The most frequently cited decisions in Ontario courts, ranked by number of citations.
The appellants abandoned an application for judicial review and the respondents were awarded costs fixed at $187,682.51 on a partial indemnity basis. The appellants appealed the costs order, arguing the costs should have been referred for assessment and that the amount was excessive. The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge did not err in fixing the costs rather than referring them for assessment. However, the Court found the costs awarded were excessive and not fair and reasonable, noting the amount was virtually the same as a substantial indemnity award and the proceedings relied on the same record as an earlier application. The appeal was allowed and the costs award was reduced to $63,000.
The court determined the dispositive appellate issues on the evidentiary record. The reasons address the principal submissions, apply the governing legal framework, and resolve the controlling questions. Relief was granted or refused according to the applicable standard of review and the merits.
The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial that hinged on the credibility of the accused versus the complainant. During the main charge, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in a brief recharge requested by the Crown, the judge erroneously framed the core issue as whether the jury believed the complainant or the accused, omitting the third alternative that they might disbelieve the accused but still have a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Canada held that, despite the error in the recharge, the charge read as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the proper standard of proof, given the correct instructions in the main charge and the short time elapsed before the recharge. The appeal was dismissed.
The appellant challenged firearms convictions arising from a street encounter with police, alleging arbitrary detention and breach of the right to counsel before he disclosed possession of a firearm. The Court held that a psychological detention had crystallized during the encounter, that the detention was arbitrary under s. 9, and that the failure to advise of counsel breached s. 10(b). The Court reformulated the legal framework for detention and established a revised three-part approach to exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), ultimately admitting the firearm because the police conduct, though unconstitutional, was not egregious and the evidence was highly reliable and essential. The Court also held that simple movement of a firearm from place to place did not constitute a 'transfer' for the purpose of the weapons trafficking offence, and entered an acquittal on that count.
The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road. The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign. The Court of Appeal overturned this finding. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error. The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.
The Court allowed the Crown's sentencing appeal, restored the trial sentence of six years and six months for two counts of impaired driving causing death, and reduced the driving prohibition to two years and four months after accounting for the presentence no-driving period.
Landmark decision reforming the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions. The Court established a presumption that reasonableness is the applicable standard of review, rebuttable where the legislature has indicated a different standard (including by providing a statutory appeal mechanism) or where the rule of law requires correctness review on constitutional questions, general questions of central legal importance, or jurisdictional boundaries between administrative bodies. The Court also provided extensive guidance on conducting reasonableness review. On the merits, the Registrar's decision to cancel the respondent's citizenship certificate was found unreasonable, as the statutory exception denying citizenship by birth to children of foreign government employees was intended to apply only to individuals whose parents had been granted diplomatic privileges and immunities.
The appellant sought a stay for breach of the constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time after substantial pre-trial and trial delay in a drug prosecution. The Court held the delay was unreasonable and reformulated the governing section 11(b) framework by introducing presumptive ceilings of 18 months in provincial court and 30 months in superior court or post-preliminary inquiry matters. Delay above the ceiling is presumed unreasonable unless the Crown proves exceptional circumstances outside its control. Applying that framework contextually, the remaining delay far exceeded the ceiling and was not justified by complexity, transition, or institutional strain. The convictions were set aside and a stay was entered.
The applicants, two major tobacco companies, sought an interlocutory stay to suspend the enforcement of new packaging regulations under the Tobacco Products Control Act pending their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the Act's constitutionality. The Court established the three-part test for interlocutory relief in Charter cases: a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience. While the applicants demonstrated a serious question and irreparable financial harm, the Court held that the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favour of the public interest in health, which the regulations aimed to protect. The applications for a stay were dismissed.
The court determined the dispositive appellate issues on the evidentiary record. The reasons address the principal submissions, apply the governing legal framework, and resolve the controlling questions. Relief was granted or refused according to the applicable standard of review and the merits.
The appellant, a non-unionized public employee holding office 'at pleasure', was dismissed without cause and given four months' pay in lieu of notice. He grieved the dismissal, and an adjudicator ordered his reinstatement, finding a breach of procedural fairness and interpreting the governing legislation as requiring cause for dismissal. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator's statutory interpretation was unreasonable and that public employees governed by a contract of employment are not owed a public law duty of procedural fairness upon dismissal. In doing so, the Court fundamentally restructured the framework for judicial review of administrative decisions, collapsing the three previous standards of review into two: correctness and reasonableness.
The appellants challenged a trial costs order requiring them to pay the respondent more than $509,000 in fees, much of it on an elevated indemnity basis after a without-costs offer to settle. The Court of Appeal held that elevated costs are warranted only through the operation of rule 49.10 or where the losing party engaged in reprehensible or egregious conduct deserving of sanction. Because the offer did not engage rule 49.10 and there was no sanction-worthy conduct, the elevated award was an error in principle. The court further held the amount awarded was not fair and reasonable under the governing costs principles and reduced the fees award to $300,000.
In a criminal appeal concerning circumstantial proof of possession of child pornography, the Court clarified that alternative inferences consistent with innocence may arise from evidence or absence of evidence, but must be reasonable rather than speculative. The Court held there is no mandatory formula for circumstantial-evidence instructions, though juries should be cautioned against inferential gap-filling and premature conclusions. Reading the trial reasons as a whole, the Court found no reversible legal error in the treatment of inferences, burden, or standard of proof. The guilty verdict was held reasonable on the totality of the evidence. The acquittal was set aside and Charter ss. 8 and 24(2) issues were remanded to the provincial appellate court.
