The appellant was convicted of possession of a loaded restricted firearm and failure to comply with a condition of a recognizance after a firearm was found in his bag in the back seat of a car also occupied by two other individuals.
The trial judge rejected the appellant's testimony that he did not know the firearm was in his bag as not credible and concluded that the only reasonable inference from the circumstantial evidence was that the firearm had been concealed in the bag with the appellant's knowledge.
The appellant appealed to the Court of Appeal on the ground that the verdict was unreasonable; the majority dismissed that appeal.
The Supreme Court unanimously dismissed the further appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D.) framework, no error in the Court of Appeal's application of Villaroman, and no error in the trial judge's use of the appellant's calm demeanour at arrest as one element of the circumstantial evidence of knowledge.