Most Cited Cases

This is a costs decision arising from a custody and access appeal concerning three children. The father's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on all four grounds. The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $25,000, representing 60-70% of her actual costs. The decision addresses the presumption of costs in favour of successful parties in family law matters, the application of the Family Law Rules cost framework, and the impact of unreasonable conduct by both parties. The court also addressed costs related to an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court, declining to award costs for that stage due to the confusing nature of family law appeal routes in Ontario.

The appellant appealed a costs award of over $300,000 made by the motion judge in family law proceedings. The motion judge had awarded costs to the respondent following a successful motion to strike the appellant's answer on the basis that a constitutional issue was not properly pleaded. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits, which provided the appellant with the opportunity to amend his answer. The respondent remained entitled to costs of the original motion, but the costs award was reduced from over $300,000 to $200,000. The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by adopting a "close to full recovery" approach, giving undue weight to settlement offers in circumstances where settlement was not practically possible, inappropriately increasing costs based on the appellant's ability to pay and the respondent's financial need, and failing to apply the proportionality principle required by the Family Law Rules.

The Crown sought leave to appeal two sentences imposed on the respondent for failing to remain at the scene of an accident and firearms offences, arguing that the first sentencing judge erred in calculating pretrial custody credit, which impacted the subsequent sentence. The Court of Appeal granted leave for both appeals. For the first sentence (Marshall #1), the Court found the trial judge erred by departing from an agreed-upon "Duncan" credit and by "double counting" mitigating factors, varying the pretrial custody credit from 39 days to 107 days, but not altering the suspended sentence. For the second sentence (Marshall #2), the Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the suspended sentence, finding that the trial judge was entitled to give substantial credit for guilty pleas given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the justice system.

The appellant was charged with possession of various drugs for the purpose of trafficking. Police arrested him before obtaining a search warrant for his residence, and then denied him access to counsel for almost six hours while they obtained and executed the warrant. The appellant immediately requested to speak to a lawyer upon arrest but was refused. The trial judge found a breach of section 10(b) of the Charter but admitted the evidence under section 24(2). The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the police followed an unconstitutional routine practice of denying access to counsel whenever they intended to obtain a search warrant, without considering the specific circumstances of the case. The court held that the evidence should have been excluded as admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

This appeal concerns a mother's request for access to three of her six children in extended care following their apprehension by the Children's Aid Society in 2015. The motion judge granted Crown wardship without access. The Divisional Court affirmed the decision but applied the old Child and Family Services Act rather than the new Child, Youth and Family Services Act, 2017. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the transitional provisions of the new Act applied, the record was insufficient to satisfy the expanded access test, the children's Indigenous heritage was not properly considered, and the approach to summary judgment in child protection matters was misapplied. The matter was remitted to Superior Court for determination under the new legislation.

The appellant, Brandon Morgan, appealed his sentence for aggravated assault and failing to comply with court orders, seeking a reduction due to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on his incarceration conditions. The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, finding that while judicial notice could be taken of the pandemic's general impact, the requested sentence reduction would render the sentence disproportionate to the gravity of the offence and the offender's blameworthiness, even considering collateral consequences. The court noted that the original sentence was already lenient and that parole authorities could consider the pandemic's impact.

Indigenous Ecuadorian villagers obtained a US$9.5 billion judgment against Chevron Corporation in Ecuador for environmental pollution. They sought to enforce the judgment in Ontario against Chevron Corporation and its seventh-level indirect subsidiary, Chevron Canada. The motion judge granted an order requiring the plaintiffs to post security for costs of approximately $942,951 before the appeal could proceed. The appellants moved to vary this order. The Court of Appeal set aside the security for costs order, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to conduct a holistic analysis of the justness of the order in all circumstances. The court emphasized that security for costs orders must be just and should not be used as a litigation tactic to prevent cases from being heard on their merits.

An insurer sought to amend its statement of defence approximately nine years after a fire destroyed the insured's restaurant to assert that the insured had deliberately set the fire, rather than relying on its original defence of non-cooperation with the fire investigation. The motion judge dismissed the amendment motion and awarded substantial indemnity costs. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the amendment but reduced the costs award, finding that while the insurer's delay was inordinate and triggered a presumption of prejudice that was not rebutted, the conduct did not rise to the level of egregious misconduct warranting substantial indemnity costs.

The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his professional negligence claim against a tax lawyer. The appellant had retained the tax lawyer to advise on tax implications of a matrimonial settlement involving the purchase of his ex-spouse's shares in a family corporation. The tax lawyer provided advice on two approaches: a direct purchase (which would trigger significant personal tax liability) and a redemption approach (which would avoid the tax hit). The appellant ultimately settled using the direct purchase approach with a negotiated "tax discount" rather than the recommended redemption approach. The appellant subsequently incurred approximately $1.3 million in tax liability and sued for negligence. The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claim, finding the tax advice was correct. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that partial summary judgment was inappropriate in these circumstances and that serious issues remained regarding the lawyer's professional obligations to ensure advice was communicated to and understood by the client.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a judge-alone trial. The trial judge found the complainant's evidence credible and rejected the appellant's testimony that the sexual activity was consensual. On appeal, the appellant raised six grounds of appeal challenging the conviction. While the Court of Appeal rejected the first three grounds (misapplication of burden of proof, improper use of silence, and improper use of lack of embellishment), it allowed the appeal on three remaining grounds: the trial judge's failure to inspect the complainant's shirt despite defence counsel's reasonable expectation that he would do so; the trial judge's erroneous admission and use of reply evidence from the appellant's roommate to establish a collusion theory without proper foundation; and most significantly, the trial judge's application of markedly different levels of scrutiny to the credibility of the complainant and the appellant. The Court found that cumulatively, these errors undermined the fairness of the trial and constituted a miscarriage of justice.

The appellant was convicted of possessing and making child pornography and received a conditional sentence. He appealed his conviction, arguing the trial judge erred in finding a position of trust and in failing to apply the private use exception to sexting. The Crown appealed the sentence, arguing it was unfit. The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, upholding the finding of a position of trust and declining to expand the private use exception to include sexting. While agreeing that the conditional sentence was unfit and a carceral sentence should have been imposed, the court dismissed the Crown's sentence appeal due to the appellant having largely served the conditional sentence, deeming it inappropriate to substitute a carceral term at that stage.

The appellant appealed both his conviction and sentence for trafficking in fentanyl and using a forged prescription. The conviction was based entirely on circumstantial evidence of identity. The trial judge found the appellant guilty of three counts of using a forged document and three counts of trafficking in fentanyl, sentencing him to six years imprisonment less eighteen months credit for pre-sentence custody. The appellant argued the verdict was unreasonable because the evidence was insufficient to prove identity beyond a reasonable doubt and that another person could have impersonated him using fake identification. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding the circumstantial evidence of identity was sufficient and that the trial judge properly applied the legal standard for convictions based on circumstantial evidence. The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, finding the six-year sentence was fit and proportionate to the appellant's role in the trafficking ring.