This appeal concerned a variation application arising from a custodial parent's proposed relocation of the child to Australia. The Court held that the party seeking variation must first establish a material change in the circumstances affecting the child, after which the court must conduct a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests without any legal presumption favouring the custodial parent, while giving that parent's views serious respect. Applying that framework, the Court concluded that the relocation materially affected the child because it would significantly curtail frequent and meaningful contact with the access parent, but the child's best interests still favoured remaining in the custodial parent's care. The appeal was allowed in part only to vary access so it could be exercised in Canada rather than Australia, with no costs.
The appellants were former employees of a bankrupt shoe retailer. Following the bankruptcy, the employees' employment was terminated. The Ministry of Labour filed a proof of claim for termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, which the Trustee disallowed on the basis that bankruptcy does not constitute termination 'by an employer'. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the words of an Act must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. The Court found that interpreting the ESA to exclude bankrupt employers would lead to absurd results and defeat the remedial purpose of the legislation.
The Crown appealed a Manitoba Court of Appeal decision reducing a six-year sentence for sexual interference with a four-year-old child to four and one-half years. The sentencing judge had employed a higher starting point despite the absence of a formal trust relationship, relying on the aggravating nature of the offence. The Court of Appeal found an error in principle. The Supreme Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal mischaracterized the sentencing judge's reasoning and that no error in principle was made. The Court provided comprehensive guidance on sentencing for sexual offences against children, directing that sentences must increase to reflect Parliament's legislative initiatives and society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children.
The accused, a stockbroker, was convicted of fraud after a jury trial. The trial judge instructed the jury that 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' should be understood in its 'ordinary, natural every day sense'. The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the jury charge insufficient. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that trial judges must explain the concept of reasonable doubt to juries. The Court provided a model charge, emphasizing that reasonable doubt is inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence, is not an ordinary everyday concept, and must be based on reason and common sense rather than sympathy or prejudice. The trial judge's failure to properly define the standard of proof was a fundamental error that could not be saved by the curative proviso.
The Crown appealed a decision substituting a conditional sentence for an 18-month custodial sentence imposed after guilty pleas to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The Court held that Bill C-41 and the conditional sentencing provisions were enacted to reduce incarceration and promote restorative justice, but conditional sentences remain punitive sanctions distinct from probation and generally should include restrictive conditions such as house arrest. The Court interpreted s. 742.1 purposively, holding that the sentencing judge need not first fix an equivalent jail term before considering community service of the sentence, and that community safety is a threshold inquiry focused on the specific offender's risk of reoffending and potential harm. While conditional sentences may satisfy denunciation and deterrence in appropriate cases, the sentencing judge's decision to impose jail here was not demonstrably unfit. The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence restored, and its service stayed because the respondent had already completed the conditional sentence.
The applicant sought judicial review of a director's delegate's decision which overturned an arbitrator's finding that the applicant was not bound by the $3,500 limit for medical and rehabilitation benefits under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS). The Divisional Court held that the director's delegate reasonably concluded that sections 14 and 18 of the SABS create limits on liability rather than exclusions, meaning the burden of proof remains on the insured. However, the court found the director's delegate erred in concluding that the Minor Injury Guideline is entirely binding as if it were part of the SABS, holding instead that it is only incorporated by reference where expressly required for interpretation. The application for judicial review was allowed and the matter remitted for a new preliminary issue hearing.
The appellant, a woman with Canadian-born dependent children, was ordered deported. She applied for an exemption based on humanitarian and compassionate considerations, which was denied without formal reasons, though she was later provided with the notes of the investigating immigration officer. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the duty of procedural fairness applied and required the provision of reasons, which was satisfied by the officer's notes. However, the notes demonstrated a reasonable apprehension of bias and the decision was an unreasonable exercise of discretion because it failed to give serious weight and consideration to the best interests of the appellant's children.
The Crown appealed a sentence reduction in a case involving prolonged physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of the offender's children. The Court held that there is no legal ceiling capping fixed-term sentences at 20 years under the Criminal Code, absent special circumstances, and that the totality principle requires only that the global sentence be just and appropriate and proportionate to the offender's overall culpability. The Court further confirmed that retribution is a legitimate and important sentencing principle, distinct from vengeance and complementary to denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society. Applying the deferential standard of review for sentence appeals, the Court held the appellate court erred by intervening absent demonstrable unfitness and restored the 25-year cumulative sentence.
The appellant father appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay child support based on an imputed annual income of $30,000. The father had quit his job as a tool and die maker and enrolled as a full-time university student. The Court of Appeal held that 'intentionally' under section 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines does not require bad faith or a specific intent to evade support obligations. The court upheld the finding that the father was intentionally under-employed but reduced the imputed income to $16,500, reflecting his capacity to work part-time while studying. The court also varied the retroactive support period to account for times the father provided childcare and was on academic probation.
Following the appellant's substantial success on appeal and at trial in a family law matter, the Court of Appeal fixed costs for both proceedings. The court noted the respondent's unreasonable conduct in prolonging the trial and failing to make or accept reasonable offers to settle. Applying the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the appellant $275,000 for the trial and $25,000 for the appeal, allowing the award to be offset against the appellant's spousal support arrears.
The accused was convicted of three sexual offences against his stepdaughter. The trial judge found the complainant credible and largely rejected the accused's evidence, but did not explicitly link each incident to a specific count or detail why the accused's denial failed to raise a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions, finding the reasons insufficient. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that a trial judge's reasons must be read in context and are sufficient if they show why the judge reached the decision, without needing to detail every step of the reasoning process.
