Girard v. Chief Animal Welfare Inspector, 2022 ONACRB 4

Tribunals ontario Animal Care Review Board

TRIBUNAUX DÉCISIONNELS ONTARIO Commission d’étude des soins aux animaux

Date: 2022-01-19

Appeal under subsection 38(1) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, R.S.O. 2019, c. 13.

Between:

Robin Girard

Appellant

and

Chief Animal Welfare Inspector

Respondent

MOTION DECISION

Order made by: Lyndra Griffith, Member

For the Appellant: Self-represented

For the Respondent: Inspector Nicole Driscoll, Agent Inspector Erin Brulé, Agent Gavin Lee, Counsel

HEARD:

By way of written submissions

REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER

OVERVIEW

1The appellant appealed a compliance order made on August 31, 2021, with a compliance deadline of September 16, 2021 pursuant to section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019 (“Act”).¹ The animals subject to the compliance order are two adult Husky type dogs and the order requires that they be seen by a veterinarian.

2The respondent is seeking a dismissal by the Board of the appellant’s appeal under section 3.4 (a) of the Common Rules of Practice & Procedure (“Rules”)²on the grounds that the appellant’s appeal is frivolous, vexatious, or commenced in bad faith.

3The parties attended the hearing scheduled on September 21, 2021 and the hearing was adjourned until October 4, 2021 to allow both parties the opportunity to exchange their disclosure. The parties attended the hearing on October 4, 2021 and the respondent requested that I hear a Motion to dismiss the appeal. The respondent had retained counsel, but the respondent’s counsel did not have sufficient time to properly file a Notice of Motion within the required timeframe and serve it on the appellant prior to the hearing. I therefore ordered that the Motion be heard in writing and provided a timetable for the parties to exchange their Motion materials.

RESULT

4Having considered the evidence and submissions filed, the Board orders that the appellant’s appeal is dismissed pursuant to section 3.4 (a) of the Rules.

ISSUES

5The issue to be determined by the Board is whether the appellant’s appeal is frivolous, vexatious, or commenced in bad faith under section 3.4 (a) of the Rules.

THE LAW

6Subsections 30 (1), (2), (3), and (4) of the Act provide as follows:

(1) An animal welfare inspector who has reasonable grounds to believe that an animal is in distress and who is able to promptly find the owner or custodian of the animal may order the owner or custodian to take such action as may, in the opinion of the inspector, be necessary to relieve the animal of its distress, which may include, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, having the animal examined and treated by a veterinarian at the expense of the owner or custodian.

(2) The order shall be in writing and shall have printed or written thereon the content of subsections 38 (1), (3) and (5).

(3) The order shall specify the time within which any action required by the order shall be performed.

(4) Every person who is served with an order under this section shall comply with it in accordance with its terms until such time as it may be modified, confirmed or revoked and shall thereafter comply with the order as modified or confirmed.

7Subsection 38(1) of the Act states that:

An owner or custodian of an animal may appeal the following to the Board within five business days after receiving notice of them:

1. An order from an animal welfare inspector.

2. A decision by an animal welfare inspector to remove an animal from a place.

3. A decision to take an animal into the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector’s care.

8Subsection 40(1) of the Act states that the provisions of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act apply to a proceeding before the Board unless they conflict with a provision of the Act, the regulations, or the Board rules.

Power of the Board

9Section 3.4 of the Rules states that the Tribunal may dismiss an appeal without a hearing if:

(a) The appeal is frivolous, vexatious, or commenced in bad faith;

(b) The appeal relates to matters that are outside the Tribunal’s jurisdiction;

(c) The statutory requirements for bringing the appeal have not been met; or

(d) The appellant is found to have abandoned the proceeding.