J.S. brought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on reverse onus charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking and firearm offences. The court found material changes in circumstances, including new sureties (father and godfather) addressing previous concerns about the mother's health, and the elevated risk posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in detention facilities. Considering the proposed strict house arrest plan, the applicant's lack of criminal record, and the overall circumstances, the court determined that release would not undermine public confidence in the administration of justice on the tertiary ground. The bail review was granted, and J.S. was released on a $15,000 surety recognizance with strict conditions.

The applicant sought to vary child and spousal support provisions of a separation agreement and to impute income to the respondent. The respondent opposed, arguing no material change of circumstances and seeking to impute income to the applicant. The court found a material change of circumstances due to the applicant's career change and significant income reduction. The court imputed income to the applicant at $58,000 for 2014-2016, increasing to $73,000 for 2017, finding his decision to start a business without experience unreasonable. The court also imputed income to the respondent at $20,000 for 2017, finding her under-employed. Retroactive and ongoing support adjustments were ordered based on these imputed incomes.

The applicant sought urgent financial relief after the respondent unilaterally removed a substantial sum from a joint line of credit on two occasions, draining it. The court found the matter met the high test of urgency required during the COVID-19 pandemic, given the significant depletion of assets and dire financial implications for the applicant and children. The court ordered the immediate return of funds to the line of credit, its freezing, and a non-dissipation order against the respondent.

The Applicants sought a significant costs award following a 41-day family law trial where they were largely successful in obtaining sole custody, limited access for the Respondent, and termination of spousal support. The Respondent, who was self-represented, engaged in unreasonable and bad faith litigation conduct, including pursuing meritless claims, missing court dates, and failing to provide disclosure. The court found the Respondent's behavior reprehensible and awarded the Applicants $132,000.00 in costs, with a portion enforceable by the Family Responsibility Office.

The Applicant Husband, successful in a bifurcated trial upholding a marriage contract and denying further spousal support, sought costs of $95,000. The Respondent Wife opposed, arguing Rule 18 did not apply and the costs were excessive, citing her financial position. The court found the Husband's offers to settle did not meet Rule 18 criteria due to time limits and conditions, but considered them under Rule 24. The Husband's position was deemed more reasonable, and the Wife's litigation conduct, including unreasonable settlement positions and unsupported claims, was discouraged. The court awarded the Husband $80,000 in costs, inclusive of HST and disbursements, noting the importance of upholding private agreements and discouraging attempts to set aside valid contracts.

A 51-year-old first offender pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and making child pornography available. His collection was one of the largest and worst ever encountered by the Ottawa Police Service, containing over 28,000 unique images and 1,144 unique videos, with 95% depicting explicit sexual activity including children as young as one year old. The trial judge imposed a sentence of two years less one day followed by three years' probation, reasoning that probation would ensure the accused received counselling. The Crown appealed, arguing the sentence was inadequate. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in principle by giving primary effect to rehabilitation rather than denunciation and general deterrence, which are the paramount sentencing objectives for child pornography offences.

The mother appealed a trial decision in a high-conflict parenting dispute, which had resulted in an order for joint custody with parallel decision-making authority and equal parenting time. The trial judge had rejected the mother's allegations against the father and the OCL's recommendation for sole custody to the mother. The mother alleged errors regarding hearsay evidence, consideration of children's wishes, application of the maximum contact principle, the trial judge's jurisdiction to vary prior orders, and the award of costs. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no reversible errors in the trial judge's factual findings, assessment of evidence, or application of legal principles. The court affirmed that OCL recommendations are not binding, the maximum contact principle does not mandate equal parenting time, and a trial judge has broad jurisdiction to make final parenting orders, not being bound by interlocutory orders. The costs award against the mother was upheld due to her unreasonable conduct during the litigation.

The Crown appealed stays of proceedings granted to three respondents on the basis of their s. 11(b) Charter right to trial within a reasonable time. The trial judge had found breaches of the Jordan ceilings, but the Court of Appeal found that she did not adequately account for the systemic disruptions to court operations caused by the COVID-19 pandemic as discrete exceptional circumstances. The Court provided guidance on how trial courts should account for pandemic-related delays, emphasizing a holistic approach and treating province-wide closures, jury blackouts, local restrictions, and backlog prioritization as discrete exceptional circumstances. The appeals were allowed, and the stays of proceedings were set aside.

The Crown appealed the 9-month sentence imposed on the respondent for sexual assault against a child, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and failed to properly apply sentencing principles from *R. v. Friesen*. The Court of Appeal granted leave, found the trial judge erred in principle by overemphasizing mitigating factors and underestimating the gravity and harm of the offence, and imposed a demonstrably unfit sentence. The Court increased the sentence to 24 months but, based on fresh evidence that the respondent had completed his original sentence and was on parole, stayed the execution of the additional incarceration.

A costs endorsement following a custody and access trial. The father sought full recovery of costs from June 29, 2012 in the amount of $5,186.60, while the mother requested no costs be ordered. The court granted custody to the father with extensive specified access to the mother. The court awarded costs to the father as the successful party, but reduced the amount to $3,600 inclusive of fees, disbursements and HST, considering the factors under the Family Law Rules and the mother's limited financial circumstances. The mother was permitted to repay the costs at $150 per month starting October 1, 2013.

Crown appeal from a trial judge's stay of proceedings against three respondents charged with conspiracy to smuggle Polish nationals from Canada into the United States, and related offences. The trial judge granted a s. 11(b) Charter application, finding that the respondents' rights to trial within a reasonable time had been violated due to unreasonable delay of 39.75 months. The trial judge characterized delays arising from defence counsel unavailability as institutional delay. The appellate court allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in mischaracterizing defence counsel unavailability as institutional delay under the Jordan framework. The court held that when the Crown and court were ready to proceed but defence counsel were not available on multiple offered dates, the delay should be attributed to the defence. After properly attributing defence delay, the remaining delay of 29 months fell within the Jordan presumptive ceiling of 30 months, and the respondents failed to demonstrate unreasonable delay. The charges were ordered to proceed to trial.

This is a bail application pending leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada. The applicant, Marshall Kazman, was convicted of serious fraud and money laundering offences, and his appeal to the Court of Appeal for Ontario was dismissed. He sought release under s. 679(3) of the Criminal Code, arguing that his application for leave was not frivolous and that exceptional circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic, his age (64), and pre-existing health conditions (asthma, respiratory, heart) made his continued detention unnecessary in the public interest. The Crown opposed, emphasizing the high enforceability interest given the serious convictions and the weak merits of the leave application. The court granted bail, finding that while the merits of the leave application were weak, the applicant's specific health vulnerabilities combined with the public health risks posed by COVID-19 in a correctional setting constituted exceptional circumstances justifying release, without undermining public confidence in the administration of justice.

The offender, Robert Hearns, pleaded guilty to aggravated assault. The court considered aggravating factors, including the brutal, unprovoked attack on a vulnerable victim and the offender's substantial criminal record, and mitigating factors, such as the guilty plea and rehabilitation efforts. The joint sentencing position of time served plus probation was accepted, largely influenced by the global COVID-19 pandemic and the increased risk of infection faced by inmates in custodial institutions. The court took judicial notice of the pandemic's impact on sentencing principles, noting that it affects the fitness of sentence and may justify a departure from usual ranges, without granting a "get out of jail free" card.

