted outside its jurisdiction or violated the rules of procedural fairness (Rule 18.2(a)) because it did not address the alleged perjury, or discredit or impeach or pursue criminal remedies against Dr. Zakrajsek, which prejudiced the appellant. It claimed that failure of the Board to address the alleged perjury brings the administration of justice into disrepute.

52The respondent submitted that there is no evidence that Dr. Zakrajsek provided false testimony. Dr. Zakrajsek was asked by the appellant if she was aware of any guidelines regarding conflict of interest, and her response was no. The respondent submitted that even if the appellant’s materials are believed on their face, all they show is that Dr. Zakrajsek ought to have been aware of the veterinary professional guidelines, not that she was aware of them.

53The Board will not dismiss Dr. Zakrajsek’s evidence on the grounds of alleged perjury. As determined in the analysis of the conflict of interest grounds, there was no evidence of conflict of interest. The Board agrees with the respondent that perhaps the witness ought to have been aware of the materials, but that it is not evidence that she was aware of them.

54For these reasons the Board finds that it is not persuaded that it heard false evidence from a witness, discovered only after the hearing, that would likely have affected the result. As such the Board finds that the appellant has not met its onus on this ground. The Board also finds that it did not violate the rules of procedural fairness, as the appellant did not request an adjournment to prepare evidence to support its claim of perjury.

55The Board’s jurisdiction in this matter does not extend to issues regarding professional misconduct as alleged by the appellant as this is the purview of the CVO.

56For these reasons, the Board is not satisfied that any of the criteria suggested by the appellant for a reconsideration regarding the alleged perjury are met. As such, the Board finds the appellant did not establish this ground of his reconsideration.

The new evidence regarding the alleged conflict of interest (Rule 18.2(d)

57The appellant submitted that it provided new evidence¹⁴ regarding information received from the CVO regarding its regular communication with licensed members regarding Professional Practice Standards and examinations on jurisprudence and asks that this be considered as proof that Dr. Zakrajsek was aware of the Guide, and that any evidence provided by her would be perceived by the appellant as a conflict of interest and should not have been considered.

58The respondent submitted that the appellant had not in fact put forward new evidence that could not have been obtained previously, and that would have affected the decision. The respondent submitted that the Palmer¹⁵ test accords with the Board’s criteria for granting reconsideration under Rule 18.2(d) for introducing new evidence, and that the materials regarding the professional responsibilities of a licenced veterinarian in Ontario were available to the appellant before the outset of the hearing, and that Dr. Zakrajsek’s perceived conflict of interest was not new to the appellant. The respondent submitted that the appellant was aware that Dr. Zakrajsek had attended his property in September 2022 because he had hired her to assess his animals, and that she would testify to that on December 1, 2022. The respondent submitted that proper preparation for the hearing would have caused the appellant to raise the issue when Dr. Zakrajsek’s name was put forward to be qualified as an expert.

59In the appellant’s reply submissions to the respondent’s submissions, it notes that Dr. Zakrajsek’s report twice stated that she did not have a conflict of interest. The Board agrees with the respondent that the appellant was aware the respondent had this report a full week before the hearing and could have researched the issue with CVO, and subsequently raised the issue before the Board before the scheduled hearing as required.

60In its reply submissions, the appellant referred to Palmer, stating that it was only after Dr. Zakrajsek’s testimony that he was able to lodge a formal complaint with the CVO regarding conflict of interest, when he became aware she had perjured herself. The appellant further submitted that the evidence is relevant as it bears on whether Dr. Zakrajsek’s evidence should be accepted or rejected and the consequences. The appellant submitted that as a result of the witness’s conflict of interest, the Board should not rely on her evidence.

61The Board finds that a reconsideration is not the time to submit new evidence which could have been presented at the hearing. Rule 18.2(d) requires that new evidence is that which could not have reasonably been obtained earlier and would have affected the result. The appellant had in its possession the respondent’s witness list on December 1, 2022. At that time, he should reasonably have been aware that he had concerns with an apparent conflict of interest and could have prepared materials to support his preliminary motion regarding conflict of interest. A reconsideration is not an opportunity for parties to correct the shortcomings of their submissions and evidence at the hearing, as parties are required to put their best case forward at the hearing.

62The Board finds that the evidence introduced by the appellant in its request for reconsideration under Rule 18.2(d), namely the communication with the CVO, with a reasonable degree of due diligence could have been obtained before the hearing. Furthermore, if it had been presented at the hearing it would likely not have affected the decision.

Rule 18.2((b) - Hardship

63The appellant submitted on pages 19 and 20 of his submissions that the Board erred in law and/or fact by incorrectly interpreting the intent of the PAWS Act and the main goal of the Board regarding financial hardship in its decision. The appellant submitted that the Board made an error of law and/or fact such that it would likely have reached a different result had the error not been made.

