ANIMAL CARE REVIEW BOARD
Safety, Licensing Appeals and Standards Tribunals Ontario
COMMISSION D’ÉTUDE DES SOINS AUX ANIMAUX
Tribunaux de la sécurité, des appels en matière de permis et des normes Ontario
Appeal under section 38 of the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act, 2019. R.S.O. 2019, c.13
Between:
Robert Kamstra Appellant
and
Chief Animal Welfare Inspector Respondent
DECISION AND ORDER
Adjudicator: Marisa Victor, Member
Appearances:
For the Appellant: Self-represented For the Respondent: Craig McManus, counsel
Telephone Hearing: September 22-25, 2020
REASONS FOR DECISION AND ORDER
A. OVERVIEW
[1]. The appellant, Robert Kamstra (Mr. Kamstra), appeals 19 orders issued by Inspector Kamil Weirzbicki (Inspector Weirzbicki) of the Animal Welfare Services under the Provincial Animal Welfare Services Act (the Act).
[2]. The orders, issued under s. 30(1) of the Act on July 30, 2020, required that Mr. Kamtrsa, the owner of six cattle, two goats, one chicken and four pot-bellied pigs, take certain steps to alleviate the distress of these animals. On August 7, 2020, Inspector Weirzbicki conducted a compliance check. He then ordered that all the animals, except for the pigs, be seized pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Act due to non-compliance with the July 30, 2020 orders.
[3]. Only an owner or custodian may appeal a s. 30 and/or s. 31 order to the Board under s. 38(1) of the Act. After a hearing, the powers of the Board on an appeal are limited to those set out under s. 38(9). First, the Board may confirm, revoke or modify an order made under s. 30. Second, the Board may order that an animal removed under subsection 31 (1) or (2) be returned to the owner or custodian.
B. ISSUES
[4]. Therefore the issues before the Board are:
i. Is Mr. Kamstra an owner of the animals?
ii. Should any of the animals seized under the s. 31 orders be returned to him?
iii. Does the Board confirm, revoke or modify the s. 30 order requiring the owner or custodian to take certain steps to alleviate distress of the pigs?
C. RESULT
[5]. Based on the evidence before me, I find that Mr. Kamstra is an owner of the animals. I also find that Mr. Kamstra is not permitted to own or care for animals, and therefore they cannot be returned to him. I further find that the s. 30 order concerning the pigs’ welfare was reasonable in the circumstances. The order for the care of the pigs is modified to recognize that Erin Kamstra, the daughter of Mr. Kamstra, is one of the owners of the pigs and is required to comply the s. 30 order requirements.
D. THE ORDERS UNDER APPEAL
[6]. The following is a summary of the orders and the animals to which they apply.
The Boundary Road Orders:
[7]. On July 30, 2020, Inspector Weirzbecki issued 17 orders to Mr. Robert Kamstra Sr. pursuant to s. 30(1) of the Act requiring action to be taken regarding the following animals located at 289 Boundary Road: “4 Holstein cows, 2 Holstein bulls, 2 Calloway Cows, 2 goats.”1 The orders required as follows:
a. Have all the animals seen by a veterinarian with special attention to overall body condition, general welfare, housing and environmental assessment.
b. Orders relating to the two beef cattle (bulls) requiring adherance to sections 2.1, 2.2, 1.2 of the NFACC Beef Cattle Code of Practice, ensuring:
Adequate access to water
Adequate access to feed
Adequate access to housing that is free of hazards, comfortable and well-drained
Adequate access to natural light.
c. Orders relating to four dairy cattle requiring adherance to sections 1.1, 1.6, 2.2, 2.3, 3.10 of the NFACC Dairy Cattle Code of Practice, ensuring:
A resting area that has bedding, warmth and dryness. Bare concrete unacceptable
Housing must allow the animals to easily stand up, lie down, have normal resting postures and visual contact with other cattle
No bare concrete platforms or hard rubber mats without generous bedding and ensure daily removal of manure
Food adequate to maintain growth and vigour
Access to adequate water
Removal of manure from alleys and beds.
d. Orders relating to two goats requiring adherance to sections 1.5.1, 1.5.2, of the CAFRC Goats Codes of Practice, ensuring:
Safe flooring, secure footing and effectively drained flooring
Absorbent bedding material and clean, comfortable and dry bedding
Access to adequate water
Access to adequate feed to meet needs and maintain proper body condition.
e. That “all animals (6 cows, 2 goats)”2 be restrained by a chain or pipe allowing the animal to move safely and be able to access water and feed.
