DECISION AND ORDER
Appeal under section 38(2) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019, R.S.O. 2019, c.13
Between:
Donna Chudczak Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent
Adjudicator: Raymond Ramdayal, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Donna Chudczak (Self-represented) For the Respondent: Nicole Driscoll, Regional Supervisor, Inspector Kate Alemany, Animal Welfare Services
Heard by Videoconference: March 24, 2022
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
BACKGROUND
1The appellant, Donna Chudczak, appeals a Statement of Account (the “SOA”) which she was issued by Animal Welfare Services (“AWS” or the “respondent”) on March 1, 2022. The SOA is for veterinarian services including an emergency fee, examination, and euthanasia of her dog, Ksenia. The total amount of the SOA is $682.52.
2On February 23, 2022, AWS Inspector Kate Alemany removed the appellant’s dog on the basis that a veterinarian advised her that removal was necessary to alleviate its distress pursuant to s. 31(1)(a) of the Provincial Animal Welfare Act, 2019 (the “Act” or “PAWS Act”).1
3On the same day, the appellant’s dog was euthanized pursuant to s. 32(1)(b) of the Act which permits an inspector to cause an animal to be euthanized if a veterinarian has advised the Inspector in writing that it is their opinion that it is the most humane course of action. The Inspector served the notice of the euthanasia on the appellant on March 1, 2022.
4It is the appellant’s position that she should not have to pay the SOA because she feels her dog was not properly diagnosed and, hence, did not require euthanasia. She explained that she took her dog to an afterhours veterinary clinic on February 19, 2022, to seek assistance for its health issues. The attending veterinarian, Dr. C. Sauvageau, offered euthanasia after examining Ksenia. The appellant declined as she was only seeking blood work, antibiotics, and hydration.
5A veterinary technician from Dr. Sauvageau’s office subsequently contacted AWS on February 22, 2022, expressing concern about Ksenia’s welfare since the appellant had refused euthanasia. Dr. Sauvageau also called on February 23, 2022, to advise that the dog was under critical distress and needed to be removed from the appellant’s home.
6The removal of Ksenia was executed by AWS on February 23, 2022. A Notice of Removal dated February 23, 2022, was provided to the appellant.
ISSUE
7The issue to be determined in this appeal is whether the SOA should be confirmed, varied, or revoked.
RESULT
8For the reasons that follow, I find that the SOA should be confirmed.
LAW
9Section 24(1)(b) of the Act permits an animal welfare inspector to enter and inspect any place for the purpose of determining compliance with an order to relieve an animal’s distress under s.30. Section 24(2) of the Act requires, if the place to be entered is a dwelling, that the inspector have a warrant or the consent of the occupier to the entry.
10Section 31(1)(c) provides that an animal welfare inspector may remove an animal in distress and take possession of the animal for the purposes of providing it with necessaries to relieve its distress if, among other things, an order respecting the animal has been made under s.30 of the Act and the order has not been complied with.
11Distress is defined in s. 1(1) as “a state of being (a) in need of proper care, water, food or shelter, (b) injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or (c) abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.”
12Critical distress is also defined in 1(1) as distress that requires immediate intervention in order to prevent serious injury or to preserve life.
13Section 35(1) states that if the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector has provided an animal with necessaries to relieve its distress, it may “from time to time, serve on the owner or custodian of the animal a statement of account respecting the cost of the necessaries.”
14Section 38(1) provides a right of appeal of a decision for removal by an animal welfare inspector and s.38(2) allows an appeal of a statement of account.
15Section 38(9) gives the Board authority, among other things, to confirm, revoke or vary a statement of account served under s. 35(1).
16Pursuant to s. 35(4), if an Owner appeals an SOA and the Board varies or confirms the amount, and the appellant does not pay it within a prescribed period of 10 days from the date of the Board’s Order, then the animal is forfeited to the Crown.
17Under s. 35(5), the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector can enter into an agreement with an owner to reduce the amount owing on a SOA or extend the time for paying or both, whether on an initial SOA or after an amount has been confirmed or varied by the Board.
THE EVIDENCE
The Respondent’s Evidence
18The respondent relied upon the testimony of Inspector Alemany, who provided details on her investigation including the removal of Ksenia on February 23, 2022. This arose from a notification from Dr. Sauvageau’s office advising of an animal in critical distress.
19Inspector Alemany attended the appellant’s home on February 23, 2022, at approximately 1:44 p.m. in the presence of two Greater Sudbury Police Officers. Upon entering the appellant’s home, Inspector Alemany observed Ksenia to be lethargic and not inclined to move or life her head. Ksenia also had a bleeding mass on her side. Inspector Alemany stated that when the dog did stand to walk, she observed her to be very unsteady on her feed and would eventually fall back into a sitting position. Based on these observations, the Inspector determined that the dog should be seen by a veterinarian immediately.
20Inspector Alemany transported Ksenia to a veterinarian whose name was redacted from the evidence. There the animal received a full emergency examination and the veterinarian strongly advised euthanasia.
21The veterinarian was unable to attend the hearing to provide testimony. Nonetheless, Inspector Alemany testified that the veterinarian verbally informed her of their observations of Ksenia:
a. She was underweight, with a body condition score of two out of five; b. She was significantly dehydrated; c. She had a bilateral ear infection; d. She had significant dental disease; e. There was a mass on her side that was firm and bleeding; f. There was no fluid in her lungs; g. Her heart rate was poor; and h. Her abdomen was tense, suggesting the possibility of another mass.