The applicant sought a bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code after being detained on charges including possession of methamphetamine for trafficking and probation breaches. The court considered a new surety and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic as material changes in circumstances, allowing for a de novo review. Despite the applicant's extensive criminal record and the seriousness of the charges, the court granted judicial interim release. It found that the proposed release plan, combined with the heightened health risks of incarceration during the pandemic, sufficiently addressed the primary, secondary, and tertiary grounds for detention, particularly for a non-violent offender.

The appellant was charged with several offences following execution of a search warrant at a residence that uncovered a marijuana grow-operation and a handgun. At trial, the appellant challenged the validity of the search warrant under a sub-facial analysis, arguing that the information to obtain contained erroneous information and that police conduct in seeking the warrant was subversive of the pre-authorization process. The trial judge found the warrant was valid after excising improper portions of the information to obtain, and declined to exercise a residual discretion to quash the warrant despite identifying deficiencies in the affiant's conduct. The appellant was convicted and appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying a "clearest of cases" standard rather than a lower threshold for setting aside a valid warrant based on subversion of the pre-authorization process.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual assault, arguing the trial judge erred by finding the complainant had no motive to fabricate and using this to assess her credibility. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, clarifying the distinction between a "proven absence of motive to fabricate" and an "absence of evidence of motive to fabricate." The court held that while a proven absence of motive is a high bar, the absence of evidence of motive can be considered as one factor among many in assessing credibility, provided it is not given undue weight or used to reverse the burden of proof. The trial judge's approach was found to be consistent with established legal principles.

The appellant, JC, appealed his convictions for sexual assault and extortion, which arose from allegations that he threatened to post a sexually explicit video of the complainant (HD) if she did not continue a sexual relationship with him. JC had been acquitted of initial sexual assault and voyeurism charges related to the video's creation due to reasonable doubt about HD's capacity to consent. On appeal, JC argued the trial judge erred by relying on stereotypes to reject his testimony about seeking consent and his theory that HD fabricated allegations to protect her relationship. The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed material errors by using ungrounded common-sense assumptions and stereotypes to discredit JC's evidence on consent, and by mischaracterizing and rejecting JC's motive theory based on stereotypical reasoning and the complainant's willingness to endure trial. The errors were deemed material and not harmless. The appeal was allowed, the convictions were set aside, and a new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the four-year sentence imposed on the respondent for various drug offences, including trafficking in cocaine and fentanyl. The Court of Appeal granted leave to appeal, finding that the trial judge made fundamental errors in sentencing. These errors included misidentifying the sentencing range for mid-level cocaine traffickers, erroneously comparing it to fentanyl, misapprehending the gravity of the offence, and overemphasizing the mitigating effect of the guilty plea. The appellate court emphasized that fentanyl is a more dangerous drug requiring higher penalties and that the weight of a guilty plea varies by case circumstances. The appeal was allowed, and the sentence was increased to six years.

Jeffrey Persad pleaded guilty to firearms and drug trafficking offences. The parties jointly submitted a nine-year imprisonment sentence, with standard credit for presentence custody. The dispute centered on enhanced credit for harsh conditions at the Toronto South Detention Centre (TSDC), where the offender experienced frequent lockdowns due to staff shortages. The Crown proposed an additional 0.5:1 credit for lockdown days, while the offender sought 2.5:1. The court, acknowledging the inhumane and persistent conditions at the TSDC as deliberate state misconduct, awarded an enhanced credit of 1.5:1 for each of the 475 lockdown days, in addition to the standard 1.5:1 credit for 1010 days in custody. The final sentence was nine years, effectively reduced to 33 months after all credits.

Appeal from conviction and sentence for conspiracy to import a narcotic. The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import cocaine from St. Maarten to Montreal. The appeal raised three grounds: whether the verdict was unreasonable, whether the jury charge was inadequate, and whether the trial judge erred in dismissing a Charter s. 11(b) application regarding delay. The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding the evidence supported the conviction, the jury instructions were adequate, and the delay was justified under both the Jordan framework and transitional exceptional circumstances. The sentence of nine years was upheld as fit.

The Crown appealed the acquittal of the respondent on a charge of driving with a blood alcohol level over 80 mg per 100 ml of blood. The trial judge found that the constable's demand for a breath sample violated section 8 of the Charter because the constable had not followed three procedures in the OPP manual for the Drager Alcotest 6810 device, and therefore could not have reasonably believed the device was functioning properly. The trial judge excluded the breath samples under section 24(2) of the Charter. The summary conviction appeal court upheld the acquittal. The Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in concluding there was no objective basis for the constable's belief that the device was functioning properly, and that the trial judge erred in excluding the evidence under section 24(2).

The appellants appealed a summary judgment order granting damages to the respondents for breach of an oral agreement regarding the sale and installation of Shaw Cable packages in Ontario. The appellants also sought leave to appeal a full indemnity costs award of $144,991. The motion judge found that the appellants breached the agreement, misappropriated funds, and owed monies pursuant to loans. The appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding the agreement was not a joint venture, that they breached it, that it was not varied, that one appellant dissipated assets, and that judgment was awarded to a non-party. The Court of Appeal upheld most findings but varied the judgment to remove a non-party from the damage award. The court upheld the full indemnity costs award, finding the appellants' conduct—including moving funds out of the country and fabricating evidence—warranted such an award.

T.L. brought a bail review application after being detained on secondary and tertiary grounds following a shooting incident. The initial bail hearing before a Justice of the Peace was flawed due to a misapprehension of evidence regarding a proposed surety. The Superior Court conducted a *de novo* hearing, considering a new supervision plan involving house arrest with grandparents as sureties, electronic monitoring, and the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic. The court found the accused satisfied the onus on both secondary and tertiary grounds, emphasizing the strength of the supervision plan and the elevated risks of detention during the pandemic. T.L. was released on strict conditions.

Both parents brought urgent motions seeking temporary custody of their young daughter. The mother sought sole or shared custody with an alcohol prohibition on the father. The father sought sole custody with limited access for the mother and restrictions on her new partner and father. The court found that the father had not established urgency based on his allegations regarding the mother's stability and her new partner's safety concerns. The court determined that the father's evidence was insufficient, inconsistent, and contradicted by his own text messages, which revealed his true motivations were financial and related to anger over the mother's new relationship. The court found that the father had engaged in self-help by unilaterally terminating a previously agreed-upon shared parenting arrangement in March 2020 without justification. The court awarded interim sole custody to the mother with regular and liberal access to the father, finding that the father's conduct demonstrated he would not facilitate the mother's relationship with the child if given custody.

The appellant sought leave to amend his Statement of Claim to assert an alternative claim for a 33% ownership interest in the corporation, based on the theory that escrow release conditions had not been satisfied. The motion judge denied the amendment, finding it constituted a new, statute-barred cause of action. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the proposed amendments did not assert a new cause of action but rather sought alternative relief based on material facts already pleaded in the original Statement of Claim. The court found no presumed or actual non-compensable prejudice to the respondents.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether a 1985 indemnity provided by the Province of Ontario to Great Lakes and Reed covered the costs of complying with a 2011 Director's Order requiring remedial work at an abandoned mercury waste disposal site near Dryden, Ontario. The motion judge had granted summary judgment in favour of Weyerhaeuser and Resolute, finding both were entitled to indemnification. The appellate court was divided. The majority (Brown and Lauwers JJ.A.) held that the 1985 indemnity did cover the costs of complying with the Director's Order, but found that Resolute had no legal interest in the indemnity because Bowater had assigned the full benefit to Weyerhaeuser in 1998. The majority remitted the issue of Weyerhaeuser's rights as assignee to the trial court. Justice Laskin dissented, arguing the 1985 indemnity covered only third-party pollution claims, not first-party regulatory compliance costs.