[8]. On August 7, 2020, a Notice of Removal was issued pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Act for “2 bulls, 2 Calloway cows, 2 Holstein cows, 1 goat, 1 kid.”
The 7499 Hwy 11 Orders:
[9]. On July 30, 2020, an order was issued pursuant to s. 30(1) of the Act requiring that the four pot-bellied pigs located there be seen by a veterinarian and that they be provided with adequte food and water.
[10]. Also on July 30, 2020, a notice of removal was issued pursuant to s. 31(1) of the Act for “1 chicken black in colour” located there.
E. PRELIMINARY ISSUES
[11]. At the start of the hearing, I asked the parties if there were any preliminary matters to be dealt with.
[12]. The appellant raised that he had not received the documents that the respondent intended to rely on. It should be noted there was a case conference order issued requiring exchange of documents prior to the hearing and by specific dates. Neither party had complied with these dates.
[13]. As a result, I determined that the fairest way to proceed was to adjourn the matter for a day. I directed both parties to exchange their documents over email in the meantime.
[14]. At the start of the second day of the hearing, the parties confirmed receipt of all the disclosure. Mr. Kamstra was asked about his ability to proceed with the hearing given the late disclosure. Although he felt it was unfair that he had not been given the documents in accordance with the case conference order, he did not raise any prejudice that prevented him from continuing with the hearing. Given that the key documents were the orders issued and that these were served on Mr. Kamstra on the day they were issued, I determined that the hearing could proceed.
F. ISSUE 1: IS THE APPELLANT, MR. KAMSTRA, AN OWNER OF THE ANIMALS?
[15]. After dealing with all preliminary issues, I directed the respondent to lead with its evidence first. This meant that Mr. Kamstra did not begin his evidence until the final day of the three-day hearing.
[16]. On the final day, Mr. Kamstra raised, for the first time before me, that he was not the owner of the animals. This was not raised as a preliminary issue even though only an owner or custodian has a right of appeal before the Board.3 Mr. Kamstra was self-represented and likely did not appreciate that this issue should have been raised as a preliminary matter at the start of the hearing.
Appellant’s Evidence and Submissions
[17]. Mr. Kamstra testified that the orders were issued to a “Robert Kamstra Sr.” but the appellant identifies himself as “Robert Allan Kamstra Jr.” He stated that Robert Winifred Allan Kamstra Sr., now deceased, was his father and was known as Robert Kamstra Sr. Complicating matters is that the appellant also has a son named Robert Allan Douglas Kamstra.
[18]. Mr. Kamstra testified that he is not the legal owner of the animals. He stated that he could not own the animals due to a judicial undertaking not to own, care for, or reside with animals (the “judicial undertaking”). This would also prevent him from being a custodian of the animals. The judicial undertaking was given as a result of unrelated criminal proceedings.
[19]. Mr. Kamstra also testified that he had been in a car accident and that his injuries prevented him from physically caring for the animals. This evidence was corroborated by Inspector Weirzbicki.
[20]. In response to cross-examination, Mr. Kamstra provided the following conflicting information regarding ownership of the animals:
a. The two bulls4 were owned by a either a business relationship or family members who do not want to be named and are too afraid of the Animal Welfare Services to come forward.5 He also separately stated that a family member took possession of them two weeks before the orders were issued. Mr. Kamstra would not clarify whether the “business relationship” is among family members, which family members are involved and who took possesion of the animals. Mr. Kamstra was adamant that he could not name other people for fear of retribution.
b. Two Holsteins had been his but he relinquished them due to the judicial undertaking not to own, possess or reside with any animal.
c. The goats were not his and are owned by his estranged wife Kim Kamstra.6
d. The pigs belong to Kim Kamstra.
e. The three roosters (2 deceased, 1 seized) belong to Kim Kamstra, although one was probably originally his.
[21]. He testified that although the animals at Boundary Road are owned by unnamed family members too afraid to come forward, he continued with the appeal on their behalf.
[22]. Mr. Kamstra testified that the bulls were purchased for food. He stated that he had made the arrangements for the animals to be sent to slaughter at a future date. The meat was to stock the family’s freezer. The pigs and roosters were also meant to be slaughtered and his daughter, Erin Kamstra, had made arrangements for that.
[23]. Erin Kamstra, Mr. Kamstra’s daughter, testified in support of the appellant. She testified that she was not the legal owner of the animals. She also stated that the legal owners were family members who are afraid to come forward. In cross-examination, she stated that she owns the pigs and that one Holslein heifer and male calf are hers.
