Erin MacCarthy

The appellant, a young person, appealed a conviction for uttering a threat arising from an incident in a school parking lot.

The court held that the trial judge's reasons suggested a misapprehension of material defence evidence and a failure to apply the W.(D.) framework when assessing whether the defence evidence raised a reasonable doubt.

Applying the unreasonable verdict principles articulated in Biniaris and Burke, the court found the conviction unsafe and unsupported by the evidence.

Given the unfairness of requiring a new trial on only one of the two related incidents, the court substituted an acquittal.

The young offender appealed a conviction for uttering threats.

The Court of Appeal found that the trial judge misdirected himself on the issue of intent by accepting the Crown's submission that it was only necessary to prove the accused intentionally uttered the words.

The Court held that the trial judge had to be satisfied the appellant intended the words to be taken seriously or meant to cause fear or intimidate.

As there was a live issue regarding whether the words were spoken in jest, the appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

Criminal appeal from convictions for impaired driving causing bodily harm and driving over the legal blood-alcohol limit, where identity of the driver was the only live issue.

The court held that the Crown's failure to preserve the vehicle for possible forensic testing breached the appellant's s. 7 disclosure rights and constituted an abuse of process under the lost-evidence framework in La, but did not justify a stay because the prejudice could be mitigated.

The trial judge nevertheless erred by preventing the defence from cross-examining on the consequences of the missing forensic evidence and by treating the absence of testing as irrelevant to reasonable doubt.

The convictions were set aside and a new trial ordered.

The appellant appealed a conviction for break and enter and theft, arguing that the trial judge improperly reversed the onus on a statement voir dire when admitting an exculpatory police statement.

The respondent conceded the legal error but argued the curative proviso should save the conviction because the remaining evidence was compelling.

The court rejected that position, holding it was not satisfied the verdict would necessarily have been the same without the statement.

The appeal was allowed and a new trial was ordered.