A custody and access appeal arising from a post-divorce dispute over whether an access parent could discuss and practise his religion with the children over the custodial parent's objection. The Court held that the governing standard under the Divorce Act is the best interests of the child, not a freestanding universal harm threshold, though risk of harm may be relevant in assessing the quality of access. The Court further held that ss. 16(8) and 17(5) of the Divorce Act do not violate Charter guarantees of religion, expression, association, or equality. The appeal was allowed in part: the religious discussion restrictions were removed or treated as unnecessary in light of undertakings, the wife retained the matrimonial home, certain debt allocations and costs awards were varied, and costs against counsel and the religious society were set aside.
The accused, a pediatrician, was charged with sexually assaulting four teenage female patients. At trial, the defence sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence that the perpetrator of such offences would belong to a narrow class of individuals (e.g., pedophiles or sexual psychopaths) and that the accused did not possess the characteristics of this class. The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, establishing a four-part test for the admission of expert evidence: relevance, necessity in assisting the trier of fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified expert. The Court held the psychiatric evidence was inadmissible as it lacked sufficient reliability and necessity to overcome the exclusionary rule against character evidence.
The accused was convicted of possession of child pornography after police searched his computer pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was obtained based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) sworn by a police officer after a computer technician reported seeing suspicious bookmarks and a webcam pointed at a child's play area. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the ITO, which contained misleading and incomplete information, failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused possessed child pornography. The Court distinguished between the offences of accessing and possessing child pornography, holding that possession requires control over the underlying data files, not merely viewing images online. The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and an acquittal was entered.
This is a costs decision arising from a custody and access appeal concerning three children. The father's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on all four grounds. The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $25,000, representing 60-70% of her actual costs. The decision addresses the presumption of costs in favour of successful parties in family law matters, the application of the Family Law Rules cost framework, and the impact of unreasonable conduct by both parties. The court also addressed costs related to an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court, declining to award costs for that stage due to the confusing nature of family law appeal routes in Ontario.
The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic based largely on intercepted private communications. The trial judge refused to open the sealed packets containing the affidavits supporting the wiretap authorizations. The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused is entitled to access the sealed packet, subject to editing to protect informants, to make full answer and defence. The Court established that a trial judge may review the authorization to determine if it complies with s. 8 of the Charter, and if unlawful, the evidence must be excluded under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code. The Court also held that the accused may cross-examine the affiant with leave of the trial judge if necessary to make full answer and defence. A new trial was ordered because the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine.
The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals regarding retroactive child support. The Court held that parents have a free-standing obligation to support their children commensurate with their income, and courts have the jurisdiction to order retroactive child support under both the Divorce Act and provincial legislation. In determining whether to make a retroactive award, courts must balance the payor parent's interest in certainty with fairness to the child by considering the reason for the recipient parent's delay, the payor parent's conduct, the child's past and present circumstances, and potential hardship. The Court allowed the appeals in D.B.S. and T.A.R., restoring the chambers judges' decisions to deny retroactive support, and dismissed the appeals in Henry and Hiemstra, affirming the retroactive support awards.
The applicant alleged discrimination on the basis of ethnic origin and disability following his arrest by police for domestic assault. The Tribunal held a summary hearing under Rule 19A to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success. The Tribunal found no evidence linking the police's actions to the applicant's ethnic origin or disability, noting the arrest was based on family complaints and police observations. The application was dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.
The appellant appealed a costs award of over $300,000 made by the motion judge in family law proceedings. The motion judge had awarded costs to the respondent following a successful motion to strike the appellant's answer on the basis that a constitutional issue was not properly pleaded. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits, which provided the appellant with the opportunity to amend his answer. The respondent remained entitled to costs of the original motion, but the costs award was reduced from over $300,000 to $200,000. The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by adopting a "close to full recovery" approach, giving undue weight to settlement offers in circumstances where settlement was not practically possible, inappropriately increasing costs based on the appellant's ability to pay and the respondent's financial need, and failing to apply the proportionality principle required by the Family Law Rules.
The mother appealed a trial judgment granting sole custody to the father and ordering that her access be supervised until she received a 'clean bill of health' from a psychiatrist and a specific psychologist was involved in the decision. She also appealed the trial judge's order awarding the father full recovery of costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, striking the conditions requiring a clean bill of health and the psychologist's involvement as they were too vague and constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority. However, the court upheld the requirement for supervised access. The court also refused to admit fresh evidence generated during a confidential appellate mediation process. The appeal of the costs award was dismissed, as the mother's conduct was unreasonable and the father had made a successful offer to settle.
The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm. At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex. The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded. The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.
The accused appealed after the Court of Appeal set aside a judicial stay entered because of repeated Crown non-disclosure in a sexual offence prosecution. A majority held that non-disclosure violates s. 7 only where it prejudices the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, and that a stay is reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice cannot be otherwise remedied. The Court also established a landmark framework for obtaining production of private third-party records, requiring the accused to show likely relevance and requiring the court to balance trial fairness against privacy and equality interests. The appeal was dismissed and a new trial ordered.
The accused was convicted of possession of stolen property based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of his estranged girlfriend. The trial judge provided boilerplate reasons that failed to address the conflicting evidence or explain the basis for the conviction. The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial due to the absence of adequate reasons. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a trial judge's failure to provide reasons that are sufficiently intelligible to permit meaningful appellate review constitutes an error of law.
A recreation instructor was convicted of sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision and was subsequently dismissed by the City of Toronto. The union grieved the dismissal, and the arbitrator allowed the relitigation of the sexual assault allegations, ultimately finding the employee was dismissed without just cause. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator's decision to allow relitigation of the criminal conviction was an abuse of process. The Court ruled that the criminal conviction must stand with all its legal effects, and the arbitrator's failure to give it full effect rendered the decision patently unreasonable.
