Rishma Gupta

Following a jury conviction for two counts of sexual interference and one count of invitation to sexual touching involving a 14-year-old victim, the court sentenced the offender on a joint submission.

The court treated the abuse of a child, abuse of a position of trust, threats to suppress reporting, and repeated incidents as significant aggravating factors, while also considering youth and first-offender status as mitigating factors.

Applying the sentencing principles governing sexual offences against children, the court accepted a sentence of two years less a day followed by 18 months' probation.

The court also ordered counselling that could include phallometric testing if deemed necessary by treatment professionals, imposed a 10-year s. 161 prohibition order, a DNA order, a no-contact order, and a 20-year sex offender registration order.

Following a jury verdict finding the accused guilty of sexual interference and related offences, the accused applied for a mistrial based on a note from the jury complaining about transportation difficulties during deliberations.

The trial judge dismissed the application, holding that a trial judge is functus officio and lacks jurisdiction to declare a mistrial after the jury has been discharged, except to correct an error in recording the verdict.

Furthermore, even if jurisdiction existed, the accused failed to establish a real danger of prejudice or a miscarriage of justice, as there was no evidence the transportation issues affected the jury's deliberations.

The applicant sought a second bail review following a prior Superior Court decision denying judicial interim release on a charge of robbery with a firearm.

The application argued a material change in circumstances based on a new release plan involving different family sureties and proposed employment.

The court held that merely proposing new sureties did not constitute a material change where the plan remained substantively similar to the earlier proposal rejected by the court.

Given the applicant’s criminal history, prior breach of bail conditions, the seriousness of the allegations, and the strength of the Crown’s case, the court found continued detention justified on the secondary ground and also on the tertiary ground under s. 515(10)(c) of the Criminal Code.