N. Stanford

The applicant was arrested for impaired driving and refusing to provide a breath sample.

He was held in police custody for 58 hours before being released on consent bail, missing weekend court cut-off times due to police delays in processing his paperwork.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging breaches of his rights under sections 7, 9, and 11(e) of the Charter, and sought a stay of proceedings.

The court found that the failure to bring the applicant before a justice within 24 hours violated his Charter rights and was the result of systemic and structural failures by the police.

Concluding that alternative remedies would not adequately dissociate the justice system from the impugned state conduct, the court granted the application and stayed the charges.

The accused was charged with 'Over 80' and impaired driving after his truck collided with a pole.

The trial judge found that the arresting officer lacked reasonable and probable grounds to arrest the accused for impaired driving due to the officer's unreliable and contradictory evidence, resulting in a breach of section 8 of the Charter.

The court also found a breach of section 10(b) because the police refused to allow the accused to call his lawyer at the roadside despite having his phone and the opportunity to do so.

Applying the Grant framework, the court excluded the breath sample evidence under section 24(2).

Without the breath readings, and finding the toxicologist's report insufficient, the court concluded the Crown failed to prove impairment beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed all charges.

Following a jury verdict finding the applicant guilty of manslaughter, the applicant brought a motion seeking the trial judge's recusal from the sentencing hearing, alleging a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicant cited several incidents, including the judge's post-verdict comments to the deceased's family, accepting doughnuts brought by the family, and various procedural rulings and expressions of frustration.

The court dismissed the application, finding that a fully informed reasonable person would not apprehend bias from any of the isolated incidents or their cumulative effect, noting that the presumption of judicial impartiality had not been displaced.