Luciana Amaral

A municipal councillor brought a defamation action against the mayor and several councillors arising from a public council statement and related legal opinion criticizing the councillor’s blog posts about senior municipal staff.

The court held the statements were not defamatory and were substantially true in substance, as the plaintiff’s blogs contained disparaging criticism of staff contrary to the municipal code of conduct.

Even if defamatory, the publications were protected by qualified privilege because they were a measured response to the plaintiff’s public letter to the editor and were made to correct the public record.

The court found no evidence of malice and noted the defendants relied in good faith on legal advice before publishing the statement.

The action was dismissed.

During a defamation trial involving a municipal councillor and the mayor along with other councillors, the plaintiff sought to introduce a report by the municipal Integrity Commissioner into evidence.

The defendants objected to its admissibility.

The court ruled the report inadmissible, finding that it did not meet the necessity and reliability criteria for the principled exception to hearsay.

The court noted that under the Municipal Act, the Integrity Commissioner is not a compellable witness, meaning the defendants would be unable to cross-examine him.

The court concluded that admitting the report would be highly prejudicial and could lead the jury to afford the untested opinion undue weight.