The plaintiff brought an action alleging he contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure and claimed the defendants conspired to withhold information about the dangers of asbestos. The defendants applied to strike out the conspiracy claims as disclosing no reasonable claim. The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement of claim should only be struck out if it is 'plain and obvious' that it discloses no reasonable claim. The Court found it was not plain and obvious that the conspiracy claim would fail, and the action was allowed to proceed.
The court determined the dispositive appellate issues on the evidentiary record. The reasons address the principal submissions, apply the governing legal framework, and resolve the controlling questions. Relief was granted or refused according to the applicable standard of review and the merits.
The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store. The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions. After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel. The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated. The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning. The appeal was dismissed.
The appellant challenged the constitutionality of the Criminal Code regime governing persons found not criminally responsible on account of mental disorder, arguing that s. 672.54 violated ss. 7 and 15(1) of the Charter by creating an improper burden, vagueness, overbreadth, and discriminatory treatment. The Court held that Part XX.1 created an individualized assessment-and-treatment regime directed to public safety and fairness, not punishment, and that an NCR accused must receive the least onerous and least restrictive disposition compatible with the statutory objectives. The majority interpreted s. 672.54 to require an absolute discharge unless the court or Review Board positively finds a significant threat to the safety of the public. The Court further held that the regime did not discriminate against mentally disordered accused, but instead promoted substantive equality through individualized treatment. Appeal dismissed.
Criminal appeal from convictions for two counts of first degree murder. The court held that the deceased’s statement of intention and police evidence of a witness’s out-of-court identification were inadmissible hearsay, and clarified that traditional hearsay exceptions must conform to the principled approach of necessity and reliability. The court further held that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was deficient because it failed to explain that the criminal standard is higher than proof on a balance of probabilities and wrongly suggested the phrase had no special legal meaning. A new trial was ordered.
The appellant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'. Her trial was held 14.5 months after her arrest, with the delay caused solely by limits on institutional resources. The trial judge dismissed her motion for a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal and entered a stay, but the Court of Appeal restored the conviction. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was not unreasonable given the strain on institutional resources and the absence of any significant prejudice to the appellant. The Court established guidelines for acceptable institutional delay in Provincial Courts.
The respondent was injured in a rear-end motor vehicle accident and claimed non-earner benefits from his insurer. The trial judge awarded the benefits, finding the respondent suffered a partial inability to carry on a normal life that developed into chronic pain. The Court of Appeal allowed the insurer's appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the wrong legal test. Under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule, an insured must demonstrate a complete inability to carry on a normal life within 104 weeks of the accident, which requires showing an impairment that continuously prevents them from engaging in substantially all pre-accident activities. The respondent failed to provide sufficient evidence of his pre-accident activities to satisfy this threshold.
A probationary employee was discharged shortly after returning from maternity leave. The collective agreement provided that probationary employees could be discharged at the sole discretion of the employer and such discharge was not subject to grievance procedures. The employee filed a grievance alleging discriminatory discharge. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the substantive rights and obligations of the Human Rights Code and other employment-related statutes are implicitly incorporated into all collective agreements. Therefore, an arbitrator has the jurisdiction to hear a grievance alleging discriminatory discharge, even for a probationary employee.
The appellant was seized by the throat by a police officer in a pub and found to be in possession of a balloon containing heroin. The trial judge found the search unreasonable under s 8 of the Charter because the Crown failed to establish the officer's reasonable grounds, but admitted the evidence under s 24(2). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness of the Charter violation and the lack of established grounds for the violent search.
The accused was subjected to excessive force by police during his arrest for impaired driving and flight from police, resulting in broken ribs and a punctured lung. The trial judge found breaches of the accused's Charter rights and reduced his sentences to conditional discharges under s. 24(1). The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of excessive force but substituted the mandatory minimum fine for the impaired driving offence. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that while state misconduct can be considered in sentencing, a sentence cannot be reduced below a statutory minimum absent a constitutional challenge to the minimum itself.
The Director of Investigation and Research authorized a search of the respondent's premises under the Combines Investigation Act. The authorization was certified by a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. The respondent challenged the search under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 8 requires prior authorization by a neutral and impartial arbiter based on reasonable and probable grounds established upon oath. The Court found that the Combines Investigation Act failed to meet these standards, as the Commission member was not a neutral arbiter and the statute did not require reasonable and probable grounds. The search provisions were struck down as unconstitutional.
These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence. The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues. Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.
Following a decision ordering a new trial, the court issued an addendum on costs. The court clarified that the new trial would only extend to claims that formed the subject-matter of the appeal, and stayed the execution of a damages award against one respondent pending the new trial. The costs of the first trial were reserved to the presiding justice at the new trial. The appellant was awarded costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal, fixed at $36,000 on a partial indemnity basis, specifically for the motion to introduce fresh evidence.
The appellant was subjected to a warrantless "frisk" search for drugs based on an informant's tip. The police found speed and then arrested the appellant, advising him of his right to counsel. The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the search unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant was detained and his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated by the delay in informing him, the search itself was reasonable under s. 8. The Court further held that the real evidence obtained should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.
The Supreme Court of Canada heard two appeals concerning the property and financial rights of common law partners upon the breakdown of their relationships. The Court held that the 'common intention' resulting trust has no further role in resolving domestic property disputes. Instead, the law of unjust enrichment is the primary vehicle. The Court clarified that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment need not always be calculated on a quantum meruit (fee-for-services) basis. Where the parties were engaged in a 'joint family venture' and there is a link between the claimant's contributions and the accumulation of wealth, the remedy should be calculated based on the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant's contributions. In Vanasse, the Court restored the trial judge's award based on wealth accumulation. In Kerr, the Court ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claims and restored the trial judge's order for spousal support effective from the date proceedings commenced.