The appellants, survivors and family members of victims of the Rana Plaza building collapse in Bangladesh in 2013, brought a class action against Loblaws and Bureau Veritas seeking damages for negligence, vicarious liability, and breach of fiduciary duty. The motion judge dismissed the action on the basis that Bangladeshi law applied (not Ontario law), the claims were statute-barred under Bangladesh's one-year limitation period, and the claims disclosed no reasonable cause of action. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal on all grounds. The court also addressed a costs appeal, reducing the costs award by 30% to reflect the public interest component of the claims.

The appellant appealed from an order striking his pleadings and limiting his trial participation rights in a family law proceeding. The respondent sought spousal support and equalization of net family property following a brief marriage. The appellant failed to comply with multiple court orders requiring disclosure of financial information and answers to undertakings and refusals given during examination. The motion judge struck the appellant's Answer and imposed restrictions on his participation at trial. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal but varied the order to augment the appellant's trial participation rights, permitting him to make an opening statement, cross-examine witnesses, and make closing submissions without requiring leave of the trial judge.

The appellant, O'Neil Thompson, appealed his conviction for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. The Court of Appeal for Ontario found that the trial judge erred in not finding an arbitrary detention under s. 9 of the Charter when police boxed in the appellant's car without reasonable grounds. The Court also confirmed a serious breach of s. 10(b) due to a systemic issue within the Peel Regional Police regarding the immediate provision of the right to counsel. Applying the s. 24(2) Charter analysis, the Court concluded that the serious nature of the Charter breaches, particularly the arbitrary detention and the systemic delay in advising of the right to counsel, outweighed society's interest in the admission of the evidence. The appeal was allowed, the conviction set aside, and an acquittal directed.

The appellants, convicted of aggravated assault, appealed both their convictions and their 15-month custodial sentences. The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeals, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of causation of injuries. However, the court granted leave to appeal the sentences, concluding that the trial judge erred in principle by automatically ruling out a conditional sentence due to the violence involved and by failing to adequately weigh all relevant sentencing objectives, including restraint and rehabilitation. The Court of Appeal substituted the custodial sentences with 15-month conditional sentences, including a period of house arrest, while maintaining probation and ancillary orders.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentence imposed on R.S. for violent sexual assault and choking, arguing it was demonstrably unfit and below the appropriate penitentiary range. The majority of the Court of Appeal agreed the sentence was demonstrably unfit, finding a 3-year penitentiary term would have been proportionate. However, the appeal was dismissed to avoid reincarceration and to preserve the probation order, as R.S. had completed the conditional sentence. A concurring judge found the original sentence fit, emphasizing the significant mitigating impact of Gladue principles on the offender's moral culpability and the deference owed to trial judges in sentencing.

This is a costs decision following a Hague Convention application. The father sought the return of two children wrongfully retained in Canada by the mother. The father was entirely successful in his application, with the court finding overwhelming evidence that the children's habitual residence was the United Kingdom and that the father had not consented to or acquiesced in their retention in Canada. The court awarded costs to the father on both a full recovery basis under the Family Law Rules and under Article 26 of the Hague Convention, finding the mother's conduct unreasonable in proceeding to trial without adequate evidence to support her claims.

The trial concerned parenting and support orders for the parties' three-year-old daughter. The child's primary residence was temporarily transferred from the mother to the father by court order due to the mother's non-compliance with previous orders and concerning conduct, including relocating the child without consent and failing to facilitate the father's parenting time. The court found the mother's credibility to be severely undermined by her dishonesty, false allegations, and defiance of court orders. The father demonstrated a greater ability to prioritize the child's best interests, facilitate the child's relationship with both parents, and comply with court directives. The court applied the new amendments to the Children's Law Reform Act, emphasizing the child's physical, emotional, and psychological safety.

Sohail Rajan's fourth bail application, heard via audioconference due to COVID-19. The court found a material change in circumstances due to the exclusion of a firearm from evidence and the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on correctional institutions. The secondary ground (risk to public safety) was satisfied due to the weakened Crown case, accumulated pre-trial custody, and a robust bail plan including sureties and GPS monitoring. The tertiary ground (maintaining public confidence) was fundamentally altered by the pandemic, as a reasonable and informed public would be concerned about the health risks in jails. The applicant, suffering from psoriasis, was deemed more vulnerable. The court granted bail with strict conditions, including house arrest, three sureties, and GPS monitoring with direct police notification for alerts.

A 14-year-old boy had been systematically alienated from his father by his mother through years of denigration, false allegations, and manipulation. The trial judge found the mother had engaged in parental alienation and ordered a reversal of custody, placing the child with the father and suspending contact with the mother for six months to allow for reconciliation. The mother and the Office of the Children's Lawyer appealed, arguing the trial judge erred in applying the best interests test, imposing an extreme remedy without expert evidence or therapeutic support, improperly delegating decision-making to therapists, and ordering therapy without the child's consent in violation of the Health Care Consent Act. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable or overriding error and upholding the trial judge's discretionary decision-making in this difficult family law matter.

A seller and buyer entered into an agreement for the purchase and sale of a warehouse for $10,225,000. The buyer intended to establish a licensed marijuana grow-op business. The agreement provided for an initial deposit of $300,000, and the buyer paid an additional deposit of $450,000 to obtain a six-month extension of the closing date. When the buyer failed to obtain Health Canada licensing and financing and failed to close, the seller sought to forfeit the entire $750,000 deposit. The application judge found the forfeiture unconscionable and reduced it to $350,000. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the deposit was not grossly disproportionate and that unconscionability must be an exceptional finding strongly compelled by the facts. The court restored the full contractual forfeiture of $750,000.

The appellants (Fasco) appealed a motion judge's decision to strike their defences to claims for contribution and indemnity by the respondent (Venmar) based on res judicata and abuse of process. The underlying dispute involved two separate house fires, six years apart, both allegedly caused by a defective heat recovery ventilation unit (HRV) manufactured by Venmar, containing a motor manufactured by Fasco. The motion judge had found that prior Quebec litigation concerning the first fire precluded Fasco from raising certain defences in the Ontario actions. The Court of Appeal allowed Fasco's appeal, finding that the motion judge erred by not applying the "plain and obvious" test, and incorrectly concluded that the causes of action and issues were identical between the Quebec and Ontario proceedings, particularly given the different factual contexts (e.g., Venmar's evolving knowledge of defects) and the contractual indemnity defence Fasco sought to raise. The court also noted that the motion judge should have considered the timeliness of Venmar's motion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario granted leave to appeal and allowed an appeal from the Divisional Court, restoring a motion judge's order to strike jury notices in two civil actions (tort and accident benefits) arising from a motor vehicle collision. The motion judge had struck the jury notices due to significant delays in scheduling civil jury trials in Ottawa amidst the COVID-19 pandemic, ordering judge-alone trials in tranches. The Divisional Court had overturned this, finding the motion judge's decision arbitrary due to insufficient evidence of prejudice beyond delay. The Court of Appeal held that delay alone can constitute prejudice, that appellate courts should show deference to discretionary case management decisions, and that the motion judge had sufficient evidence of local conditions to justify the order.