[24]. In conclusion, the appellant submits that he cannot be the owner of the animals because of the judicial undertaking that prevents him from owning animals. He further reiterates that the respondent is targeting him and his family such that family members who are owners of the animals are too afraid to come forward.
Respondent’s Evidence and Submissions
[25]. Inspector Weirzbicki testifed for the respondent. He stated that his initial reason for conducting an inspection was in response to a complaint that the respondent received.
[26]. Inspector Weirzbicki stated that the mailbox located at 289 Boundary Road lists two names: L. Teasdale and R. Kamstra. When he first attended the property at 289 Boundary Road on July 30, 2020, Inspector Weirzbicki met with Linda Teasdale, Mr. Kamstra’s aunt. She stated that she was an owner of the 289 Boundary Dr. property. She signed a consent to inspect the property. In addition, she added to the consent that “the livestock do not belong to me.” She stated to Inspector Weirzbicki that Mr. Kamstra owns the animals.
[27]. Inspector Weirzbicki then proceeded to 7499 Hwy 11 in order to serve the orders, as he believed that was Mr. Kamstra’s residence. Inspector Weirzbicki had attended at that property before due to other investigations involving the appellant. On arrival, he noticed two dead chickens in cages. The cages were beneath a shelter that exposed the animals to the elements. The cages contained no food or water. A third rooster was still alive and seized immediately under s. 31 of the Act due to its distress. Inspector Weirzbicki also noticed pigs on the property at that time and issued the s. 30 orders relevant to the pigs care. He further testified that Mr. Kamstra was not at either location on July 30, 2020.
[28]. Inspector Weirzbicki eventually served Mr. Kamstra with the orders later that day at Mr. Kamstra’s mother’s address on Amelia Street in Thunder Bay. While being served with the orders, Mr. Kamstra stated that the animals were not his. Inspector Weirzbicki stated that, due to the escalating situation, he called the Thunder Bay police for assistance. Inspector Weirzbicki testified that the police informed him that Mr. Kamstra was not allowed to possess or take care of animals. Mr. Kamstra accepted the orders that were being served on him once the officers advised him he needed to accept the documents or else he could be breaching the conditions of his judicial undertaking.
[29]. Inspector Weirzbicki later confirmed through a police records search that Mr. Kamstra is not to have care or control of animals or reside in a home with animals. The records also showed that Kim Kamstra is not allowed near Mr. Kamstra, not allowed at the 7499 Hwy 11 property, and has not been there since April 2020. This information is relevant in regard to the ownership of the pigs.
[30]. On August 7, 2020, Inspector Weirzbicki re-attended at 289 Boundary Road property to check on compliance with the s. 30 orders. While there, he was confronted by Erin Kamstra. She stated to him that she and Carli Garrett, a friend, were providing care to the animals. She also stated that Mr. Kamstra was not allowed to care for the animals.
[31]. In conclusion, the respondent submits that Mr. Kamstra is the owner of the animals on the following basis:
a. Mr. Kamstra did not inform the respondent that he was not the owner of the animals when he was served with the orders at issue.7
b. Mr. Kamstra testified at the hearing with respect to providing care for the animals.
c. There was no evidence of other owners aside from Mr. Kamstra and Erin Kamstra’s statements that the legal owners are too fearful to come forward.
Analysis
[32]. I find that the appellant, Mr. Kamstra, is an owner of all the animals. The term “owner” is not defined in the Act. It may very well be that Mr. Kamstra is a co-owner. It was uncontested that he has a judicial undertaking not to own, care or reside with animals. However, I do not find that this bars me from determining that he was indeed an owner.
[33]. My finding does not mean that Mr. Kamstra has breached the conditions placed on him in relation to his judicial undertaking. I have no jurisdiction to make any such a determination. My finding that Mr. Kamstra is an owner of the animals at issue in the orders before me is made on a balance of probabilities and based on the evidence I heard. The significance of the finding is only in relation to the appeal before this Board under the Act.
[34]. In relation to the name “Robert Kamstra Sr.” on the orders, the respondent clearly intended to serve this appellant. The appellant and Inspector Weirzbicki are known to each other. When Inspector Weirzbicki did not locate Mr. Kamstra at his properties, he located the appellant at his mother’s house and served him in person. The appellant is convinced Inspector Weirzbicki and other members of Animal Welfare Services have a vendetta against him. This would indicate that he too believed that the orders were meant for him. It is improbable that anyone would believe that the orders for immediate care of the animals were meant for the deceased Robert Kamstra Sr. Therefore, as both parties seemed to understand that the orders were meant to be served on this appellant, I do not find that the addition of “Sr.” caused any real confusion or invalidated the orders.