The appellant, a former resident of an Indian Residential School, brought a civil action alleging he was sexually assaulted by a supervisor decades earlier. The trial judge found the appellant credible despite inconsistencies in his testimony and concluded the assaults occurred. The Court of Appeal overturned the decision, holding that the trial judge failed to apply a standard of proof commensurate with the serious nature of the allegations. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, definitively ruling that there is only one standard of proof in civil cases: proof on a balance of probabilities. The Court rejected the notion of a shifting standard based on the gravity of the allegations and clarified that corroboration is not legally required in civil sexual assault claims.
The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including forcible confinement, assault, and criminal harassment against a former girlfriend, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment. He appealed the sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give him credit for 18 months spent on bail under strict house arrest conditions. The Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered, and the failure to do so is an error in principle. The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months' imprisonment.
In an interim decision regarding a human rights complaint against a school board and several individuals, the Tribunal considered whether to remove certain personal respondents. The Commission advised it would not proceed against four individuals, who were subsequently removed. The Tribunal then analyzed whether to remove a fifth individual, a superintendent, applying factors such as corporate vicarious liability and whether her individual conduct was a central issue. Finding no compelling reason to keep her as a party and no prejudice in her removal, the Tribunal removed her. The Tribunal declined to remove a sixth individual whose conduct was central to the allegations.
The court addressed sentencing for breaches of long-term supervision orders by Indigenous long-term offenders and reaffirmed the mandatory application of Gladue principles in every such case. It held that sentencing judges must consider systemic and background factors and craft proportionate, individualized sanctions even for serious breaches tied to risk management. In the first appeal, errors in principle required intervention and the custodial term was reduced to one year. In the second appeal, the one-year sentence imposed by the appellate court was upheld.
The accused were charged with multiple offences related to a cocaine-trafficking ring. The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence obtained via an ex parte authorization supported by a lengthy police affidavit. At trial, cross-examination revealed errors in the affidavit regarding confidential sources, leading the trial judge to reject the entire affidavit, exclude the wiretap evidence, and acquit the accused. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, clarifying that the investigative necessity requirement for wiretaps means there must be no other reasonable alternative method of investigation. The Court held that the affidavit met this standard and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of review by globally rejecting the affidavit instead of excising the erroneous information and considering whether sufficient reliable information remained to support the authorization.
The appellant, a victim of a motor vehicle accident, had her statutory accident benefits terminated by the respondent insurer. The insurer's notice of termination advised her of the right to seek mediation but did not outline the full dispute resolution process or the relevant limitation periods. After unsuccessful mediation, the appellant filed an action more than two years after the termination. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the two-year limitation period under the Insurance Act does not begin to run until the insurer provides a valid refusal, which requires adequate compliance with s. 71 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule. Because the insurer failed to inform the appellant of the complete dispute resolution process, including the right to arbitrate or litigate and the applicable time limits, a proper refusal was not given, and the limitation period was not triggered. The appeal was allowed.
The aboriginal appellant pled guilty to manslaughter for the killing of her common law husband and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The sentencing judge did not give special consideration to her aboriginal background under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, noting she lived off-reserve. The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 718.2(e) applies to all aboriginal offenders wherever they reside and requires sentencing judges to consider unique systemic or background factors and appropriate restorative sanctions. Although the trial judge erred in his approach, the appeal was dismissed because the three-year sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence and the fact that the appellant had already been granted parole.
The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the provincial appellate court after a trial judge had convicted the accused of sexual offences against three young girls. The Supreme Court held that under s. 686(1)(a)(i) an appellate court may re-examine and to some extent reweigh the evidence, including credibility-based findings, but must show substantial deference to the trial judge's assessment. The Court further held that children's evidence is not inherently unreliable and should not be assessed through rigid adult credibility stereotypes or assumptions about how victims of sexual abuse ought to behave. The appellate court erred by overstating inconsistencies, discounting supporting evidence, and relying on outdated views about corroboration and complaint. The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.
The accused, a retirement home manager, was charged with assaulting several elderly residents. By the time of trial, four complainants had died and one was incompetent to testify. The trial judge admitted videotaped statements to the police from two deceased complainants under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying heavily on the striking similarities between the statements, and convicted the accused. The Court of Appeal excluded the statements and acquitted the accused. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the hearsay statements were inadmissible. The Court clarified the principled approach to hearsay, ruling that trial judges may consider corroborative or conflicting evidence when assessing threshold reliability, modifying its previous ruling in R. v. Starr. However, on the facts, the deceased complainant's statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the dangers of admitting untested hearsay.
The appellant was arrested for aggravated assault and detained for 18 hours before being formally charged, primarily to allow the police to conduct an identification parade. At trial, the judge found the arrest unlawful and arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, ordering a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest under s. 450(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court further held that the 18-hour detention was not unreasonable and did not violate s. 9 of the Charter, as the identification parade was the fairest and most practical means of identification.
The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the auditors’ appeal and confirmed that an expert witness must be able and willing to provide fair, objective, and non-partisan assistance to the court as a threshold admissibility requirement, with remaining concerns about independence generally addressed at the gatekeeping weighing stage.
The accused, a lawyer, was charged with breach of trust, theft, and fraud. A former secretary gave evidence favourable to the defence at the preliminary inquiry. The Crown subsequently interviewed her, obtained statements, decided not to call her at trial, and refused to disclose the statements to the defence. The trial judge dismissed the defence's application for disclosure, and the accused was convicted. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, establishing that the Crown has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence, subject to reviewable discretion regarding privilege, relevance, and timing.