The respondent mother brought a motion to quash the appellant father's appeal from a trial judgment made in his absence. The father had sought to reduce his child support obligation, end his spousal support obligation, and rescind support arrears. The trial judge proceeded without the father, who was absent due to securing employment on his first day of work. The mother argued the father must first bring a motion to set aside the trial order in Family Court before appealing to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court has jurisdiction under rule 25(19)(e) of the Family Law Rules to set aside an order, and that the proper procedural route was to bring a motion to set aside in Family Court rather than appeal directly to the Court of Appeal.

A police officer was convicted of sexually assaulting a complainant by performing searches of her while transporting her to a police station. At trial, the trial judge admitted a prior consistent statement made by the complainant to a female officer at the police station, in which the complainant stated she had already been searched three times. The summary conviction appeal judge quashed the conviction, finding the trial judge erred in admitting and relying on the prior consistent statement. The Crown appealed to the Court of Appeal for Ontario. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the prior consistent statement was admissible under the narrative as circumstantial evidence exception to the rule against prior consistent statements, and that the trial judge properly used the statement to assess the complainant's credibility by considering the context, timing, and spontaneous nature of the complaint.

An appeal concerning the failure to disclose immediately litigation agreements between a plaintiff (subrogated insurer) and a defendant that converted their adversarial relationship into a cooperative one. The plaintiff and defendant entered into two agreements (2011 and 2016) whereby the defendant would defend the action and prosecute a third-party claim funded by the plaintiff, and subsequently the plaintiff assigned all its rights in the action to itself. These agreements were not disclosed immediately but rather piecemeal throughout 2016. The motion judge found the agreements should have been disclosed but refused to stay the action, finding no prejudice. The appellate court reversed, holding that failure to immediately disclose agreements that change the litigation landscape constitutes abuse of process requiring a stay of the non-disclosing party's claim as a matter of principle.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual interference, sexual assault, and failing to comply with a recognizance, as well as his indeterminate sentence as a dangerous offender. The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on the complainant's evidence, which was corroborated by medical findings and DNA evidence. The appellant argued the trial judge applied uneven scrutiny to the evidence and failed to properly apply the principles from R. v. W. (R.) regarding assessment of child witness testimony. On sentencing, the appellant argued the trial judge failed to consider Gladue factors and section 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code. The Court of Appeal dismissed both appeals, finding no error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, proper application of the legal principles, and that Gladue considerations would not have altered the dangerous offender designation given the appellant's incurable personality disorder and paraphilias.

The appellant, M.V., appealed an eight-year global sentence for sexual interference, child luring, and child pornography. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in principle by relying on aggravating circumstances from the sexual interference offences to determine the sentence for the child luring offences, effectively sentencing the appellant twice for the same conduct. The court allowed the appeal, set aside the original sentence, and substituted a five-and-a-half-year global sentence, emphasizing the importance of respecting joint sentencing submissions and the principle of totality.

The appellant, Lerrell Stennett, appealed his convictions for dangerous operation and impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm, and an ancillary victim surcharge order. The accident involved the appellant losing control of his vehicle on a wet highway, resulting in multiple collisions and serious injuries to himself and passengers. The trial judge found the appellant guilty based on circumstantial evidence of excessive speed for the conditions and a projected blood alcohol concentration indicating impairment. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no misapprehension of evidence, no improper inference from consequences, and no circular reasoning. The court allowed the appeal from sentence only to set aside the victim surcharges, as the regime was later ruled unconstitutional.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of cocaine for trafficking after police officers detained him on a street in Windsor, Ontario without reasonable suspicion, violating his Charter rights under sections 8, 9, and 10(b). The trial judge found the detention arbitrary and the searches unlawful but admitted the evidence under section 24(2) of the Charter, finding the police acted in good faith. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge erred in assessing the seriousness of the Charter breach by relying solely on the officers' subjective belief that they were not detaining the appellant. The court found the police should have known they were exceeding their powers following the Supreme Court's decision in R. v. Grant, and excluded the evidence, entering acquittals on all counts.

The Royal Bank of Canada sought to recover over $3 million from individual defendants under personal guarantees for a family company's loans. The defendants appealed a summary judgment, arguing that their liability was joint and several and limited to a global amount based on bank employee misrepresentations. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred by not adequately explaining the rejection of the defendants' unchallenged evidence regarding misrepresentation and by misapplying the entire agreement clause. A trial was ordered to determine the scope of liability under the guarantees.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's finding of civil contempt for breaching a parenting order. The motion judge found that the appellant had intentionally picked up the children from school on a day when he was not entitled to do so, contrary to the court order governing transitions. While the Court of Appeal found that the three elements of civil contempt were established beyond a reasonable doubt, it held that the motion judge erred in law by failing to consider whether to exercise her discretion to decline to make a contempt finding. The Court emphasized that the contempt power is discretionary and should be exercised as a last resort, particularly in high-conflict matrimonial cases involving children. The appeal was allowed and the contempt finding was set aside.

The appellant was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for the purposes of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime following observations by an experienced drug investigator in a parking lot in Vaughan, Ontario. The investigator observed the appellant and another man transferring cylindrical bins from one vehicle to another, followed by an exchange of cash. The appellant appealed, challenging the lawfulness of the arrest and subsequent search, arguing that the grounds for arrest disappeared when the pills could not be immediately identified, and that the police breached section 489.1 of the Criminal Code by failing to file a report to a justice as soon as practicable. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the arrest was based on reasonable grounds, the search incident to arrest was lawful, and the manner in which the police exercised their discretion did not require return of the seized property.

The appellant appealed his convictions for firearms and drug offences, and the sentence imposed. The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's inference that the appellant knew about the hidden firearm. However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in principle by concluding that a conditional sentence was outside the range for firearms offences. Considering the appellant's significant rehabilitative progress and personal circumstances, the Court varied the sentence for the firearms charge to a conditional sentence of two years less a day, followed by two years of probation, while maintaining the time served sentence for the drug charges.

The appellant was convicted of conspiracy to facilitate terrorist activity and participation in the activities of a terrorist group, and acquitted of possessing explosive substances with intent to endanger life in association with a terrorist group. He was sentenced to a global sentence of 12 years imprisonment (5 years for conspiracy, 7 years consecutive for participation in terrorist group activities). The Crown appealed seeking a 20-year sentence and delayed parole eligibility. The appellant cross-appealed seeking a 5-8 year sentence. The Court of Appeal dismissed both the appeal and cross-appeal, finding no reversible error in the trial judge's assessment of the gravity of the offences, application of sentencing principles including parity and totality, treatment of mitigating factors including rehabilitation and remorse, and determination of parole eligibility.

