Most Cited Cases

The appellants abandoned an application for judicial review and the respondents were awarded costs fixed at $187,682.51 on a partial indemnity basis. The appellants appealed the costs order, arguing the costs should have been referred for assessment and that the amount was excessive. The Court of Appeal held that the motions judge did not err in fixing the costs rather than referring them for assessment. However, the Court found the costs awarded were excessive and not fair and reasonable, noting the amount was virtually the same as a substantial indemnity award and the proceedings relied on the same record as an earlier application. The appeal was allowed and the costs award was reduced to $63,000.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault following a trial that hinged on the credibility of the accused versus the complainant. During the main charge, the trial judge correctly instructed the jury on the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. However, in a brief recharge requested by the Crown, the judge erroneously framed the core issue as whether the jury believed the complainant or the accused, omitting the third alternative that they might disbelieve the accused but still have a reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court of Canada held that, despite the error in the recharge, the charge read as a whole adequately instructed the jury on the proper standard of proof, given the correct instructions in the main charge and the short time elapsed before the recharge. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant challenged firearms convictions arising from a street encounter with police, alleging arbitrary detention and breach of the right to counsel before he disclosed possession of a firearm. The Court held that a psychological detention had crystallized during the encounter, that the detention was arbitrary under s. 9, and that the failure to advise of counsel breached s. 10(b). The Court reformulated the legal framework for detention and established a revised three-part approach to exclusion of evidence under s. 24(2), ultimately admitting the firearm because the police conduct, though unconstitutional, was not egregious and the evidence was highly reliable and essential. The Court also held that simple movement of a firearm from place to place did not constitute a 'transfer' for the purpose of the weapons trafficking offence, and entered an acquittal on that count.

The court determined the dispositive appellate issues on the evidentiary record. The reasons address the principal submissions, apply the governing legal framework, and resolve the controlling questions. Relief was granted or refused according to the applicable standard of review and the merits.

The appellants challenged a trial costs order requiring them to pay the respondent more than $509,000 in fees, much of it on an elevated indemnity basis after a without-costs offer to settle. The Court of Appeal held that elevated costs are warranted only through the operation of rule 49.10 or where the losing party engaged in reprehensible or egregious conduct deserving of sanction. Because the offer did not engage rule 49.10 and there was no sanction-worthy conduct, the elevated award was an error in principle. The court further held the amount awarded was not fair and reasonable under the governing costs principles and reduced the fees award to $300,000.

The appellant was rendered a quadriplegic in a motor vehicle accident when the impaired driver failed to negotiate a sharp curve on a rural road. The trial judge apportioned 35% liability to the municipality for failing to post a warning sign. The Court of Appeal overturned this finding. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the trial judge's decision, holding that the trial judge's finding of negligence was a question of mixed fact and law that should not be overturned absent a palpable and overriding error. The Court clarified the standards of review for questions of law, fact, and mixed fact and law.

This appeal concerned a variation application arising from a custodial parent's proposed relocation of the child to Australia. The Court held that the party seeking variation must first establish a material change in the circumstances affecting the child, after which the court must conduct a fresh inquiry into the child's best interests without any legal presumption favouring the custodial parent, while giving that parent's views serious respect. Applying that framework, the Court concluded that the relocation materially affected the child because it would significantly curtail frequent and meaningful contact with the access parent, but the child's best interests still favoured remaining in the custodial parent's care. The appeal was allowed in part only to vary access so it could be exercised in Canada rather than Australia, with no costs.

The applicants, two major tobacco companies, sought an interlocutory stay to suspend the enforcement of new packaging regulations under the Tobacco Products Control Act pending their appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada challenging the Act's constitutionality. The Court established the three-part test for interlocutory relief in Charter cases: a serious question to be tried, irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience. While the applicants demonstrated a serious question and irreparable financial harm, the Court held that the balance of convenience weighed heavily in favour of the public interest in health, which the regulations aimed to protect. The applications for a stay were dismissed.

This is a costs decision arising from a custody and access appeal concerning three children. The father's appeal to the Court of Appeal was dismissed on all four grounds. The court awarded the mother costs fixed at $25,000, representing 60-70% of her actual costs. The decision addresses the presumption of costs in favour of successful parties in family law matters, the application of the Family Law Rules cost framework, and the impact of unreasonable conduct by both parties. The court also addressed costs related to an unsuccessful appeal to the Divisional Court, declining to award costs for that stage due to the confusing nature of family law appeal routes in Ontario.

The appellant appealed a costs award of over $300,000 made by the motion judge in family law proceedings. The motion judge had awarded costs to the respondent following a successful motion to strike the appellant's answer on the basis that a constitutional issue was not properly pleaded. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal on the merits, which provided the appellant with the opportunity to amend his answer. The respondent remained entitled to costs of the original motion, but the costs award was reduced from over $300,000 to $200,000. The court found that the motion judge erred in principle by adopting a "close to full recovery" approach, giving undue weight to settlement offers in circumstances where settlement was not practically possible, inappropriately increasing costs based on the appellant's ability to pay and the respondent's financial need, and failing to apply the proportionality principle required by the Family Law Rules.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment ordering him to pay child support based on an imputed annual income of $30,000. The father had quit his job as a tool and die maker and enrolled as a full-time university student. The Court of Appeal held that 'intentionally' under section 19(1)(a) of the Child Support Guidelines does not require bad faith or a specific intent to evade support obligations. The court upheld the finding that the father was intentionally under-employed but reduced the imputed income to $16,500, reflecting his capacity to work part-time while studying. The court also varied the retroactive support period to account for times the father provided childcare and was on academic probation.

The Court allowed the Crown's sentencing appeal, restored the trial sentence of six years and six months for two counts of impaired driving causing death, and reduced the driving prohibition to two years and four months after accounting for the presentence no-driving period.

A custody and access appeal arising from a post-divorce dispute over whether an access parent could discuss and practise his religion with the children over the custodial parent's objection. The Court held that the governing standard under the Divorce Act is the best interests of the child, not a freestanding universal harm threshold, though risk of harm may be relevant in assessing the quality of access. The Court further held that ss. 16(8) and 17(5) of the Divorce Act do not violate Charter guarantees of religion, expression, association, or equality. The appeal was allowed in part: the religious discussion restrictions were removed or treated as unnecessary in light of undertakings, the wife retained the matrimonial home, certain debt allocations and costs awards were varied, and costs against counsel and the religious society were set aside.

