Meaghan Cunningham

The Crown brought an application to remove the accused's counsel of record due to a conflict of interest.

The defence counsel's daughter and colleague had previously provided legal advice to the complainant upon her arrest for impaired driving.

The defence counsel intended to cross-examine the complainant using records from that impaired driving charge.

The court found that a solicitor-client relationship existed between the complainant and the firm, creating a clear conflict of interest.

The application was granted and counsel was removed to preserve the public perception of fairness in the administration of justice.

The applicant, charged with human trafficking and prostitution-related offences, brought a constitutional challenge arguing that ss. 286.2(1), 286.3(1) and 286.4 of the Criminal Code violate s. 7 of the Charter.

The applicant relied on a previous Superior Court decision that declared the provisions invalid.

The court found the previous decision to be plainly wrong, as it misidentified the purpose of the legislative scheme and incorrectly interpreted the provisions.

Applying the correct statutory interpretation, the court held that the provisions are rationally connected to their objectives, are not overbroad, and do not have grossly disproportionate effects.

The application was dismissed.

During a dangerous offender hearing, the Crown sought to introduce new evidence alleging the offender sexually touched and choked two fellow inmates.

The defence opposed the admission, citing choice of counsel conflicts, delay, and lack of advance notice.

The court granted the Crown's request, ordering a voir dire with independent counsel for the offender to determine if the new allegations could be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

The Crown brought an application during a trial for sexual offences to admit evidence of the accused's subsequent discreditable conduct as similar fact evidence.

The accused operated a home daycare where the offences allegedly occurred against two young children.

Three years later, neighbours observed the accused masturbating naked in his living room window.

The court applied the four-part test for discreditable conduct and found the evidence admissible regarding one complainant due to striking similarities in the location and nature of the act.

The application was dismissed regarding the second complainant as the conduct lacked sufficient similarity.

During a trial for sexual offences alleged to have occurred at a home daycare, the Crown applied to admit the out-of-court statements of two young complainants under the principled exception to the hearsay rule.

The complainants, who were 3.5 and 5 years old at the time of the alleged offences, were unable to adopt their video-recorded police statements under section 715.1 of the Criminal Code due to a lack of present memory.

The court found that the necessity criterion was met because the children's direct evidence was unavailable despite reasonable efforts.

The court also found that the statements met the threshold reliability criterion based on substantive reliability, noting the children's lack of motive to lie, the absence of leading questions, and the fact that the sexual acts described were outside the expected knowledge of children their age.

The court declined to exercise its residual discretion to exclude the statements, finding their probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The accused pleaded guilty to manslaughter and, during the sentencing hearing, sought to bring a Charter application for declaratory relief and damages under s. 24(1) due to his treatment in pre-trial solitary confinement.

The court declined to hear the application, ruling that a criminal sentencing hearing is not the appropriate forum for a complex civil damages claim, which should instead be pursued in the civil courts.

The Crown applied to have the offender designated as a dangerous offender following his convictions for attempted murder, aggravated assault, forcible confinement, and robbery.

The offender broke into the victims' home, stabbed one victim 18 times, and slashed the other victim's throat three times while she was tied to a chair.

The court found that the offender's behaviour was of an extremely brutal nature and that he constitutes a threat to the life and safety of others.

The court designated the offender as a dangerous offender and imposed a sentence of detention in a penitentiary for an indeterminate period.

The offender was convicted of attempted murder, aggravated sexual assault, and administering a noxious thing after intentionally attempting to infect multiple sexual partners with HIV.

The court found that the offender acted deliberately and maliciously, lying about his HIV status and seeking out vulnerable young men.

The court sentenced the offender to a global sentence of 14 years imprisonment, reduced by pre-sentence custody.

The court also designated the offender as a long-term offender and imposed a 5-year supervision order, finding a substantial risk of reoffending based on his pattern of reckless and predatory conduct.

The applicant, an inmate awaiting sentencing for attempted murder and aggravated sexual assault related to HIV transmission, applied for habeas corpus to be removed from administrative segregation and placed in the general prison population with a cellmate.

The applicant argued a denial of procedural fairness and failure to conduct mandated five-day reviews.

The court found that while there was a denial of procedural fairness in how the reviews were documented, the applicant was aware of the reasons for his segregation.

Due to the high risk the applicant posed to other inmates, the court held that administrative segregation was lawful and necessary for safety.

The application was dismissed, but the institution was ordered to continue offering alternative accommodation proposals.

The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of his wife, who died from severe burn injuries and had suffered extensive prior abuse.

During pre-trial motions, the court ruled on the admissibility of two statements the accused made to police and the admissibility of prior discreditable conduct evidence.

The court found both the December 6 and December 11 statements were voluntary and that the accused's Charter rights were not violated.

The court also ruled that evidence of the accused's prior discreditable conduct, including evidence that he had shot the victim with a pellet gun 29 times, was highly probative of his animus, motive, and state of mind, and its probative value outweighed any prejudicial effect.

The accused was charged with attempted murder, attempted aggravated sexual assault, attempt to administer a noxious thing, and sexual assault against a developmentally delayed complainant, alleging he attempted to infect the complainant with HIV.

The trial was severed from counts involving other complainants.

The court found the accused intended to infect others with HIV, but the Crown failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused attempted to anally penetrate the complainant without consent, due to inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence.

The accused was acquitted of the main charges but found guilty of a conceded breach of probation charge.

The Crown sought to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The statement had previously been ruled inadmissible in a separate proceeding before a different judge.

The court held that issue estoppel did not apply to voluntariness rulings and permitted the voir dire.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of video recording, an unrecorded interaction in the holding cells, and a failure to transport him directly to the remand centre after bail court.

The court found the police explanations reasonable, no evidence of improper conduct, and concluded the statement was voluntary and admissible.

The Crown brought an application to admit a videotaped statement made by the accused to police.

The accused argued the statement was involuntary due to a missing minute of the video recording, an unrecorded cell block visit, and a failure to comply with a remand warrant.

The accused also argued that a previous ruling in a separate proceeding excluding the same statement should bar its admission based on issue estoppel.

The court held that issue estoppel does not apply to voluntariness rulings.

The court further found that the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement was voluntary, as the missing recording and technical warrant violation did not overbear the accused's will.