[35]. With regard to the animals at 289 Boundary Road, Mr. Kamstra’s aunt indicated that he was the owner of the animals. She also said the animals were on the Boundary Road property temporarily until Mr. Kamstra could build something suitable at the 7499 Hwy 11 property. Mr. Kamstra agreed he was the owner of some of the animals in the past. He then stated that ownership had been relinquished and that unnamed family members, possibly through a business relationship, now jointly owned the animals, in particular the bulls. This evidence was unconvincing and was not supported by any corroborative evidence such as documents. Regardless, Mr. Kamstra retained some control over the animals even if he was not physically taking care of them.8 The animals were kept on properties which were known to be locations he lived at or visited frequently.9 Indeed, the 289 Boundary Road property has his name on the mailbox, together with the name of his aunt. Mr. Kamstra intended that the bulls would be slaughtered for food for himself and other family members. He himself had made the arrangments for the bulls to be taken to slaughter. Due to the s. 31 orders for the seizure of the animals, the slaughter did not occur. I find that if a person makes arrangements for the end of life of an animal, then they are exercising legal rights over that animal. This is an indication of ownership.
[36]. The 7499 Hwy 11 property is owned by Mr. Kamstra and his estranged wife Kim Kamstra. However, Inspector Weirzbicki testified that he had been informed that Kim Kamstra was not allowed to attend at the 7499 Hwy 11 property and had not been there since April 2020. The three chickens, two deceased, at that location were housed in a shelter made by Mr. Kamstra. Mr. Kamstra stated one of the chickens had been his. The pigs and the chickens were also intended for slaughter. In this case, those arrangements were made by Erin Kamstra. According to Inspector Weirzbicki, Mr. Kamstra’s aunt told him the animals at 289 Boundary Road would all be moved to 7499 Hwy 11 at some point once Mr. Kamstra could build shelters for them. Mr. Kamstra testified that the pigs were his wife’s animals, though she is not allowed on the property. However, Erin Kamstra testified that the pigs were hers. The totality of this evidence again suggests that Mr. Kamstra is the owner, or co-owner, of the rooster and the pigs at 7499 Hwy 11.
[37]. Finally, I note that Mr. Kamstra did not want to accept the orders when they were served on him on July 30, 2020. Indeed, the testimony of Inspector Weirzbicki suggests that he was forced to accept them by police who advised him he would be in breach of his judicial undertaking if he did not accept the documents. Nevertheless, once he took the order, he then assumed the role of an owner. Only an owner or custodian has the right to appeal to the Board.10 Mr. Kamstra exercised that legal right and appealed the orders. I do not accept that he did so on behalf of unnamed family members. Mr. Kamstra filed the appeal under his name. He did not act as a representative. He acted as the appellant. These actions also support the finding that he has legal rights over the animals and is an owner of the animals at issue in the orders.
[38]. If I am wrong, however, and Mr. Kamstra is not the owner, then the appeal by Mr. Kamstra cannot proceed. Under s. 38 of the Act, only an owner or custodian of an animal subject to a s. 30 or s. 31 order can appeal to the Board. Mr. Kamstra cannot be a custodian as his injuries, regardless of the judicial undertaking, prevent him from caring for the animals. If Mr. Kamstra is not an owner or a custodian then he has no standing as an appellant. As an owner or custodian has five days to file an appeal under the Act,11 and that time period has long since passed, there could be no appeal by any other potential owner of the animals. The respondent then retains possession of the animals, assumes full responsibility for them, and may dispose of them as it sees fit.
ISSUE 2: SHOULD ANY OF THE ANIMALS REMOVED UNDER S. 31 BE RETURNED TO MR. KAMSTRA?
[39]. Given that I have found that Mr. Kamstra is an owner, I must now turn my mind to the Board’s powers under this appeal: whether any of the animals removed under s. 31 should be returned to the owner.
[40]. This leads to a significant problem. If Mr. Kamstra were to be succesful in this appeal, the seized animals would be returned to his ownership. This would violate his judicial undertaking that he shall not own, possess or reside with any animals. There are no other owners who have appealed to this Board in relation to these orders. The succesful appeal of these orders cannot result in the animals being returned to any other owner but Mr. Kamstra.