These consolidated appeals addressed the interpretation and application of the amended summary judgment regime under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court of Appeal held that summary judgment may be granted not only where claims or defences are without merit or the parties agree, but also where the motion judge can achieve a full appreciation of the evidence and issues required to make dispositive findings on the motion record, possibly supplemented by limited oral evidence. The court articulated the “full appreciation” test, confirmed that the standard of review on whether there is a genuine issue requiring a trial is correctness, and explained the proper use of the new powers to weigh evidence, evaluate credibility, draw inferences, and hear oral evidence on discrete issues. Applying those principles, the court dismissed the Combined Air, Misek, and Parker appeals, dismissed the Mauldin appeal, and allowed the Bruno appeal by setting aside summary judgment and dismissing the motion.

The Crown appealed a sentence reduction in a case involving prolonged physical, sexual, and emotional abuse of the offender's children. The Court held that there is no legal ceiling capping fixed-term sentences at 20 years under the Criminal Code, absent special circumstances, and that the totality principle requires only that the global sentence be just and appropriate and proportionate to the offender's overall culpability. The Court further confirmed that retribution is a legitimate and important sentencing principle, distinct from vengeance and complementary to denunciation, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of society. Applying the deferential standard of review for sentence appeals, the Court held the appellate court erred by intervening absent demonstrable unfitness and restored the 25-year cumulative sentence.

Following a decision ordering a new trial, the court issued an addendum on costs. The court clarified that the new trial would only extend to claims that formed the subject-matter of the appeal, and stayed the execution of a damages award against one respondent pending the new trial. The costs of the first trial were reserved to the presiding justice at the new trial. The appellant was awarded costs of the proceedings in the Court of Appeal, fixed at $36,000 on a partial indemnity basis, specifically for the motion to introduce fresh evidence.

The appellant was convicted of conspiring to import a narcotic based largely on intercepted private communications. The trial judge refused to open the sealed packets containing the affidavits supporting the wiretap authorizations. The Supreme Court of Canada held that an accused is entitled to access the sealed packet, subject to editing to protect informants, to make full answer and defence. The Court established that a trial judge may review the authorization to determine if it complies with s. 8 of the Charter, and if unlawful, the evidence must be excluded under s. 178.16 of the Criminal Code. The Court also held that the accused may cross-examine the affiant with leave of the trial judge if necessary to make full answer and defence. A new trial was ordered because the appellant was denied the right to cross-examine.

The Crown appealed a decision substituting a conditional sentence for an 18-month custodial sentence imposed after guilty pleas to dangerous driving causing death and dangerous driving causing bodily harm. The Court held that Bill C-41 and the conditional sentencing provisions were enacted to reduce incarceration and promote restorative justice, but conditional sentences remain punitive sanctions distinct from probation and generally should include restrictive conditions such as house arrest. The Court interpreted s. 742.1 purposively, holding that the sentencing judge need not first fix an equivalent jail term before considering community service of the sentence, and that community safety is a threshold inquiry focused on the specific offender's risk of reoffending and potential harm. While conditional sentences may satisfy denunciation and deterrence in appropriate cases, the sentencing judge's decision to impose jail here was not demonstrably unfit. The appeal was allowed, the custodial sentence restored, and its service stayed because the respondent had already completed the conditional sentence.

The accused was convicted of possession of child pornography after police searched his computer pursuant to a warrant. The warrant was obtained based on an Information to Obtain (ITO) sworn by a police officer after a computer technician reported seeing suspicious bookmarks and a webcam pointed at a child's play area. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated s. 8 of the Charter because the ITO, which contained misleading and incomplete information, failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds to believe the accused possessed child pornography. The Court distinguished between the offences of accessing and possessing child pornography, holding that possession requires control over the underlying data files, not merely viewing images online. The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and an acquittal was entered.

Following the appellant's substantial success on appeal and at trial in a family law matter, the Court of Appeal fixed costs for both proceedings. The court noted the respondent's unreasonable conduct in prolonging the trial and failing to make or accept reasonable offers to settle. Applying the factors under Rule 24(11) of the Family Law Rules, the court awarded the appellant $275,000 for the trial and $25,000 for the appeal, allowing the award to be offset against the appellant's spousal support arrears.

The accused, a stockbroker, was convicted of fraud after a jury trial. The trial judge instructed the jury that 'proof beyond a reasonable doubt' should be understood in its 'ordinary, natural every day sense'. The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial, finding the jury charge insufficient. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that trial judges must explain the concept of reasonable doubt to juries. The Court provided a model charge, emphasizing that reasonable doubt is inextricably linked to the presumption of innocence, is not an ordinary everyday concept, and must be based on reason and common sense rather than sympathy or prejudice. The trial judge's failure to properly define the standard of proof was a fundamental error that could not be saved by the curative proviso.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered four appeals regarding retroactive child support. The Court held that parents have a free-standing obligation to support their children commensurate with their income, and courts have the jurisdiction to order retroactive child support under both the Divorce Act and provincial legislation. In determining whether to make a retroactive award, courts must balance the payor parent's interest in certainty with fairness to the child by considering the reason for the recipient parent's delay, the payor parent's conduct, the child's past and present circumstances, and potential hardship. The Court allowed the appeals in D.B.S. and T.A.R., restoring the chambers judges' decisions to deny retroactive support, and dismissed the appeals in Henry and Hiemstra, affirming the retroactive support awards.

The mother appealed a trial judgment granting sole custody to the father and ordering that her access be supervised until she received a 'clean bill of health' from a psychiatrist and a specific psychologist was involved in the decision. She also appealed the trial judge's order awarding the father full recovery of costs. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, striking the conditions requiring a clean bill of health and the psychologist's involvement as they were too vague and constituted an improper delegation of judicial authority. However, the court upheld the requirement for supervised access. The court also refused to admit fresh evidence generated during a confidential appellate mediation process. The appeal of the costs award was dismissed, as the mother's conduct was unreasonable and the father had made a successful offer to settle.

The accused was convicted of three sexual offences against his stepdaughter. The trial judge found the complainant credible and largely rejected the accused's evidence, but did not explicitly link each incident to a specific count or detail why the accused's denial failed to raise a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeal set aside the convictions, finding the reasons insufficient. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, holding that a trial judge's reasons must be read in context and are sufficient if they show why the judge reached the decision, without needing to detail every step of the reasoning process.

The plaintiff brought an action alleging he contracted mesothelioma from asbestos exposure and claimed the defendants conspired to withhold information about the dangers of asbestos. The defendants applied to strike out the conspiracy claims as disclosing no reasonable claim. The Supreme Court of Canada held that a statement of claim should only be struck out if it is 'plain and obvious' that it discloses no reasonable claim. The Court found it was not plain and obvious that the conspiracy claim would fail, and the action was allowed to proceed.