The appellant appealed his sentence of eight years imprisonment for sexually assaulting his girlfriend's daughter over a period of approximately one year beginning when the victim was 12 years old. The appellant sought leave to appeal and argued that the sentencing judge erred by failing to adequately consider his guilty plea, rehabilitative potential, and Aboriginal background under the Gladue principles. The Court of Appeal found that while the sentencing judge erred in requiring a causal connection between the appellant's Aboriginal background and the offences, the sentence remained fit given the gravity of the crimes and their devastating impact on the victim.

The appellant, convicted of importing fentanyl and possession for the purpose of trafficking, appealed his convictions and sentence. The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the conviction appeal, affirming the trial judge's application of wilful blindness to both the nature and origin of the controlled substance. The court also dismissed the sentence appeal, upholding the 15-year global sentence, finding the comparison of fentanyl to heroin for sentencing purposes to be apt, and emphasizing the principles of denunciation and general deterrence given the drug's extreme danger and quantity. The victim surcharge was set aside.

The appellant appealed convictions for assaulting a police officer, failing to comply with a recognizance, drug trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime. The appeal centred on alleged Charter breaches: excessive force (ss. 7, 12) and denial of the right to counsel (s. 10(b)). The Court of Appeal dismissed the excessive force argument, finding the trial judge did not misallocate the burden of proof. However, it allowed the appeal regarding the s. 10(b) breach, finding the trial judge erred in applying the *Grant* factors and should have excluded the evidence (fanny pack contents). Consequently, convictions for drug trafficking and possession of proceeds of crime were quashed, and acquittals entered, while convictions for assaulting a police officer and breach of recognizance were upheld.

The applicant father sought an urgent hearing for the return of his two daughters to Nigeria, alleging wrongful removal by the respondent mother. The court, operating under COVID-19 protocols, determined whether the matter was urgent. Despite the father's claim of international kidnapping, the court found the matter not urgent due to global travel restrictions and the children's safety and well-being being protected by remaining with the mother in Ontario. The court emphasized that the urgency determination was summary and without prejudice to the substantive motion.

Jahmal Graham was convicted after a jury trial for possession of a prohibited firearm with readily accessible ammunition, possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking, and possession of proceeds of crime. He was also convicted at a judge-alone trial for breach of probation and two firearms prohibition orders. The court considered aggravating factors, including Graham's recidivism for firearms and drug offences, the public nature of the firearms possession, and the quantity of cocaine. Mitigating factors included strong family support, some education, spiritual interests, and challenges in his upbringing. The court rejected claims of historical sexual abuse and anti-black racism as mitigating factors due to lack of proof and found Graham lacked present rehabilitative potential. The court determined Graham was the principal in possession of the unlawful items. A total sentence of 10 years imprisonment was imposed, after applying the totality principle and credit for pre-trial custody and lockdown conditions. Ancillary orders for a lifetime firearms prohibition, DNA order, and forfeiture of seized property were also granted.

The applicant sought divorce, child and spousal support, and equalization of net family properties from the respondent. The primary issue was whether income should be imputed to the respondent due to intentional underemployment or unemployment. The court found the respondent intentionally underemployed, imputing an income of $83,394 per year based on his prior work history and admissions. The court fixed retroactive spousal support for a specific period and left open further spousal support calculations. An equalization payment of $10,149.26 was ordered to the applicant. The court also determined the respondent's proportionate share for future Section 7 educational expenses.

The respondent father sought costs against both the mother and her counsel, Rocco Achampong, following the stay of his Ontario Court of Justice custody application when the mother commenced divorce proceedings in the Superior Court of Justice. The father claimed $6,135 in full indemnity costs. The court found that while the mother was entitled to proceed in the Superior Court of Justice, her counsel's conduct in bringing a motion without notice in that court while actively corresponding with the father's counsel about an imminent motion in the Ontario Court of Justice constituted a breach of professional obligations. The court awarded costs against the counsel personally but dismissed the claim against the mother.

The appellant father appealed a custody and access order from the Superior Court of Justice concerning his three sons. The motions judge granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent mother, awarding her sole custody of two of the three children and ordering that the father's access and communication with the children be at the children's discretion. The father challenged the appropriateness of summary judgment, the weight given to the custody assessment, the best interests analysis, and alleged Charter violations. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the motions judge's decision to proceed by summary judgment, his consideration of the evidence, his analysis of the children's best interests, and his costs award.

Appeal from conviction for drug-related offences and breach of recognizance. The appellant challenged the admissibility of evidence seized during a search warrant execution at his residence. The trial judge dismissed the s. 8 Charter motion based on a redacted information to obtain (ITO). The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in concluding the redacted ITO contained sufficient grounds to support the search warrant. The court determined that the confidential informant information was insufficiently reliable, with weak credibility assessment, inadequate corroboration, and non-compelling information regarding whether the firearm would be at the searched location. The court also found the ITO contained misleading language suggesting the target lived at the residence when he did not. The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and acquittals were entered on all counts.

The appellant appealed his drug-related convictions arising from a search warrant execution at his residence. The trial judge found a breach of the appellant's s. 10(b) Charter right to counsel without delay but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of Appeal found the trial judge committed errors of principle in her s. 24(2) analysis by: (1) attenuating the seriousness of the breach based on police compliance with the duty not to question before counsel contact; and (2) treating the impact of the breach as neutral because the appellant failed to demonstrate that the delay prevented meaningful consultation with counsel. The Court of Appeal concluded the s. 10(b) breach was serious and its impact significant, and that exclusion of the evidence was warranted to maintain the integrity of the administration of justice.

The applicant mother sought sole custody of five of the parties' eight children (ages 6-18), with access to the respondent father at her discretion, and child support retroactive to January 1, 2011, with the father's income imputed at $25,000 per annum. The mother had assigned her child support claim to the City of Toronto. The respondent father sought joint custody with free access and opposed any child support order. The court found the father was not a credible witness, having failed to disclose properties, misrepresented his financial situation to obtain social assistance, and failed to comply with financial disclosure orders. The court granted sole custody to the mother, structured access for the younger children on alternate Saturdays, and imputed the father's income at $25,000 per annum, ordering retroactive child support of $641 per month from January 1, 2012, with arrears of $29,727 payable forthwith to the City of Toronto.

An employee was terminated after eight years and four months of employment when her employer sold its assets. The employment agreement contained a termination clause providing two weeks' notice per year of employment or pay in lieu thereof, stated to be inclusive of all statutory entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000. The employer paid the employee thirteen weeks' working notice plus a lump sum equivalent to eight weeks' pay, and made benefit contributions during the notice period. The employee sought damages equivalent to twelve months' notice, arguing the termination clause was unenforceable. The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the clause enforceable but determining that if wrong, reasonable notice would be nine months. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the termination clause unenforceable because it excluded the employer's statutory obligation to contribute to the employee's benefit plans during the notice period and did not clearly satisfy the employer's statutory obligation to pay severance pay.

An accounting firm filed a corporate client's tax returns after the due date, resulting in the denial of approximately $550,000 in tax credits by the Canada Revenue Agency. The client received notices of assessment in April 2010 and pursued administrative remedies through the CRA appeal process, with the accountant's assistance, until May 2011 when the CRA advised it intended to confirm the assessments. The client commenced a negligence action in August 2012. The motion judge dismissed the action as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002, finding the claim was discoverable in April 2010. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the claim was not discovered until May 2011 when the CRA appeal process concluded, as it would not have been appropriate to commence proceedings while alternative remedies remained available.