10The Statutory Powers Procedure Act grants the decision maker the power to control the proceedings including addressing abuse of processes. Subsection 23 (1) states:

A tribunal may make such orders or give such directions in proceedings before it as it considers proper to prevent abuse of its processes. R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22, s. 23 (1).³

ANALYSIS

11The respondent submits that the appellant is an Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument (“OPCA”) litigant defined by the Alberta Court of the Queen’s Bench in Meads v. Meads.⁴ In Meads, Associate Chief Justice Rooke stated that the Court developed a new awareness and understanding of a category of vexatious litigant that he collectively labelled as Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Argument litigants [“OPCA litigants”]. The Court described in Meads that “These persons employ a collection of techniques and arguments promoted and sold by ”gurus” to disrupt court operations and to attempt to frustrate the legal rights of governments, corporations, and individuals.”⁵

12Meads states that:

OPCA strategies have proven disruptive, inflict unnecessary expenses on other parties, and are ultimately harmful to the persons who appear in court and attempt to invoke these vexatious strategies. Because of the nonsense they argue, OPCA litigants are invariably unsuccessful and their positions dismissed, typically without written reasons. Nevertheless, their litigation abuse continues. The growing volume of this kind of vexatious litigation is a reason why these Reasons suggest a strong response to curb this misconduct.⁶

13The respondent also relies on Kuleba v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation⁷ where the Ontario Assessment Review Board (OARB), relying on Meads, dismissed the appellant’s appeal as an abuse of process for advancing an OPCA argument.

14The OARB stated in Kuleba that “The Ontario Courts have been clear that OPCA litigant arguments should not be seriously considered, because the entire purpose of the tactics is to abuse the judicial process.” “People who engage in these tactics have generally learned them from others, usually for a fee. That is the sense in which these tactics are organized. There are people actively spreading these useless tactics to others for profit.”⁸

15Another authority submitted by the respondent is Ei v Morlog,⁹ where the Court stated the following:

In my view, plaintiffs who file OPCA claims are playing a game that is designed to frustrate the system and inflict unrecoverable expense and needless stress on the defendants. OPCA claims have been derided as abusive over and over again in courts across the country. I do not believe for a minute that OPCA plaintiffs believe that they can separate their legal personalities by putting their names in capital letters or calling themselves “Noble” or otherwise.¹⁰

16The respondent submits that Meads sets out a number of indicia of OPCA litigants to help with their identification. In Meads the Court explained that “persons who engage in OPCA litigation tend to adopt certain stereotypic motifs in their written materials and in‑court conduct. The vast majority of these indicia are almost never shared by other self‑represented litigants, including those who may have difficulty communicating their positions and arguments, and by litigants who are affected by cognitive and psychological dysfunction.”¹¹

17Meads clarified that “these indicia do not prove a claim or action is invalid, or that a litigant is vexatious. These are telltale fingerprints that are typically found in OPCA litigation, and that, if identified, may warrant closer review and specific court procedures.”¹²

18The respondent submits that the appellant’s Notice of Appeal (NOA) and oral submissions during the case conference and hearings disclose several key indicia of OPCA Arguments recognized in Meads and by subsequent Canadian decisions.

19The first indicium presented by the respondent was that OPCA litigants often present opposing parties with a “fee schedule” typically demanding payment in precious metals. The respondent noted that section 4 of the appellant’s NOA presents a fee schedule and demands for payment in gold:

We reserve the rights to activate fee schedule valued in precious metals. Erin is liable for the employment of our time for an hour. Six ounces of gold.¹³

20The second indicium presented by the respondent was the mention of the person’s birth certificate in atypical circumstances in OPCA documents. The respondent noted that in section 5 of the NOA, beside “Name” the appellant refers to his birth certificate:

Commercial nomenclature of the PROVINCE OF ONTARIO BIRTH CERTIFICATE held in trust by Deputy Registrar for Ontario. [Robin Girard] is registered.¹⁴

21The third indicium presented by the respondent was that OPCA litigants often use abnormal formats in their mailing addresses, including the use of square brackets, qualifying Canada in the address and modifying the postal code and/or demanding that mail only be sent to an unconventional address. The respondent noted that Section 1 of the appellant’s NOA references an unconventional address:

Robin Girard Estates General executor robin girarad, General-Post, Poupore Street, two-nine, Gogama Hamlet, nobel township Girard province, Canada minor. Near: [P0M 1W0].

22The respondent also noted that the applicant requested that disclosure be sent to a similar address during the hearing held on September 21, 2021.

