Michael Ruhl

The applicant unit owner sought oppression relief under sections 37 and 135 of the Condominium Act, 1998, alleging unfair and bad-faith conduct by the condominium corporation in relation to service-dog accommodation, noise and access disputes, counsel communications, and other governance conflicts, and also sought relief under section 76 concerning an allegedly deficient status certificate.

The court held that most allegations of bad faith, dishonesty, intimidation, and procedural unfairness were not established, and found the corporation generally acted reasonably, including in retaining counsel, pursuing entry relief, and addressing building and noise concerns.

However, the court found one breach of reasonable expectations: the corporation became too entrenched and insufficiently responsive in accommodating two service dogs, amounting to unfair prejudice and unfair disregard, though not oppression.

A declaration was granted on that limited basis, but no compensation was awarded because prior CAT damages had already compensated the same accommodation-related harm and double recovery would be inappropriate.

The status-certificate claim was dismissed for failure to prove a material misstatement or omission.

The moving party brought a motion to set aside the Registrar's dismissal of her appeal for failure to perfect on time.

The delay was primarily caused by the moving party's initial appeal counsel, who failed to address fee waivers and properly serve documents.

The Court of Appeal applied the Paulsson factors and found that it was in the interests of justice to set aside the dismissal, as the moving party should not suffer the consequences of her lawyer's oversight, the appeal materials were essentially ready, and there was no prejudice to the children's best interests.

The motion was granted and the appeal was permitted to proceed.

The applicant father sought an interim order allowing the children to travel from Germany to Ontario, pending a determination of whether the Ontario court had jurisdiction over custody and access under the Children's Law Reform Act.

The applicant argued the court could make the order under s. 40 of the CLRA or its parens patriae jurisdiction.

The court held that s. 40 only applies after a court has determined it lacks jurisdiction, not before.

The court also declined to exercise parens patriae jurisdiction, finding no situation of necessity.

The request was dismissed pending the jurisdictional hearing.