The Crown appealed a Manitoba Court of Appeal decision reducing a six-year sentence for sexual interference with a four-year-old child to four and one-half years. The sentencing judge had employed a higher starting point despite the absence of a formal trust relationship, relying on the aggravating nature of the offence. The Court of Appeal found an error in principle. The Supreme Court allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal mischaracterized the sentencing judge's reasoning and that no error in principle was made. The Court provided comprehensive guidance on sentencing for sexual offences against children, directing that sentences must increase to reflect Parliament's legislative initiatives and society's deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children.

The accused, a pediatrician, was charged with sexually assaulting four teenage female patients. At trial, the defence sought to introduce expert psychiatric evidence that the perpetrator of such offences would belong to a narrow class of individuals (e.g., pedophiles or sexual psychopaths) and that the accused did not possess the characteristics of this class. The trial judge excluded the evidence, but the Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the convictions, establishing a four-part test for the admission of expert evidence: relevance, necessity in assisting the trier of fact, the absence of any exclusionary rule, and a properly qualified expert. The Court held the psychiatric evidence was inadmissible as it lacked sufficient reliability and necessity to overcome the exclusionary rule against character evidence.

The Supreme Court of Canada heard two appeals concerning the property and financial rights of common law partners upon the breakdown of their relationships. The Court held that the 'common intention' resulting trust has no further role in resolving domestic property disputes. Instead, the law of unjust enrichment is the primary vehicle. The Court clarified that a monetary remedy for unjust enrichment need not always be calculated on a quantum meruit (fee-for-services) basis. Where the parties were engaged in a 'joint family venture' and there is a link between the claimant's contributions and the accumulation of wealth, the remedy should be calculated based on the share of the accumulated wealth proportionate to the claimant's contributions. In Vanasse, the Court restored the trial judge's award based on wealth accumulation. In Kerr, the Court ordered a new trial for the unjust enrichment claims and restored the trial judge's order for spousal support effective from the date proceedings commenced.

The appellant sought a stay for breach of the constitutional right to be tried within a reasonable time after substantial pre-trial and trial delay in a drug prosecution. The Court held the delay was unreasonable and reformulated the governing section 11(b) framework by introducing presumptive ceilings of 18 months in provincial court and 30 months in superior court or post-preliminary inquiry matters. Delay above the ceiling is presumed unreasonable unless the Crown proves exceptional circumstances outside its control. Applying that framework contextually, the remaining delay far exceeded the ceiling and was not justified by complexity, transition, or institutional strain. The convictions were set aside and a stay was entered.

The accused was charged with sexual assault causing bodily harm. At trial, the Crown introduced similar fact evidence from the accused's former wife regarding alleged past assaults to show a propensity for non-consensual, painful sex. The accused argued the evidence was highly prejudicial and that the former wife and the complainant had colluded. The trial judge admitted the evidence and left the issue of collusion to the jury, resulting in a conviction. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the similar fact evidence was wrongly admitted because its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative value, and the trial judge erred in law by failing to resolve the issue of collusion as a condition precedent to admissibility.

The appellant was convicted of multiple offences including forcible confinement, assault, and criminal harassment against a former girlfriend, and was sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment. He appealed the sentence on the basis that the trial judge failed to give him credit for 18 months spent on bail under strict house arrest conditions. The Court of Appeal held that time spent under stringent bail conditions is a relevant mitigating factor that must be considered, and the failure to do so is an error in principle. The appeal was allowed and the sentence was reduced to 16 months' imprisonment.

The appellant was subjected to a warrantless "frisk" search for drugs based on an informant's tip. The police found speed and then arrested the appellant, advising him of his right to counsel. The trial judge acquitted the appellant, finding the search unreasonable under s. 8 of the Charter and excluding the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that while the appellant was detained and his s. 10(b) right to counsel was violated by the delay in informing him, the search itself was reasonable under s. 8. The Court further held that the real evidence obtained should not be excluded under s. 24(2) as its admission would not bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

The Director of Investigation and Research authorized a search of the respondent's premises under the Combines Investigation Act. The authorization was certified by a member of the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission. The respondent challenged the search under section 8 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Canada held that section 8 requires prior authorization by a neutral and impartial arbiter based on reasonable and probable grounds established upon oath. The Court found that the Combines Investigation Act failed to meet these standards, as the Commission member was not a neutral arbiter and the statute did not require reasonable and probable grounds. The search provisions were struck down as unconstitutional.

The appellant was seized by the throat by a police officer in a pub and found to be in possession of a balloon containing heroin. The trial judge found the search unreasonable under s 8 of the Charter because the Crown failed to establish the officer's reasonable grounds, but admitted the evidence under s 24(2). The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the admission of the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute given the seriousness of the Charter violation and the lack of established grounds for the violent search.

The Burnbrae defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims against them. The plaintiffs, who were competitors in the egg industry, alleged that Burnbrae conspired with others to drive them out of business by supplying deficient eggs, misusing confidential information, and interfering with contractual relations. Applying the new summary judgment framework from Hryniak v. Mauldin, the court found no evidence to support the plaintiffs' sweeping allegations against Burnbrae. The court concluded that Burnbrae's actions were legitimate competitive behavior and dismissed the action against the Burnbrae defendants.

In a criminal appeal concerning circumstantial proof of possession of child pornography, the Court clarified that alternative inferences consistent with innocence may arise from evidence or absence of evidence, but must be reasonable rather than speculative. The Court held there is no mandatory formula for circumstantial-evidence instructions, though juries should be cautioned against inferential gap-filling and premature conclusions. Reading the trial reasons as a whole, the Court found no reversible legal error in the treatment of inferences, burden, or standard of proof. The guilty verdict was held reasonable on the totality of the evidence. The acquittal was set aside and Charter ss. 8 and 24(2) issues were remanded to the provincial appellate court.

The Government of British Columbia and a class of consumers brought separate actions against tobacco companies regarding the health impacts of smoking and 'light' cigarettes. The tobacco companies issued third-party notices against the Government of Canada, claiming contribution and indemnity based on negligent misrepresentation, negligent design, failure to warn, and statutory liability. Canada brought motions to strike the third-party claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed Canada's appeals and struck all third-party claims. The Court held that Canada's alleged representations and design decisions regarding low-tar cigarettes were core government policy decisions immune from tort liability. Furthermore, Canada did not qualify as a 'manufacturer' or 'supplier' under the relevant provincial statutes.

