M. Bojanowska

The accused, a young person with autism, was charged with sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching against his younger cousin.

The Crown's case relied entirely on the evidence of the complainant, who testified via closed-circuit television and a videotaped statement.

The court found the complainant's evidence to be unreliable due to a tainted initial disclosure prompted by suggestive questioning from her mother, material inconsistencies between her various accounts, and the implausibility of the alleged repeated penile penetration occurring undetected in a busy household.

Finding that the Crown failed to prove the charges beyond a reasonable doubt, the court acquitted the accused on all counts.

Following a conviction for sexual assault at a re-trial, the accused brought an application for a stay of proceedings under s. 11(b) of the Charter, alleging unreasonable delay.

The total delay from the order for a new trial to the anticipated sentencing date was over 42 months.

The court deducted significant periods of defence delay, largely attributed to the late retention and poor scheduling of a defence sleep expert, as well as exceptional circumstances including counsel illness and unavoidable scheduling conflicts.

The net delay was calculated at 13.5 months, well below the 18-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the defence failed to take meaningful steps to expedite the proceedings and dismissed the application.

The accused was found guilty by a jury of second degree murder of his six-year-old daughter and attempted murder of his seven-year-old son.

The offences occurred when the accused, motivated by a desire to spite his estranged wife, administered sleep medication to the children in a hotel room.

The court considered the egregious breach of parental trust, the vulnerability of the victims, and the need for denunciation and general deterrence.

The accused was sentenced to life imprisonment with parole eligibility set at 18 years for the murder, and a concurrent 10-year sentence for the attempted murder.

The accused was tried for the first-degree murder of his daughter and the attempted murder of his son after giving them sleep medication and alcohol during a suicide attempt.

During the pre-charge conference, defence counsel requested that criminal negligence causing death be left with the jury as a discrete included offence to first-degree murder.

The trial judge declined the request, ruling that in the circumstances of the case, criminal negligence causing death is manslaughter by another name and leaving both would unnecessarily complicate jury deliberations.