23The fourth indicium presented by the respondent was that OPCA litigants frequently refuse to identify themselves by name, instead stating that they are a representative of an entity identified by the litigant’s name, such as a trust or an estate. The respondent noted that throughout the appellant’s NOA as well as during the hearing, the appellant referred to himself as either “Robin Girard Estates,” General Executor” and “General Executor Robin Girard.”¹⁵

24The fifth indicium presented by the respondent was that OPCA litigants often assert a form of dual identity where their existence is split into two legal personalities or entities. The respondent indicates that under Section 3 of the appellant’s NOA, the applicant asserts that he was unlawfully labelled and therefore has had “personation” done against him. He refers to himself in the third person and his NOA splits the appellant into two entities: General Executor Robin Girard and [Robin Girard].

25The respondent submits that the content of the appellant’s NOA and his oral submissions provide overwhelming support for the conclusion that he is an OPCA litigant.

26I am persuaded by the respondent’s evidence that, on a balance of probabilities, the applicant is an OPCA litigant and his appeal should be dismissed on the grounds that the appellant’s appeal is frivolous and vexatious. In addition to the Meads indicia presented by the respondent, it is important to note that during the Hearing teleconference held on September 21, 2021, the appellant insisted that I disclose whether or not I was bonded and he questioned my authority. This appears to be another indicium described in Meads, where the Court stated that “in some instances an OPCA litigant may argue that a defect of some kind renders a court or judge without authority. An OPCA litigant may attempt to identify that defect by demanding that the court prove its authority is valid and genuine.”¹⁶

27The appellant has not presented a basis for his appeal. The Reasons for Appeal in the NOA are as follows:

• Unlawfully labelled as general when Court of Appeal of Ontario recognizes the title of general-executor. This is personation.

• defiant trespass by ERIN BRULE.

• Trus [E.I.N. 98-6068209] is failed by Mr. Judge Robin Tremblay. the docket is doctored. affidavit never presented. This is retaliation by Ontario Provincial Police not charging bond of judge and for not returning pick-up truck as ordered by judge Martin Trembay. We are marooned under commercial blockage. Dogs accepted provisionally from lawyer. Provision of care for life of dogs. This is abreached trust.

28The Reasons for Appeal section of the appellant’s NOA contains nonsensical legal jargon combined with illogical sentences that do not address any basis for appealing a compliance order issued under s.30 of the Act. As discussed above, the remedy sought is for precious metals rather than for a remedy authorized under the Act in relation to the appellant’s two dogs. Finally, the appellant has not submitted any responding materials for this Motion. He also refused service of all documents related to this Motion, though I am satisfied from the discussions had at the hearing that the appellant had sufficient notice that his appeal could be dismissed following the Motion. He was given the opportunity to make written submissions on the subject but failed to do so.

CONCLUSION

29The appellant’s arguments and behaviour fit the profile of an OPCA litigant. Like in Kuleba, the appellant exhibits many of the traits described in Meads and presents as an OPCA litigant. His NOA does not contain any identifiable ground for appeal, he was confusing during the hearing teleconference, he challenged the Tribunal’s authority, he did not provide any coherent argument for his position, and the remedy sought isn’t possible. In light of the above, I find that the appellant is an OPCA litigant engaged in frivolous and vexatious conduct. The appropriate response is to dismiss the appeal as an abuse of process.

ORDER

30The appellant’s appeal is dismissed without a hearing pursuant s.3.4 of the Rules.

Footnotes

1. 1Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, SO 2019, c 13.
2. 2Tribunals Ontario, Common Rules of Practice & Procedure, Rule 3.4.
3. 3Statutory Powers Procedure Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.22
4. 4Meads v. Meads, 2012 ABQB 571.
5. 5Ibid at para 1.
6. 6Ibid at para 71.
7. 7Kuleba v Municipal Property Assessment Corporation, Region 13, re (Ontario Assessment Review Board, 8 O.M.T.R. 149).
8. 8Ibid.
9. 9Ei v Morlog, 2016 ONSC 4476.
10. 10Ibid at para 2.
11. 11Supra note 4 at para 199.
12. 12Ibid at para 202.
13. 13Exhibit “A”; Respondent’s Documents.
14. 14Ibid.
15. 15Exhibit “A” and “C”; Respondent’s Documents.
16. 16Supra note 4 at para 286.