The accused were charged with multiple offences related to a cocaine-trafficking ring. The Crown's case relied heavily on wiretap evidence obtained via an ex parte authorization supported by a lengthy police affidavit. At trial, cross-examination revealed errors in the affidavit regarding confidential sources, leading the trial judge to reject the entire affidavit, exclude the wiretap evidence, and acquit the accused. The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittals and ordered a new trial. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, clarifying that the investigative necessity requirement for wiretaps means there must be no other reasonable alternative method of investigation. The Court held that the affidavit met this standard and that the trial judge erred in applying the standard of review by globally rejecting the affidavit instead of excising the erroneous information and considering whether sufficient reliable information remained to support the authorization.

The court determined the dispositive appellate issues on the evidentiary record. The reasons address the principal submissions, apply the governing legal framework, and resolve the controlling questions. Relief was granted or refused according to the applicable standard of review and the merits.

The appellants were former employees of a bankrupt shoe retailer. Following the bankruptcy, the employees' employment was terminated. The Ministry of Labour filed a proof of claim for termination and severance pay under the Employment Standards Act, which the Trustee disallowed on the basis that bankruptcy does not constitute termination 'by an employer'. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the words of an Act must be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament. The Court found that interpreting the ESA to exclude bankrupt employers would lead to absurd results and defeat the remedial purpose of the legislation.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered by the provincial appellate court after a trial judge had convicted the accused of sexual offences against three young girls. The Supreme Court held that under s. 686(1)(a)(i) an appellate court may re-examine and to some extent reweigh the evidence, including credibility-based findings, but must show substantial deference to the trial judge's assessment. The Court further held that children's evidence is not inherently unreliable and should not be assessed through rigid adult credibility stereotypes or assumptions about how victims of sexual abuse ought to behave. The appellate court erred by overstating inconsistencies, discounting supporting evidence, and relying on outdated views about corroboration and complaint. The appeal was allowed and the convictions were restored.

The appellant was approached by a police officer investigating the use of a stolen credit card at a liquor store. The officer told the appellant to 'wait a minute' while he asked preliminary questions. After receiving further information over the radio, the officer arrested the appellant and informed him of his right to counsel. The appellant argued he was detained from the moment the officer told him to wait, and that his right to counsel was violated. The Supreme Court held that while the right to counsel must be provided immediately upon detention, the appellant was not detained during the initial exploratory questioning. The appeal was dismissed.

The accused appealed after the Court of Appeal set aside a judicial stay entered because of repeated Crown non-disclosure in a sexual offence prosecution. A majority held that non-disclosure violates s. 7 only where it prejudices the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, and that a stay is reserved for the clearest of cases where prejudice cannot be otherwise remedied. The Court also established a landmark framework for obtaining production of private third-party records, requiring the accused to show likely relevance and requiring the court to balance trial fairness against privacy and equality interests. The appeal was dismissed and a new trial ordered.

The accused was subjected to excessive force by police during his arrest for impaired driving and flight from police, resulting in broken ribs and a punctured lung. The trial judge found breaches of the accused's Charter rights and reduced his sentences to conditional discharges under s. 24(1). The Court of Appeal upheld the finding of excessive force but substituted the mandatory minimum fine for the impaired driving offence. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal and cross-appeal, holding that while state misconduct can be considered in sentencing, a sentence cannot be reduced below a statutory minimum absent a constitutional challenge to the minimum itself.

The accused, a retirement home manager, was charged with assaulting several elderly residents. By the time of trial, four complainants had died and one was incompetent to testify. The trial judge admitted videotaped statements to the police from two deceased complainants under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, relying heavily on the striking similarities between the statements, and convicted the accused. The Court of Appeal excluded the statements and acquitted the accused. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that the hearsay statements were inadmissible. The Court clarified the principled approach to hearsay, ruling that trial judges may consider corroborative or conflicting evidence when assessing threshold reliability, modifying its previous ruling in R. v. Starr. However, on the facts, the deceased complainant's statement lacked sufficient indicia of reliability to overcome the dangers of admitting untested hearsay.

Criminal appeal from convictions for two counts of first degree murder. The court held that the deceased’s statement of intention and police evidence of a witness’s out-of-court identification were inadmissible hearsay, and clarified that traditional hearsay exceptions must conform to the principled approach of necessity and reliability. The court further held that the jury instruction on reasonable doubt was deficient because it failed to explain that the criminal standard is higher than proof on a balance of probabilities and wrongly suggested the phrase had no special legal meaning. A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed an acquittal entered after the provincial appellate court excluded the accused’s post-polygraph confessions to multiple arsons. The majority held that the common law confessions rule is a contextual voluntariness inquiry concerned with both reliability and fairness, requiring consideration of threats or promises, oppression, operating mind, and police trickery. It further held that appellate courts owe deference to a trial judge’s factual assessment of voluntariness absent palpable and overriding error. On the facts, the police interrogation, while persistent and strategic, did not involve inducements or oppression sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to voluntariness, and the confessions and re-enactment were admissible.

The mother appealed a trial decision awarding joint custody of the parties' young child and ordering the parents to attend counseling, with an unnamed counselor to resolve disputes. The father cross-appealed the net family property equalization payment. The Court of Appeal allowed the mother's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in awarding joint custody given the parents' complete inability to communicate and lack of historical cooperation. The court also held the trial judge exceeded her jurisdiction by ordering counseling and delegating decision-making to a counselor. Sole custody was awarded to the mother, and a new trial was ordered for access. The father's cross-appeal regarding property was dismissed.

The appellant was arrested for aggravated assault and detained for 18 hours before being formally charged, primarily to allow the police to conduct an identification parade. At trial, the judge found the arrest unlawful and arbitrary under s. 9 of the Charter, ordering a stay of proceedings. The Court of Appeal reversed this decision. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the police had subjective and objective reasonable and probable grounds for the arrest under s. 450(1) of the Criminal Code. The Court further held that the 18-hour detention was not unreasonable and did not violate s. 9 of the Charter, as the identification parade was the fairest and most practical means of identification.

The appellant appealed a sexual assault conviction involving a child complainant, arguing that the trial judge's reasons were inadequate because they did not expressly explain the rejection of his denial. The court held that the adequacy of reasons must be assessed functionally and contextually by asking whether they permit meaningful appellate review. Reviewing the whole record, including the complainant's evidence, the diary evidence, and the trial judge's express application of the reasonable doubt standard and the W.(D.) framework, the court found the route to conviction was clear. The reasons were sufficient to show that the denial did not raise a reasonable doubt when weighed against the accepted evidence. Appeal dismissed.