The appellant broadcaster sought injunctive relief against parties assisting Canadian residents to subscribe to and decode U.S. direct-to-home satellite programming. The appeal turned on whether s. 9(1)(c) of the Radiocommunication Act imposed a blanket prohibition on decoding encrypted subscription programming signals unless authorized by a lawful distributor in Canada, or only prohibited decoding of signals from licensed Canadian distributors. Applying the modern contextual approach to statutory interpretation, the Court held the provision unambiguously creates an absolute prohibition with a limited exception and aligns with the broader broadcasting and copyright regime. The Court refused to answer the stated Charter questions because the record did not support constitutional adjudication.
The Crown appealed the conditional sentences imposed on two black single mothers who pleaded guilty to importing cocaine. The trial judge had introduced his own research on systemic racial and gender bias, concluding these factors mitigated their culpability and justified conditional sentences. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge overstepped his role by acting as advocate, witness, and judge, and erred in principle by imposing conditional sentences for a serious offence like importing cocaine. Although the appropriate sentences would have been custodial terms of 20 months and two years less a day, the Court dismissed the appeal because the respondents had already served 17 months of their conditional sentences, and incarcerating them now would cause undue hardship.
The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes. The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability. Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims. The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability. Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.
The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability. The complainant, who had a mild mental disability, gave inconsistent testimony, including conflicting statements about inventing the allegations. The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements to corroborate her testimony, without explaining how he resolved the inconsistencies. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining how he resolved the significant credibility issues and erred in using prior consistent statements to corroborate the complainant's testimony.
Police stopped and detained a person matching the description of a recent break-and-enter suspect, conducted a protective pat-down, and then reached into his pocket and found marijuana, leading to a trafficking prosecution. The Supreme Court recognized a limited common law power of investigative detention where police have reasonable grounds to suspect a connection to a particular crime and detention is reasonably necessary, together with a limited protective pat-down search power grounded in officer safety. The Court held, however, that the more intrusive pocket search was not justified on the facts and violated s. 8 of the Charter. Applying the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the Court excluded the non-conscriptive evidence because the unjustified search represented a serious breach and admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.
The appellant was driving a rented SUV when he was pulled over by a police officer who mistakenly believed the vehicle required a front licence plate. Despite realizing his error, the officer continued the detention, discovered the appellant's licence was suspended, arrested him, and searched the vehicle, finding 35 kg of cocaine. The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the revised s. 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant. The Court held that the police conduct was a brazen and flagrant disregard for Charter rights, aggravated by misleading testimony, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The evidence was excluded and an acquittal entered.
The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a young child. At trial, the defence cross-examined the complainant on her two-and-a-half-year delay in reporting the abuse, suggesting fabrication. The Crown called a child psychologist to testify that delayed disclosure is common and does not indicate falsehood. The trial judge admitted the expert evidence, and the accused was convicted. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the expert evidence was inadmissible. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada solely on the admissibility of the expert evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert evidence was not necessary because the principle that delay does not equate to falsehood is not outside the normal experience of a jury and could be addressed through a proper jury instruction.
The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination and reprisal. The respondents brought a motion to dismiss the application as untimely, and the applicant brought a motion to disqualify the respondents' counsel due to an alleged solicitor-client conflict. The Tribunal dismissed the request to disqualify counsel, finding no evidence that relevant confidential information was received. The Tribunal also dismissed the application as untimely, finding that the 19-month delay was not incurred in good faith and that the alleged reprisal was not a genuine attempt to enforce rights under the Code.
The Burnbrae defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against them. The plaintiffs, who were competitors in the egg industry, alleged that Burnbrae conspired with others to drive them out of business by supplying deficient eggs, misusing confidential information, and interfering with contractual relations. Applying the new summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no evidence to support the plaintiffs' sweeping allegations against Burnbrae. The court concluded that Burnbrae's actions were legitimate competitive behavior and dismissed the action against the Burnbrae defendants.
The appellant's home was destroyed by fire. The respondent insurer denied the claim, alleging arson, despite its own experts and investigators concluding the fire was accidental. The insurer maintained this bad faith defence through a lengthy trial to force a lower settlement. The jury awarded compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages to $100,000. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the $1 million jury award, holding that the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith was an independent actionable wrong and the jury's award, while high, was a rational response to the insurer's exceptionally reprehensible conduct.
The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction involving a child complainant, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not expressly explain the rejection of his denial. The court held that the adequacy of reasons must be assessed functionally and contextually by asking whether they permit meaningful appellate review. Reviewing the whole record, including the complainant's evidence, the diary evidence, and the trial judge's express application of the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court found the route to conviction was clear. The reasons were sufficient to show that the denial did not raise a reasonable doubt when weighed against the accepted evidence. Appeal dismissed.
In two joined criminal appeals, the court considered whether mandatory minimum imprisonment terms in s. 95(2) of the Criminal Code for possession of loaded prohibited or restricted firearms violated s. 12 of the Charter. The majority held that while the impugned minimums were not grossly disproportionate for the respondents themselves, they were grossly disproportionate in reasonably foreseeable licensing-type scenarios and therefore unconstitutional. The infringement was not justified under s. 1, and the mandatory minimum provisions were declared of no force or effect. The respondents' individual fit sentences were nevertheless upheld.
The mother appealed a trial decision awarding joint custody of the parties' young child and ordering the parents to attend counseling, with an unnamed counselor to resolve disputes. The father cross-appealed the net family property equalization payment. The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding joint custody given the parents' complete inability to communicate and lack of historical cooperation. The court also held the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction by ordering counseling and delegating decision-making to a counselor. Sole custody was awarded to the mother, and a new trial was ordered for access. The father's cross-appeal regarding property was dismissed.
