3 total
Motion to strike pleadings in human rights complaint dismissed; broad scope of inquiry affirmed.
The corporate respondent brought a motion to strike portions of the pleadings filed by the Commission and the complainant.
The respondent argued that allegations relating to events after the date of the original complaint, allegations not raised in the original complaint, and allegations in the complainant's pleadings that contradicted or added to the Commission's pleadings should be struck.
The Tribunal dismissed the motion, finding that the impugned material facts formed part of the continuum of events of the complaint, and that the complainant has independent party status under the Code to file her own pleadings.
Adjudicator recused himself due to reasonable apprehension of bias arising from consulting work against implicated third party.
The respondent, Kimberly-Clark Inc., brought a motion requesting that the adjudicator recuse himself on the basis of a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The adjudicator had disclosed that he was acting as a non-witness consultant for the plaintiffs in a class action lawsuit against Manulife Financial, a company that provided services to the respondent and whose actions were implicated in the human rights complaint.
The adjudicator granted the recusal motion, finding that his inability to provide full details of his consulting arrangement due to solicitor-client privilege, combined with the potential need to rule on Manulife's status in the proceedings, established a reasonable apprehension of bias.
The respondent's request for an order directing the appointment of a specific type of substitute adjudicator was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Statutory amendment to definition of employer does not apply retroactively to pending certification application.
The applicant filed an application for certification under the construction industry provisions of the Labour Relations Act, 1995.
Subsequently, the definition of employer in section 126 of the Act was amended.
The responding party argued that the new definition should apply, while the applicant argued that the definition in effect at the time of filing should apply.
The Board held that the definition of employer as it existed on the date of filing applies, as there was no clear legislative intent to give the amendment retroactive effect.