[41]. This is an impossible appeal because even if I was persuaded to grant the appeal, I could not grant the relief. Even if Mr. Kamstra could establish that the animals should be returned to him, his own testimony regarding his judicial undertaking clearly indicates that the animals cannot be returned to him. Indeed, even if there was a custodian who could care for the animals on his behalf, he would still be in violation of his judicial undertaking because he is not allowed to own animals at all.
[42]. I stated above that my finding that Mr. Kamstra is the owner of the animals is not a finding that Mr. Kamstra has violated his judicial undertaking. However, it is quite another issue for this Board to order that the animals be returned to his ownership in direct violation of that judicial undertaking. It could also put Mr. Kamstra in significant jeopardy by issuing an order that clearly violates the restrictions he is under.
[43]. Given the above, Mr. Kamstra cannot be succesful because he is barred from owning, caring for or residing with the animals he is seeking to reclaim possession of under this appeal. The appeal cannot succeed.
[44]. Nevertheless, I do wish to acknowledge that two days of testimony centered on whether the animals at issue were properly being taken care of. Any finding I make in relation to this issue is moot because I cannot return the animals. In general, though, the appellant was not able to show on a balance of probabilities that the orders issued on July 30 were not required. Two chickens were dead in their cages exposed to the elements and with only empty water and food dishes. None of the remaining animals appeared to have access to palatable and clean water in quantities to meet their needs. The bedding available to the cattle was less then the standard required as evidenced by the lack of depth of the bedding and because manure was caked to their underbellies. The bulls’ heads were tethered so tightly with chains that they could not adopt normal postures, could not lie down, nor could they have accessed water if some had been available. There did not appear to be any change in the care of the animals at the reinspection on August 7 which lead to the animals’ removal. The veterinary report completed after the animals were seized stated that the surviving rooster, the two Holstein cows and the adult female goat were in thin body condition and required access to good quality feed. In conclusion, the s. 30 orders issued on July 30 and the s. 31 orders issued on August 7 were necessary to alleviate the distress of the animals.
ISSUE 3: DOES THE BOARD CONFIRM, REVOKE OR MODIFY THE S. 30 ORDER REQUIRING THE OWNER OR CUSTODIAN TO TAKE CERTAIN STEPS TO ALLEVIATE DISTRESS OF THE PIGS?
[45]. The concerns regarding ownership raised under the second issue are not determinative of this issue since the animals were not seized. The Board is not being asked to return the animals to an owner. Instead, the Board must confirm, revoke or modify the s. 30 orders issued for the care of the pigs at 7499 Hwy 11.
Respondent’s Evidence
[46]. Inspector Weirzbicki testified that on July 30, 2020, he observed that the four pot-bellied pigs, including one boar, were loose on the property and were in lean condition. He suspected that they had access to water somewhere, but could not find the source. He noted that the boar was in lean condition and was losing hair and you could see his vertebrae. He provided the animals with water while he was there.
[47]. Inspector Weirzbicki did not do a thorough inspection of the property because he did not believe he had the grounds to so do. He did not have a warrant, did not have permission of the owners of the property to inspect, and did not have a complaint to investigate in relation to this property. He attended at the property in order to serve the Boundary Road s. 30 orders and made the orders here at 7499 Hwy 11 based on plain sight observations he made on arrival.
[48]. Inspector Weirzbicki’s concern regarding the pigs was that they were exposed to hazards on the property and that this caused an undue risk of distress. There was debris and materials throughout including garbage, old tires, old farm equipment and metal and wire pieces. He supported his evidence with photos of the grounds. Based on his observations, he believed the pigs were at an undue risk of distress.
[49]. Photos of the property and of the pigs were entered into evidence. The photos show pigs roaming free in areas where there is significant material such as garbage, wires, old tires, metal and debris. There is one photo of a pig in a pen with a rooster. That pen has bedding and what appears to be a bucket.
[50]. With regard to their food, Inspector Weirzbicki believed the pigs only had access to whatever food they could scavenge. Inspector Weirzbicki also testified that one of the pigs followed him around and he took this as an indication that the pig was hungry. In his opinion, the pigs, and in particular the boar, were too thin.
[51]. Inspector Weirzbicki testified that when he returned for a compliance inspection on August 7, 2020 he found the boar still running loose.
Appellant’s Evidence
[52]. Erin Kamstra testified that the pigs were hers.12 She was arranging for their butchering. She stated that she had six pigs but that one had been missing since Inspector Weirzbicki’s inspection. She stated that the animals were penned and that it was Inspector Weirzbicki who let them out.