This trial addressed parenting and child support arrangements for the parties' six-year-old son. The mother sought primary residence, sole decision-making responsibility, and retroactive child support, while the father sought joint decision-making and equal parenting time, opposing retroactive support. The court found the mother's evidence of family violence and the father's controlling behavior credible, which significantly influenced the decision on decision-making responsibility. The court granted the mother sole decision-making responsibility and primary residence, increased the father's parenting time (but denied equal time), and ordered the father to pay substantial retroactive child support due to blameworthy conduct and financial abuse.

The appellant, a former lawyer whose license was revoked, appealed a motion judge's decision to dismiss his action against 11 of 16 defendants under Rule 2.1 as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal against the Law Society Tribunal and Legal Aid Ontario, finding the claims abusive due to outstanding appeals and multiplicity of proceedings. However, the Court allowed the appeal in part, reinstating claims against Doctor Michael Colleton and the Hamilton Police Service, ruling that these claims were not "clearest of cases" for Rule 2.1 dismissal and involved complex legal issues (e.g., absolute privilege, negligent investigation) better suited for a Rule 21 motion.

This appeal concerned the correct approach to defamation and civil conspiracy pleadings in the context of a motion to strike. The Divisional Court had struck out the defendant's counterclaim, finding it lacked particularity. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the Divisional Court misapplied the modern, flexible approach to pleadings and failed to read the pleadings generously. The Court of Appeal reinstated the motion judge's decision, which had dismissed the motion to strike, emphasizing the high bar for striking pleadings and the deference owed to motion judges.

The trial concerned parenting and child support for five children. The mother sought primary residence, sole decision-making, and retroactive child support, including imputation of income to the father. The father sought primary residence and sole decision-making, or equal parenting time, and opposed retroactive support. The court granted the mother primary residence and sole decision-making, finding the father's allegations unsupported and his conduct controlling and disrespectful. The court imputed income to the father due to intentional under-employment and ordered retroactive child support from June 1, 2018, with a payment plan for significant arrears, considering the father's blameworthy conduct and the children's hardship.

The appellant, Pierre Aragon, appealed his convictions for aggravated assault, assault with a weapon, possessing a weapon, and uttering a threat, and his indeterminate dangerous offender sentence. The convictions stemmed from a 2012 beating of Fernando Fernandes, a Loners Motorcycle Club associate, by members of a rival group. The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding the recognition evidence and extrinsic discreditable conduct evidence properly admitted. However, the Court allowed the sentence appeal, concluding that the sentencing judge erred in identifying aggravating factors and failed to provide sufficient reasons for several rulings, including the decision to recall witnesses and the constitutional challenge. The sentence was set aside, and a new sentencing hearing was ordered before a different judge.

The Crown appealed an acquittal of sexual assault charges. The accused was charged with sexually assaulting his sister-in-law on two occasions without her consent. The trial judge acquitted the accused, finding his testimony that the sexual activity was consensual to be credible. The trial judge negatively assessed the complainant's credibility based on her post-assault behaviour, which included continued association with the accused and failure to flee or call for help. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge erred in law by relying on stereotypical views about how sexual assault victims should behave. The court determined that this legal error was material to the verdict because the trial judge's belief in the accused's credibility was inextricably linked to her flawed assessment of the complainant's credibility. The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, Broadgrain Commodities Inc., sold sesame seeds to Beidahuang Grain Group Co. Ltd. under a CIF contract. The goods were damaged during transit. The appellant obtained marine insurance from the respondent, Continental Casualty Company, but the respondent denied coverage. The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the appellant's action, finding that although the appellant had an insurable interest, it sustained no loss as it was paid in full by Beidahuang. The appellant appealed, arguing it suffered loss through subsequent short-payments from Beidahuang. The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the appellant failed to provide any credible evidence of loss and that a self-serving affidavit without supporting documentation was insufficient to create a triable issue.

Appeal from conviction for robbery and sentence imposed by Justice Eugene Ewaschuk on June 14 and June 29, 2010. The appellant was convicted of robbery but acquitted of using an imitation firearm. The appeal raised five grounds challenging the trial judge's conduct during cross-examination of the Crown's key witness, jury instructions on memory loss due to fear, absence of motive to fabricate, elements of the offence, and criticism of defence counsel's closing analogy. The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal but allowed the sentence appeal, finding the trial judge erred in applying the Truth in Sentencing Act to calculate pre-sentence custody credit.

The defendant brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a breach of contract action. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached a settlement agreement by giving testimony before the Ontario Municipal Board regarding the environmental impact of the plaintiff's proposed development. The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding that although the testimony constituted expression relating to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff had satisfied the merits and public interest hurdles under section 137.1(4). The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the plaintiff failed to meet its burden under section 137.1(4)(a) regarding substantial merit and that the motion judge erred in interpreting "substantial merit" as referring to the seriousness of the subject matter rather than the potential merits of the claim. The Court also found insufficient evidence of damages to satisfy the public interest balancing under section 137.1(4)(b).

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder arising from the deaths of two sex trade workers found in different locations in the Niagara Region approximately 29 months apart. Both victims died of blunt-force trauma to the head, and blood of both victims was found in the appellant's residences. The trial judge admitted evidence of one count as similar act evidence on the other count and refused to sever the counts. The trial judge also refused to discharge a juror who had a prior acquaintance with the victim's stepmother, and declined to leave manslaughter as an included offence. The Court of Appeal found multiple errors: the similar act evidence did not meet the required threshold of striking similarity, the juror should have been discharged to preserve the appearance of fairness, and manslaughter should have been left to the jury. The court also addressed a Charter breach regarding live monitoring conditions in wiretap authorizations but found the evidence admissible under section 24(2).

The appellant, C.G., appealed his convictions for sexual assault, sexual interference, invitation to sexual touching, and breach of recognizance. The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge made three fundamental errors: an inadequate analysis of "inadvertent collusion" concerning defence witnesses, a failure to analyze crucial competing exculpatory evidence (e.g., creaky floors, light sleepers, appellant's work schedule), and an improper application of the principles from R. v. W. (D.) by not explaining why the exculpatory evidence failed to raise a reasonable doubt. The trial judge also erred by relying on a stereotype about sex offenders taking "incredible risks" without proper evidentiary foundation. The appeal was allowed, and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant, a self-represented, non-English speaking litigant, appealed a trial judgment that dismissed her claim for general damages and awarded substantial costs against her following a motor vehicle accident. The Court of Appeal found the trial procedurally and substantively unfair due to several errors: the improper management and use of a "Joint Trial Brief" that unfairly excluded evidence favorable to the appellant; the erroneous admission and use of expert medical opinion (Dr. Sanchez's report) as hearsay without cross-examination, while excluding the appellant's expert (Dr. Becker); and the prejudicial use of information about the appellant's statutory accident benefits settlement to suggest malingering. The Court also found the trial judge erred in failing to revisit the decision not to strike the jury given the complexities and the appellant's self-represented status. The appeal was allowed, the judgment and orders set aside, and a new trial ordered.