The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the provincial appellate court excluded the accused’s post-polygraph confessions to multiple arsons. The majority held that the common law confessions rule is a contextual voluntariness inquiry concerned with both reliability and fairness, requiring consideration of threats or promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery. It further held that appellate courts owe deference to a trial judge’s factual assessment of voluntariness absent palpable and overriding error. On the facts, the police interrogation, while persistent and strategic, did not involve inducements or oppression sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness, and the confessions and re-enactment were admissible.
The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years. On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant. The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea. The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.
The appellant employee filed a complaint under the Employment Standards Act for unpaid commissions. An employment standards officer rejected the claim without providing the employee an opportunity to respond to the employer's submissions. The employee subsequently pursued a civil action for wrongful dismissal and the unpaid commissions. The lower courts held the civil claim for commissions was barred by issue estoppel. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that while the preconditions for issue estoppel were met, the doctrine should not be applied as a matter of discretion because the administrative decision was made in a manifestly unfair manner.
Crown appeal from an acquittal for sexual assault arising from progressively more intimate sexual touching during a purported job interview. The Court held that consent for the actus reus is the complainant’s subjective state of mind and that there is no defence of implied consent in Canadian law. The only potentially available mens rea defence was honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, but there was no air of reality to that defence on the accepted facts, particularly in light of repeated verbal refusals. The appeal was allowed, a conviction entered under s. 686(4), and the matter remanded for sentencing.
The parties cohabited for four years and were married for three. The appellant wife suffered from various health problems and eventually became completely disabled and unable to work. Upon separation, the trial judge and Court of Appeal denied her permanent spousal support, finding no compensatory basis or contractual agreement for support. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act and provincial legislation recognize three bases for spousal support: compensatory, contractual, and non-compensatory. Even where a spouse has not suffered economic disadvantage caused by the marriage, a mutual obligation of support may arise from the marriage relationship itself, entitling a sick or disabled spouse to support based on need and the other spouse's ability to pay.
In a manslaughter sentencing appeal, the Court addressed when a trial judge may reject a joint submission following a guilty plea. It held that departure is permitted only where the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or otherwise be contrary to the public interest, rejecting a simple fitness approach. Applying that standard, the Court found the trial judge erred in principle by substituting a modestly longer custodial term and adding probation despite the negotiated resolution and systemic interests in certainty. The appeal was allowed and the sentence was varied to match the joint submission of additional custody without probation.
The Court allowed an accused’s appeal and restored a stay of proceedings for breach of the right to be tried within a reasonable time under s. 11(b) of the Charter. Applying Jordan, it held that net delay remained above the 30‑month ceiling after proper deductions for defence delay and certain discrete events. The case was not particularly complex despite voluminous disclosure, and transitional exceptional circumstances did not justify the remaining delay. The Court emphasized that all justice system actors must proactively prevent and minimize delay and that Jordan must be followed as governing law.
The appellant was convicted of drug and breach charges after police found cocaine during a search. The initial investigative detention on the street was lawful, but the police subsequently arbitrarily detained the appellant in a cruiser, failed to provide him with his right to counsel, and conducted two unreasonable searches, including a strip search where an officer gratuitously inflicted pain. The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by treating the absence of systemic police misconduct as a mitigating factor, failing to consider the impact on the appellant's Charter rights, and overemphasizing the seriousness of the charges. The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.
The appellant challenged an impaired driving conviction on the basis that police failed to comply with the informational component of s. 10(b) of the Charter by mentioning legal aid but not advising of existing 24-hour duty counsel services and the toll-free number for immediate free legal advice. The majority held that where duty counsel services exist and are available in the jurisdiction, detainees must be routinely informed of their existence and basic means of access, absent valid waiver or urgency. Applying the Collins framework under s. 24(2), the Court held that both the breathalyser results and the incriminating statement were obtained in the course of the Charter breach and that their admission would render the trial unfair. The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.
The Crown appealed a 12-month sentence imposed on a young Black first-time offender for possession of a loaded handgun. The trial judge had significantly reduced the sentence based on social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism. The Court of Appeal held that while social context evidence of anti-Black racism is highly relevant to assessing an offender's moral blameworthiness and rehabilitative prospects, it does not reduce the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence. The Court also held that the Gladue framework for Indigenous offenders does not apply directly to Black offenders, though it can inform the approach. The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to two years less a day, but permanently stayed due to the passage of time.
The accused was charged with first degree murder in the death of an Indigenous woman and sex worker found dead in his hotel room with an 11 cm wound in her vaginal wall. At trial, the accused testified at length about prior sexual activity with the deceased without having made an application under the s. 276 regime of the Criminal Code, and the jury was not given any limiting instruction on the permissible uses of that evidence. The jury acquitted the accused of both first degree murder and the included offence of unlawful act manslaughter. The Alberta Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal and ordered a new trial on first degree murder. The majority of the Supreme Court held that the trial judge erred by failing to comply with the mandatory s. 276 regime, and that the resulting failure to inoculate the jury against mistakes of law related to the defence of honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent warranted a new trial on unlawful act manslaughter. However, a new trial on first degree murder was not warranted as the errors did not materially bear on the murder acquittal, which turned on a battle of expert evidence on whether a sharp object was used. The dissent would have upheld the Court of Appeal's order of a new trial on both murder and manslaughter.
The accused was charged with first degree murder. At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented circumstantial evidence, while the accused called witnesses providing arguably exculpatory evidence. The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused to trial for second degree murder, refusing to weigh the evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that while a preliminary inquiry judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole evidence when the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence, the judge in this case properly considered the evidence as a whole and did not err in committing the accused to trial.