[53]. She testified that the pigs love eating rotten apples and that food was stored for the pigs outside the pen. She stated that there was food and water in the pens. She disagreed that the pigs were skinny.
[54]. Erin Kamstra testified that a veterinarian did come to view the pigs and determined that the housing available was secure for the pigs. Although a veterinarian report was entered into evidence, it only related to the cattle and the rooster and did not mention the pigs. No veterinarian evidence was entered, either through documents or via testimony, to confirm or contradict the observations of either party in relation to the care of the pigs.
Analysis
[55]. “Distress” is defined in the Act at s. 1(1) as being:
a. in need of proper care, water, food or shelter
b. injured, sick, in pain or suffering, or
c. abused or subject to undue physical or psychological hardship, privation or neglect.
[56]. Section 15(3) of the Act states that “No person shall knowingly or recklessly cause an animal to be exposed to an undue risk of distress.” The Act does not to define the phrase “undue risk of distress”.
[57]. The appellant must show on a balance of probabilities, meaning that it is more likely than not, that the order issued should be revoked or modified. I cannot find in favour of the appellant. The evidence before me establishes that the pigs should be seen by a veterinarian, and be provided with adequate food and water.
[58]. This decision is based on several factors. First, two chickens on the property were found dead in their cages lacking access to food and water. Second, the location of the food and water for the pigs was unknown. Third, the grounds the animals were roaming contained siginficant debris, such as metal and wires that could injure the animals. This is a significant factor considering that it appears there was no one living at the property and an animal tangled in metal debris could be injured and in distress for a substantial period of time before being discovered and assisted. Fourth, the boar’s appearance suggested that veterinary attention may be needed. On the totality of the evidence, I find that the order to have the pigs seen by a veterinarian and provided with access to food and water is reasonable under the circumstances and necessary to relieve the animals of undue risk of distress.
[59]. The evidence also establishes that Erin Kamstra is an owner of the pigs. She stated they were hers. She also testified that she provides the animals with care. She was also responsible for arranging butchering, a reasonable indication of ownership.
[60]. Therefore, I am modifiying the order so that the owner required to comply with the s. 30 order is not Mr. Kamstra, but is instead Erin Kamstra. I am also modifying the date of compliance to seven days after this order is issued.
ORDER:
[61]. Pursuant to the powers of the Board under s. 38 of the Act, the Board orders that:
a. The orders issued under s. 31 of the Act seizing the animals at 289 Boundary Road (August 7, 2020) and the rooster at 789 Hwy 11 (July 30, 2020) are confirmed. The animals shall not be returned to the owner, Robert Kamstra.
b. The order requiring that the pot-bellied pigs at 789 Hwy 11 be examined by a veterinarian and provided with adequate food and water is modified such that the owner who must comply with the order is now Erin Kamstra and the date of compliance is changed to seven days from the date of this order.
Released: December 2, 2020
Marisa Victor, Member
Footnotes
- There was significant conflicting evidence during the hearing regarding the description of the animals. While the first order states that it relates to eight cattle “4 Holstein cows, 2 Holstein bulls, 2 Calloway Cows, 2 goats,” it was clear from the testimony of both parties that the orders only relate to six cattle: two beef cattle bulls, four dairy cattle (both male and female). There was disagreement as to whether the cattle identified as beef cattle were “Calloway” or “Belted Galloway” and whether some of the “cows” were in fact young male bovines.
- Note that this order, issued the same day as the first order identifying eight cattle, now indicates there are only six cattle.
- See s. 38 of the Act.
- Mr. Kamstra identified these as two Belted Galloway bulls. They are identified as the 2 beef cattle or bulls in the orders.
- Mr. Kamstra’s closing submissions focused on the perceived vendetta the respondent has against the appellant and his family. He believes the respondent has sought to destroy his life. Whether or not this belief is accurate is not a matter that can be decided by the Board.
- The unrelated criminal and family law processes relate to the breakdown of marriage between Mr. Kamstra and Kim Kamstra.
- This is contradicted by the respondent’s own witness, Inspector Weirzbicki, during his testimony.
- It was undisputed that Mr. Kamstra was in a car accident and as a result has injuries creating mobility issues.
- There is no requirement under the Act that an owner of an animal must also be the owner of the property where the animal is located.
- See s. 30, 31 and 38 of the Act.
- See s. 38 of the Act.
- Mr. Kamstra testified that the pigs belonged to his wife Kim Kamstra.