The appellant's home was destroyed by fire. The respondent insurer denied the claim, alleging arson, despite its own experts and investigators concluding the fire was accidental. The insurer maintained this bad faith defence through a lengthy trial to force a lower settlement. The jury awarded compensatory damages and $1 million in punitive damages. The Court of Appeal reduced the punitive damages to $100,000. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and restored the $1 million jury award, holding that the insurer's breach of the duty of good faith was an independent actionable wrong and the jury's award, while high, was a rational response to the insurer's exceptionally reprehensible conduct.

The parties cohabited for four years and were married for three. The appellant wife suffered from various health problems and eventually became completely disabled and unable to work. Upon separation, the trial judge and Court of Appeal denied her permanent spousal support, finding no compensatory basis or contractual agreement for support. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the Divorce Act and provincial legislation recognize three bases for spousal support: compensatory, contractual, and non-compensatory. Even where a spouse has not suffered economic disadvantage caused by the marriage, a mutual obligation of support may arise from the marriage relationship itself, entitling a sick or disabled spouse to support based on need and the other spouse's ability to pay.

The accused was convicted of possession of stolen property based solely on the uncorroborated testimony of his estranged girlfriend. The trial judge provided boilerplate reasons that failed to address the conflicting evidence or explain the basis for the conviction. The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction and ordered a new trial due to the absence of adequate reasons. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the Crown's appeal, holding that a trial judge's failure to provide reasons that are sufficiently intelligible to permit meaningful appellate review constitutes an error of law.

The Crown appealed the conditional sentences imposed on two black single mothers who pleaded guilty to importing cocaine. The trial judge had introduced his own research on systemic racial and gender bias, concluding these factors mitigated their culpability and justified conditional sentences. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge overstepped his role by acting as advocate, witness, and judge, and erred in principle by imposing conditional sentences for a serious offence like importing cocaine. Although the appropriate sentences would have been custodial terms of 20 months and two years less a day, the Court dismissed the appeal because the respondents had already served 17 months of their conditional sentences, and incarcerating them now would cause undue hardship.

The appellant was convicted of sexual assault and sexual exploitation of a person with a disability. The complainant, who had a mild mental disability, gave inconsistent testimony, including conflicting statements about inventing the allegations. The trial judge convicted the appellant, relying on the complainant's prior consistent statements to corroborate her testimony, without explaining how he resolved the inconsistencies. The Court of Appeal upheld the convictions. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, holding that the trial judge failed to provide sufficient reasons explaining how he resolved the significant credibility issues and erred in using prior consistent statements to corroborate the complainant's testimony.

The accused was charged with sexually assaulting a young child. At trial, the defence cross-examined the complainant on her two-and-a-half-year delay in reporting the abuse, suggesting fabrication. The Crown called a child psychologist to testify that delayed disclosure is common and does not indicate falsehood. The trial judge admitted the expert evidence, and the accused was convicted. The Court of Appeal ordered a new trial, holding the expert evidence was inadmissible. The Crown appealed to the Supreme Court of Canada solely on the admissibility of the expert evidence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the expert evidence was not necessary because the principle that delay does not equate to falsehood is not outside the normal experience of a jury and could be addressed through a proper jury instruction.

A recreation instructor was convicted of sexually assaulting a boy under his supervision and was subsequently dismissed by the City of Toronto. The union grieved the dismissal, and the arbitrator allowed the relitigation of the sexual assault allegations, ultimately finding the employee was dismissed without just cause. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the arbitrator's decision to allow relitigation of the criminal conviction was an abuse of process. The Court ruled that the criminal conviction must stand with all its legal effects, and the arbitrator's failure to give it full effect rendered the decision patently unreasonable.

The appellant was convicted of aggravated assault as a party to a robbery and sentenced to an effective term of five and one-half years. On appeal, he argued the trial judge erred by capping pre-sentence custody credit at 1.5 days without considering the harsh lockdown conditions he endured, and by imposing a longer sentence than his co-accused. The Court of Appeal agreed the trial judge erred in law regarding the cap on credit for harsh conditions, but declined to grant enhanced credit due to a lack of evidence showing an adverse impact on the appellant. The court also found no error regarding parity, noting the co-accused's guilty plea. The appeal was allowed only to correct a 23-day calculation error in the pre-sentence credit.

The aboriginal appellant pled guilty to manslaughter for the killing of her common law husband and was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. The sentencing judge did not give special consideration to her aboriginal background under s. 718.2(e) of the Criminal Code, noting she lived off-reserve. The Supreme Court of Canada held that s. 718.2(e) applies to all aboriginal offenders wherever they reside and requires sentencing judges to consider unique systemic or background factors and appropriate restorative sanctions. Although the trial judge erred in his approach, the appeal was dismissed because the three-year sentence was fit given the seriousness of the offence and the fact that the appellant had already been granted parole.

The appellant was charged with impaired driving and 'over 80'. Her trial was held 14.5 months after her arrest, with the delay caused solely by limits on institutional resources. The trial judge dismissed her motion for a stay under s. 11(b) of the Charter. The summary conviction appeal court allowed her appeal and entered a stay, but the Court of Appeal restored the conviction. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the delay was not unreasonable given the strain on institutional resources and the absence of any significant prejudice to the appellant. The Court established guidelines for acceptable institutional delay in Provincial Courts.

Crown appeal from an acquittal for sexual assault arising from progressively more intimate sexual touching during a purported job interview. The Court held that consent for the actus reus is the complainant’s subjective state of mind and that there is no defence of implied consent in Canadian law. The only potentially available mens rea defence was honest but mistaken belief in communicated consent, but there was no air of reality to that defence on the accepted facts, particularly in light of repeated verbal refusals. The appeal was allowed, a conviction entered under s. 686(4), and the matter remanded for sentencing.

The appellant was driving a rented SUV when he was pulled over by a police officer who mistakenly believed the vehicle required a front licence plate. Despite realizing his error, the officer continued the detention, discovered the appellant's licence was suspended, arrested him, and searched the vehicle, finding 35 kg of cocaine. The trial judge found breaches of ss. 8 and 9 of the Charter but admitted the evidence under s. 24(2). The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, applying the revised s. 24(2) framework from R. v. Grant. The Court held that the police conduct was a brazen and flagrant disregard for Charter rights, aggravated by misleading testimony, and that admitting the evidence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The evidence was excluded and an acquittal entered.