The Court allowed the Crown appeal and restored a detention order under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code. It held that the public-confidence ground is a distinct and non-residual basis for pre-trial detention, not confined to exceptional cases or unexplained crimes. The Court also held that review under ss. 520 and 521 is a hybrid remedy available only for significant new evidence, legal error, or a clearly inappropriate decision, and found no proper basis for the reviewing judge to overturn detention on these facts.
The accused was charged with possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking. He challenged the constitutionality of the reverse onus provision in the Narcotic Control Act, which presumed an intent to traffic upon proof of possession. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provision violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter. Furthermore, the Court established a two-part proportionality test for s. 1 of the Charter and found that the reverse onus clause failed the rational connection component, as possession of a small quantity of narcotics does not rationally support an inference of intent to traffic.
The accused and a co-perpetrator participated in a violent beating that left the victim dead. The accused stomped on the victim's head. At trial, the Crown's medical expert initially testified the accused caused the death, but later agreed with the defence expert that the co-perpetrator caused the fatal injuries. The Crown maintained its theory but also argued co-perpetrator liability. The accused was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal substituted a manslaughter conviction, finding the murder verdict unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, reaffirming the Yebes test that the reasonableness of a verdict is a question of law. The Court held that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have found the accused had the requisite intent for murder as a party to the offence, and restored the second degree murder conviction.
The appellant, a black youth, was acquitted of assaulting a police officer after the Youth Court Judge accepted his testimony over the conflicting testimony of the white arresting officer. In her oral reasons, the judge remarked that police officers have been known to overreact when dealing with non-white groups. The Crown appealed, arguing these comments raised a reasonable apprehension of bias. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the acquittal, holding that the judge's comments, viewed in context by a reasonable and informed person aware of the social reality of racism, did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias but rather reflected an appropriate recognition of the social context.
The complainants requested reconsideration of an interim decision that refused to add the Ministry of Education and various individuals as full party respondents to their human rights complaints regarding special education. The Tribunal reviewed its new reconsideration powers under the amended Human Rights Code and its Rules of Procedure. The Tribunal determined that while interim decisions disposing of central issues can be subject to reconsideration, the complainants failed to establish any new facts, conflict with established jurisprudence, or other compelling factors to justify reconsidering the original decision. The request for reconsideration was denied.
The parties separated after a 27-year marriage. At trial, the judge ordered the wife to pay an equalization payment, ordered the husband to pay indefinite spousal support based on imputed incomes, and awarded full indemnity costs to the husband. The wife appealed the spousal support, equalization, and costs orders. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge failed to explain the basis for imputing $484,356 in annual income to the wife, precluding meaningful appellate review. The court also set aside the costs award, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the husband's settlement offer and his degree of success at trial. The spousal support and costs issues were remitted to the trial judge, while the equalization payment was upheld.
The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal order for a new trial on sexual assault charges arising from a camping trip on which the two accused engaged in sexual activity with a 16-year-old complainant who had consumed substantial alcohol. The majority held that capacity to consent is a precondition to subjective consent, not a vitiating factor, so a trial judge need not address consent and capacity separately or in any particular order. The majority further held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient in the context of the case, as all parties agreed that the complainant's evidence — if accepted — established both incapacity and non-consent. The concurring judges agreed on the result but found the trial judge's reasons insufficient on the capacity question, applying the curative proviso on the basis of overwhelming evidence of non-consent. The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge's errors were not trivial and the evidence was not sufficiently overwhelming to apply the curative proviso.
Two appellants pleaded guilty to wholesale fentanyl trafficking and received sentences of 7 and 11 years respectively at trial. The Crown appealed and the Alberta Court of Appeal set a 9-year starting point for wholesale fentanyl trafficking, increasing the sentences to 10 and 14 years. The majority upheld the starting-point methodology as a permissible form of appellate sentencing guidance, finding it compatible with existing sentencing principles and the deferential appellate standard of review. The majority also found both original trial sentences demonstrably unfit given the gravity of wholesale fentanyl trafficking, and declined to disturb the Court of Appeal's increased sentences. The dissent would have allowed the appeals, finding neither original sentence demonstrably unfit and that the Court of Appeal improperly reweighed mitigating factors.
The appellant appealed sentence following convictions for multiple sexual offences committed against four very young boys over several years while occupying positions of trust. The court rejected the submission that a six-year sentence in an earlier authority represented the high-water mark for prolonged child sexual abuse cases. It held that where an adult in a position of trust regularly abuses young children over a substantial period, mid to upper single-digit penitentiary terms are generally appropriate, and where the abuse includes intercourse, violence, threats, or extortion, upper single-digit to low double-digit terms will generally be fit. Given the repeated anal intercourse, threats, extortion, physical violence, grooming, and devastating victim impact, the sentence imposed was at the lower end of the appropriate range. Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.
The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation arising from allegations by a child family member, arguing that the trial judge conflated credibility with reliability, misapprehended material parts of the defence evidence, and applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge expressly considered both credibility and reliability, properly applied the criminal burden of proof, and was entitled to assess the child's evidence in light of her age. The court further held that no material misapprehension tainted the rejection of the appellant's denial and that the trial judge did not impose a harsher standard on the defence evidence. The appeal was dismissed.
The Crown appealed a summary conviction appeal court decision that overturned the accused's convictions for impaired driving and driving over 80. The summary conviction appeal judge had found that the trial judge reversed the burden of proof on a section 8 Charter application and erred in finding the arresting officer had reasonable and probable grounds to make a breathalyzer demand. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the trial judge applied the correct burden of proof when the reasons were read as a whole. The Court also held that the officer had reasonable and probable grounds based on the totality of the circumstances, including a civilian report of erratic driving, the occurrence of an accident, and the accused's physical indicia of impairment. The convictions were restored.