64The appellant submitted that Rule 3.1(a), which gives the Board the ability to liberally interpret and apply or waive, vary, or apply the Rules on its own initiative or at the request of a party, should have been applied by the Board. While not stated by the appellant, the Board assumes the appellant is asking the Board to waive the disclosure deadline set in its Case Conference Report and Order¹⁶ (CCRO) dated December 5, 2022.

65The Board addressed late disclosure in paragraphs 23 to 25 of its Decision, and hardship in paragraphs 67 to 69 of its Decision. The appellant is rearguing this issue.

66While Rule 3.1 allows the Board to waive, or vary its own Rules, such as those regarding Disclosure, at the request of a party, the purpose is to facilitate a fair, open and accessible process and to allow effective participation of the parties. To have waived disclosure and permitted the introduction of a document after the evidence, would have prejudiced the respondent.

67The Board therefore finds that the Appellant has not met its grounds that the Board made an error of law and/or fact had been made by not accepting late disclosure.

The purpose of the SOA

68The appellant submitted that the Board’s decision to “not consider an unsubstantiated claim of financial hardship” (paragraph 67) equates to cruel and unusual punishment. He submitted that an error was therefore made in that the decision was contrary to the intent of the Rules, the PAWS Act, and societal expectations of a fair outcome, bringing the administration of justice into disrepute.

69The respondent submitted that the appellant testified on the first day of the hearing that he was unable to pay the SOA, and that was the extent of the evidence during the hearing. It added that it was not until the day after the hearing, before beginning submissions, that the appellant attempted to introduce a financial statement and Revenue Canada Statement of Account for invoices to the Board. The respondent objected to the introduction of evidence after the close of the hearing, noting that the materials were not provided in disclosure and not raised in testimony. The Board upheld the respondent’s objection and refused to allow the new evidence.

70The respondent also submitted that the PAWS Act sets out a clear obligation/liability of an owner for costs incurred by AWS in caring for animals in its care. It submitted that this is reimbursement, not a penalty. It further submitted that there is no financial gain or imposition of a penalty in the assessment of a SOA, and that all of the expenses included on the SOA were supported by invoices and were directly spoken to at the hearing by first-hand witnesses.

71In its reply submissions the appellant added that if he forfeits the animals, they will be sold, and the alleged profits go to AWS. The Board advises this is a new argument, and therefore will not be considered.

72The appellant has not persuaded the Board that it made an error in law and/or fact when it did not consider the appellant’s unsubstantiated claims of financial hardship, submitted after the hearing. The Board does not accept the appellant’s new argument that the SOA is punitive. A reconsideration is not the time for presenting new arguments.

Additional Issues

73The appellant advised the Board of certain inconsistencies in the decision at paragraph 89, noting that the amount confirmed is $4,696, and the amount ordered to be paid to the Minister of Finance is $4,696.17. It further advised that the Board referred to the Appellant in the plural form.

74The Board acknowledges these typographical errors but notes that these are minor errors that are not substantive and do not change the decision. Minor errors by definition in Rule 17 do not affect the order or decision. Therefore, a reconsideration of the decision is not warranted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

75The appellant has failed to satisfy the Board that any of its Rule 18.2 criteria for Reconsideration have been established.

76For the reasons noted above, the appellant’s request for reconsideration is dismissed.

Released: May 05, 2023

____________________________

Susan Clarke, Vice-Chair

___________________________

Edgar-André Montigny, Member

Footnotes

1. 1David Romkes v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 30 (the “decision”).
2. 2Supra note 1, paras 31 – 38.
3. 3Rule 3.1(c) states that “These Rules will be liberally interpreted and applied and may be waived, varied or applied on the Tribunal’s own initiative, or at the request of a party, to ensure consistency with governing legislation and regulations.
4. 4S.O. 2019, Ch. 13
5. 5Janiak v Ippolito, 1985 CanLII 62 (SCC), SCR 146, at para 33 (Janiak).
6. 6Ibid, para 36
7. 7Note that the appellant used the September 9, 2022 removal date in his arguments. The Board has corrected this to September 12, 2022 which was the date the decision to keep in care was issued for the rabbits.
8. 8Supra note 1, paras 15 to 22.
9. 9While there were two such Guides in Schedule B, it is assumed the appellant is referencing the “Guide to Professional Practice Standard: Conflicts of Interest in the Practice of Veterinary Medicine – College of Veterinarians of Ontario” (“Guide”). A copy of the Guide was not provided in submissions however the Board was provided one during Closing Submissions at the hearing.
10. 10Westerhof v. Gee Estate, 2015 ONCA 206 (Westerhof).
11. 11R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194: Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 53.03
12. 12Appellant’s submissions Section 4, page 16
13. 13Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, s. 131
14. 14Supra note 8, Section 3, pages 14 and 15
15. 15R. V. Palmer, 1979 CanLii 8 (SCC); affirmed recently by the SCC in Barendregt v. Gebliunas, 2022 SCC 22.
16. 16.