Police stopped and detained a person matching the description of a recent break-and-enter suspect, conducted a protective pat-down, and then reached into his pocket and found marijuana, leading to a trafficking prosecution. The Supreme Court recognized a limited common law power of investigative detention where police have reasonable grounds to suspect a connection to a particular crime and detention is reasonably necessary, together with a limited protective pat-down search power grounded in officer safety. The Court held, however, that the more intrusive pocket search was not justified on the facts and violated s. 8 of the Charter. Applying the s. 24(2) exclusion analysis, the Court excluded the non-conscriptive evidence because the unjustified search represented a serious breach and admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute. The appeal was allowed and the acquittal restored.

The parties separated after a traditional marriage where the wife was primarily responsible for child care and domestic duties while also working part-time. Years later, the husband applied to terminate spousal support, arguing the wife should have achieved economic self-sufficiency. The trial judge terminated support, but the Court of Appeal reinstated it. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the husband's appeal, holding that the Divorce Act requires a fair and equitable distribution of resources to alleviate the economic consequences of marriage or its breakdown. The Court rejected the strict self-sufficiency model, finding that all four objectives in section 17(7) of the Act must be considered, including compensation for economic disadvantages arising from the marriage.

The accused, a lawyer, was charged with breach of trust, theft, and fraud. A former secretary gave evidence favourable to the defence at the preliminary inquiry. The Crown subsequently interviewed her, obtained statements, decided not to call her at trial, and refused to disclose the statements to the defence. The trial judge dismissed the defence's application for disclosure, and the accused was convicted. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal and ordered a new trial, establishing that the Crown has a legal duty to disclose all relevant information to the defence, subject to reviewable discretion regarding privilege, relevance, and timing.

The parties separated after a 27-year marriage. At trial, the judge ordered the wife to pay an equalization payment, ordered the husband to pay indefinite spousal support based on imputed incomes, and awarded full indemnity costs to the husband. The wife appealed the spousal support, equalization, and costs orders. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, finding that the trial judge failed to explain the basis for imputing $484,356 in annual income to the wife, precluding meaningful appellate review. The court also set aside the costs award, finding the trial judge misapprehended the evidence regarding the husband's settlement offer and his degree of success at trial. The spousal support and costs issues were remitted to the trial judge, while the equalization payment was upheld.

The Crown appealed a 12-month sentence imposed on a young Black first-time offender for possession of a loaded handgun. The trial judge had significantly reduced the sentence based on social context evidence of systemic anti-Black racism. The Court of Appeal held that while social context evidence of anti-Black racism is highly relevant to assessing an offender's moral blameworthiness and rehabilitative prospects, it does not reduce the objective gravity or seriousness of the offence. The Court also held that the Gladue framework for Indigenous offenders does not apply directly to Black offenders, though it can inform the approach. The appeal was allowed and the sentence varied to two years less a day, but permanently stayed due to the passage of time.

The appellant was convicted of drug and breach charges after police found cocaine during a search. The initial investigative detention on the street was lawful, but the police subsequently arbitrarily detained the appellant in a cruiser, failed to provide him with his right to counsel, and conducted two unreasonable searches, including a strip search where an officer gratuitously inflicted pain. The trial judge found multiple Charter breaches but admitted the evidence. On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge erred in his s. 24(2) analysis by treating the absence of systemic police misconduct as a mitigating factor, failing to consider the impact on the appellant's Charter rights, and overemphasizing the seriousness of the charges. The evidence was excluded and acquittals were entered.

The appellant wife appealed a trial judge's spousal support order following a 19-year marriage. The trial judge had ordered time-limited support with a review order and refused to make support retroactive. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the trial judge erred in imposing a review order, refusing retroactive support, and in determining the quantum and duration of support. The Court increased the support amount and duration, applying the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines as a cross-check, and set aside the review order.

The appeals concerned the constitutionality of the former rape-shield provisions in Criminal Code ss. 276 and 277, which restricted defence use of a complainant’s prior sexual conduct in sexual offence prosecutions. The Court held that s. 276 violated ss. 7 and 11(d) of the Charter because its blanket exclusion could bar relevant defence evidence whose probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and that the provision was not saved by s. 1. Section 277, which barred sexual reputation evidence to support or attack credibility, was upheld as targeting an illegitimate use of evidence. The Court also held that preliminary inquiry judges lacked jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the impugned provisions, so the appeals from the committals nevertheless failed and the matters were to proceed to trial.

The appellant, an RCMP officer, shot and killed a detainee in a cell and was convicted of manslaughter. The trial judge found the mandatory minimum four-year sentence under s. 236(a) of the Criminal Code constituted cruel and unusual punishment and granted a constitutional exemption, imposing a conditional sentence. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, holding that the four-year sentence was not grossly disproportionate on the facts. Furthermore, the Court ruled that constitutional exemptions are not an available remedy for mandatory minimum sentences that violate s. 12 of the Charter; such laws must be struck down under s. 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982.

The Crown sought leave to appeal two sentences imposed on the respondent for failing to remain at the scene of an accident and firearms offences, arguing that the first sentencing judge erred in calculating pretrial custody credit, which impacted the subsequent sentence. The Court of Appeal granted leave for both appeals. For the first sentence (Marshall #1), the Court found the trial judge erred by departing from an agreed-upon "Duncan" credit and by "double counting" mitigating factors, varying the pretrial custody credit from 39 days to 107 days, but not altering the suspended sentence. For the second sentence (Marshall #2), the Court dismissed the Crown's appeal, upholding the suspended sentence, finding that the trial judge was entitled to give substantial credit for guilty pleas given the unique circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic's impact on the justice system.

Appellants sued their former solicitors for negligence and lost opportunity damages, claiming the solicitors failed to raise a six-year limitation period in the underlying action against Mitsubishi Motors, which was dismissed as statute-barred under a two-year limitation period. The motion judge granted partial summary judgment dismissing the misrepresentation component of the damages claim, finding the appellants had not appealed the trial judge's obiter finding of no misrepresentation. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that an appeal is from a judgment, not from reasons, and that the appellants' appeal of the entire judgment necessarily included misrepresentation claims. The court also held that partial summary judgment was inappropriate as the misrepresentation claims were intertwined with other claims proceeding to trial.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his application against the Law Society of Upper Canada and the Attorney General of Ontario as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellant argued the motion judge erred by not reviewing the evidence filed in his supplementary application record. The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, endorsing the principle that Rule 2.1 is designed for summary dismissal based on the face of the pleadings and written submissions, and that resorting to evidence defeats the purpose of the rule.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual exploitation arising from allegations by a child family member, arguing that the trial judge conflated credibility with reliability, misapprehended material parts of the defence evidence, and applied unequal scrutiny to the evidence of the complainant and the accused. The Court of Appeal held that the trial judge expressly considered both credibility and reliability, properly applied the criminal burden of proof, and was entitled to assess the child's evidence in light of her age. The court further held that no material misapprehension tainted the rejection of the appellant's denial and that the trial judge did not impose a harsher standard on the defence evidence. The appeal was dismissed.