Tallman Truck Centre Limited appealed an order staying its action against K.S.P. Holdings Inc. The stay was imposed because Tallman failed to immediately disclose a settlement agreement with the co-defendant, Secure Capital Advisors Inc., which fundamentally altered Secure's adversarial position to a cooperative one with Tallman. The Court of Appeal dismissed Tallman's appeal, affirming that such agreements, regardless of type (Mary Carter or Pierringer-type), require immediate disclosure as they change the litigation landscape. The court reiterated that failure to immediately disclose constitutes an abuse of process, for which a stay of proceedings is the only appropriate remedy, regardless of intent or perceived prejudice.

The applicant father and respondent mother both sought costs following a motion where success was divided. The father was unsuccessful on temporary custody and venue but successful on parenting schedule terms. The mother served two offers to settle, both containing parenting terms more favourable to the father than the final order. The court found the mother was entitled to costs due to her early and severable offers, and her success on key issues. The father was ordered to pay the mother $9,000 in costs, payable in instalments, despite his argument regarding ability to pay.

The appellants, defendants in a mortgage guarantee action, commenced third party claims against their former lawyer for contribution and indemnity, alleging he failed to obtain releases of their personal guarantees as instructed. The motion judge granted summary judgment dismissing the claims as statute-barred under section 18 of the Limitations Act, 2002, finding an absolute two-year limitation period. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that section 18 does not establish an absolute limitation period but rather works with sections 4 and 5 of the Limitations Act to create a presumed start date subject to discoverability principles. The court also found the motion judge erred in principle by not fully appreciating the complexity of the discoverability issue when deciding to proceed by summary judgment.

The appellant was convicted of firearms offences and possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking following a police stop of a van in a residential neighbourhood where break-ins had occurred. The Court of Appeal found that the initial traffic stop constituted an arbitrary detention in breach of section 9 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, as the officer had no reasonable grounds to suspect the occupants were involved in the break-ins and no legitimate highway traffic purpose for the stop. Although the arrest and search incident to arrest were found to be lawful based on the smell of fresh marijuana, and the post-arrest strip search was found to be unlawful, the Court determined that the arbitrary detention tainted all subsequent police conduct. Applying the section 24(2) analysis, the Court excluded all evidence obtained as a result of the Charter violations, finding that the seriousness of the police misconduct and its strong negative impact on the appellant's Charter-protected interests outweighed society's interest in adjudication on the merits.

The appellant was convicted of possession of child pornography and appealed both conviction and sentence. The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction, finding that the police search of the appellant's computer was reasonable and not unreasonably invasive under section 8 of the Charter. The court found that where child pornography has been located on a computer during initial examination, it is reasonable for police to examine all images and videos on the computer, as well as Internet search history, to identify further material and determine who was responsible. The court also found that the mandatory minimum six-month sentence for possession of child pornography was grossly disproportionate in reasonable hypothetical circumstances and violated section 12 of the Charter. However, the court upheld the ten-month sentence imposed by the trial judge as fit and proportionate, given the serious nature of the offence and the appellant's collection of 89 unique videos and 50 unique images of extreme child pornography.

The appellant, a psychologist, was convicted by jury of two counts of impaired operation of a motor vehicle causing bodily harm following a two-vehicle collision. She appealed on multiple grounds, including Charter violations, credibility assessments, jury charge errors regarding straddle evidence, and prosecutorial misconduct. The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds of appeal, finding no Charter breaches, no reversible credibility errors, and no miscarriage of justice despite some improper prosecutorial conduct.

The appellant, G.M.C., appealed his convictions for assault and compliance charges, following a 12-day trial. The appeal was based on three grounds: the trial judge's alleged improper judicial notice of "memory science," uneven scrutiny of evidence (including credibility assessment, demeanour, and use of bad character evidence), and reasonable apprehension of bias. The Court of Appeal dismissed all grounds, finding that the trial judge's observations on memory were common sense, that there was no reversible error in the credibility assessments or application of different standards, and that the isolated incidents did not give rise to a reasonable apprehension of bias. The court affirmed the convictions.

The court addressed temporary parenting arrangements and schooling for a nine-year-old child following the separation of the parents. The father sought shared parenting and the child's return to his original school in Moorefield. The mother sought sole custody and enrollment at a new school in Elmira. The court found that the parents had shared caregiving responsibilities prior to separation and that the mother's unilateral relocation did not create a valid new status quo. The court ordered interim shared custody on a week-about basis with equal parenting time, while allowing the child to continue at the new school in Elmira to minimize further disruption.

The defendant pleaded guilty to impaired driving causing bodily harm. The Crown sought a fifteen-month jail sentence, while the defence sought an intermittent sentence of ninety days plus probation. The court imposed an eleven-month jail sentence with a two-year driving prohibition. The sentencing considered the serious injuries to the victim, including permanent disability and chronic pain, balanced against the defendant's own significant injuries from the collision, his guilty plea, community service, and remorse. The court rejected the defence position that the defendant's medical condition warranted an intermittent sentence, finding that while medical factors could place the defendant lower in the sentencing range, they did not justify a fundamentally different outcome.

On appeal from convictions for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and breach of recognizance, the appellant challenged the trial judge's rejection of his Charter claims. The trial judge found an arbitrary detention under s. 9 based on the precipitous arrest for breach of recognizance (the officer failed to verify that the cellphone prohibition remained in force), but rejected the appellant's racial profiling claim. The trial judge also rejected the s. 8 unreasonable search argument and admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in his analysis of the racial profiling claim and in his s. 24(2) analysis, and ordered a new trial.

The appellant sued two law firms alleging they defrauded him by misappropriating settlement funds from a motor vehicle accident claim. The motion judge dismissed the action under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the allegation of misappropriation was not entirely implausible and that the statement of claim did not bear the hallmarks of frivolous or vexatious litigation. The court held that Rule 2.1.01 should be reserved for the clearest of cases and is not an appropriate mechanism for early dismissal when a pleading asserts a legitimate cause of action.

The appellant was arrested on a surety warrant that had been rescinded by an administrative judge over a month prior to the arrest, but the rescission was not recorded on CPIC. A pat-down search incident to arrest and a subsequent strip search yielded cocaine and marijuana. The trial judge found the arrest lawful and the searches reasonable. On appeal, the court found the arrest was unlawful because: (1) the surety warrant had been validly rescinded by the administrative judge; (2) the arresting officer lacked reasonable grounds for the arrest; and (3) the police failed to make reasonable inquiries when the appellant informed them the warrant had been dealt with in court. The court also found the strip search violated section 8 of the Charter. The evidence was excluded under section 24(2) and verdicts of acquittal were substituted.

The appellant purchaser failed to close on an agreement of purchase and sale for a residential property in Mississauga. After receiving multiple extensions, the appellant ultimately did not close due to inability to obtain mortgage financing. The respondent vendors resold the property for a lower price and sued for damages. The motion judge awarded damages for the difference in price plus consequential losses, and ordered forfeiture of the $75,000 deposit without crediting it toward the damages. On appeal, the court upheld the damages award but reversed the deposit forfeiture issue, holding that the deposit must be credited toward the damages when the vendor suffers a loss from the purchaser's breach.