22Inspector Alemany also stated that the veterinarian described the dog as “moribund” meaning that the animal was close to passing away. It was also stated that the dog was not likely to recover or improve with any form of treatment.
23More detailed medical information is also provided in a patient chart prepared by the attending veterinarian and dated February 24, 2022. The patient chart and other veterinary records form part of the respondent’s disclosure.
24On the same day of the examination, the attending veterinarian signed a Certificate of Veterinarian advising the euthanasia of the animal pursuant to s. 32(1)(b) of the Act. The appellant was subsequently advised by telephone of the veterinarian’s observations and recommendation that the dog be euthanized. Inspector Alemany advised the appellant that she would attend her premises on February 25, 2022, to issue her a written Notice of Euthanasia and an SOA. The appellant stated that the inspector should attend with police. When questioned about this statement at the hearing, the appellant stated that she was feeling intimidated and felt more secure for the police to be there.
25Inspector Alemany attempted on two separate occasions to have an officer of the Greater Sudbury Police to accompany her to the appellant’s home, but they were busy each time. On March 1, 2022, Inspector Alemany issued the Notice of Euthanasia and the SOA by registered mail to the appellant. The tracking number revealed that the documents were delivered and signed for by the appellant on March 3, 2022.
The Appellant’s Evidence
26The appellant described her dog as a female, white, terrier mix type who was a senior in age. The appellant testified that she is also a senior receiving government assistance and has a limited, fixed monthly income.
27The appellant contends that at the time her dog was taken from her, Ksenia’s temperature and pulse were normal, and her dehydration was treatable. She does not feel euthanasia was necessary and further states that her dog’s other medical conditions were treatable. She would have also preferred that a second and third medical opinion be sought. She also feels that Ksenia should have been placed on intravenous fluids for 24 hours.
28The appellant also submitted handwritten notes which I considered in reaching my decision. These notes contain the appellant’s account of the events and, specifically, the care she provided for her dog.
ANALYSIS
SOA should be confirmed, varied, or revoked?
29On the evidence before me, I find that the SOA should be confirmed in the amount of $682.52.
30I find that the appellant provided insufficient evidence to counter the medical opinions before me that her dog was in advanced critical condition. In addition to this, it was recommended by two separate veterinarians that the dog be euthanized. The appellant confirmed that Dr. Sauvageau recommended that Ksenia be euthanized at her visit prior to the animal’s removal. The second veterinarian that saw Ksenia (after her removal) also recommended euthanasia. The patient chart dated February 24, 2022, notes many medical issues which support this recommendation including abnormalities of the abdomen, anal glands, oral cavity, ears, eyes, cardiovascular system, lymph nodes, urogenital/reproductive and musculoskeletal system. It also stated that the dog was very dehydrated, thin, and emaciated. There were also several small adenomas including one large orange sized mass on Ksenia’s right abdomen that was actively oozing and bleeding.
31While neither of the veterinarians were able to testify at the hearing, the rules for the admission of hearsay evidence are different and more relaxed for administrative tribunals as compared to courts pursuant to s. 15(1) of the Statutory Powers Procedure Act.2 Given that Inspector Alemany’s testimony of what the veterinarian reported to her was relevant to the matter before me, and I accept the Inspector’s testimony regarding what the doctor informed her to be true and reliable evidence, I therefore place significant weight on the testimony of the Inspector, including what the veterinarian told her, as well as her account of the events concerning Ksenia. This is also corroborated in the documentary evidence before me.
32As a result, there is no question in my mind that Ksenia was in a deteriorating state and that veterinary care was required on an emergency basis. Based on the descriptions written in the veterinarian records and the testimony by Inspector Alemany, the dog was experiencing medical distress and needed to be seen by a veterinarian as soon as possible. I also accept the professional medical advice that the euthanasia was necessary which resulted in associated costs of the examination and, ultimately, euthanasia.
33Therefore, I find that the appellant is responsible for the costs of the emergency medical treatment that her dog received. I have considered the appellant’s testimony that she is a senior on a fixed income. However, her position that the total cost of the SOA is too high was not supported by evidence. The SOA is broken down as follows:
Emergency fee: $230.00 Office examination: $99.00 Euthanasia: $275.00 Total balance including HST: $682.52
34It is the respondent’s position that these costs are comparable to the invoiced costs from other veterinarians for similar services provided to AWS in the past. Although inconvenient and unexpected to the appellant, I find the costs in the SOA to be reasonable and within the ability of the appellant to pay. The appellant receives old age benefits and CPP totalling approximately $1,566.00 each month. She also has access to credit and has been using a credit card for other purchases.
35I find that the appellant has not provided sufficient evidence that repayment of the SOA would cause them undue hardship. I also note that that the week prior to this incident, the appellant took Ksenia to another vet and was able to pay for that service which was approximately $485.00.
36Based on the above, the SOA is confirmed. It is clear from the respondent’s evidence that Ksenia needed medical attention and with that came associated costs. I also accept that the amount of the SOA was reasonable and within the appellant’s ability to pay.
ORDER:
37For the reasons set out above, the Board confirms the Statement of Account in the amount of to $682.52.
Released: June 8, 2022
Raymond C. Ramdayal, Member