The appellants appealed a libel judgment arising from a press conference at which counsel publicly read and commented on contempt allegations against a Crown attorney that were later found to be untrue. The Court held that the private defamation action did not constitute government action under s. 32 of the Charter, but confirmed that the common law must nonetheless develop consistently with Charter values. The Court declined to adopt the American actual malice rule, holding that Canadian defamation law appropriately balances freedom of expression with the protection of reputation. It further held that any qualified privilege attached to the occasion was defeated by the excessive, careless, and high‑handed dissemination of serious allegations. The jury's awards of $300,000 general damages, $500,000 aggravated damages, and $800,000 punitive damages were upheld.

The accused was charged with possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking. He challenged the constitutionality of the reverse onus provision in the Narcotic Control Act, which presumed an intent to traffic upon proof of possession. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the provision violated the presumption of innocence under s. 11(d) of the Charter. Furthermore, the Court established a two-part proportionality test for s. 1 of the Charter and found that the reverse onus clause failed the rational connection component, as possession of a small quantity of narcotics does not rationally support an inference of intent to traffic.

The appellant appealed sentence following convictions for multiple sexual offences committed against four very young boys over several years while occupying positions of trust. The court rejected the submission that a six-year sentence in an earlier authority represented the high-water mark for prolonged child sexual abuse cases. It held that where an adult in a position of trust regularly abuses young children over a substantial period, mid to upper single-digit penitentiary terms are generally appropriate, and where the abuse includes intercourse, violence, threats, or extortion, upper single-digit to low double-digit terms will generally be fit. Given the repeated anal intercourse, threats, extortion, physical violence, grooming, and devastating victim impact, the sentence imposed was at the lower end of the appropriate range. Leave to appeal sentence was granted, but the sentence appeal was dismissed.

The accused and a co-perpetrator participated in a violent beating that left the victim dead. The accused stomped on the victim's head. At trial, the Crown's medical expert initially testified the accused caused the death, but later agreed with the defence expert that the co-perpetrator caused the fatal injuries. The Crown maintained its theory but also argued co-perpetrator liability. The accused was convicted of second degree murder. The Court of Appeal substituted a manslaughter conviction, finding the murder verdict unreasonable. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal, reaffirming the Yebes test that the reasonableness of a verdict is a question of law. The Court held that a properly instructed jury could reasonably have found the accused had the requisite intent for murder as a party to the offence, and restored the second degree murder conviction.

An ageing father gratuitously placed the bulk of his assets in joint accounts with his adult daughter. Upon his death, the daughter claimed the balance through a right of survivorship, while her ex-husband claimed the assets formed part of the estate. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the presumption of resulting trust applies to gratuitous transfers to adult children, limiting the presumption of advancement to minor children. However, the Court found sufficient evidence that the father intended to gift the right of survivorship to his daughter, rebutting the presumption of resulting trust. The appeal was dismissed.

The respondent Indian bands began logging on Crown land without authorization, claiming aboriginal title. The Minister of Forests issued stop-work orders and commenced enforcement proceedings. The bands argued they lacked funds for a complex trial and sought an order for interim costs (costs in advance and in any event of the cause). The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the Court of Appeal's decision to grant interim costs, establishing a three-part test for such awards in public interest litigation: the party must be genuinely impecunious, the claim must be prima facie meritorious, and the issues must transcend individual interests and be of public importance.

The appellant challenged an impaired driving conviction on the basis that police failed to comply with the informational component of s. 10(b) of the Charter by mentioning legal aid but not advising of existing 24-hour duty counsel services and the toll-free number for immediate free legal advice. The majority held that where duty counsel services exist and are available in the jurisdiction, detainees must be routinely informed of their existence and basic means of access, absent valid waiver or urgency. Applying the Collins framework under s. 24(2), the Court held that both the breathalyser results and the incriminating statement were obtained in the course of the Charter breach and that their admission would render the trial unfair. The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and an acquittal entered.

The accused was charged with first degree murder. At the preliminary inquiry, the Crown presented circumstantial evidence, while the accused called witnesses providing arguably exculpatory evidence. The preliminary inquiry judge committed the accused to trial for second degree murder, refusing to weigh the evidence. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the accused's appeal, holding that while a preliminary inquiry judge must engage in a limited weighing of the whole evidence when the Crown relies on circumstantial evidence, the judge in this case properly considered the evidence as a whole and did not err in committing the accused to trial.

The appellant father appealed a trial judgment awarding custody of the parties' child to the respondent mother, along with spousal support, child support based on imputed income, and an equalization payment. The Court of Appeal upheld the custody and equalization orders, finding no palpable and overriding error. However, the Court set aside the spousal support award due to a lack of evidence of economic disadvantage, and reduced the child support obligation, finding no evidentiary basis to impute income to the appellant.

The plaintiffs' action was dismissed by the Registrar for failure to set it down for trial. Due to their solicitor's failure to file a Notice of Change of Solicitors, they did not receive notice of the dismissal. Almost six years later, they moved to set aside the dismissal. The Master dismissed the motion, but the Divisional Court reinstated the action. On appeal, the Court of Appeal restored the Master's order, finding that the delay was inordinate, the solicitor's conduct amounted to more than mere inadvertence, and reinstating the action would undermine the principle of finality and the administration of justice.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their fraud action based on a release, while the respondents' counterclaim on two promissory notes was sent to trial after a mini-trial. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the motion judge erred in principle by failing to assess the advisability of a staged summary judgment process in the context of the litigation as a whole. Because the release and the promissory notes were part of the same series of transactions, and credibility was a central issue, both the claim and counterclaim were required to proceed to trial to avoid inconsistent findings and substantive injustice.

The Supreme Court of Canada considered a proposed plan of arrangement for a leveraged buyout of BCE Inc. that would add substantial debt to Bell Canada, reducing the trading value of its debentures. The debentureholders opposed the arrangement, claiming oppression under s. 241 of the CBCA and arguing the arrangement was not fair and reasonable under s. 192. The Court held that the directors' fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation, not to specific stakeholders, though directors may consider stakeholder interests. The debentureholders failed to establish a reasonable expectation that their investment grade rating would be maintained. The Court affirmed the trial judge's approval of the arrangement, finding it had a valid business purpose and resolved objections in a fair and balanced way.

