M. Michaud

The accused, who pleaded guilty to causing bodily harm while operating a motor vehicle with excess blood alcohol, brought a motion for directions regarding the sentencing procedure.

The accused has a prior conviction under former s. 253(b) of the Criminal Code and sought to have the court first determine whether, pursuant to R. v. Bundy, 2025 NSSC 325, that prior conviction constitutes a "first offence" for sentencing purposes under s. 320.2(a)(ii), which would trigger a mandatory minimum 30-day imprisonment and preclude a conditional sentence order.

The Crown opposed, arguing judicial economy favoured proceeding to sentencing first.

The court granted the motion, holding that the Bundy issue is not moot and directly impacts the available sentencing range, and directed that arguments on the Bundy interpretation be heard before sentencing submissions.

The appellant appealed her summary conviction for refusing to provide a breath sample.

At the police station, after speaking with duty counsel, the appellant refused to leave her cell and began speaking only in French, despite having communicated in English previously.

The trial judge found she was 'playing games' and convicted her.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's credibility findings and conclusion that the refusal was unequivocal were supported by the evidence.

The Crown appealed a directed verdict of acquittal for a charge of failing or refusing to comply with a breath demand.

The trial judge had found that the breathalyzer technician lacked objective reasonable and probable grounds to make the demand because there was no evidence of what the roadside approved screening device (ASD) fail meant.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court allowed the appeal, finding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to consider all reasonable inferences, specifically that an experienced officer could reasonably rely on an ASD fail result to form objective grounds.

A new trial was ordered.

The Crown appealed the respondent's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The trial judge had excluded the breathalyzer readings under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding a breach of the respondent's s. 10(b) right to counsel, as police failed to provide him with a lawyer's directory when he could not reach his counsel of choice.

The Superior Court of Justice found no error in the trial judge's application of the law or the Grant framework and dismissed the appeal.

The Crown appealed the accused's acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle with a blood alcohol concentration over 80mg.

The trial judge had excluded the breath samples under s. 24(2) of the Charter after finding breaches of the accused's rights regarding a delayed roadside screening demand and a privacy breach involving video surveillance in her cell.

The Summary Conviction Appeal Court upheld the trial judge's findings on the Charter breaches but found errors in principle in the s. 24(2) analysis, specifically regarding the assessment of the seriousness of the breaches and the application of the law concerning post-discovery Charter breaches.

The appeal was allowed, the acquittal set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed convictions for four counts of assault and two counts of uttering threats arising from incidents involving his spouse.

He argued that the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant’s credibility, failed to address inconsistencies in the evidence, improperly applied the test in R. v. W.(D.), and should have drawn an adverse inference from the Crown’s failure to call a witness.

The summary conviction appeal court held that credibility findings are entitled to substantial deference absent palpable and overriding error and that the trial judge reasonably accepted the complainant’s detailed evidence, which was partially corroborated by police observations.

The court further held that the Crown had no obligation to call the witness and that any variance in offence dates was immaterial and caused no prejudice.

The appeal was dismissed.