The appellants brought a defamation action against the respondent newspaper and reporter over an article concerning a proposed private golf course development and alleged political influence. At trial, the jury found for the appellants and awarded damages. The Court of Appeal set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial, recognizing a new defence of responsible journalism. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal, formally recognizing the new defence of responsible communication on matters of public interest. The Court held that the traditional strict liability regime for defamatory statements of fact failed to adequately protect freedom of expression under the Charter. The new defence applies where the publication is on a matter of public interest and the publisher was diligent in trying to verify the allegations. A new trial was ordered due to the trial judge's failure to leave this defence to the jury and errors in the fair comment instruction.

The appellant appealed a costs order of $131,000 awarded to the respondents following a successful motion to stay the action. The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by relying too heavily on the hours spent and the costs grid, resulting in an award that was not fair and reasonable and exceeded the reasonable expectations of the parties. The Court reduced the costs award to $67,500, emphasizing that the time claimed for preparation was excessive for a motion that was not complex.

The Crown appealed acquittals entered after the trial judge quashed a CDSA search warrant and excluded drugs, firearms, and other seized evidence from an apartment searched during a nightclub drug-trafficking investigation. The Court of Appeal held that refusal of leave to cross-examine the affiant did not bar a sub-facial challenge to the warrant, but concluded that the trial judge nevertheless exceeded the proper scope of Garofoli review by reweighing the amplified record, preferring inferences, and effectively conducting a de novo assessment. The court reaffirmed that warrant review asks whether reliable evidence that might reasonably be believed remained on the basis of which the warrant could have issued. The acquittals tied to the seizure at 306 Adelaide were set aside and a new trial was ordered.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision staying its action for breach of contract and negligence on the basis of forum non conveniens. The Court of Appeal upheld the finding that West Virginia, where the respondent processed the steel coils, was the more convenient forum. However, the Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and reduced the motion judge's costs award from $36,000 to $15,000, finding the original amount unreasonable for a two-hour motion.

The court determined the dispositive appellate issues on the evidentiary record. The reasons address the principal submissions, apply the governing legal framework, and resolve the controlling questions. Relief was granted or refused according to the applicable standard of review and the merits.

The accused appealed from a Court of Appeal order setting aside his jury acquittal for first degree murder and directing a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial judge seriously misdirected the jury by inviting application of the reasonable doubt standard to individual pieces of evidence rather than to the ultimate issues on the whole of the evidence, while recognizing a limited exception in credibility instructions. The Court further held that psychiatric evidence elicited from a defence expert, tending only to place the accused within an abnormal group capable of the offence, was not admissible on identity because it lacked sufficiently distinctive traits and its prejudicial propensity effect predominated. Although the Court found the Court of Appeal erred on the psychiatric evidence issue, it concluded the Crown met the stringent burden applicable on an appeal from acquittal by showing the verdict would not necessarily have been the same absent the misdirection. The appeal was therefore dismissed and the order for a new trial stood.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault, assault, and criminal harassment against his former girlfriend. The trial judge had convicted the appellant on four counts based primarily on the complainant's testimony, while acquitting him on five others. On appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in his credibility assessment by failing to reconcile his finding that the complainant had no motive to fabricate with his acceptance of defence evidence showing she sought revenge. The Court of Appeal agreed, finding the trial judge failed to give effect to the complainant's motive to falsely accuse the appellant and her deliberate lies during testimony. The appeal was allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The defendant appealed a decision of a motions judge that set aside a case management master's order requiring the non-resident plaintiffs to post security for costs. The Divisional Court resolved conflicting jurisprudence regarding the standard of review for appeals from a master, holding that the standard is the same as for appeals from a judge: correctness for errors of law, and palpable and overriding error for findings of fact. The court found that the motions judge erred by treating the appeal as a hearing de novo and substituting his own view of the evidence regarding the plaintiffs' impecuniosity. The master's finding that impecuniosity had not been established was entitled to deference, and her order for security for costs was restored.

The appellant was convicted of child pornography offences after a 29-month delay between the swearing of the information and the conclusion of his trial. He appealed the dismissal of his application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter. Applying the newly released framework from R. v. Jordan, the Court of Appeal deducted defence delay and delay caused by a discrete event (Crown counsel's car accident), bringing the remaining delay to 17 months, which fell below the 18-month presumptive ceiling. The court found the appellant failed to show the delay was unreasonable under the transitional rules and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant was arrested for possession of narcotics. Hours later, an RCMP officer conducted a warrantless inventory search of the appellant's impounded car pursuant to police policy, discovering cash and cocaine. The Supreme Court of Canada held that the search violated section 8 of the Charter because an inventory search is not a valid objective of the common law power of search incident to arrest, and thus the search was not authorized by law. However, applying the Collins test under section 24(2) of the Charter, the Court concluded that the non-conscriptive evidence should not be excluded, as the breach was not serious and exclusion would have a more detrimental impact on the administration of justice.

The accused was convicted of sexual assault against a young child who attended a daycare operated by his wife. The trial judge found the child's declarations reliable and rejected the accused's testimony, finding his explanations to be attempts at justification. The Court of Appeal set aside the conviction, holding that the trial judge's reasons for rejecting the accused's testimony were insufficient. The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the Crown's appeal and restored the conviction, holding that the trial judge's reasons, viewed as a whole, adequately demonstrated the rationale behind her findings on credibility and reasonable doubt, and were sufficiently amenable to appellate review.

The appellants were convicted of drug-related offences based in part on wiretap evidence obtained under s. 184.2 of the Criminal Code. At trial, they challenged the admissibility of the wiretap evidence under s. 8 of the Charter and sought leave to cross-examine the police officer who swore the affidavit in support of the authorization. The trial judge, applying the Garofoli threshold test, denied leave to cross-examine and admitted the evidence. The Court of Appeal upheld the ruling. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeals, holding that the Garofoli leave requirement remains constitutional and that the trial judge did not err in finding no reasonable likelihood that cross-examination would elicit evidence of probative value.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal order for a new trial on sexual assault charges arising from a camping trip on which the two accused engaged in sexual activity with a 16-year-old complainant who had consumed substantial alcohol. The majority held that capacity to consent is a precondition to subjective consent, not a vitiating factor, so a trial judge need not address consent and capacity separately or in any particular order. The majority further held that the trial judge's reasons were sufficient in the context of the case, as all parties agreed that the complainant's evidence — if accepted — established both incapacity and non-consent. The concurring judges agreed on the result but found the trial judge's reasons insufficient on the capacity question, applying the curative proviso on the basis of overwhelming evidence of non-consent. The dissent would have dismissed the appeal, concluding that the trial judge's errors were not trivial and the evidence was not sufficiently overwhelming to apply the curative proviso.